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Abstract
This thesis analyses the failure of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission to adopt conservation and management measures that are sufficient to
ensure the conservation and long term sustainability of bigeye tuna. The analysis
focuses on the inter-related fisheries for skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye, and identifies
critical challenges to the adoption of sufficient measures.

Analysis of these fisheries shows that overfishing of bigeye is occurring and that the
migratory, multi-species and multi-gear characteristics of these fisheries create
substantial management challenges. The thesis studies the framework for managing
these fisheries, the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. This study determines
that the Convention is generally consistent with modern principles and standards of
international fisheries governance. Although the Convention is weakened by
ambiguities in key provisions, the thesis argues that it is generally sufficient to provide
an effective framework for the conservation and management of the Western and
Central Pacific tuna fisheries. Despite this framework, the thesis demonstrates that the
Commission has failed to adopt conservation and management measures that are
sufficient to address overfishing of bigeye.

The thesis analyses the interests of the participants in the Western and Central Pacific
tuna fisheries and demonstrates that the nature and influence of these interests are a key
challenge to the negotiation of a measure that is sufficient to end overfishing of bigeye.
The thesis argues that there is no clear interest among a dominant group of members to
resolve current overfishing of bigeye. While some of these members have significant
bigeye interests, they all have more significant skipjack interests that conflict with their
lesser bigeye interests.

The thesis concludes that the Commission has failed to adopt a sufficient response to
overfishing of bigeye due to the combination of the migratory, multi-species and multigear characteristics of the fishery, with the nature of the participants‟ interests and
influences.
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Chapter One: Introduction
For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed
upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest;
and only when he himself is concerned as an individual. For besides other
considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects
another to fulfil.
Aristotle1

1.1

Introduction

At its establishment in 2004, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
(WCPFC) was celebrated as the fulfilment of a vision that would create a „new world of
shared benefits and shared responsibility‟.2 The WCPFC was established by the
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in
the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF Convention).3 Commentators lauded the
WCPF Convention as „state of the art‟4 and noted that it was the world‟s first5 fisheries
treaty to build on the principles established by the United Nations Fish Stocks
Agreement (UNFSA).6

1

Aristotle. (Reprinted 1916) Aristotle's Politics. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Oxford, United Kingdom.
Oxford University Press. p57.
2
President J. Urusemal. (2004) Opening Statement at the Inaugural Meeting of the Western and Central
Pacific Fisheres Management Commission by the President of the Federated States of Micronesia. Western
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Pohnpei, 9 December 2004. WCPFC p1.
3
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF Convention). Opened for signature 5 September 2000. Entered into force 19
June 2004. Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. Available at http://www.wcpfc.int. 2000.
4
P. F. Taito. (2004) Statement to the Inaugural Meeting of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission by the Minister of State and Associate Minister of Pacific Island Affairs for New Zealand.
Inaugural Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Pohnpei, Federated States of
Micronesia. WCPFC p2.
5
T. Aqorau. (2001) Tuna Fisheries Management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean: A Critical Analysis
of the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean and its Implications for the Pacific SIDS States. The International Journal of Marine and
Coastal Law. 16.3. p381.
6
Full title is: Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention of the Law
of the Sea 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA). Opened for signature 4 August 1995.
Entered into force 2001. New York, USA. International Legal Materials, vol. 34. 1995.
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At the time of its establishment, fish stocks globally were in decline and the world was
becoming increasingly concerned at the global failure to address overfishing and
implement modern principles of fisheries management.7 Against this context of global
decline, there were expectations that the WCPFC would adopt conservation and
management measures and avoid the threat of overfishing, thereby ensuring the
sustainability of the western and central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) tuna fisheries.8 At the
first full meeting of the WCPFC in 2005, the chair of the WCPFC, Glenn Hurry
(Australia), commented that the WCPFC „has the best opportunity of all the world‟s
regional fisheries management organisations to successfully manage its fish stocks‟.9

The WCPFC was the first, and only, regional institution with a mandate to regulate the
WCPO tuna fisheries across their entire range and ensure their long term conservation
and sustainable use.10 However, despite its mandate, the WCPFC has since repeatedly
failed to adopt conservation and management measures that are sufficient to meet its
own Scientific Committee‟s recommendations. As will be demonstrated by this thesis,
the status of the WCPO tuna fisheries has declined even further since the establishment
of the WCPFC, due to its failure to stop overfishing by its members.

This introductory chapter presents the approach and structure for the thesis, and defines
its scope and limitations. It then presents a justification of the originality and
importance of this work within the current literature.

7

Unfortunately this decline has only worsened. There is now a comprehensive body of literature analysing the
seemingly incessant decline of international fisheries and weaknesses within the global framework for the
management and conservation and management of fisheries. Selected examples of this literature include: C.
Mullon, P. Freon, et al. (2005) The Dynamics of Collapse in World Fisheries. Fish and Fisheries. 6. -- D.
Pauly, V. Christensen, et al. (1998) Fishing Down Marine Food Webs. Science. 279. -- J. Jackson, M. Kirby, et
al. (2001) Historical Overfishing and the Recent Collapse of Coastal Ecosystems. Science. 293. -- R. Myers
and B. Worm. (2003) Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory Fish Communities. Nature. 423. -- B. Worm,
R. Hilborn, et al. (2009) Rebuilding Global Fisheries. Science. 325. -- R. Hilborn. (2007) Moving to
Sustainability by Learning From Successful Fisheries. Ambio. A Journal of the Human Environment. 36.4.
8
S. Tarte. (2004) Managing Tuna Fisheries in the Pacific: A Regional Success Story? Thirty Ninth Foreign
Policy School. Dunedin, New Zealand, 25-28 June 2004. University of Otago. p2.
9
WCPFC. (2005) Media Release. Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. WCPFC.
10
Article 2 of the WCPF Convention declares: „The objective of this Convention is to ensure, through
effective management, the long term conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean in accordance with the 1982 Convention and the Agreement.
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1.2

Thesis Approach and Structure

The critical problem for the WCPFC is the unsustainably high impact of purse seine and
longline fisheries on stocks of bigeye and yellowfin. This has been a significant focus of
conservation and management negotiations throughout the life of the WCPFC.11 The
thesis proposes that the WPCFC has failed to adopt conservation and management
measures that are sufficient to stop overfishing of bigeye. It appears that yellowfin is
wavering on the point of overfishing, but is not currently suffering from significant
levels of overfishing. This is not a controversial finding and is widely supported by
scientific literature cited in Chapter Two. However, the question of why such a failure is
occurring is less clear. That is the focus for this thesis.

The aim of this thesis is to further develop the understanding of this failure and identify
its causes. In order to achieve this aim, the thesis analyses three critical factors that
shape the development and adoption of conservation and management measures. These
are: the characteristics of the WCPO tuna fisheries and the complexity of the
management challenge (the problem); the WCPF Convention and the framework that it
provides for conservation and management (the rules); and the interests of the
participants in the WCPO tuna fisheries and their influence over the development and
adoption of conservation and management measures (the participants).

This approach enables the thesis to review the status of the tropical tuna fisheries and
confirm whether it is correct that the WCPFC has failed to adopt a conservation and
management measure that is sufficient to address sustainability concerns. The analysis

11

See Agenda Item 6 for 2005, Agenda Item 7 for 2006, Agenda Item 8 for 2007, Agenda Item 7 for 2008 and
Agenda Item 9 for 2009 and 2010 of the WCPFC Summary Reports. WCPFC. (2005) Summary Report of the
Second Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Second Regular Session of
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia, 12-16
December 2005. WCPFC. -- WCPFC. (2006) Summary Report of the Third Regular Session of the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Third Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Apia, Samoa, 11-15 December 2006. WCPFC. -- WCPFC. (2007) Summary Report of the Fourth
Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Fourth Regular Session of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Tumon, Guam. WCPFC. -- WCPFC. (2008) Summary
Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Fifth Regular
Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Busan, Korea. WCPFC. -- WCPFC. (2009)
Summary Report of the Sixth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Sixth
Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Tahiti, French Polynesia, 7-11
December 2009. WCPFC. -- WCPFC. (2010) Summary Report of the Seventh Regular Session of the Western
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Honolulu,
USA, 6 - 10 December 2010. WCPFC.
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of the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries, the WCPF Convention, and the interests of the
participants enables the thesis to determine the causes of any failure.

Chapter Two studies the three WCPO tropical tuna species that are the focus of the most
challenging conservation and management negotiations within the WCPFC. The chapter
identifies the biological, oceanographic, industrial and economic characteristics of the
fisheries that target skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin. The purpose of the analysis is to
answer two research questions: what are the key management challenges; and what are
the characteristics of the fisheries that impact on the conservation and management of
bigeye and yellowfin?

The next three chapters analyse the WCPF Convention. This analysis determines
whether the WCPF Convention provides a sufficient framework to ensure the long term
conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO tuna stocks. The benchmarks for the
assessment of the WCPF Convention are provided by the principles and standards of
modern international fisheries governance, as prescribed by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),12 UNFSA, the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing (Code of
Conduct),13 and other relevant international instruments.14

When considering the sources of international fisheries governance, it is important to
note the distinctions between binding and non-binding agreements. Binding agreements,
such as the LOSC, bind party States to implement and abide by their provisions.
Consequently, binding agreements include signature and ratification/accession
procedures that generally involve whole-of-government processes. States tend to pay
more attention to binding obligations that have been ratified through whole-of-

12

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). Opened for signature 10 December 1982.
Entered into force 16 November 1994. Montego Bay, Jamaica. International Legal Materials, vol. 21. 1982.
13
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing (Code of Conduct). Adopted by the FAO on 31 October 1995.
Rome, Italy. Available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/ccrf/en. 1995.
14
Chapters Three, Four and Five identify these instruments as they arise in the analysis. Key examples include:
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention). Opened for signature 23 May 1969. Entered
into force 27 January 1980. New York, USA. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1155. 1969. -- Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD). Opened for signature 5 June 1992. Entered into force 29 December 1993. Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil. Available at http://www.cbd.int/convention/. 1992. -- Agreement to Promote Compliance with
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (FAO Compliance
Agreement). Adopted by the FAO November 1993. Entered into force 24 April 2003. Rome, Italy.
International Legal Materials, vol. 33. 1993.
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government processes, than to voluntary commitments that may have minimal
government engagement beyond the delegation that negotiated them.15 Not surprisingly,
binding agreements are the product of cautious negotiations as States slowly debate and
wordsmith texts.

Non-binding

agreements

include

declarations,

recommendations,

resolutions,

guidelines, plans and codes that are typically negotiated through multilateral
conferences. These instruments are voluntary and do not include, nor require, formal
processes for signature or approval. Their non-binding nature is reflected in their
language („should‟ rather than „shall‟). Their „soft‟ nature has been a point of criticism
as some States appear to use „soft law‟ measures as a diplomatic pretension of sincerity,
when they have little capacity or intent to act.16 Nevertheless, despite their non-binding
status, agreements such as the Code of Conduct can play an important role in fisheries
governance and may have some legal effect.17 They reflect emerging international
principles that may later become incorporated in subsequent binding agreements, and
elaborate the context within which binding agreements (such as the WCPF Convention)
are implemented and interpreted.18 Consequently, the negotiation and development of

15

D. Balton and D. Zbicz. (2004) Managing Deep-Sea Fisheries: Some Threshold Questions. The International
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. 19.3. p252.
16
The High Seas Task Force noted that many non-binding agreements which are well supported, repeat key
concepts and provisions found in hard law instruments covering similar matters. The Task Force suggested that
some States would sign up voluntarily to commitments that they „would not entertain‟ if they were legally
bound to implement them. High Seas Task Force. (2006) Closing the Net: Stopping Illegal Fishing on the High
Seas. London, United Kingdom. Governments of Australia, Chile, Canada, Namibia, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom, WWF, IUCN and the Earth Institute. p44.
17
There is some suggestion that the Code of Conduct may be attaining some level of customary law status
within public international law. For selected readings, see: W. Edeson. (1999) Closing the Gap: The Role of
'Soft' International Instruments to Control Fishing. Australian Yearbook of International Law. 20. -- G. Lugten.
(2006) Soft Law with Hidden Teeth: The Case for a FAO International Plan of Action on Sea Turtles. Journal
of International Wildlife and Policy. 9.2.
18
For example, the binding WCPF Convention requires parties and members to implement the „non-binding‟
International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catches of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries (IPOASeabirds) for their longline fishing vessels in the WCPO tuna fisheries. This obligation arose following the
Fourth Session of the WCPFC in 2007 which adopted the binding Conservation and Management Measure
2007-04: Conservation and Management Measure to Mitigate the Impact of Fishing for Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks on Seabirds (CMM2007-04 Seabirds). This binding measure obliged WCPFC members to implement
the non-binding IPOA-Seabirds and to report on their implementation. The measure also applies to UNFSA
parties through its Article 8 which requires parties to become members of relevant RFMOs and apply their
conservation and management measures (or at least cooperate and apply such measures). Patricia Birnie writes
on the influence of soft law and argues that the LOSC must now also be interpreted in light of Chapter 17 of
the UNCED declaration, Agenda 21. P. Birnie. (1999) New Approaches to Ensuring Compliance at Sea: The
FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. Review of European Community and International Environmental Law. 8.1.
p50.
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non-binding instruments can also be a slow and cautious process as States pay
considerable regard to the wording and nature of such instruments.19
For the purposes of this thesis, principles are defined as internationally agreed „truths‟
that serve as a foundation for governance or action; standards are measurable „actions‟
against which performance can be assessed.20 For example, the principle of the
precautionary approach requires the WCPFC to act when there is a potential threat.21
Certain standards are then specified for what this action should include. In this regard,
the WCPFC could adopt precautionary reference points and management strategies that
seek to maintain or restore stock populations at levels consistent with the reference
points.22

These principles and standards reflect modern concepts of best practice in cooperative
management of international fisheries and provide an internationally agreed template for
how States should cooperate in fisheries management. Chapter Three introduces the
fundamental agreements that prescribe modern international fisheries governance, and
provides a concise background on the negotiation of the WCPF Convention. Chapter
Four analyses provisions of the WCPF Convention relating to cooperation and the
establishment of a regional fisheries management organisation (RFMO). The analysis
assesses the principles and standards that are prescribed by the WCPF Convention and
tests them against benchmarks in international fisheries governance. Chapter Five
analyses and assesses the WCPF Convention‟s principles and standards relating to the
functions of the WCPFC, and its adoption of conservation and management measures.

Chapter Six assesses the adequacy of WCPFC conservation and management measures
in order to determine whether they are likely to ensure the long term conservation and
sustainable use of bigeye and yellowfin. The purpose of the analysis is to answer the
question: has the WCPFC adopted conservation and management measures that are
sufficient to address overfishing of bigeye and yellowfin?
19

L. Juda. (2002) Rio Plus Ten: The Evolution of International Marine Fisheries Governance. Ocean
Development and International Law. 33. p116.
20
These definitions are developed from definitions provided in A. Delbridge, J. Bernard, et al., Ed. (1998) The
Macquarie Encyclopedic Dictionary. Sydney, Australia. Macquarie University.
21
The precautionary approach is described subsequently in more detail. Articles 5 and 6 of UNFSA and
Articles 5 and 6 of the WCPF Convention prescribe a precautionary approach.
22
Annex II. UNFSA.
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Chapters Seven and Eight undertake a comprehensive analysis of the key interests that
may influence WCPFC conservation and management measures. The purpose of this
analysis is to answer two research questions: what interests do participating States have
in the conservation and management of bigeye and yellowfin; and how might these
interests influence the WCPFC‟s negotiation and adoption of conservation and
management measures for bigeye and yellowfin. Chapter Seven analyses the interests
and influences that each participating State has in particular species (bigeye, yellowfin
and skipjack) and particular gears (purse seine, longline and other gears). The analysis
concludes with an analytical scale that grades their interests and indicates their likely
influence on negotiating positions. Chapter Eight then analyses interests related to three
areas: coastal States‟ interests in their control over access to the tropical tuna fisheries;
flag States‟ interests in their registered fishing vessels that operate within the WCPO
tuna fisheries; and market States‟ interests in importation of tuna from the WCPO
region.

Chapter Nine synthesises the findings of the thesis and concludes with a discussion of
the causes of the WCPFC‟s failure to adopt conservation measures that are sufficient to
resolve overfishing of bigeye. This discussion is informed by the complexity of the
management challenge, the assessment of the governance arrangements, and the nature
of the interests and influences involved.

The thesis utilises a broad range of literature and observations to support its research.
Much of this was identified, collected, recorded and reviewed while the author was on
various delegations to WCPFC meetings. In the course of this research, the author
attended every WCPFC Preparatory Conference and Commission Meeting from 2003 to
2010, and a number of subsidiary and related other meetings. The author attended these
meetings as an observer on Government delegations or as an independent consultant.23

A broad range of relevant literature was identified, reviewed and analysed. Primary
resources included: international legal texts; related treaties; WCPFC resolutions and
conservation and management measures; WCPFC information and delegation papers;
23

These meetings are summarised in Appendix Four.
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WCPFC reports; and various other regional fora reports and papers relevant to the
WCPO tuna fisheries. Secondary resources included a large range of books, journal
articles and stakeholder commentary.

The author also recorded observations while attending the various WCPFC meetings.
Direct references to these observations are used sparingly throughout the thesis, and
only when other sources are lacking due to the recent timescale of the study and the
sometimes contentious nature of the discussions.

Finally, the author interviewed 31 delegates and stakeholders from 20 different States
on the sidelines of WCPFC meetings in 2007 and 2008. Interviews were held
individually in order to facilitate frank discussions so that the author could collect the
broadest range of views in a manner that was not limited by official positions. The
interviews were structured in a manner that would facilitate a diverse range of feedback
and hopefully uncover as many viewpoints and concerns as possible from an insider‟s
viewpoint. While there was a standard backgrounder that was given to each interviewee,
the actual interview was highly flexible and the topics discussed reflected the specific
expertise, knowledge and concerns of the interviewee. This resulted in a diverse range
of responses. In accordance with Australian national guidelines, a research proposal
outlining the proposed research and methodology was submitted to the University of
Wollongong Human Research Ethics Committee for review and was approved in 2007.
The study then used the responses from these consultations to further inform the study
of primary and secondary literature.

1.3

Scope and Limitations

This thesis focuses its analysis on the negotiation and adoption by the WCPFC of
conservation and management measures for the tropical tuna fisheries. For the purposes
of this thesis, „tropical tuna fisheries‟ are defined as all fisheries that catch skipjack,
bigeye and yellowfin tunas, regardless of whether the species is targeted or caught
incidentally as bycatch. The WCPFC defines conservation and management measures
as legally binding on WCPFC members and cooperating non-members. Resolutions are
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defined as statements or recommendations that serve a political or diplomatic purpose
but are not legally binding.24

The adoption of an agreed measure is fundamental to the implementation of sustainable
fishing practices. Without an agreed conservation and management measure, there is no
collective framework for members to implement reductions in fishing mortality across
the range of the tuna stocks. While some States may unilaterally implement their own
conservation reductions, the effectiveness of these actions may be undermined by
ongoing fishing operations in adjacent EEZs or high seas. The conservation and
management measure is effectively the first management step.

The thesis does not study the implementation or enforcement of a conservation measure,
nor does it study the collection of data. These matters are all substantial studies in their
own right and are beyond the scope of this thesis. The thesis notes previous doctoral
studies that have focused on compliance and enforcement and fisheries data in the
WCPO tuna fisheries.

25

The author has also written extensively on implementation

obstacles within the WCPO tuna fisheries, and on matters relating to monitoring,
control and surveillance in the WCPO tuna fisheries.26

The thesis uses 2008 data, updated in 2010 as the best available database at the time of
the completion of the thesis. Provisional data for 2009 did become available towards the
end of the study but this was not used due to concerns regarding its accuracy, given its
provisional nature.

24

WCPFC. (2005) Nomenclature for Commission Decisions. Second Session of the Western anfd Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission. Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia, 12-16 December 2005. WCPFC.
25
S. M. Tupou. (2004) An Analysis of the Regional Responses of the Pacific Island States to the Developing
Requirements of the Fisheries Compliance Regime Under International Law. Doctor of Philosophy, University
of Nottingham. 2004. -- L. Manarangi-Trott. (2008) Fisheries Data Requirements Under International Law:
Achieving Long-Term Conservation and Sustainable Use of Tuna Fisheries in the Western Central Pacific
Ocean. Doctor of Philosophy, University of Wollongong. 2008.
26
Selected examples include: Q. Hanich, F. Teo, et al. (2008) Closing the Gaps: Building Capacity in Pacific
Fisheries Governance and Institutions. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. -- Q. Hanich. (2010) A Collective
Approach to Pacific Islands Fisheries Management: Moving Beyond Regional Agreements. Marine Policy. 34.
-- Q. Hanich, C. Brown, et al. (2009) Compliance Review: A Study Undertaken to Support the Development of
a Regional MCS Strategy for Pacific Oceanic Fisheries. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA.
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1.4

Justification

Tuna is one of the world‟s most valuable and internationally traded seafood
commodities.27 This global industry and trade is heavily dependent upon the WCPO
tuna fisheries which provide the majority of the world‟s tuna. The estimated catch for
the WCPFC tuna fisheries in 2008 was 2,439,171 metric tonnes (mt). The WCPO tuna
fisheries provided 56% of the global tuna catch and was valued at approximately
US$5.393 billion in 2008.28 As will be demonstrated in Chapters Seven and Eight, the
conservation and management of these fisheries has profound consequences at a
regional level, and significant consequences globally.

This thesis presents three original contributions to a growing literature on the
management of these globally significant fisheries. First, the thesis provides a
comprehensive assessment of the WCPF Convention against modern principles and
standards of international fisheries governance.

Second, the thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the interests of all the reported
participants in the WCPO tuna fisheries, and the influence of these interests over the
negotiation and adoption of conservation and management measures. While there are a
number of political and economic studies of the WCPO tuna fisheries,29 only a few
provide any analysis of the interests involved in the context of negotiations over
conservation and management measures. And even this level of analysis is limited. This
is not intended as a criticism, but simply reflects the focus of these studies. For
example, Langley et al write a concise and clear analysis of the performance of the
27

In 2007, the three most valuable marine capture fisheries and their estimated worth were: miscellaneous
coastal fisheries US$14,241 million; shrimp US$11,191 million; and tuna, bonitos and billfish US$10,484
million. The four most internationally traded seafood commodities (including aquaculture) in terms of value
were: tuna 8.7%. groundfish 11%, salmon 12.1% and shrimp 15.4%). FAO. (2009) FAO Yearbook 2007 Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics. Rome, Italy. FAO.
28
WCPFC. (2009) Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August. WCPFC. p7. Data sourced from: P.
Williams. (2010) Tuna Fishery Yearbook: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (Raw Excel
Database). Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. SPC. -- P. Terawasi and L. Rodwell. (2010) Value of
WCPO Tuna Fisheries (Excel Database). Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA.
29
Selected examples include: K. Barclay and I. Cartwright. (2007) Capturing Wealth from Tuna: Case Studies
from the Pacific. Canberra, Australia. Asia Pacific Press. -- E. Havice and L. Campling. (2010) Shifting Tides
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishery: The Political Economy of Regulation and Industry
Responses. Global Environmental Politics. 10.1. -- T. Aqoarau. (2009) Current Legal Developments: Western
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. 24. -- H.
Parris, A. Wright, et al. (2010) The Challenges of Fisheries Governance after UNFSA: The Case of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Handbook of Marine Fisheries Conservation and
Management. Ed. Q. Grafton, R. Hilborn, et al. New York, USA. Oxford University Press.
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WCPFC and argue that progress in adopting conservation and management measures
has been slowed by tensions between States primarily interested in purse seine and
longline fisheries, and between developing coastal States and DWFNs.30 But the article
provides little detail on these interests and how they might impact on conservation and
management negotiations. Kompass and Che provide a detailed bioeconomic model to
maximise economic benefits from the WCPO tuna fisheries, but little analysis of the
specific interests and how these interests might influence negotiations over conservation
and management measures.31 Botet writes on the regulation of tuna in the WCPO and
discusses key participants and their national interests over a couple of pages, citing the
Pacific island coastal States, distant water fishing States, archipelagos and former
colonial powers.32 But there is little analysis of specific interests (i.e. gear and species),
nor discussion of how certain States might favour certain management responses over
others. Parris provides a detailed assessment of existing conservation and management
measures and analyses their allocation ramifications for groupings of WCPFC members,
but does not investigate the specific interests and how these might influence
negotiations for future conservation and management measures.33

The most comprehensive source of information on the interests of States and territories
that participate in the WCPO tuna fisheries is provided annually by the Secretariat to the
Pacific Community‟s (SPC) Oceanic Fisheries Programme, and by the Pacific Islands
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA).34 These databases provide information on the current
30

A. Langley, A. Wright, et al. (2009) Slow Steps Towards Management of the World's Largest Tuna Fishery.
Marine Policy. 33.2.
31
T. Kompass and N. C. Tuong. (2006) Economic Profit and Optimal Effort in the Western and Central Pacific
Tuna Fisheries. Pacific Economic Bulletin. 21.3.
32
V. Botet. (2001) Filling in One of the Last Pieces of the Ocean: Regulating Tuna in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean. Virginia Journal of International Law. 41.
33
H. Parris. (2010) Is the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Meeting its Conservation and
Management Objectives? Ocean and Coastal Management. 53.1. Dr Parris has also written a doctoral thesis
and papers on potential allocation models for the WCPFC. See: H. Parris. (2009) Governing Complex
Commons: Essays in Regional Tuna Management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Doctor of
Philosophy, Australia National University. 2009. -- H. Parris and A. Lee. (2009) Allocation Models in the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission and Implications for Pacific Island States. Navigating
Pacific Fisheries: Legal and Policy Trends in the Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments in the
Western and Central Pacific Region. Ed. Q. Hanich and M. Tsamenyi. Wollongong, Australia. Australian
National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS).
34
P. Williams and P. Terawasi. (2010) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
Including Economic Conditions in 2009. Sixth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Nuku'alofa Tonga, 10 - 19 August. WCPFC. -- P. Williams and P.
Terawasi. (2009) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Including Economic
Conditions in 2008. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the Commission for the Conservation
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 1021 August 2009. WCPFC. -- P. Williams and P. Terawasi. (2008) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western
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and historical activities of the key fleets by gear type. They do not, nor are they intended
to, provide an interest analysis of all WCPFC members in the context of WCPFC
conservation and management deliberations.

WCPFC official documents report historical catches of WCPFC members as directly
relevant to specific conservation measures.35 But it is not the purpose of these
documents to analyse catch histories and fishing behaviours and discuss how members
may wish to influence measures to protect or compromise their interests.

Lastly, through analysis of the WCPF Convention and the interests of the participants,
the thesis identifies causes of the WCPFC‟s failure to adopt a conservation and
management measure that is sufficient to ensure the long term conservation and
sustainable use of the tropical tuna fisheries. It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to
a greater understanding of the challenges facing the WCPFC, and support the
development of new processes that might overcome these challenges.

and Central Pacific Ocean Including Economic Conditions in 2007. Fourth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee of the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific. Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, 11-22 August 2008. WCPFC. -- P. Williams
and C. Reid. (2006) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Including Economic
Conditions in 2005. Second Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Manila, Philippines, 7-18 August 2006. WCPFC. -- P. Terawasi and L. Rodwell.
(2010) Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries (Excel Database). Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. -- C. Reid. (2009)
Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA.
35
For example, annex of WCPFC. (2008) CMM 2008-01 Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye
and Yellowfin Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Fifth Regular Session of the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Guam, USA, 8 - 12 December 2008. WCPFC. A copy of this measure is
provided in Appendix Two of this thesis.
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Chapter Two: Increasing Catches, Declining Stocks
Stocks of bigeye tuna are being harvested beyond maximum sustainable levels,
and yellowfin tuna fishing is reaching dangerous levels. Skipjack is abundant at
the moment but the management of the three species is inter-related because
they swim and get caught together.36

2.1

Introduction

The WCPFC faces a challenging and complex problem. It must resolve overfishing
across fisheries that catch multiple species, utilise multiple gears, occur in multiple
jurisdictions, and engage multiple stakeholders. In order to analyse this problem, it is
first necessary to understand the particular characteristics of these fisheries and the key
management challenges.

This Chapter studies the three WCPO tropical tuna species that are the focus of the most
challenging conservation and management negotiations within the WCPFC, and
identifies the biological, ecosystemic, industrial and oceanographic characteristics of the
fisheries that target skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis), bigeye (Thunnus obesus), and
yellowfin (Thunnus albacares). The purpose of the analysis in this Chapter is to answer
two questions: what are the key management challenges; and what are the
characteristics of the fisheries that impact on the conservation and management of
bigeye and yellowfin?

2.2

Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries

Skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin are the most productive and valuable tuna in the WCPO.
In 2008, these three species comprised 96% of all tuna WCPO catch and 95% of all
value from WCPO tuna catches.37 While the longline and troll fleets that target albacore
(Thunnus alalunga) can take small but profitable by-catches of bigeye and yellowfin,
36

R. Gillett and I. Cartwright. (2010) The Future of Pacific Island Fisheries: Summary. Noumea, New
Caledonia. SPC. p3.
37
Data sourced from: P. Williams. (2010) Tuna Fishery Yearbook: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission (Raw Excel Database). Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. SPC. -- P. Terawasi and L.
Rodwell. (2010) Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries (Excel Database). Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA.
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these fleets have a minimal impact on bigeye and yellowfin and are the subject of
separate

conservation

and

management

deliberations

within

the

WCPFC.

Consequently, the characteristics of these albacore fleets are only examined in relation
to their specific catches of bigeye and yellowfin.

2.2.1

Biology and Behaviour

The WCPO stretches approximately 6,000 nautical miles, from South East Asia to the
remote atolls of Kiribati in the central Pacific. Over 25,000 islands are scattered
throughout this vast ocean space, yet they occupy less than 1% of the WCPO. 38 This
vast ocean is home to the world‟s most productive tuna fisheries, with the majority of
tuna catches occurring within 10 degrees of the equator (see Figure 1).39
Figure 1: Location of Skipjack, Bigeye and Yellowfin Catches (2005 - 2008)40

38

P. Kench. (2010) Pacific Island Landscapes. International Seminar on Islands and Oceans. Tokyo, Japan, 2022 January 2010. Ocean Policy Research Foundation p4.
39
Catches are concentrated in the equatorial waters of Indonesia, Philippines and tropical Pacific island States.
Only bigeye is extensively fished beyond these waters. 10 degrees equals 600 nautical miles.
40
Figure sourced from: SPC. (2009) Status of Tuna Stocks (Powerpoint Presentation). Sixth Regular Session of
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Papeete, French Polynesia, 7-11 December 2010.
WCPFC.
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Skipjack and yellowfin spawn in warm waters within 10 degrees of the equator, or
higher latitudes where the water is warm enough.41 Bigeye also require warm waters to
spawn but are believed to extend into higher latitudes (out to 20º from the equator). 42
All three species are highly productive and fast growing.43 Skipjack are by far the most
productive with a biomass estimated to be greater than that of bigeye, yellowfin and
albacore combined.44 Skipjack grow rapidly and sexually mature at around one year,
and can weigh five kilograms and reach 80cm in length by four years old.45 Most
captures occur on skipjack between one and three years old. 46 Given that most skipjack
have already had an opportunity to reproduce prior to capture, this further strengthens
the stock‟s resilience to fishing.47 Yellowfin can weigh 30 kilograms and reach 120cm
by the time they reach maturity at approximately two years.48 Most captures occur on
yellowfin between one and six years old.49 Bigeye are longer lived and slower to
mature, reaching maturity at approximately three years.50 Most captures occur on bigeye
between one and 10 years old.51

All three species are distributed throughout the tropical and subtropical waters of the
Pacific Ocean and are listed in the LOSC as highly migratory. 52 However, the extent of
their migratory behaviour is uncertain. Tagging data for each of the species has
demonstrated considerable migrations with significant proportions of tagged fish
migrating large distances, and some individuals migrating over 4,000 nautical miles.

41

FFA. (2002) The Oceanic Fisheries of the Western and Central Pacific: A Baseline Study. Honiara, Solomon
Islands. FFA. p3.
42
Ibid. p3. -- J. Hampton, K. Bigelow, et al. (1998) A Summary of Current Information on the Biology,
Fisheries and Stock Assessment of Bigeye Tuna (thunnus obsesus) in the Pacific Ocean, with Recommendations
for Data Requirements and Future Research. Noumea. SPC. p5.
43
K. Miller. (2007) Climate Variability and Tropical Tuna: Management Challenges for Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks. Marine Policy. 31. p60.
44
R. Gillett. (2010) Marine Fishery Resources of the Pacific Islands. Rome, Italy. FAO. p38.
45
A. Langley and J. Hampton. (2008) Stock Assessment of Skipjack Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean. Fourth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the Commission for the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Port Moresby, Papua New
Guinea, 11-22 August 2008. WCPFC. p3.
46
R. Gillett. (2010) Marine Fishery Resources of the Pacific Islands. Rome, Italy. FAO. p38.
47
J. Hampton. (2005) Tuna Fisheries and their Impacts in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Noumea.
SPC. p5.
48
FFA. (2002) The Oceanic Fisheries of the Western and Central Pacific: A Baseline Study. Honiara, Solomon
Islands. FFA. p3.
49
R. Gillett. (2010) Marine Fishery Resources of the Pacific Islands. Rome, Italy. FAO. p38.
50
J. Hampton, K. Bigelow, et al. (1998) A Summary of Current Information on the Biology, Fisheries and
Stock Assessment of Bigeye Tuna (thunnus obsesus) in the Pacific Ocean, with Recommendations for Data
Requirements and Future Research. Noumea. SPC. p5.
51
R. Gillett. (2010) Marine Fishery Resources of the Pacific Islands. Rome, Italy. FAO. p38.
52
Annex I. LOSC.
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Yet simultaneously, many tagged fish have demonstrated limited migratory behaviour
with a high degree of residency.53

There is still a degree of uncertainty regarding whether Pacific populations are one
genetic stock for each species, or are subdivided into multiple stocks. Genetic analysis,
tagging programmes and modelling have been unable to convincingly and consistently
address uncertainties regarding stock structures.54 Stock assessments for each of the
three tuna assume that each species is one stock across the WCPO.55

For the purposes of this thesis, it appears that the three tuna species are sufficiently
migratory in behaviour and regionally distributed that stocks will migrate across, and
straddle, international boundaries and require international cooperation to ensure
effective management. For example, stock assessments demonstrate that tuna fishing in
Indonesia and the Philippines is impacting on WCPO tuna fisheries more broadly,56
53

The following selected papers report on the uncertain and sometimes conflicting results of modelling and
tagging studies for yellowfin, skipjack and bigeye: A. Langley, S. Harley, et al. (2009) Stock Assessment of
Yellowfin Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of
the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p49. -- J. Sibert and J. Hampton. (2003)
Mobility of Tropical Tunas and the Implications for Fisheries Management. Marine Policy. 27. pp91-92. -- R.
Hilborn and J. Sibert. (1988) Is International Management of Tuna Necessary? Marine Policy. -- K. Evans, A.
Langley, et al. (2008) Behaviour and Habitat Preferences of Bigeye Tuna (Thunnus obesus) and their Influence
on Longline Fishery Catches in the Western Coral Sea. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Science. 65.
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indicating a need for strong cooperation between the States of both regions. It is also
apparent that sufficient levels of residency exist to warrant consideration of
differentiation within conservation measures at sub-regional and national levels. Sibert
and Hampton suggested in 2003 that the restricted migratory behaviour of yellowfin
could allow for restrictions to apply in one fishery and not in another distant fishery
without undermining the conservation goal.57 Ultimately, a cooperative approach is
required that works at regional, sub-regional and national levels.

2.2.2

Oceanography and Climate

The WCPO fisheries are influenced by the western equatorial Pacific warm pool, a
fundamental component of the earth‟s climate.58 The warm pool is the warmest and
largest single expanse of warm water in the world and drives the world‟s most intense
atmospheric convection with sea surface temperatures exceeding 28ºC.59 The pool
migrates inter-annually along the equatorial region in phase with the Southern
Oscillation Index: eastwards towards Kiribati in the central Pacific during El Nino
events, and westwards towards Papua New Guinea in the western Pacific during La
Nina events.60 Although primary productivity is low in the warm pool itself, there is a
permanent convergence of cold and warm waters along its eastern edge that is highly
productive.61 Such convergence zones are rich in planktons and micronektons, and
hence important food sources for higher order predators.62 Consequently these areas are
also rich in skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye. Studies have found high correlations
between the abundance of tuna, and the location of the convergence on the eastern edge
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of the warm pool.63 Other studies have identified correlations between recruitment and
El Nino/La Nina events with tropical tunas such as skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye
experiencing high recruitment levels during El Nino.64 As the warm pool moves east
and west, and takes the aggregations of tuna with it, so too do the fishing fleets that
target the most productive fishing grounds.

El Nino events also lift the thermocline closer to the surface from its otherwise
relatively deep levels. This layer of rapid temperature change, from warm surface
waters to cool deeper waters, becomes more defined and effectively restricts the vertical
movement of tuna schools, leaving them more vulnerable to surface fishing activities.65

More recently, attention has focused on how these oceanographic and atmospheric
systems may alter due to climate change. Climate models do not yet provide consistent
indicators for how climate change will alter the occurrence, intensity or frequency of El
Nino events.66 However, initial modelling indicates that skipjack and bigeye
concentrations are likely to shift further eastwards,67 and that El Nino events will
continue into the foreseeable future as a dominant feature of the Pacific climate.68

These existing inter-annual variations, potentially exacerbated in future by climate
change impacts, are a significant factor that the WCPFC must consider as it develops
conservation and management measures. This is further validation that international
cooperation is required to manage these migratory fisheries.
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2.2.3

WCPO Tuna Fisheries – Increasing Catches

The WCPO tuna fisheries are the largest in the world. They provide approximately 56%
of the global tuna catch (estimated to be approximately 4.3 million mt). The total tuna
catch for 2008 was estimated to be approximately 2,426,195 mt. This was a new record
highest annual catch (but only by 0.25%). This catch was approximately 81% of the
total Pacific Ocean catch (estimated to be approximately 3,009,477 mt). Skipjack was
the most productive of the three key tuna with catches totalling 1,634,617 mt in 2008,
while yellowfin and bigeye catches totalled 539,481 mt and 159,128 mt respectively. 69
Catches for each of the three species have steadily increased since the Convention was
agreed in 2000, with record catches recorded for each of the species in recent years. In
2000, the total tuna catch was 1,899,233 mt (see Figure 2 below).70
Figure 2: WCPO Tuna Catches 2000 - 2008 (mt)71
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The record catch for skipjack was 1,708,605 mt in 2007. The 2008 catch of yellowfin
and bigeye were the highest on record. Yellowfin was 17% higher than the previous
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record set in 1998 while bigeye was marginally higher than the previous record
(157,173 mt) in 2004.72 Prior to 2000, the previous significant surge in WCPO tuna
catches occurred in the 1980s as the purse seine fleet expanded.73

Four gear types are primarily responsible for most commercial catches of skipjack,
yellowfin and bigeye. Purse seine is by far the most significant, catching approximately
1,809,190 mt in 2008 of these three species. Meanwhile, longline caught 166,596 mt,
pole and line caught 151,133 mt and other gears caught 209,721 mt (largely various
fleets in Indonesia and the Philippines). The following sections examine each of these
gear types and identify their key characteristics in relation to the bigeye, yellowfin and
skipjack fisheries.

2.2.4

Purse Seine

A purse seine is a large net which encircles mid-water schools close to the surface.74 A
number of small vessels will be deployed to assist with setting the net. Once complete,
the lower part of the net is then enclosed to prevent escapement and the net is then
cinched to side of the purse seiner so that the catch can then be brailed into the holds.
Purse seine vessels are the largest of the fishing vessels targeting WCPO tuna and have
increased in size significantly since their first widespread use in the 1970s. „Super
superseiners‟ exceed 100 metres in length and can carry approximately 2,500 to 3,000
mt of frozen tuna in multiple holds.75 Purse seiners are often equipped with helicopters
and various sophisticated technologies to assist with finding schools and minimise fuelexpensive transits (see Figure 3 for a photo of a purse seiner).
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Figure 3: Photo of Purse Seiner with Tender76

Purse seine fishing rapidly expanded worldwide in the 1980s, particularly in the
WCPO.77 In 1980, purse seine catches accounted for only 14% of all tuna catches. By
1990, this had risen to 56%. In 2008, catches by purse seine vessels accounted for
approximately 78% of all WCPO catches of skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin (see Figure
4 below). There are approximately 1,400 purse seiners operating in the WCPO fisheries
(approximately 200 to 300 vessels operate beyond domestic waters).78
Figure 4: Skipjack, Yellowfin and Bigeye Catches by Gear Type79
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Purse seiners are used to target skipjack, which comprises approximately 70-85% of all
purse seine catches (79% in 2008), and yellowfin which comprises approximately 1530% of all purse seine catches (18% in 2008). Bycatch of bigeye accounts for a very
small percentage (1-3%) of total purse seine catch but nevertheless has a significant
impact due to the sheer size of the catch in the context of total bigeye catches. 80 Tuna
caught by purse seine vessels are primarily sold as frozen raw material for canning,
much of which is processed in Bangkok, Thailand.81 As a consequence, the purse seine
fisheries only comprise 62% of the total value of the bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack
fisheries due to the lower value of tuna for canning. In effect, purse seine is valuable
more in terms of its quantity, than its quality.

A globally significant development in purse seining has been the increasing use of
floating fish aggregating devices (FADs) and radio/satellite/sonar equipped buoys.
Yellowfin, bigeye and skipjack (and many other species) are attracted to drifting objects
at sea.82 Purse seine fleets have exploited this behaviour by setting their nets around, or
near, naturally floating objects (i.e. floating logs and other storm detritus), and more
increasingly „seeding‟ fishing grounds with their own artificial FADs.83 These FADs
often now have sophisticated buoys attached that can monitor the growth of an
aggregation underneath the FAD and inform the purse seine vessel about its size and
location.84

The use of FADs rapidly increased in the late 1990s and has now become a significant,
and increasingly controversial, feature of the purse seine fishery. FADs are estimated to
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account for approximately 70% of all global purse seine catches of tuna.85 In the WCPO
in 2004 (a peak year for FAD use), all purse seine sets on associated schools (i.e. FADs
and naturally floating logs) accounted for approximately 70% of all purse seine sets.86
Since then, sets on naturally floating logs have dropped significantly while the use of
artificial FADs has moderately increased. Total sets on FADs now account for
approximately 36% of all WCPO sets in 2008 (plus 11% sets on free floating logs).87

The use of FADs has become increasingly a matter of concern due to the significantly
different nature of their catches. Purse seine sets on schools associated with FADs and
logs will catch smaller fish, particularly juvenile yellowfin and bigeye, whereas sets on
unassociated free swimming schools (i.e. non-FAD sets) will catch larger skipjack
and/or adult yellowfin.88 Purse seine sets on FADs and logs are a significant factor in
overfishing of bigeye, as bigeye are only caught by purse seiners in significant amounts
when they set on FADs and logs.

89

Purse seiners that only set on unassociated free

schools do not have a significant impact on stocks of bigeye.90 Furthermore, there are
concerns that the use of FADs is introducing further uncertainties into scientific
assessments due to their impact on tuna behaviour.91
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Proponents argue that FADs have increased the efficiency of purse seining, 92 while
others note that the significant reduction in the size of fish caught undermines the
efficiency gains.93 Most importantly in regard to the subject of this thesis, the use of
FADs has raised serious conservation concerns due to the high levels of bycatch of
juvenile tuna and other species from FAD sets, and the possibility that the use of FADs
may be creating a „ecological trap.‟94 An ecological trap is an event whereby population
growth is reduced due to individuals making poor habitat choice. Studies have
suggested that tuna associated with FADs are less healthy than those in unassociated
free swimming schools.95

In 2004, a scientific report to the inaugural meeting of the WCPFC noted that purse
seine setting on floating objects (FADs and logs) had the potential to impact
considerably on non-target species even if the target stock was not being adversely
affected.96 The report expressed particular concern regarding the bycatch of bigeye tuna
in the purse seine fishery for skipjack and yellowfin, and noted that further increases in
purse seine fishing on floating objects would increase the fishing mortality on both
bigeye and yellowfin with potentially severe consequences for the status of the bigeye
and yellowfin tuna stocks. Since then, overfishing by longline, purse seine and other
fisheries has continued. In 2009, an assessment was presented to the WCPFC that
suggested that an 80% cut in the use of FADs (among other measures) was required to
maintain bigeye biomass at levels above maximum sustainable yield (MSY).97
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2.2.5

Longline

Longline vessels, as the name suggests, utilise a very long mainline (sometimes over
100km in length) from which thousands of baited branch lines are suspended. The
mainline is kept on or near the surface by regularly attached floating buoys, while
branch lines are suspended below at specific depths according to conditions and
targets.98 Longline vessels are much smaller and cheaper than purse seiners and range in
size from small domestically based vessels under 100 gross registered tonnage with ice
or chill capacity that undertake voyages of less than a month, to large scale freezer
vessels over 250 tonnes which operate over large areas and undertake long voyages over
many months (sometimes over a year).99 Figure 5 presents a photo of a longline vessel
setting its lines.
Figure 5: Photo of Tuna Longliner100

Large scale distant water longline fleets have a long history in the WCPO. This type of
fishing gear became dominant throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Longliners
originally targeted albacore and yellowfin, but expanded to bigeye and bluefin as
freezer technology developed throughout the 1960s and 1970s and enabled the growth
of a Japanese frozen sashimi market. While small scale longline fleets continued to
expand throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the dominance of large scale longline fleets
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began to decline as overcapacity became a significant problem and other gears quickly
developed.101 In 1960, longline catches accounted for 54% of all WCPO tuna catches.
By 1990, this had declined to 13% of all tuna catches. In 2008, longline catches
accounted for 7% of all WCPO catches of skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin (see Figure 5
above). There are approximately 4,869 longliners operating in the WCPO fisheries.102

Longliners target bigeye, yellowfin and albacore. In 2008, bigeye comprised
approximately 38% of all longline catches, yellowfin (30%) and albacore (30%).
Skipjack accounts for approximately 2% in bycatch. Vessels operating in the tropical
fisheries will target yellowfin and bigeye for sashimi markets, while vessels operating in
sub-tropical waters will target albacore. Albacore longliners will also sometimes take
bycatch of yellowfin and bigeye, which although small in tonnage are often important
economically.103 Due to the high value of sashimi products, the longline fisheries
comprise a higher percentage of the value of the WCPO tuna fishery than would
otherwise be indicated by their tonnage. Longline fisheries were 25% of the total value
of bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack fisheries in 2008 (see Figure 3 above).

Overfishing of bigeye by longline vessels is a continuing conservation and management
challenge. In 2004, the WCPFC received advice that there was a high risk that
overfishing was occurring for bigeye.104 The advice indicated that longline fishing was
having the largest impact on bigeye. Since then, overfishing by longline, purse seine
and other fisheries has continued. In 2009, an assessment of bigeye noted that longline
fisheries continued to have the largest impact on bigeye stocks.105 Further scientific
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assessments suggested that a 50% cut in longline catches of bigeye (among other
measures) was required to maintain bigeye biomass at levels above MSY.106

The scientific advice also noted that the longline fishery could potentially impact
considerably on non-target species even if the target stock was not being adversely
affected.107 In addition, scientists and conservationists have expressed concerns at the
threats posed by increasing longline catches of sharks to supply sharkfin markets, and
the high bycatch of vulnerable species, particularly seabirds and turtles.108

2.2.6

Pole and Line

Pole and line is a centuries old technology that utilises live baitfish to attract tuna to the
vessel where they are then caught by pole and line gear that is cast off the deck by crew.
The pole and line fishery expanded throughout the Pacific in the 20th Century targeting
skipjack and yellowfin for canning. The fishery reached its peak in 1974 when pole and
line fisheries accounted for 57% of all WCPO tuna catches. 109 However, improvements
in purse seine technology and efficiency saw pole and line activities steadily decline
throughout the 1980s and 1990s and recede to a few skipjack and albacore fisheries that
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Recent Developments in Management. Cambridge, United Kingdom. TRAFFIC International. -- M. Lack and
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Longline Fishing Effort. Second Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central
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primarily operate in domestic waters.110 In 2008, pole and line fisheries accounted for
only 6% of all skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin catches (see Figure 5 above). As most
pole and line product is canned, it is a relatively low value fishery and only comprises
approximately 6% of the total value of all WCPO skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye.
Figure 6 presents a photo of pole and line fishers working a school of skipjack.
Figure 6: Photo of Pole and Line Fishermen111

Recently, attention has begun to refocus on pole and line as a potential „eco-friendly‟
alternative to purse seine, given the increasing conservation concerns about purse seine
bycatch of juvenile yellowfin and bigeye. The FFA and Greenpeace have both initiated
projects exploring market-based support for the expansion of pole and line fisheries
within the Pacific islands region.112 However, purse seine industry reports have
expressed concern at the resurgence of a pole and line fishery due to its heavy demands
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on baitfish and the potential conflict between large scale fishing for baitfish and coastal
community requirements for food security.113

2.2.7

Other Gears

A number of other gears are also used to catch tuna, particularly in the Philippines and
Indonesia. Trolling is used widely in both the northern and southern sub-tropical
albacore fisheries but has little impact on bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin (bycatch only
accounts for 0.2% of all catches).114 Consequently, for the purposes of this thesis, troll
fisheries are not addressed in detail and any troll bycatch of bigeye, yellowfin and
skipjack is included within other gear totals.
The „other‟ fisheries that this thesis will focus on are those that impact on bigeye,
yellowfin and skipjack and represent significant stakeholder interests. These include an
assortment of primarily Indonesian and Philippine artisanal and small scale fisheries
that utilise various gears including ring nets, gill nets, and handlines. Despite the small
scale nature of these fisheries, their large number and location mean that they have a
significant impact, particularly on yellowfin. In 2008, these other gears accounted for
9% of all WCPO catch of skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye – and 7% of the total value of
these fisheries (see Figure 5 above). In addition, there are thousands of small scale
fishing vessels in Vietnam that operate various gears (i.e. purse seine, longline, gill net
and other gears). They are estimated to catch approximately 42,500 mt of skipjack,
yellowfin and bigeye.115

The key concern with these other fisheries is the lack of information on their activities
and catches, and their potentially significant impacts on yellowfin and bigeye
populations. In 2009, the WCPFC initiated a project to address the information gaps,
describing the incomplete fishery data in Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines as the
113
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114
P. Williams. (2010) Tuna Fishery Yearbook: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (Raw
Excel Database). Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. SPC.
115
T. Lewis. (2005) The Tuna Fisheries of Vietnam - An Overview of Available Information. First Meeting of
the Scientific Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Noumea, New Caledonia,
8-19 August 2005. WCPFC. p16.
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main source of uncertainty in the current knowledge of the WCPO tuna fisheries. 116 The
significance of this uncertainty is exacerbated by the likely impact that these fisheries
are having on bigeye and yellowfin stocks. Tagging studies have shown substantial
movements of tuna between Indonesian and Philippine waters and the western part of
the WCPO.117 The 2009 stock assessments for both bigeye and yellowfin stated that the
Philippines and Indonesian domestic fisheries were significant factors in the depletion
of WCPO bigeye and yellowfin stocks.118 Further assessments suggested that a
substantial cut in Indonesian and Philippine fishing effort (among other measures) was
required to maintain bigeye biomass above MSY.119

Many of the other coastal States within the WCPO also have numerous artisanal
fisheries that catch tuna (among other species) for local consumption. With the
exception of Indonesia and the Philippines, most of these fisheries have very little
impact on tuna stocks when compared with the impacts of the large scale commercial
fisheries. However, these fisheries are often highly significant to local communities and
provide a critical benefit to coastal States. For example, Kiribati estimates that its
artisanal fleet, of approximately 4,800 vessels under 7 metres, catches roughly
12,600 mt of all tuna species and employs 20,000 people.120 Kiribati has one of the
highest rates of per capita fish consumption in the world121 and one of the largest
artisanal catches of tuna within the Pacific islands region. However, in general, total
catches by artisanal fleets are often poorly monitored and understood due to limited
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institutional resources and spatially dispersed fisheries activities.122 Consequently, it is
not possible to provide data on catches and gears for these activities in most cases.

2.3

Value and Benefits of the WCPO Tropical Tuna Fisheries

The WCPO tuna fisheries provide numerous benefits to a global community with a
broad spectrum of interests: from food security and employment for artisanal
communities in remote Pacific atolls, to luxury sushi bars in New York and London.
These communities live and work within a diverse range of States that include some of
the least developed States in the world, such as Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Solomon
Islands,123 and some of the wealthiest States in the world, such as the USA, Japan and
China.124 For some of these communities, the WCPO fisheries provide expensive luxury
products, such as sashimi, and tradable business assets for globalised corporations such
as Trimarine, FCF and Itochu.125 While for others, the WCPO tuna fisheries provide
globally important sources of cheap protein126 and regionally important opportunities
for economic development.127
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2.3.1

Increasing Overall Value

The overall value of the WCPO tuna fisheries has increased dramatically since the
WCPF Convention was signed in 2000. It was estimated at US$5.393 billion for 2008,
an increase of 117% since 2000. However, during that time, overall catches only
increased by 28%. The key increase was in value, not catch. As demonstrated in Figure
7, the primary cause of this dramatic increase in value was the rise in the value of
skipjack, and to a lesser extent yellowfin and bigeye.
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Figure 7: Increasing Values (Catches in mt, Values in US$1,000s)
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Between 2000 and 2008, catches of the three tropical tunas increased moderately
(skipjack by 31%, yellowfin by 26% and bigeye by 28%), largely due to reported catch
increases in Papua New Guinea, Philippines and Indonesia. However, they each
experienced far more dramatic increases in value. The value of the WCPO skipjack
fishery increased in value by 238%, while the value of yellowfin and bigeye increased
by 80% and 40% respectively. The key drivers behind this dramatic rise in value were
the significant increases during 2007 and 2008 in the composite landed prices for
skipjack (86% increase), yellowfin (28% increase) and bigeye (27% increase). This
resulted in the landed value of the WCPO skipjack fishery increasing by 54% in 2007
and another 24% in 2008.128 As a consequence, the skipjack fishery for 2008 was
estimated to be valued at US$2.851 billion, while yellowfin and bigeye were valued at
US$1.420 billion and US$865 million respectively.

In terms of gear and fleets, the dramatic increases in price for skipjack and yellowfin
resulted in the purse seine fishery substantially increasing in value by 315%. The value
of the purse seine fishery increased from $US765 million in 2000 to $US3.173 billion in
2008, despite catches only increasing by 50% (see Figure 8). During that time, longline
fleets increased in value by 20% to US$1.458 billion, while pole and line increased in
value by 9% to US$US$371 million, despite recording a 35% reduction in catch. Other
gears, primarily Indonesian and Philippine artisanal fleets, increased by 163% to
$US369 million despite catches only increasing by 13%.

Purse seine fleets now dramatically exceed the value of all other fleets. However, while
the overall value of these fisheries have substantially increased, significant questions
have arisen regarding the fishery‟s economic efficiency and profitability.
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2.3.2

Reduced Overall Profitability

Since the mid-1990s, various studies have suggested that the profitability of the WCPO
tuna fisheries could be increased through significant changes in fleet composition and
reductions in most, if not all, fleets.129 Among other things, these studies have suggested
that fishing capacity was significantly above optimal levels, thereby reducing the
profitability of the WCPO tuna fisheries. In 2000, bioeconomic modelling indicated that
a reduction in fishing effort levels to 50% of 1996 levels would significantly increase
the profitability of the WCPO tuna fisheries and maximise the level of resource rent
generated within the Pacific islands region.130 Although this level of reduction would
reduce the overall revenue from the fishery, the increase in profitability would
compensate and allow coastal States to charge higher resource rents. Studies in 2006
confirmed that the level of rent generated across the WCPO tuna fisheries would
increase if effort levels were reduced, with one study recommending that a 68%
reduction in 2004 purse seine effort levels would maximise the economic profits
available from the fisheries.131 However, bioeconomic modelling by the FFA and SPC
found that these benefits would be enjoyed disproportionately and that the actual
outcomes could be detrimental to Pacific island States with significant purse seine
fisheries.132

Similarly, the current fleet composition does not necessarily maximise the benefit from
WCPO tuna fisheries. Catches of bigeye and yellowfin by purse seine fishing vessels,
129
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particularly juveniles in schools associated with FADs, provide a smaller benefit to the
overall value of the WCPO tuna fisheries than would otherwise be achieved if these fish
had been allowed to mature and then be caught by longline. The overall benefit from the
WCPO tuna fisheries would be significantly higher if these tuna were caught in a
manner (such as by longline) that allowed their maximum value to be reached. For
example, 46,781 mt of bigeye was taken by purse seine in 2008 and valued at
approximately US$80 million.133 If purse seiners had been prohibited from setting on
schools associated with FADs and were able to otherwise avoid all catches of bigeye,
then these fish may potentially have become available to the longline fishery for a far
greater benefit to the overall value of the WCPO tuna fisheries. If 47,781 mt of bigeye
was caught by longline instead of purse seine, it would potentially have provided
US$387 million, almost five times the value of the 2008 purse seine catch.134 Even
without any consideration of the potential gains from increased size and productivity
that would ensue from catching these fish as adults by longline, rather than as juveniles
by purse seine, this represents a significant lost value.

Consequently, some economists have suggested that purse seine fishing should be
reduced drastically to maximise the value of the WCPO tuna fisheries.135 However, this
would also have a significant impact on skipjack fisheries and global canned tuna
markets. This is because skipjack is not generally caught by longline and could not be
caught by pole and line in sufficient numbers to replace all purse seine catches due to
the baitfish requirements of the pole and line fishery.136

There is also a concern that the overall value of the WCPO tuna fishery has been
reduced as highly productive skipjack have filled the ecosystem niche previously
occupied by other, more heavily fished, top order predators. In theory, high levels of
fishing on less productive but more valuable predators, such as yellowfin, bigeye, and
various billfish and sharks, has reduced these stocks and allowed highly productive, but
133
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less valuable, skipjack to flourish in their place.137 If accurate, this would represent a
significant lost value in the overall WCPO tuna fishery due to the low value of skipjack
per fish.

Reducing overcapacity or changing fleet and species compositions to maximise the
benefit from the WCPO tuna fisheries would likely transfer the benefit from those
States with significant purse seine interests to those States with significant longline
interests. As will be shown later, this also has impacts on the benefits for coastal and
flag States given that longline and purse seine fleets each fish in different locations
(purse seine predominantly in coastal State waters). Ultimately, the overall profitability
of the WCPO tuna fisheries is reduced as a result of overcapacity, fleet composition and
overfishing of high value species. Resolving these inefficiencies will require some of
form of mechanism to distribute the reductions and benefits.

2.4

Tuna Catches and Conservation Status

This section summarises recent catches by gear and then analyses current scientific
literature in order to establish the current status of each stock, and their key
conservation threats. This provides the necessary baseline conservation information to
enable the thesis to analyse the WCPFC‟s relevant conservation and management
measures and determine whether they are sufficient to ensure the long term conservation
and sustainable use of bigeye and yellowfin.

2.4.1

Skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis)

Skipjack catches have steadily increased since the WCPF Convention was agreed in
2000. Overall skipjack catches have increased by 31% since 2000, with the principal
rise occurring in the dominant purse seine fishery. Purse seine catches have increased
from 81.5% of total skipjack catches in 2000, to 87% in 2008. This has largely come at
the cost of pole and line fisheries which have declined by 14.35% of total skipjack
catches in 2000, to 8% in 2008. During this same period, skipjack catches by other
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gears (i.e. largely artisanal fishing activities in the Philippines and Indonesia) have
increased 132% and now comprise 4.5% of all skipjack catches (see Figure 8).
Figure 8: Skipjack Catches 2001 - 2008 (mt)138
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Stocks assessments in 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2008 consistently indicated that these
increased levels are sustainable (for skipjack) and are not overfishing the skipjack stock,
nor is the stock in an overfished state.139 The 2008 assessment noted that recruitment
has been consistently high since the 1980s with strong peaks in 1998 and 2004-2005 in
association with El Nino events. The assessment acknowledged that current fishing
mortality exceeded the long term MSY which was estimated at 1,280,000 mt. However,
this assessment did not raise concerns as it concluded that fishing mortality was
138
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significantly under the MSY based on the higher recruitment levels generated during the
past decade (2,000,000 mt).140
The assessment proposed the following three reference points.141 It estimated that the
current biomass of skipjack had been fished down to 66% of the theoretical level that
scientists calculated would exist if fishing had not occurred (Bcurrent/Bcurrent, F=0 =
0.66).142 The assessment estimated that fishing mortality was at 26% of the level where
overfishing would occur (Fcurrent/ FMSY = 0.26) and that the current biomass of
skipjack was 299% of the level that would produce MSY (Bcurrent/ BMSY = 2.99).

The assessments suggest that skipjack is moderately exploited and could sustain higher
catches. However, as discussed earlier, there are questions whether the current use of
FADs undermines the potential yield of the stock due to the higher catches of small
skipjack. Additionally, there are concerns that the health and distribution of skipjack
may be negatively affected by the use of FADs.143 Lastly, there are also concerns that
any increase in exploitation may have negative consequences for bigeye and yellowfin
given the high catches of juveniles of both species.144

2.4.2

Yellowfin (Thunnus albacares)

Yellowfin catches in the WCPO have remained relatively stable since 2000 at around
400,000 mt per annum. Prior to the 1980s, the yellowfin fishery was dominated by
longliners. Since then, purse seine vessels have significantly increased their share of the
140
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catch. As noted earlier, 2008 was a record year for yellowfin due to a significantly
higher catch by purse seine vessels. Purse seine catches of yellowfin increased by 52%
to 334,516 mt in 2008.

Average purse seine catches for 2000-2007 were 52% of total yellowfin catches, while
2008 was significantly higher at 62% of total yellowfin catches. While overall catches
of yellowfin increased with the larger catches by purse seine vessels, the next two
largest fisheries for yellowfin only increased marginally. The share of the total
yellowfin catch for longline and other gear fisheries declined from an average of 18% in
2000-2007 to 13% in 2008. Similarly, yellowfin catches by other gears (i.e. largely
Philippine and Indonesian artisanal fisheries) declined from average 2000-2007 catch
share of 26% to 22% of all yellowfin catches in 2008 (see Figure 9).
Figure 9: Yellowfin Catches 2001 - 2008 (mt)145
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Since the establishment of the WCPFC, stock assessments for yellowfin have been
undertaken in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009.
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These have raised concerns about the
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levels of fishing mortality on yellowfin. The 2005, 2006 and 2007 assessments
indicated to varying degrees, that there was a high risk that overfishing was occurring.
In response, every meeting of the WCPFC Scientific Committee between 2005 and
2008 recommended a reduction in fishing mortality for yellowfin.147

The 2009 assessment was more optimistic than earlier assessments and indicated that
the entire WCPO yellowfin stock was not experiencing overfishing. Nevertheless, the
assessment did note that there were significant regional differences in levels of fishing
mortality, exploitation rates and depletion and that the spawning biomass in the western
equatorial region (where 95% of the total yellowfin catch is taken) had declined to
approximately 30% of its unexploited level.148

The assessment indicated a long term MSY of 552,000 to 637,000 mt but noted that
recent recruitment levels (1998-2007) are considerably lower than the long term average
recruitment levels utilised to calculate the MSY. If recent recruitment levels were
sustained, then the overall yield from the fishery will be less than the current MSY
estimates.149 The assessment proposed the following three reference points.150 It
estimated that the current biomass of yellowfin had been fished down to 57.8% to
New Caledonia, 8-19 August 2005. WCPFC. -- J. Hampton, A. Langley, et al. (2006) Stock Assessment of
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60.1% of the theoretical unfished biomass (Bcurrent/Bcurrent, F=0 = 0.578 to 0.601). The
assessment estimated that fishing mortality was at 41% to 85% of the level where
overfishing would occur (Fcurrent/ FMSY = 0.41 to 0.85) and that the current biomass of
yellowfin was 151.9% to 158.4% of the level that would produce MSY (Bcurrent/ BMSY
= 151.9 to 158.4).

In response to this more positive assessment, the 2009 Scientific Committee
downgraded its earlier recommendations for reductions and advised the WCPFC that
there be no increase in fishing mortality in the western equatorial region (where most
yellowfin catches occur).151

The scientific assessments suggest that yellowfin stocks are fully exploited and
recommend against increases in fishing mortality. They indicated that the Philippines
and Indonesian surface fisheries have high levels of juvenile fishing mortality and that
these fisheries, and purse seine fishing on FADs, have the highest impact on yellowfin
stocks, while purse seine fishing on free swimming schools has a moderate impact.
These fisheries are having high impacts in the western equatorial region, and more
generally across the WCPO. The assessment also noted that Japanese coastal pole and
line and purse seine fisheries have a significant impact on biomass levels in their home
region.152

2.4.3

Bigeye (Thunnus obesus)

Bigeye catches have increased by 36% since 2000, averaging 139,000 mt per year
(2000-2008). The fishery is almost entirely exploited by longline vessels. However, the
use of FADs by purse seine has resulted in increasingly significant bycatch of juvenile
bigeye. Catches have steadily increased since 2000, with two peak record years in 2004
and 2008. The increase in overall catches is largely attributed to a significant increase in
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purse seine bycatch of bigeye, significant increases in longline catches and a large
increase in Indonesian reports of pole and line catches of bigeye.

As shown in Figure 10, the purse seine share increased during this time from 25% of
total catches of bigeye in 2000, to 29% in 2008. Meanwhile, longline declined from
63% of total catches of bigeye in 2000, to 57% in 2008, while pole and line increased
from 2% of total catches of bigeye in 2000, to 6% in 2008.
Figure 10: Bigeye Catches 2001 - 2008 (mt) 153
160,000
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
-

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

408

712

318

464

430

404

510

346

Longline

73,877

88,605

77,670

97,626

78,774

83,559

82,701

89,930

Other Gears

11,312

12,508

12,931

19,756

17,224

12,503

13,048

13,141

Pole and Line

2,349

2,803

1,778

9,313

6,757

10,810

8,967

8,930

Purse Seine

28,771

26,344

26,072

29,944

38,254

38,066

37,434

46,781

Troll

Stock assessments for bigeye were conducted and reviewed by the WCPFC Scientific
Committee in 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2009. These assessments have raised concerns
about the levels of fishing mortality on bigeye. Each assessment has indicated that
overfishing on bigeye was occurring, although the stock was not yet in an overfished
state.154 Each subsequent Scientific Committee specifically recommended that
153
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reductions in fishing mortality were required.155 In 2006, the Scientific Committee
recommended that fishing mortality be reduced by 25% against 2001-2004 levels. In
2008, the Scientific Committee recommendation had worsened to a 30% reduction, but
noted that this would still not prevent the stock from becoming overfished.

In 2009, the assessment was markedly more pessimistic and concluded not just that
overfishing for bigeye was occurring, but that the stock may have also now moved
slightly into an overfished state. This appeared to be due to a shift in selectivity by
domestic fisheries in Indonesia and the Philippines. The assessment cautioned that
recruitment levels were highly uncertain and noted earlier assumptions of high
recruitment during 1995-2005, with recent declines back to levels approximating long
term average levels. Within this context, the assessment recommended a minimum
reduction of 44% on 2004-2007 levels, noting that some model runs had predicted far
more pessimistic outcomes.156

The 2009 assessment noted that catches significantly exceeded the long term MSY of
56,880 mt. It was suggested that this was due to recent above average recruitment and
high fishing mortality. It noted that current catches significantly exceeded MSY even if
they were recalculated based on continuing high recruitment levels (which seems
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unlikely given that recruitment appears to have recently declined).157 The assessment
proposed the following three reference points.158 It estimated that the current biomass of
bigeye had been fished down to 18% to 29% of the theoretical unfished biomass
(Bcurrent/Bcurrent, F=0 = 0.18 to 0.29). The assessment estimated that fishing mortality
was at 151% to 255% of the level where overfishing would occur (Fcurrent/ FMSY = 1.51
to 2.55) and that the current biomass of bigeye was 111% to 155% % of the level that
would produce MSY (Bcurrent/ BMSY = 1.11 to 1.55).

The 2009 assessment indicated that longline fishing continued to have the greatest
impact on bigeye across the WCPO and that purse seine fishing and the Philippines and
Indonesian domestic fisheries have a substantial impact in the western equatorial, and to
a lesser extent, the eastern equatorial regions. It also noted that Japanese coastal pole
and line and purse seine fisheries have a significant impact on biomass levels in their
home region.159

Following the assessment, the 2009 Scientific Committee recommended a 30%
reduction in fishing mortality on 2001-2004, but noted that fishing mortality has
increased rather than decreased since the 2001-2004 benchmark levels. This effectively
translated into a reduction of 34% to 50% from 2004-2007 levels.160

In conclusion, the scientific assessments suggest that bigeye stocks are experiencing
overfishing and likely to be lightly overfished. The assessments indicate that serious
reductions are required across all gears.
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2.4.4

Ecosystem Issues and Associated and Dependent Species

The tuna fisheries discussed above impact directly and indirectly on the WCPO oceanic
ecosystem. These impacts are significant for a number of associated and dependent
species.

There are two keys areas of concern regarding the impact of industrial fishing on tuna
and the broader ecosystem. First, there is a global concern that the ecological effect of
all forms of industrial fishing has been far higher than generally acknowledged and that
this potentially has serious consequences for coastal and oceanic ecosystems. In 2003,
Nature published the findings of a contentious study by Myers and Worm which
estimated that industrial fishing had reduced large predatory fish biomass by 90%
against pre-industrial levels, and that these impacts extended beyond coastal regions
into oceanic ecosystems.161 The Myers and Worm study was particularly concerning
because it suggested that most scientists and managers were unaware of the true scale of
this impact. This was because the heaviest impact occurred during the early years of a
fishery before management and scientific arrangements were in place. Myers and Worm
suggested that industrial fishing „typically reduced community biomass by 80% within
15 years of exploitation‟162 They suggested that greater consideration was required of
the substantial potential ecosystem effects of removing most large predators. They
noted that such low levels compromised the sustainability of fishing and significantly
reduced the potential economic yields.163 In order to support future restoration of large
predator stocks, Myers and Worm provided revised minimum estimates for unexploited
communities.164

Other scientists have also expressed concerns with management strategies that depend
upon accurate stock assessments but utilise estimates of pre-fishing unexploited
biomass that are based on data collected after significant impacts have already occurred.
Studies have suggested that coastal and oceanic ecosystems have been substantially
affected by fishing practices significantly prior to recent times.165 Such studies have
161

R. Myers and B. Worm. (2003) Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory Fish Communities. Nature. 423.
p280.
162
Ibid. p280.
163
Ibid. p282.
164
Ibid. p280.
165
Selected examples of such studies include: J. Jackson, M. Kirby, et al. (2001) Historical Overfishing and the
Recent Collapse of Coastal Ecosystems. Science. 293. -- V. Christensen, S. Guenette, et al. (2003) Hundred-

Page | 61

reviewed historical reports, logbooks and literature, and even palaeological and
archaeological data, which significantly pre-date the arbitrary 1950 or 1960 date that
many assessments utilise as their baseline for unexploited biomass.166 These studies
have raised concerns that modern fisheries science is shifting the baselines and using
downgraded baselines that assume the now-degraded condition of coastal and oceanic
ecosystems is normal. One of the leading scientists involved in these studies, Daniel
Pauly, argues that the effect of this „shifting baselines syndrome‟ is the „gradual
accommodation of the creeping disappearance of resource species‟ and the use of
inappropriate management reference points.167 Simultaneously, concerns have been
expressed that fisheries institutions are subsequently setting management targets that
simply attempt to arrest declines and do not aim to rebuild stocks and ecosystems to the
richer and more productive states that existed previously.168

However, not all scientists agree with such assessments, particularly in regard to the
Myers and Worm estimated impact of industrial fishing on large predatory fish.
Scientists involved in Pacific tuna stock assessments were immediate and vocal critics
of the Myers and Worm estimates, and suggested that the methodology used to
determine the estimates was deeply flawed.169 They argued that a key assumption of the
study relating to the longline catch per unit of effort was invalid and that the study had
excluded important data from the equatorial Pacific. These critics reported that their
study, accounting for these suggested methodological flaws, indicated that the biomass
decline and fishing impacts were far less severe than suggested by Myers and Worm.170
One response analysed all data from 1950 to 2004 and estimated that current biomass
for Pacific tuna species range from 36% to 91% of original biomass. However, they did
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note that estimates for large fish longer than 175cm had decreased by 80% (from 5% to
1% of population), but that the tropic level of the population had not detectably
declined.171 In response, Myers and Worm checked their assessment against these
criticisms, argued over further points of methodology and replied that re-analysis
continued to indicate that their original assumptions were still justified.172

Regardless of whether one supports or argues against these recent studies into shifting
baselines, the controversy highlights that there is considerable uncertainty in current
assessments regarding the impact of industrial fishing and the status of large predator
stocks, such as yellowfin and bigeye. Professor Callum Roberts argues that current
models used in fishery management are based on assumptions that are just as flawed as
those used in earlier models. He describes such models as „cartoons of reality.‟173

The uncertainties in fisheries assessments are further exacerbated by the use of FADs
and their potential impacts as ecological traps and the inherent uncertainties that FADs
create for behavioural assessments (see Section 2.2.4 above). These additional
uncertainties, beyond those specifically referred to in each stock assessment, are
particularly significant in the context of WCPFC conservation and management
measures. The WCPF Convention requires that members of the WCPFC shall be more
cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate.174 These requirements
are discussed in further detail in Chapter Four.

There is also considerable concern regarding the impact of tuna fisheries on associated
and dependent species. Tuna fisheries, like all other large-scale industrial fisheries,
impact to varying degrees on non-target species.175 Some non-target species of fish and
shark are captured incidentally and retained for subsequent use. These are commonly
referred to as byproduct and can provide an important component of catches,
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particularly in the longline fisheries.176 Other non-target species are captured
incidentally but have zero, or little, commercial value and are therefore discarded by the
vessel. This is referred to as bycatch and can include seabirds, turtles, cetaceans and
sharks and various species of fish that may be of little interest to the captain of a fishing
vessel who may be focused on a specific market or processing factory.177

In the WCPO tuna fisheries, the purse seine and longline gears have the largest
incidental catch (both byproduct and bycatch), while pole and line is far more selective
and tends to take only small amounts of mahi mahi, rainbow runners and non-target
tunas.178 There are some minor concerns regarding the potential impact of incidental
catches of some non-tuna species of fish and billfish that are important to island
communities for local consumption.179 However, key concerns relate to the potential
impacts of bycatch on vulnerable species (i.e. seabirds, cetaceans, turtles and sharks).180
As noted in Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5, there is significant bycatch of vulnerable species in
the longline and purse seine (particularly FAD) fisheries with potentially adverse
impacts on some species.181
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2.5

Conclusion

The WCPFC faces an increasingly complex and urgent conservation and management
challenge. The scientific assessments clearly indicate that urgent action is required to
address overfishing and reduce fishing mortality for bigeye, and halt any increases in
fishing mortality for yellowfin. However, catches have continued to increase across all
gears and all three tuna species, despite numerous recommendations from the Scientific
Committee that conservation action is required.

This Chapter demonstrates that the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries are comprised of
numerous gears and species that migrate across a vast area and multiple boundaries.
Each species of tropical tuna is caught by each gear in a tightly inter-meshed manner
that is difficult, if not impossible, to separate. Consequently, this makes the fishery
inherently challenging to manage. This complexity is exacerbated by the substantially
different biological characteristics of skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye (i.e. the highly
resilient and productive skipjack appears to be under little pressure from existing fishing
operations, while the longer-lived and less productive bigeye is suffering significantly
from overfishing).

In conclusion, the Chapter demonstrates that the inter-meshed characteristics of the
WCPO tropical tuna fisheries will make it difficult for the WCPFC to sufficiently
reduce fishing mortality of bigeye, and restrain fishing mortality for yellowfin, without
significantly impacting on fishing activities for skipjack. Consequently, it is likely that
the WCPFC will need to implement a broad mix of reductions and controls across a
range of gears and locations to ensure the long term conservation and sustainable use of
bigeye and yellowfin. Furthermore, it appears increasingly likely that some form of
total, or almost total, FAD prohibition will ultimately be required to address the
increasingly significant concerns regarding juvenile bycatch and the potentially
significant ecological trap concerns.
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Chapter Three: Regional and Global Developments in
Fisheries Governance
RFMOs play a critical role in the global system of fisheries governance. They
are the primary mechanism for achieving the cooperation between and among
coastal States and fishing nations that is essential for the effective management
of international fisheries.182

3.1

Introduction

The WCPF Convention was negotiated at a time when the WCPO tuna stocks were in a
relatively healthy state, and not under imminent threat of overfishing or decline.
Delegations came together to negotiate a fisheries convention that would maintain the
tuna stocks in good health for the benefit of all participants, current and future. 183 These
negotiations produced the world‟s first fisheries convention that incorporated modern
principles and standards of fisheries governance, much of which had only recently been
adopted by UNFSA and the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.

However, as demonstrated by Chapter Two, the WCPO tuna fisheries are now under
significant pressure from overfishing and urgent action is required to reduce fishing
mortality for bigeye, and halt any increase in fishing mortality for yellowfin.
Nevertheless, catches have continued to increase across all gears and all three tuna
species, despite numerous recommendations from the Scientific Committee that
conservation action is required.

The next three Chapters analyse the founding treaty for the WCPFC, the WCPF
Convention. This analysis enables the thesis to determine whether the WCPF
Convention provides a sufficient framework to ensure the long term conservation and
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sustainable use of the WCPO tuna stocks. The benchmarks for this analysis are
provided by the principles and standards of modern international fisheries governance,
as prescribed by the LOSC, UNFSA, the Code of Conduct, and other relevant
agreements. These principles and standards provide an agreed template for how States
should cooperate in fisheries management. Consequently, they can be used as a
benchmark to test the adequacy of the WCPF Convention as a framework for
conservation and management.

Chapter Three introduces the fundamental agreements that prescribe modern
international fisheries governance, and provides a concise background on the regional
institutions and the negotiation of the WCPF Convention. Chapters Four and Five then
analyse the provisions of the WCPF Convention and identify and assess the key
principles and standards against benchmarks in international fisheries governance.

3.2

International Fisheries Governance

The LOSC, UNFSA and the Code of Conduct prescribe a framework of principles for
international fisheries governance.184 The implementation of these principles is
informed by internationally agreed minimum standards that are elaborated within these
instruments and other supplementary agreements.185 These principles and standards
have developed through tradition, customary law and diplomatic conferences.186 Some
of these developments, such as the ecosystem based approach to fisheries management,
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are relatively new to fisheries governance and post-dated the negotiation and adoption
of the LOSC. Other principles, such as the freedom to fish on the high seas, can be
continuously traced back through centuries old rules of customary law.

At the most basic level, the principles and standards for the conservation, management
and exploitation of WCPO tuna fisheries are framed within the context of three
international principles. First, the principle of State sovereignty allows States to
authorise and undertake activities within their territory, free of external interference
within internationally agreed limits. Related principles of international law regarding
State sovereignty were explicitly articulated by the United Nations General Assembly in
1970, based on earlier principles prescribed by the United Nations Charter.187 The
principle of sovereignty was further articulated during the latter 20th Century to
recognise the permanent sovereignty that States have over their natural resources. These
developments occurred during a period of de-colonisation as newly emergent
developing States asserted control over natural resources within their territories, against
the interests of foreign companies which had attained rights over these resources during
the colonial era. 188
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Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law.
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Second, these rights are limited by the principle of international law, sic utere two ut
alienum non laedas, and precedents in case law,189 which impose an obligation on
States to consider, and not infringe unduly upon, the sovereignty and sovereign rights of
other States in their exercise of their own territorial sovereignty or sovereign rights.190
These principles have provided the conceptual foundation for developments in
international environmental law, most notably Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration which recognised that States have a „responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.‟191

Third, States may decide to exert their sovereignty through entering into treaties that
may further extend their rights and obligations. However, the effect of such treaties
(including the WCPF Convention) is limited by a principle of customary international
law: Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt (hereafter cited as pacta tertiis). This principle
dates back to Roman law and describes the basic rule of contract law that agreements do
not impose rights or obligations on third parties. The principle was codified in the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969 Vienna Convention). As codified in
Article 34, treaties do not „create either obligations or rights for a third State without its
consent.‟192

189
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Beyond this foundation, the principles, standards and legal order for the operation and
implementation of these institutions and measures is provided by the LOSC and an
umbrella of supplementary binding and non-binding agreements. Collectively, these
agreements, and the principles and standards they established, provide the international
fisheries governance framework within which all marine fisheries are exploited and
managed.193
The LOSC provides the fundamental „constitution for the oceans,‟194 and articulates a
number of basic principles for the conservation and management of fisheries resources
and the marine environment. Despite some opposition,195 119 States signed the LOSC
when it was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica, an
unprecedented event in the history of international conferences.196 Since then, a total of
160 States have acceded to or ratified the legally binding LOSC.197

In most respects, the story of the negotiation of the LOSC is a highlight of international
political history. Commentators lauded the signature of the LOSC as a „major step
towards an integrated management regime for the oceans‟198 and a monumental
achievement of the international community that would stand the test of time as a
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comprehensive constitution of the oceans.199 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to
study the negotiations of the LOSC in depth and much has already been written
detailing the various interests and machinations that took place during those nine
years.200 For the purposes of this study, the outcomes of most interest are the principles
that the LOSC established relating to fisheries conservation and management. These are
described in detail in Chapters Five and Six.

At the adoption of the LOSC, it was suggested that the property rights granted to coastal
States would significantly resolve the tragedy of the commons in fisheries and allow for
effective fisheries management within coastal regions.201 However, by the early 1990s it
became increasingly apparent that the LOSC on its own was insufficient to address the
increasing threats posed by overfishing, overcapacity and destructive fishing
practices.202 Subsequently, in 1992, two important global meetings were held that would
become catalysts for the development of new principles and standards in modern
199
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international fisheries governance, particularly in regard to straddling and highly
migratory fisheries.

In May 1992, Mexico and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
organised an International Conference on Responsible Fishing in Cancun, Mexico. The
conference adopted the Declaration of Cancun which, among other things, noted the
lack of management of high seas fisheries and the severe problem of overcapacity in
fishing fleets. The Declaration called upon States to implement a number of actions to
improve conservation and management of world fisheries and called upon the FAO to
draft a Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing that took the Declaration‟s principles
into account.203

In June 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) agreed that measures were required to more effectively promote the
implementation of the LOSC and ensure that high seas marine living resources were
exploited in a rational manner. Chapter 17 of the UNCED declaration, Agenda 21,
called for States to implement a number of actions to ensure that high seas fisheries
were managed in accordance with the LOSC. Most importantly, Agenda 21 called upon
the United Nations to convene a special conference on implementation of provisions of
the LOSC relating to straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.204

These two initiatives began a prolific series of conferences and negotiations that ran
concurrently and consecutively throughout much of the 1990s under the aegis of both
the United Nations General Assembly and the FAO. Both initiatives attempted to
remedy the weaknesses in the LOSC and strengthen the global framework for fisheries
management through the development of new binding and non-binding agreements.
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The two initiatives ultimately resulted in the successful negotiation of the Code of
Conduct, UNFSA and various other supplementary agreements to the LOSC.205 UNFSA
is the most significant of these supplementary agreements in regard to straddling and
highly migratory fisheries.206 It is effectively the centre of this group of new agreements
that were intended to address the weaknesses and gaps within the LOSC in regard to
high seas fisheries.207 Reflecting the significance of UNFSA, much has since been
written on its negotiation of UNFSA, and the various machinations and interests of
those involved.208 Given this broad literature and comprehensive analysis, it would be
redundant for this thesis to review the negotiation of UNFSA in detail. However, it is
useful to briefly note a key conflict from the conference that continues to smoulder
within the WCPFC, and introduce some of the important new principles and standards
that UNFSA elaborated.

The conflict was between coastal States and DWFNs who disagreed on how to
implement compatible management across both high seas and EEZs, while balancing
their respective rights. Coastal States argued that unregulated fishing on the high seas
was responsible for the crisis in straddling and highly migratory fisheries and that the
LOSC had already resolved questions relating to conservation and management within
EEZs. These States opposed weakening sovereign rights or the integrity of EEZs, or
introducing new obligations on coastal States, and supported the negotiation of a
binding treaty that would address fishing on the high seas only. 209 On the other hand,
205

This activity also resulted in the development of issue-specific agreements, resolutions and plans such as the
FAO Compliance Agreement, the four International Plans of Action (IPOAs) and various United Nations
General Assembly resolutions. These supplementary agreements are components of the global framework for
fisheries management and elaborate upon the LOSC and provide guidance in relation to specific conservation
and management issues (i.e. mitigating seabird bycatch).
206
S. Nandan. (2005) Current Fisheries Governance. Moving from Words to Action. St Johns, Newfoundland
207
M. W. Lodge. (2004) Improving International Governance in the Deep Sea. The International Journal of
Marine and Coastal Law. 19.3.
208
One of the more interesting commentaries on the Conference is provided by De Yturriaga, a Spanish
Permanent Representative to the UN. De Yturriaga writes from a „freedom to fish the high seas‟ viewpoint that
is closer to distant water fishing State interests than coastal State interests. He is critical of Nandan‟s support
for a binding Agreement and describes Nandan‟s actions at the fourth meeting as an abandonment of his
presidential neutrality. J. A. De Yturriaga. (1997) The International Regime of Fisheries. Publications on
Ocean Development. vol. 30. Boston. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. For other selected readings on the
Conference and UNFSA that present a more comprehensive range of views, see: J.-P. Levy and G. G. Schram,
Ed. (1996) United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. The
Hague, Netherlands. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. -- D. J. Doulman. (1995) Structure and Process of the 19931995 United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Rome, Italy.
FAO. -- D. Balton. (1996) Strengthening the Law of the Sea: The New Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Ocean Development and International Law. 27.
209
In this light, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Iceland and New Zealand jointly submitted a draft Convention text
to the second session in July 1993 that applied the Convention only to the high seas Argentina, Canada, Chile,

Page | 73

DWFNs argued that the LOSC and RFMOs already prescribed sufficiently binding rules
and that it was impractical for a global treaty to create more specific rules, as these
could not fit differing regional requirements. They argued against restricting their
conditional rights to fish the high seas and sought to minimise text that regulated high
seas fisheries. These States supported the negotiation of non-binding broad guidelines
that would support the conservation and management of straddling and migratory fish
stocks on the high seas and inside EEZs, and argued that explicit measures should be
left to RFMOs.210

The Chair of the conference, Satya Nandan, attempted to balance these interests and
suggested that the final outcome of the conference must address five key elements in
order for it to be effective and avert a global fisheries crisis. These key elements were to
be consistent with the LOSC and included: sufficiently detailed minimum international
standards for conservation and management; ensuring compatible and coherent
measures across high seas and EEZs; effective mechanisms for compliance and
enforcement; globally agreed framework for regional cooperation; and compulsory
dispute settlement mechanisms.211 In 1995, a successful compromise was negotiated,
despite significant concerns from both sides.212 UNFSA was subsequently adopted in
August 1995 and entered into force in December 2001.213 The new agreement reflected
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210
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the migratory and straddling nature of the fish stocks in question and further developed
existing principles and standards from the LOSC relating to cooperation between States,
compatibility of conservation and management across international boundaries, and
State responsibility.214 In turn, these UNFSA principles are now recognised as important
general principles for all fisheries management215 and a foundation of modern ocean
governance.216

UNFSA institutionalised the duty to cooperate through requiring States to cooperate,
either directly or through appropriate sub-regional fisheries organisations or RFMOs.217
UNFSA expanded on the LOSC and explicitly required all UNFSA parties to apply the
conservation and management measures established by relevant existing RFMOs such
as the WCPFC. This significantly extended the authority of relevant RFMOs as it
indirectly bound all UNFSA parties to apply all relevant RFMO conservation measures,
regardless of their status in relation to individual RFMOs.218 Furthermore, only those
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Migratory Fish Stocks. New York, USA, 24 to 28 May 2010. United Nations.
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parties which participated in such organisations, or agreed to implement their
conservation and management measures, would now have access to the fishery
resources to which the RFMO measures applied.219 The intent of UNFSA is succinctly
summarised by Michael Lodge, an international lawyer who supported Nandan‟s
drafting of UNFSA. He suggests that the logic behind the agreement was „to create a
situation where global rules are applied on a regional basis through regional
organisations and those who do not play by the rules of the relevant RFMO may not
fish‟.220

UNFSA also prescribed specific requirements for coastal States and fishing States to
implement compatible conservation and management measures. While UNFSA
explicitly recognised and maintained the sovereign rights of coastal States, it
simultaneously prescribed new conservation, cooperation and compatibility obligations
that applied to waters under national jurisdiction as well as the high seas. UNFSA also
prescribed strong new compliance and enforcement provisions that significantly
expanded the flag State responsibilities described in LOSC, and controversially
established boarding and inspection procedures that allowed foreign flagged vessels to
board and inspect fishing vessels on the high seas.

In addition, UNFSA prescribed a precautionary approach to the conservation,
management and exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fisheries and required
parties to adopt science based measures to manage, conserve and protect target stocks,
associated and dependent stocks and marine biodiversity in general. 221 This filled in the
gaps of the LOSC provisions relating to conservation and management and responded
to concerns that traditional single species focused fisheries management approaches
were failing to adequately consider important ecosystem interactions and manage
fishing activities in a sustainable manner.

These new principles are analysed in further detail in Chapters Five and Six in the
context of the WCPF Convention. The WCPF Convention incorporated most of these
new principles and standards with little change. Nevertheless, UNFSA is still significant
219
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to the WCPO fisheries due to its global nature and its extension of WCPFC
conservation and management measures on to all UNFSA parties.

While negotiations were taking place in New York for UNFSA, the FAO in Rome built
upon the Cancun Declaration and began negotiating the voluntary non-binding Code of
Conduct222 and its integral component, the binding FAO Compliance Agreement.223 The
United Nations General Assembly and FAO negotiations covered over-lapping ground
on some matters, included some of the same delegates for both initiatives, incorporated
similar concepts, and influenced each other‟s development.224

The Code of Conduct broadly set the agenda for fisheries conservation and
management225 and articulated „principles and standards applicable to the conservation,
management and development of all fisheries‟.226 Furthermore, while UNFSA only
addressed straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, the Code of Conduct applied to
all fisheries, both on the high seas and in waters under national jurisdiction. In effect, it
provided a globally non-binding framework for national and international efforts to
develop and implement sustainable fisheries practices (although it also includes
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provisions that are binding under other legal instruments such as the LOSC, UNFSA
and FAO Compliance Agreement).
The Code of Conduct was „holistic in nature‟227 and addressed all areas of fisheries and
aquaculture, from exploration to postharvest processing and trade. Implementation is
supported through various workshops, programme activities, technical guidelines228 and
additional agreements and mechanisms.229 While implementation continues to be
slow,230 a key success of the Code of Conduct has been its establishment of a broadly
accepted framework of principles and standards that guides national and international
efforts to improve fisheries management and development.

While the principles and standards that are prescribed by the Code of Conduct and its
supplementary agreements are legally non-binding and depend upon individual States
for implementation, it is important to note that they carry the imprimatur of global
227
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consensus and are linked to the LOSC and UNFSA. The LOSC requires coastal and
fishing States, in determining conservation and management measures and total
allowable catches for EEZs and high seas, to take into account „any generally
recommended international standards, whether subregional, regional or global‟.231 This
is further strengthened by UNFSA which requires States to „adopt and apply any
generally recommended international minimum standards for the responsible conduct of
fishing operations‟.232 Furthermore, UNFSA also instructs „any court or tribunal to
which a dispute has been submitted under this Part shall apply … as well as generally
accepted standards for the conservation and management of living marine resources‟.233
In effect, the non-binding standards prescribed by the Code and its subsequent
agreements can quickly accumulate a significant mandate as they become generally
recommended international minimum standards.234

In addition, some global environmental instruments prescribe general principles and
standards that are sometimes relevant to international fisheries governance. The three
most relevant in regard to highly migratory fisheries include: 235 the Convention on
Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES); 236 the Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species (Bonn Convention);237 and the Convention on the
Conservation of Biological Diversity (CBD).238 While these instruments are not directed
at fisheries or marine conservation, they each have programmes or measures that are
relevant in some manner. For example, the CBD is a framework agreement that works
towards three goals: conservation of biological diversity; sustainable use of its
231
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components; and fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation
of genetic resources.239 These goals are implemented through a non-binding work
programme and the national activities of its 193 Parties.240 Each of these Parties are
responsible for implementing CBD provisions and applying these to activities
undertaken by its citizens (or entities) that may adversely affect biodiversity. In regard
to fisheries, this includes obligations on State Parties to, among other things, identify
and monitor processes and activities that may have significant adverse impacts on
marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction241 and require environmental impact
assessments of proposed projects that are likely to have significant adverse impacts on
marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction.242

In summary, the LOSC, UNFSA and the Code of Conduct provide the foundation texts
for the modern international fisheries governance framework, particularly in regard to
highly migratory fisheries. This framework prescribes the international principles and
standards for conservation and management, and in so doing establishes the legal
environment within which decisions are enacted, interpreted, implemented and
disputed. The LOSC provides the basic framework and core principles. UNFSA further
elaborates this framework, prescribing specific principles and standards for the
conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. The Code
of Conduct and supplementary agreements and mechanisms provide further detail for
principles and standards that all States should work towards individually and
collectively. In addition, this framework is elaborated by other binding and non-binding
agreements, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and decisions in case law
that are not directly linked to the LOSC, UNFSA or the Code of Conduct, but
nevertheless elaborate principles and standards that may impact on modern fisheries
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governance. A few examples of such matters include conservation of marine
biodiversity243 and the regulation of trade.244

3.3

Pre-WCPFC Cooperation in Fisheries Management and Development

Prior to the establishment of the WCPFC, the Pacific island States developed a strong
collective approach and created a number of cooperative institutions to support the
sustainable management and development of the WCPO tuna fisheries. The Pacific
Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) played a central role in fostering regional
cooperation amongst its membership in their management and development of the
region‟s tuna fisheries. Based in Honiara, Solomon Islands, the FFA was founded in
1979 by the independent Pacific island States, Australia and New Zealand and sits
within the Pacific Islands Forum umbrella. In 1979, the independent members of the
Pacific Islands Forum (then named the South Pacific Forum) foresaw the challenges
involved in managing and developing their newly proclaimed exclusive economic zones
(EEZs) and recognised that individually they did not have the capacity to respond
adequately. They combined their resources and established the FFA to promote intraregional cooperation and harmonisation of fisheries management policies. The mission
of the FFA is to support and enable Pacific island States to achieve sustainable fisheries
and maximise their social and economic benefits in harmony with the broader
environment.245
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The FFA itself does not manage the tuna fisheries and has no such mandate, nor any
authority to enforce decisions of its governing council.246 This is an important
distinction as the establishment of the FFA caused concern among distant water fishing
nations (DWFNs) that the FFA was a regional fisheries management organisation and
therefore should be open to the participation of distant water fishing States with an
interest in the tuna fisheries.247 The FFA supports the interests of the Pacific island
States through facilitating regional cooperation in their favour and providing technical
and policy advice. Concerns over the role of the FFA were effectively laid to rest in the
early 1990s as discussions developed for the establishment of the WCPFC.248

The FFA works closely with its partner agency, the Secretariat of the Pacific
Community (SPC), to facilitate regional cooperation and support the management and
development of the region‟s tuna fisheries, at various national and regional levels. The
SPC, formerly the South Pacific Community, was the first of the regional fora to be
established. It was founded in 1947 by the colonial powers of the time: Australia, New
Zealand, Netherlands, France, United Kingdom and the United States of America
(USA). The membership evolved through the period of de-colonisation and now
includes the independent Pacific island States,249 the Pacific island territories250 and
Australia, New Zealand, France and the USA. The organisation‟s headquarters are in
Noumea, with regional offices throughout the Pacific islands region. Its mission is to
„help Pacific island people make and implement informed decisions about their
future‟.251

The framework for much of the subsequent success in Pacific island fisheries
cooperation was established in 1982 by a sub-set of the FFA membership who have
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since become a driving force within the FFA.252 The 1982 Nauru Agreement
Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common Interest was
negotiated by the equatorial Pacific island States whose waters include the most
significant fisheries.253 The Pacific island Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA)
recognised that they were in a weak position when negotiating access arrangements
individually with DWFNs, particularly when DWFNs played each State against each
other in negotiations over access fees and conditions.254 In response, the PNA
negotiated the Nauru Agreement in order to coordinate and harmonise their fisheries
management and access conditions, thereby placing themselves in a stronger strategic
position when negotiating with DWFNs.255 The Nauru Agreement became the
cornerstone for regional cooperation and enabled subsequent cooperative agreements to
develop increasingly harmonised approaches to common fisheries that would extend
beyond the limited membership of the PNA.

Immediately after concluding the Nauru Agreement, the PNA negotiated an
implementing arrangement to begin operationalising the treaty‟s objectives.256 The First
Implementing Arrangement to the Nauru Agreement257 was adopted in September 1983
and established harmonised minimum terms and conditions for foreign fishing vessels.
While these conditions were originally intended to only apply to PNA, the broader FFA
endorsed a draft of the conditions during their negotiations and began a parallel
initiative that quickly extended the application of the minimum terms and conditions to
the entire FFA membership. In January 1991, following a significant increase in the
252
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number of vessels fishing in PNA waters, the Second Implementing Arrangement to the
Nauru Agreement came into effect and expanded the minimum terms and conditions to
also incorporate observer requirements, prohibit transhipments at sea, expand
monitoring and surveillance, and introduce an annual registration for the regional vessel
register. Once again the broader membership of the FFA endorsed the PNA‟s expanded
conditions and agreed that they should be implemented throughout all the FFA
member‟s EEZs.258 In 1997, the FFA built on these arrangements and agreed to require
all their licensed foreign vessels to report continuously to a satellite based vessel
monitoring system that would be operated by the FFA secretariat and would forward
vessel positions to national officers to monitor.259

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PNA became concerned at the rapid
expansion of the purse seine fishery and its potential impact on the long term
sustainability of the WCPO tuna fisheries. In 1990, the PNA agreed to provisionally
limit the number of purse seine vessel licenses. In 1993, the PNA members signed the
legally binding Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Purse Seine Fishery in
the Western and Central Pacific (Palau Arrangement, 1995) which subsequently entered
into force in 1995.260

Prior to the establishment of the WCPFC, the Palau Arrangement was the only
mechanism available to control purse seine fishing effort in the WCPO.261 The Palau
Arrangement aimed to protect tuna stocks from overfishing and improve the economic
benefits to Pacific island members of the PNA from access fees and fisheries
development. It attempted to do this through limiting the licenses available to fish
within the PNA EEZs (therefore limiting catches and hopefully increasing prices) and
enabling further cooperation in the management of the purse seine fisheries between
PNA members. Given its exclusive coastal State membership, the scope of the Palau
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Arrangement was effectively limited to EEZs, although significantly, the preamble to
the Arrangement emphasised the special interest of coastal States in tuna in adjacent
high seas areas.

Despite their impressive degree of cooperation, the exclusive coastal State membership
of the FFA and PNA inevitably limited the effectiveness of these institutions and
arrangements. Fishing effort targeting the same migratory stocks on the high seas and
inside the neighbouring waters of Indonesia and the Philippines was unregulated with
potentially significant impacts on the sustainability of the WCPO tuna stocks. In
practice, the WCPO tuna fisheries were still an unregulated and open access fishery, and
vulnerable to the „tragedy of the commons‟.262 This limitation was acknowledged in the
founding convention for the FFA when it was first signed in 1979. Article Three of the
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention recognised that:
„effective co-operation for the conservation and optimum utilisation of the
highly migratory species of the region will require the establishment of
additional international machinery to provide for co-operation between all
coastal states in the region and all states involved in the harvesting of such
resources.‟263

In the early 1990s, FFA members began discussions to establish a broader regional
forum that could enable effective management of the migratory tuna fisheries beyond
their EEZs and ensure the long term sustainability of the tuna stocks. This regional
forum would have to be far more open than the closed membership of the FFA or PNA,
262
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and would need to engage the DWFNs, Indonesia and the Philippines. In 1994, the FFA
hosted a multilateral high level conference of Pacific island States and DWFNs on the
future management and conservation of straddling and highly migratory fisheries within
the WCPO. Thus began the development of the WCPFC.264

3.4

Negotiating the WCPF Convention

While delegates met in New York to negotiate UNFSA, the FFA hosted a Multilateral
High Level Conference (MHLC) of WCPO coastal States and DWFNs to exchange
views on improving cooperation in fisheries data collection and compliance with
licensing regulations.265 Previously, there had been a strong reluctance among Pacific
island States to develop a multilateral approach with DWFNs for the conservation and
management of WCPO tuna fisheries. This was due largely to power disparities and a
history of conflict between the island States and DWFNs over fishing access to their
EEZs, and disagreements over the role of DWFNs in the conservation and management
of fisheries in EEZs.266 This conflict was particularly strong in regard to differing views
over coastal States rights over migratory fisheries. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the
USA rejected interpretations of the LOSC that granted coastal states sovereign rights
over migratory species within their EEZs.267 By the late 1980s, this argument had
264
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265

Page | 86

largely been resolved as it became widely accepted that the LOSC granted coastal States
„practically exclusive powers over regulating access‟ to the fisheries within their EEZ,
including straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.268 In 1996, the USA officially
changed its position and asserted sovereign rights over highly migratory species within
its EEZ.269

Although limited in scope, the meeting nevertheless agreed on the need to cooperatively and sustainably manage WCPO tuna resources across their entire range.270
This agreement initiated two subsequent technical consultations to discuss improved
cooperation in data, science and the establishment of a vessel monitoring system.271

Progress towards a multilateral approach began to develop momentum soon after the
adoption of UNFSA in 1995. At the Twenty Sixth South Pacific Islands Forum in 1995,
regional leaders called for the urgent development of comprehensive regional fisheries
management arrangements consistent with UNFSA, in light of the successful outcomes
of the UNFSA negotiations.272 Forum leaders expressed their consensus view that these
management arrangements must utilise a precautionary approach to ensure the
sustainable exploitation of the WCPO tuna fisheries.273 In 1996, the Forum Leaders

of the Sea Convention: New Initiatives on Governance of High Seas Fisheries Resources: the Straddling Stocks
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supported an offer by the Marshall Islands to host a second MHLC between coastal
States and DWFN in order to progress the development of such an arrangement.274

3.4.1

The Majuro Declaration

The Second Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and Management
of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific was held in Majuro,
Marshall Islands, in June 1997. This initiated an intense three years of negotiations
between coastal States and DWFNs over the future management of the region‟s tuna
fisheries.275 The second MHLC was described as a seminal event and the first time that
all WCPO coastal States and DWFNs had collectively agreed to a multilateral approach
to the conservation and management of the region‟s tuna fisheries.276

The second MHLC committed to establish a mechanism for the conservation and
management of the WCPO highly migratory fish stocks and concluded with the
adoption of the Majuro Declaration which established timelines and principles for
negotiations, and identified matters to be covered within any subsequent
arrangement.277 Significantly, the Majuro Declaration recognised recent developments
in fisheries governance and conservation as requiring consideration when negotiating
future arrangements. These included the LOSC, Agenda 21 and the recently concluded
UNFSA.278 These were important statements given ongoing concerns at the time that
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UNFSA might not achieve sufficient support to enter into force or to achieve its aims.279
Significantly, although some DWFNs had yet to overcome their concerns regarding
UNFSA and ratify the Agreement, they appeared ready to endorse the authority of
UNFSA within the context of MHLC negotiations.280

Furthermore, the Declaration noted a number of concerns and committed participants to
incorporate a number of principles within their negotiations. The Declaration included
commitments by participants to collect and share fisheries data in accordance with
UNFSA and cooperate in the monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing
activities.281 It noted environmental concerns and the need to avoid adverse impacts on
the marine environment, preserve marine biodiversity, maintain the integrity of the
marine ecosystem and minimise the risk of long term or irreversible effects of fishing
operations.282 The Declaration recognised the importance of highly migratory fish
stocks to developing States and territories in the region and their need for special
assistance. Participants committed to provide financial, scientific and technical
assistance to Pacific island developing States and territories to enable them to
participate effectively in the conservation, management and sustainable use of tuna.283 It
also recognised that States held rights to fish on the high seas, and held a duty to
cooperate and take measures as necessary for the conservation of living resources on the
high seas.284 Significantly, in the context of discussions regarding highly migratory
fisheries, the Declaration explicitly recognised the sovereign rights and duties held by
coastal States over living marine resources within their EEZs.285 This was notable given
earlier opposition by some DWFNs to the recognition of coastal State rights over highly
migratory fisheries inside their EEZs. Finally, the Declaration included a commitment
279
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by participants to cooperate in the conservation and management of highly migratory
fisheries across their range, in accordance with the principles contained in the LOSC
and UNFSA (explicitly including the precautionary approach), and ensure that
conservation and management measures for highly migratory fish stocks in waters
under national jurisdiction and the high seas were compatible.286

Through its recognition of the LOSC, UNFSA and Agenda 21, and its explicit
references to the concerns noted above, the Majuro Declaration provided a framework
of principles for subsequent negotiations that was significantly more sophisticated than
any other RFMO then in existence.287 Many of the principles within this framework –
such as compatibility, coastal State sovereign rights over migratory fisheries, the
precautionary approach, and the ecosystem based approach to management – had only
recently been incorporated into modern fisheries governance and had been the cause of
considerable contention. Some of these tensions, particularly regarding interpretations
of compatibility and a precautionary approach, continued throughout the following
MHLC negotiations.288
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3.4.2

The Multilateral High Level Conference 1997-2000

The Majuro Declaration identified a number of matters that required consideration by
further sessions of the MHLC in 1998 and 1999. These matters included: geographical
area to be covered; membership and participation by observers; mechanisms for
decision making and procedures for settlement of disputes; relationships with other
regional and global fisheries organisations; financial and administrative arrangements;
species and stocks to be covered by the arrangement; determination of conservation and
management measures, including the application of the precautionary approach;
mechanisms for the collection and exchange of fisheries data, and scientific research;
and procedures for monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement.289

Guided by this framework, WCPO coastal States and DWFNs subsequently met five
more times between June 1997 and September 2000, as they negotiated a new fisheries
convention for the WCPO. These conferences were chaired by Satya Nandan who had
recently concluded his successful leadership of the UNFSA negotiations.

In June 1998, to the surprise of delegations, Nandan initiated discussions with the
submission of a draft convention for consideration.290 The draft text built upon
discussions in Majuro and intercessional technical meetings, but was largely based on
UNFSA, with some consideration of existing regional arrangements and other
international agreements such as the Code of Conduct.291 Despite concerns from both
coastal States and DWFNs regarding the presumptive and broad nature of this action,
the draft nevertheless set the structure for subsequent negotiations.292
289
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There is a significant collection of official reports293 and literature294 that provides
detailed analysis and commentary on the content and nature of the MHLC negotiations.
Notably, Sandra Tarte attended every MHLC from 1997 onwards and wrote detailed
reports on each meeting.295 This thesis will not repeat earlier work on the MHLC but
will focus its analysis on the framework established by the MHLC, the WCPF
Convention.
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In brief, subsequent MHLC meetings negotiated through the matters raised in the
Majuro Declaration, reaching a conclusion at the seventh session of the MHLC in
Honolulu, USA in September 2000. These negotiations were often contentious, but
despite their controversies, the MHLC was ultimately successful in that it produced the
world‟s first tuna RFMO Convention that fully reflected the provisions of UNFSA.296 In
so doing, the MHLC incorporated many of the modern principles and standards of
fisheries governance that had developed during the 1990s.

However, the negotiations failed to resolve some fundamental disagreements and
consequently depended upon ambiguous language to progress agreement and enable the
WCPF Convention to be adopted. These matters will be discussed in detail in Chapters
Five and Six as they relate to the provisions of the WCPF Convention. In summary, the
MHLC was unable to agree on defined northern or western boundaries and adopted an
eastern boundary that partly overlapped with the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IATTC). The MHLC also deferred interpretation of contentious matters
relating to application to archipelagic waters, compatibility of management across EEZs
and high seas, and criteria for „real interest‟ to the Commission. While the MHLC
provided comprehensive guidance on various conservation and management issues, it
failed to address a fundamental disagreement on whether the Commission should
allocate fishing rights throughout its membership for all the highly migratory fish
throughout their range.

At the Seventh Session of the MHLC, the Chair concluded negotiations after all efforts
at reaching agreement had been exhausted, and formally presented the Conference with
a draft text of the Convention. The Convention was adopted by a vote of 19 in favour,
two against (Japan and Korea), and three abstentions (China, France and Tonga).297
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The Seventh Session of the MHLC also adopted a resolution to organise the
establishment of the Commission. This initiated seven preparatory conferences that met
from 2001 to 2004. The Conference established three working groups that developed a
number of recommendations relating to: the organisation structure of the Commission,
its budget and financial contributions;298 the scientific structure of the Commission and
the provision of interim scientific advice;299 and monitoring, control and surveillance.300
Despite significant early tensions and attempts by the USA, Japan and Korea to reopen
the Convention, the Preparatory Conferences were ultimately successful in resolving
outstanding matters. By the conclusion of these Conferences, Japan, Korea, China,
France and Tonga had all committed to support the new Commission. This was a
significant achievement and ensured that the Commission enjoyed sufficient
participation.301
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Session of the Preparatory Conference for the Establishment of the Commission on the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Suva, Fiji. University of the
South Pacific. -- S. Tarte. (2003) Report on the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Conference for the
Establishment of the Commission on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific. Suva, Fiji. University of the South Pacific. -- S. Tarte. (2003) Report on the Fifth
Session of the Preparatory Conference for the Establishment of the Commission on the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Suva, Fiji. University of the
South Pacific. -- S. Tarte. (2004) Report on the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Conference for the
Establishment of the Commission on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific. Suva, Fiji. University of the South Pacific.
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Importantly, the Preparatory Conferences also developed and recommended the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Rules of Procedure. 302 These were
adopted at the First Regular Session of the WCPFC and were particularly important for
clarifying the role and mandate of the Northern Committee, and the nature and extent of
the participation of territories.303

3.5

Conclusion

In conclusion, despite their controversies, the MHLC and Preparatory Conferences were
ultimately successful in that they engaged most of the key coastal States and DWFNs
behind the world‟s first tuna RFMO Convention that fully reflected the provisions of
UNFSA.304 In so doing, the MHLC incorporated many of the modern principles and
standards of fisheries governance that had developed during the 1990s.

302

WCPFC. (2004) Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Rules of Procedure. Inaugural Session
of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Pohnpei, FSM, 9 to 10 December 2004. WCPFC.
303
See Annex 1 (Northern Committee) and Annex II (Participating Territories). Ibid.
304
M. Lodge. (2006) The Practice of Fishing Entities in Regional Fisheries Management Organisations: The
Case of the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Ocean Development and International Law. 37.
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Chapter Four: The WCPF Convention – Cooperation
The effectiveness of the regulation of international marine fisheries is
constrained by the consensual nature of international law.305

4.1

Introduction

This chapter analyses provisions of the WCPF Convention relating to cooperation and
the establishment of a RFMO. This analysis assesses whether they are consistent with
international principles and standards relating to cooperation over highly migratory
fisheries, as prescribed by the LOSC, UNFSA, the Code of Conduct, and other relevant
agreements. These principles and standards provide an internationally agreed
framework for how States should cooperate in fisheries management. Consequently,
they can be used as a form of benchmark to assess the WCPF Convention and determine
whether it provides a sufficient institutional framework to enable cooperation to the
degree necessary to ensure the long term conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO
tuna stocks. A reference matrix table in Appendix One summarises the assessment of
these principles and standards against international fisheries governance.

4.1.1

Two Key Factors – Location and Flag

Before beginning the analysis, it is important to note that there are two factors that can
significantly influence what principles and standards of international fisheries
governance will apply. The first factor is the location of the fishing activity. The second
factor is whether the participating States are party to those instruments that apply to the
fisheries in question (i.e. WCPF Convention and UNFSA).

First, the location of the fishing activity significantly influences what principles and
standards of international fisheries governance apply. This is due to the zonal
framework established by the LOSC and the significant governance differences that
occur in territorial seas, archipelagic waters, EEZs and high seas. Figure 11

305

E. Molenaar. (2004) Unregulated Deep-Sea Fisheries: A Need for a Multi-Level Approach. The
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. 19.3. p226.
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demonstrates the significance of this factor and shows the high proportion of the WCPO
that is located within waters under national jurisdiction.
Figure 11: Maritime Claims in the WCPO306

The LOSC recognises coastal State sovereignty over their territorial seas and
archipelagic waters with exclusive rights and control over fisheries resources within
these waters.307 This sovereignty also extends to ports, which are within the internal
waters of the coastal State.308

306

Map sourced from: Q. Hanich, C. Schofield, et al. (2009) Oceans of Opportunity? The Limits of Maritime
Claims in the Western and Central Pacific Region. Navigating Pacific Fisheries: Legal and Policy Trends in
the Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments in the Western and Central Pacific Region. Ed. Q.
Hanich and M. Tsamenyi. Wollongong, Australia. Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and
Security (ANCORS).
307
Parts II Part IV. LOSC. For further discussion, see also: E. Hey. (1999) The Fisheries Provisions of the LOS
Convention. Developments in International Fisheries Law. Ed. E. Hey. The Hague, Netherlands. Kluwer Law
International. p20.
308
As such, the LOSC grants port States sovereignty over the operation of their ports, subject to limited duties
relating to pollution. Article 218-220. LOSC. Molenaar suggests that there is an incorrect presumption of
access to ports, particularly in regard to vessels in distress. Customary international law gives no general right
of access to ports, while Molenaar notes that even vessels in distress, or force majeure, can be refused entry in
circumstances where the interests of the port State override those of the vessel (i.e. pollution concerns). E.
Molenaar. (2006) Port State Jurisdiction: Towards Mandatory and Comprehensive Use. The Law of the Sea:
Progress and Prospects. Ed. D. Freestone, R. Barnes, et al. Oxford, United Kingdom. Oxford University Press.
p195.
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While the extent of the territorial sea was a matter of ongoing contention prior to the
conclusion of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, the exclusive control of the
fisheries resources within the territorial sea has long been recognised. 309 As such, the
LOSC grants coastal States „absolute and unfettered‟ control over the exploitation,
conservation and management of the WCPO fisheries within these waters.310 Coastal
States also hold similar rights and control over fisheries resources within their
archipelagic waters, only limited by an obligation (without prejudice to their
sovereignty) that they respect the traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities
of the immediately adjacent neighbouring State (and any relevant existing
agreements).311 Highly migratory fisheries such as tuna are subject to the sovereignty of
the coastal State as they migrate through the territorial and archipelagic seas.312

The LOSC prescribes no specific duty to cooperate in relation to fisheries in territorial
seas and archipelagic waters, (except for the limited obligation on archipelagic States
regarding immediately adjacent neighbouring States).313 Nor does the LOSC prescribe
any obligation for coastal States to conserve or utilise fisheries subject to their
sovereignty (i.e. territorial seas or archipelagic waters).314

Next, the LOSC grants coastal States sovereign rights over the exploitation,
conservation and management of the natural resources within its EEZ. 315 Coastal States

309

European history traces State control over ocean space to the Greek and Roman periods. Early Greek rulers
extended their dominions over the adjacent seas, largely for military and political purposes. More extensively,
the Roman Empire claimed control (but not ownership) over the Mediterranean Sea. Maritime claims reached
their historical nadir between the 15th and 17th Centuries when various European States made claims of
sovereignty over large tracts of ocean space. From the 17 th Century onwards, coastal States were largely
considered to hold sovereignty over narrow territorial seas out to three nautical miles or so (reflecting the
maximum range of a shore-based cannon). For further background, see: M. S. McDougal and W. T. Burke.
(1985) The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary International Law of the Sea. New Haven Studies in
International Law and World Public Order. vol. 2. Dordrecht, Netherlands. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. -- F.
Newton. (1981) Inexhaustibility as a Law of the Sea Determinant. Texas International Law Journal. 16.
310
S. Kaye. (2001) International Fisheries Management. International Environmental Law and Policy Series.
The Hague, Netherlands. Kluwer Law International. p90.
311
Article 51. LOSC.
312
It should be noted that Article 64 of the LOSC which prescribes duties to cooperate in relation to highly
migratory fisheries only refers to the EEZ and high seas, not territorial or archipelagic waters. See: S. Kaye.
(2001) International Fisheries Management. International Environmental Law and Policy Series. The Hague,
Netherlands. Kluwer Law International. p125.
313
Parts II and IV. LOSC.
314
E. Hey. (1999) The Fisheries Provisions of the LOS Convention. Developments in International Fisheries
Law. Ed. E. Hey. The Hague, Netherlands. Kluwer Law International. p20.
315
Article 56. LOSC. The recognition of the EEZ by the LOSC brought under national jurisdiction large tracts
of ocean that had previously belonged to the regime of the high seas and effectively transferred property rights
for 85% to 90% of the world‟s then active fisheries from the international commons to coastal states. M.
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do not hold sovereignty over their EEZ, but rather hold rights and responsibilities over
the activities that occur within these waters, such as fisheries.316 This includes migratory
species such as tuna as they migrate through the EEZ.317

Despite some contention during the negotiation of the LOSC and in the years
immediately following its adoption, it is now accepted that these sovereign rights are
essentially exclusive (hence „Exclusive‟ Economic Zone). The LOSC provides that
fisheries within the EEZ can only be exploited with the consent of the coastal State,318
subject to specific provisions that oblige the coastal State to: manage and conserve
fisheries in EEZs;319 promote their optimum utilisation and share their surplus catch; 320
and, cooperate with other States and relevant organisations to ensure conservation and
promote the optimum utilisation of fish stocks.321 These provisions are discussed in
further detail as they relate to relevant sections in this chapter and Chapter Five.
Shyam. (1980) The Emerging Fisheries Regime: Implications for India. Ocean Development and International
Law.8.
316
F. Vicuna. (1989) The Exclusive Economic Zone: Regime and Legal Nature under International Law.
Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. pp17-27.
317
E. Molenaar. (2003) Participation, Allocation and Unregulated Fishing: The Practice of Regional Fisheries
Management Organisations. International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. 18. As noted above in Section
4.2, DWFN historically opposed proposals that coastal States held sovereign rights over highly migratory fish
as they migrated through their EEZs. However, the reality at sea has essentially moved on. For over 20 years,
the status quo has reflected the coastal State interpretation and there is no indication that DWFN are likely to
endorse fishing for tuna within EEZs without the permission of coastal States.
318
For example, Spain interpreted that the LOSC did not grant discretionary powers to the coastal State to
determine the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity and the allocation of surpluses to other States. Spain.
(1984) Spanish Statement New York, USA. United Nations. For further discussion of this position, and
arguments against its validity, see: J. A. De Yturriaga. (1997) The International Regime of Fisheries.
Publications on Ocean Development. vol. 30. Boston. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. P117-119. For selected
general readings on fisheries and the EEZ, see: M. Dahmani. (1987) The Fisheries regime of the Exclusive
Economic Zone. Publications on Ocean Development. vol. 11. Dordrecht. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. -- B.
Kwiatkowska. (1989) The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea. Publications on
Ocean Development. vol. 14. Dordrecht, Netherlands. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. -- W. T. Burke. (1992
Reprint of 1982) Fisheries Regulations under Extended Jurisdiction and International Law. Rome. FAO.
319
Article 61. LOSC.
320
Article 62. LOSC. The „optimum utilisation‟ obligation responded to 1970s concern of DWFNs that coastal
States would drastically limit utilisation of the resources newly enclosed in their fisheries zones. In recognition
that many developing States did not have the capacity to „optimally harvest‟ their EEZs, coastal States are
obliged to give other States access to any surplus beyond which their fleets could harvest. However, coastal
States are granted a wide discretion in determining this surplus and the conditions for foreign access. Article 62
of LOSC states that coastal States are obliged to calculate their capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch of
their EEZ and give other States access to any surplus beyond which their fleets could harvest. When giving
access to other States to its EEZ, coastal States shall take into account all relevant factors, including, inter alia,
the significance of the fisheries to the coastal State economy and its other national interests, and various other
factors described in Articles 62, 69 and 70. Nevertheless, the final word on the exploitation, conservation and
management of fisheries within an EEZ remains with the coastal State. Even Spanish Ambassador, Jose
Yturriaga, recognises that „as a matter of fact, the participation of third States in the surplus of the living
resources of the EEZ – with or without a recognised right of access – will be, in the last resort, dependent upon
the good grace of the coastal State‟. J. A. De Yturriaga. (1997) The International Regime of Fisheries.
Publications on Ocean Development. vol. 30. Boston. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p125.
321
Articles 61, 62, 69, 70, 71, 72 and 73. LOSC.
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For fisheries in waters beyond national jurisdiction, the LOSC continued the global
commons status for the high seas and provided that no State may validly purport to
subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.322 Similarly, the LOSC continued to
apply the traditional freedom of the seas to the high seas, thereby granting all States an
equal right to fish the high seas.323 An early consequence of these equal rights was the
creation of an obligation not to interfere with the vessels of other States on the high
seas, nor impose on their rights.324 The modern concept of flag State primacy devolved
from original assertions that vessels at sea were figuratively a piece of territory of the
State under whose flag they sailed. The LOSC built upon this traditional principle and
prescribed exclusive flag State jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas.325
However, these flag State rights are now balanced by obligations which impose a duty
to cooperate and require flag States to manage their high seas fishing activities at
sustainable levels.326 This duty to cooperate is further elaborated for anadromous327 and
catadromous328 stocks, trans-boundary and straddling stocks329 and highly migratory
stocks (i.e. tuna).330

322

Articles 86 and 89. LOSC. The principle of fish as a common property, and the associated freedom to fish,
arose during a historical period when most people considered the bounty of the ocean to be endless and beyond
human impact. In 1868, the Darwinist scientist Professor Huxley described the produce of the sea as the
property of the people in common. The term common was derived from the British „common land‟ which
described free land used for grazing animals by people who lived locally. For selected readings, see: T. H.
Huxley. (1868) Sea Fisheries Commission Report. Sea Fisheries Commission. -- R. L. Allen. (1990) Common
Property Resources. Proceedings of the Australian and New Zealand Southern Trawl Fisheries Conference.
Melbourne, 6 to 9 May 1990. Bureau of Rural Sciences.
323
Article 87. LOSC. Principles allowing open access to the resources of the seas also have a long history.
While the Romans lay claim to control the Mediterranean, within the Roman Empire the sea was subject to free
and open access. Fisheries were considered to be common property and could not be appropriated by any
individual or owned until capture. This concept of freedom of the seas was most famously developed and
articulated by Hugo Grotius in 1604-05 in his work, Mare Liberum. Grotius developed a substantial theoretical
and historical argument that proclaimed that nature constituted the inexhaustible oceans and air for common
use – that these were the common property of all. Behind the theory was the pragmatic purpose for the
doctrine: defending the vested commercial interests of the Dutch against the extensive maritime claims of the
Portuguese. After some contention, this principle came to dominate ocean governance and global fisheries for
the next 400 years. For selected readings, see: H. Grotius. (1604) The Freedom of the Seas. Oxford. Oxford
University Press: This publication is a translation of the latin text and was produced in 1916. -- G. R. Russ and
D. C. Zeller. (2003) From Mare Liberum to Mare Reservarum. Marine Policy. 27. -- F. Newton. (1981)
Inexhaustibility as a Law of the Sea Determinant. Texas International Law Journal. 16.
324
R. Rayfuse. (2004) Non-Flag State Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries. Publications on Ocean
Development. vol. 46. Boston. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p8.
325
Articles 91, 92 and 94 of the LOSC are particularly relevant.
326
Articles 61, 62, 63, 64, 116, 117, 118, 119. LOSC.
327
Article 66. LOSC.
328
Article 67. LOSC.
329
Article 63. LOSC.
330
Article 64. LOSC.
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For highly migratory species, the LOSC requires coastal and fishing States to cooperate
directly or through appropriate international organisations with a view to ensuring
conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilisation, both within and
beyond the EEZ.331 In regions where there is no appropriate organisation, such States
shall cooperate to establish such an organisation and participate in its operation.332
However, the interpretation and practical application of the duty to cooperate provisions
of the LOSC has been problematic due to the vagueness of its interpretation. It does not
necessarily involve a duty to reach an agreement, provided that cooperative action has
been undertaken in good faith.333

Second, the framework of principles and standards within which States exploit, manage
and conserve WCPO tuna fisheries, also depends on the status of these States in regard
to relevant agreements (such as the WCPF Convention and UNFSA). These agreements
further develop this framework, but only in regard to those States which have consented
to abide by such agreements. The principle of pacta tertiis means that a RFMO cannot
impose an obligation on a flag State to regulate, restrict or prohibit its vessels fishing on
the high seas unless the flag State has consented to the obligation.334 Similarly, the
RFMO cannot impose obligations on coastal, market or port States to take actions
within their jurisdiction without their consent.

As noted in Chapter Three, UNFSA is the most significant global agreement in this
regard. UNFSA effectively provided substance to the principle of cooperation through
detailing standards on how States should cooperate in regard to straddling and highly
migratory fisheries and what functions this cooperation should perform. Ellen Hey
argues that UNFSA provides the most substantive guidance on how States conserve and
manage straddling and highly migratory fisheries.

331

Article 64. LOSC.
Articles 64 and 118. LOSC.
333
G. Munro, A. Van Houtte, et al. (2004) The Conservation and Management of Shared Fish Stocks: Legal
and Economic Aspects. Rome. FAO.
334
As introduced in Chapter 3.
332
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It does [this] by providing the minimum substantive standards which States are
to meet … the institutional mechanisms required and the enforcement and
dispute mechanisms for securing the application of the measures adopted.335

UNFSA standardised RFMOs as the appropriate form of cooperation and required
fishing States and coastal States to give effect to their duty to cooperate by establishing
an RFMO or arrangement where none exists.336 It set a standard for cooperation that
required States to „enter into consultations in good faith and without delay‟ particularly
if overfishing was evident or a new fishery was developing. 337 In establishing RFMOs,
States shall agree on (among other things): the mandated stocks; the area of application;
relationships with other existing organisations; and scientific advisory mechanisms.338
Where RFMOs exist, UNFSA requires States to give effect to their duty to cooperate
through joining, or participating in, a RFMO or arrangement (if one existed), or at
minimum applying the conservation and management measures established by such
organisations or arrangements.339 UNFSA also prescribed principles and standards of
conservation and management for States giving effect to their duty to cooperate, 340 and
prescribed specific standards for the operation of RFMOs and their functions.341

Perhaps most powerfully, UNFSA explicitly prescribes that only those States which
agree to implement measures of an existing RFMO (in regard to highly migratory and
straddling stocks) shall have access to the fishery resources to which those measures
apply.342 UNFSA binds its parties to prohibit vessels from fishing within the
Convention Area of an existing relevant RFMO if it does not implement that RFMO‟s
conservation and management measures.343 This extension of the duty to cooperate
significantly extends the authority of relevant RFMOs (such as the WCPFC) as it
indirectly binds all UNFSA parties to apply all relevant RFMO conservation measures,
regardless of their status in relation to each RFMO.

335

E. Hey. (1996) Global Fisheries Regulations in the First Half of the 1990s International Journal of Marine
and Coastal Law. 11.4. p472.
336
Article 8.5. UNFSA.
337
Article 8.2. UNFSA.
338
Article 9. UNFSA.
339
Article 8. UNFSA.
340
Article 5. UNFSA.
341
Part III. UNFSA.
342
Article 8.4. UNFSA.
343
Article 17.2. UNFSA.
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In effect, UNFSA limited the freedom to fish on the high seas for straddling and highly
migratory fisheries and institutionalised the duty to cooperate (in regard to straddling
and highly migratory fisheries) through the mechanism of RFMOs.344 Nandan declared
at the conclusion of UNFSA negotiations that „the freedom to fish on the high seas no
longer exists as it did under the old law of the sea. It is no longer a free-for-all.‟345
Recent commentary indicates that UNFSA provisions relating to the duty to cooperate
may be developing sufficient customary status under international law to also limit the
freedom to fish for States that are neither party to UNFSA, nor the relevant RFMO.346

UNFSA further extended the principle of cooperation through defining standards that
require RFMO members to exchange information on vessels fishing for migratory and
straddling stocks that are flagged to States which are neither members of the relevant
RFMO or party to UNFSA, and to take measures to deter vessels which undermine the
effectiveness of subregional or regional conservation and management measures.347
These extensions in the duty to cooperate raised significant concerns by some
commentators that this may be inconsistent with the principle of pacta tertiis as some
States may be obliged to implement provisions of RFMO conventions to which they had
not specifically consented. The Spanish Ambassador, De Yturriaga, suggested that these
provisions of UNFSA appeared to „ignore one of the basic principles of international
law concerning treaties (pacta tertiis).‟348 However, this analysis itself ignores the fact
that parties to UNFSA have consented to be bound by its provisions, including its
broader obligations to abide by all relevant RFMO measures. Hayashi notes that
UNFSA provisions are only binding on those States which become Parties to UNFSA
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Rosemary Rayfuse argues that UNFSA operationalises the duty to cooperate: „perhaps the single most
significant aspect of this operationalisation, is the „institutionalisation‟ of the duty to cooperate by requiring its
exercise through RFOs (RFMOs).‟ R. Rayfuse. (2004) Non-Flag State Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries.
Publications on Ocean Development. vol. 46. Boston. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p43.
345
(1997) Backgrounder : The Agreement on High Seas Fishing: An Update. United Nations Department of
Public Information. Available at: http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/sustdev/fishery.htm. Accessed on 16
October 2008.
346
T. Henriksen. (2009) Revisiting the Freedom of Fishing and Legal Obligations on States Not Party to
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations. Ocean Development and International Law. 40. p91.
347
Article 17.4. UNFSA.
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J. A. De Yturriaga. (1997) The International Regime of Fisheries. Publications on Ocean Development. vol.
30. Boston. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p223.
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„and in that sense, they are not contrary to international law in general, including the
Convention (LOSC)‟.349
UNFSA and the FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU)350 provide further standards
for the implementation of the duty to cooperate in relation to monitoring, control and
surveillance and efforts to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. At a
general level of cooperation, UNFSA establishes standards that require States to support
RFMO monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) systems and ensure their measures
are compatible with each RFMO‟s MCS scheme for the waters within which their
vessels are active.351 Similarly, cooperation is a key principle of the non-binding IPOAIUU.

While UNFSA significantly expanded obligations regarding cooperation for fisheries in
EEZs and the high seas, it provides little guidance that it applies to territorial seas or
archipelagic waters. The general principles of UNFSA specifically refer to the LOSC‟s
duty to cooperate.352 Given that the LOSC only prescribes a duty to cooperate for
fisheries within EEZs and high seas, it would appear reasonable to interpret the mandate
for UNFSA as also limited to EEZs and high seas. 353 This interpretation is further
supported by Articles 3 and 7 which specifically refer to the protection of a coastal
State‟s „sovereign rights‟ when discussing waters under national jurisdiction, and do not
refer to any issues relating to sovereignty, as might occur in discussions regarding
fisheries management within territorial seas or archipelagic waters.

In summary, the operation of these two factors (i.e. location and participation in treaties)
produces the following outcomes. If the fishing activity occurs within the sovereign

349

M. Hayashi. (1995) The 1995 Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks: Significance for the Law of the Sea Convention. Ocean and Coastal Management.
29.1-3. P66. For further discussion of these matters, see: E. Franckx. (2000) Pacta Tertiis and UNFSA. Rome,
Italy. FAO. -- R. Rayfuse. (1999) The United Nations Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks as an Objective Regime: A Case of Wishful Thinking. Australian Yearbook of International Law. 20.
350
The IPOA-IUU is a non-binding agreement adopted within the framework of the FAO Code of Conduct. It
was endorsed by the FAO Council in 2001. International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU). Adopted by the FAO 23 June 2001. Rome, Italy.
Available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/publications/ipoa/en. 2001.
351
Part IV. LOSC.
352
Article 5. UNFSA.
353
Noting that Article 3 of UNFSA qualifies its application to waters under national jurisdiction.
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waters of a coastal State (i.e. territorial sea or archipelagic waters), then the fisheries
governance framework is almost entirely at the discretion of the coastal State, subject to
minimal responsibilities to not cause harm to others and a general LOSC responsibility
on all parties to protect and preserve the marine environment.354 If the fishing activity
occurs within an EEZ, then the fisheries governance framework is largely at the
discretion of the coastal State, subject to LOSC responsibilities relating to conservation,
optimum utilisation and a duty to cooperate. If the coastal State is party to a RFMO or
UNFSA, then that State is obliged to require that the vessel comply with all applicable
conservation measures. If the coastal State is not party to an RFMO or UNFSA, then
that State is under no obligation to require fishing vessels to comply with such
measures. In such cases, the coastal State is only bound by the general international
principle of sic utere two ut alienum non laedas which requires it to not cause harm to
other States, and the vague duties to cooperate prescribed by the LOSC.355

If the fishing activity occurs on the high seas, then the fisheries governance framework
is entirely at the discretion of the flag State, subject to LOSC responsibilities relating to
conservation, the duty to cooperate, and dispute resolution.
If the vessel is flagged to a State that is party to a RFMO or UNFSA, then that State is
obliged to require that the vessel comply with all agreed conservation measures such as
fishing limitations, area closures, foreign boarding and inspections, etc. On the other
hand, if the vessel is flagged to a non-party, then that State is under no obligation to
require the fishing vessel to comply with such measures. In such cases, the flag State is
only bound by the general international principle of sic utere two ut alienum non laedas
which requires it to not cause harm to other States, and the vague duties to cooperate
prescribed by the LOSC.

354

Article 192. LOSC.
160 States have now ratified or acceded to the LOSC. This includes almost all participants within the
WCPO tuna fisheries (see Chapter Four for analysis of participating States), except the USA and the Latin
American States. Despite the non-party Status of the USA and Latin States, it is widely argued that the LOSC
has attained customary law status and as such has universal application. L. Sohn. (1984) The Law of the Sea:
Customary International Law Developments. American University Law Review. 34. P280. See also discussion
in: D. Larson. (1994) Conventional, Customary, and Consensual Law in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. Ocean Development and International Law. 25. United Nations. (2010) Status of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement Relating to Implementation of Part XI of the
Convention, and of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks – Table
Recapitulating the Status of the Convention and of the Related Agreements, as of 1 June 2010. United Nations,.
Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf. Accessed on 30 August 2010.
355
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In effect, the principles of pacta tertiis, combined with the zonal allocation of ocean
space and living marine resources to flag States and coastal States, mean that vessels
fishing on the high seas are only subject to regulations formulated by the State to which
they are registered, while vessels fishing within waters under national jurisdiction are
only subject to the fisheries regulations of the applicable coastal State (and the
jurisdiction of their flag State in regard to other maritime matters). This means that the
guiding principles and standards of international fisheries governance against which the
WCPF Convention is assessed, vary depending upon the location of the fishing activity
and the flag State of the fishing vessel.

4.2

Assessment

Cooperation is fundamental to the management of the WCPO tuna fisheries due to the
highly migratory nature of the region‟s tuna fisheries and the region‟s high dependence
upon these fisheries. It is crucial that the fisheries are managed effectively throughout
their range, both within and between EEZs, and on the high seas. Otherwise,
unrestrained exploitation in one EEZ or high seas pocket has the potential to
significantly impact on catches elsewhere.356 The following sections analyse provisions
of the WCPF Convention relating to cooperation and the establishment of the WCPFC
and assess whether they are consistent with principles and standards of international
fisheries governance and support the long term conservation and sustainable use of the
WCPO tuna stocks.

4.2.1

Cooperation and the Establishment of a Commission

Ultimately, the WCPF Convention prescribes provisions relating to cooperation that are
largely derived from UNFSA and build on the duty to cooperate provisions of the
LOSC. Article 4 clearly declares that the WCPF Convention shall be interpreted and
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Article 64 of the LOSC describes the obligation on States to cooperate in the management of highly
migratory fisheries. For selected readings on cooperation in the management of highly migratory fisheries, see:
T. Henriksen, G. Honneland, et al. (2006) Law and Politics in Ocean Governance: The UN Fish Stocks
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applied in the context of, and in manner consistent with the LOSC and UNFSA. This
linkage to the LOSC and UNFSA is repeated numerous times in the Preamble, several
Articles and Annex III of the WCPF Convention.357 The WCPF Convention effectively
prescribes the Commission as the institutional mechanism for „… giving effect to their
duty to cooperate in accordance with the 1982 Convention (LOSC), the Agreement
(UNFSA) and this Convention.‟358

In regard to fisheries within EEZs and high seas, the WCPF Convention is consistent
with relevant principles and standards of international fisheries governance, as it
effectively duplicated many of the relevant provisions from UNFSA and placed them
within the regional context of the WCPO region. Although the cause of some contention
during the MHLC,359 the comprehensive nature of the WCPF Convention and its
duplication of much of UNFSA, means that it is widely consistent with UNFSA
principles and standards relating to cooperation, and therefore consistent with these
benchmarks of international fisheries governance.

The WCPF Convention prescribes specific standards for the establishment of a
Commission and its operation that build on UNFSA provisions.360 These standards
relate to: the establishment of a Commission which is to meet annually; 361 the
establishment of subsidiary bodies and their functions;362 the establishment of a
secretariat;363 administrative, financial and legal arrangements (i.e. chair, costs, legal
personality);364 transparency;365 cooperation with other organisations;366 and entry into
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Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific: Fourth Session. Honolulu, Hawaii, 10-19 February
1999. WCPFC. P15.
360
Part III. WCPF Convention.
361
Article 9. WCPF Convention.
362
Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14. WCPF Convention.
363
Articles 15 and 16. WCPF Convention.
364
Article 9, 17, 18 and 19. WCPF Convention.
365
Article 21. WCPF Convention.
366
Article 22. WCPF Convention.
358

Page | 107

force.367 Principles and standards relating to decision making are discussed below in
Section 4.2.7, while the functions of the Commission are discussed in Chapter Five.

While many of these standards were the focus of substantial discussions, and were
amended significantly from their UNFSA sources, they are ultimately consistent with
the relevant standards in international fisheries governance established by UNFSA, and
mirrored to varying degrees within the Code of Conduct (see Article 7). One example of
this can be seen in the efforts by Japan to restrict participation by non-government
organisations.368 This was subsequently countered and the eventual text largely mirrors
the UNFSA standards of transparency.369

Similarly, the WCPF Convention prescribes various standards for cooperation relating
to: membership and the participation of Chinese Taipei;370 obligations of members;371
flag State duties;372 monitoring, control and surveillance;373 requirements of developing
States;374 and non-parties.375 UNFSA also establishes standards of cooperation in
relation to the recognition of the special requirements of developing States.376 These
detailed standards are discussed further in subsequent sections.

In regard to fisheries within archipelagic waters and territorial seas, it appears
reasonable to assess the WCPF Convention as consistent with international principles of
fisheries governance relating to the duty to cooperate for these waters. The numerous
explicit links to the LOSC and UNFSA support such an interpretation. In addition, there
is essentially no duty to cooperate within international fisheries governance for fisheries
within these waters.377 In effect, it could be argued that the WCPF Convention would be
inconsistent with international fisheries governance if it established a duty to cooperate
on coastal States for fisheries within their territorial seas or archipelagic waters. On the
367
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other hand, it could be assumed that any such interpretation is premised on the
assessment that archipelagic States consented to include their sovereignty within the
mandate of the WCPF Convention.378

Nevertheless, tuna fisheries in archipelagic waters are having an increasingly significant
impact on WCPO tuna stocks and require some form of conservation response.379
Consequently, it is appropriate that archipelagic States consider the general principal
that States shall not cause harm, and ensure that activities in their territories do not
cause harm or affect the interests of other States.380 This may not require such States to
cooperate through the mechanism of the WCPFC if such States act unilaterally or
through some other mechanism to address fishing activities that harm other States (such
as overfishing of juvenile bigeye).

This section concludes that the WCPF Convention is consistent with the principle of
cooperation prescribed by the LOSC‟s duty to cooperate and similarly with the
standards prescribed by UNFSA. The WCPF Convention establishes the Commission in
accordance with the standards prescribed by UNFSA in a manner that effectively
operationalises the implementation of the duty to cooperate at the regional level. Within
the limits of international fisheries governance, this provides a generally sufficient
platform for States to cooperate and ensure the long term conservation and sustainable
use of the WCPO tuna fisheries. However, there remains a level of uncertainty in regard
to how the region, if not the WCPFC, will address fishing activities in archipelagic
waters that may impact significantly on the WCPO tuna fisheries.

4.2.2

Objective and Preamble

The objective of the WCPF Convention381 is derived in large part from UNFSA and
remains consistent with the principles prescribed by UNFSA. In effect, it simply applies
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the central objective of UNFSA, „long term conservation and sustainable use,‟382 to the
highly migratory fish stocks of the WCPO, in accordance with the LOSC and UNFSA.
The objective is further defined and informed by the preamble to the WCPF Convention
(see Figure 12).

Figure 12: WCPF Convention Preamble on Conservation and Management
The preamble to the WCPF Convention notes that effective conservation and management,
among other things:383
requires the application of a precautionary approach and the best scientific information
available;
is conscious of the need to avoid adverse impacts on the environment and minimise the
risk of long term or irreversible effects of fishing operations;
is conscious of the need to preserve biodiversity and maintain the integrity of marine
ecosystems;
recognises the special circumstances and needs of small island developing States and
territories;
prioritises the needs of human food consumption;
recognises needs of both present and future generations;
recognises the objective of optimum utilisation; and,
acknowledges that compatible, effective and binding conservation and management
measures can only be achieved through cooperation between coastal States and DWFNs.

This preamble places the objective within the context of principles of sustainable
development that evolved throughout the late 20th Century and which provided the
conceptual framework upon which UNFSA and the Code of Conduct were subsequently
developed.384 The first significant reference385 for these principles of sustainable
382
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development is the 1987 Brundtland Report which summarised the findings of the
World Commission on Environment and Development.386 The report defined
sustainable development as „development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs‟.387
Conservation and sustainable use was defined by the report as requiring that States:

maintain ecosystems and ecological processes essential for the functioning of
the biosphere … preserve biological diversity … observe the principle of
optimum sustainable yield in the use of living natural resources and
ecosystems.388

The Brundtland report was highly influential in the development of international law in
the fields of sustainable development and international environmental law and set the
path which led to the United Conference on Environment and Development,389 which in
turn resulted in the adoption of the CBD and the negotiation of UNFSA.390 The concept
of sustainable development has been described as a basic paradigm for the 21st
Century.391 The developments throughout this period saw the conceptual integration of
marine environmental protection with sustainable development as an international
principle of environmental law.392 The CBD subsequently defined „sustainable‟ as the
use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the
long term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the
needs and aspirations of present and future generations.393 Falk and Elver suggest that
Oxford University Press. -- M. H. Nordquist, J. Moore, Norton., et al. (2003) The Stockholm Declaration and
Law of the Marine Environment. Twenty Sixth Annual Conference of the Center for Ocean Law and Policy.
Stockholm, Sweden, 22 to 25 May 2002. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
385
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388
Ibid. Annexe 1 Summary of Proposed Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Sustainable
Development.
389
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this concept of sustainable development would likely have been included in the LOSC if
the negotiations for the LOSC had occurred in the 1990s, rather than the 1970s.394

This section concludes that the objective and preamble of the WCPF Convention are
consistent with relevant principles of international fisheries governance and sustainable
development. They effectively incorporate key principles and standards from the LOSC
and UNFSA, and broader principles of sustainable development. This establishes a
sufficiently strong goal and conceptual framework and, if implemented, should enable
the WCPFC to ensure the long term conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO tuna
fisheries.

4.2.3

Convention Area

The WCPF Convention clearly identifies that it applies to all stocks of highly migratory
fish within the Convention Area except sauries.395 Conservation and management
measures shall be applied throughout the range of the stocks, or to specific areas as
determined by the WCPFC. However, the extent and application of the WCPF
Convention Area is potentially ambiguous due to the contentious nature of negotiations
in the MHLC on these matters. For this reason, it is useful to briefly review MHLC
negotiations on this issue.

Early negotiations at MHLC supported a Convention Area that covered the range of the
stocks with strong support for clear boundaries defined by specific coordinates.396
Subsequent MHLC negotiations on this matter became contentious as MHLC meetings
attempted to balance scientific and management requirements with political and legal
concerns.397 Problematically, the definition of the boundary would determine, to a
significant extent, the likely membership of the Commission. This could have
potentially significant impacts on the politics of future decision making, and on
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allocations of participatory rights in the fishery.398 Consequently, delegations balanced
their conservation and management interests to cover the range of the stocks, with their
political interests to maximise their own influence and their share of any potential future
allocation of participatory rights.

Negotiations on the boundaries were further complicated by concerns regarding the
inclusion of disputed waters in the South China Sea399 and demands from Indonesia, the
Philippines, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea to exclude their archipelagic
waters from the Convention Area.400 Negotiations on the eastern boundary were
complicated by existing arrangements in the Eastern Pacific where the IATTC included
waters within the French Polynesian and Kiribati EEZs, and a suggestion by Canada for
the northern and eastern boundaries to include the range of northern albacore and extend
into Canadian waters.401

Various potential Convention Areas were discussed throughout the third, fourth, fifth
and sixth MHLCs without any clear agreement on defined boundaries. By the end of the
sixth MHLC, delegates reluctantly supported a compromise proposal by the chair to
leave the western and northern boundaries undefined. No explicit reference was made in
the Convention to the South China Sea or the archipelagic waters of Indonesia and the
Philippines. Instead, the chair noted the following understanding in his closing
statement to the sixth MHLC:

It is important to clarify in this regard that the Convention applies to the waters
of the Pacific Ocean. In particular, on the western side the Convention Area is
398
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not intended to include waters in South-East Asia which are not part of the
Pacific Ocean; nor is it intended to include the waters of the South China Sea as
this would involve States which are not participants in this Conference.402

In the end, the WCPF Convention describes coordinates for the eastern and southern
boundaries of the Convention Area, but provides no text on the western and northern
boundaries.403 In regard to the western boundary, the Convention must be read in the
context of the Chair‟s „understanding‟ that the Convention Area applies to the waters of
the Pacific Ocean and is not intended to include waters in South-East Asia or the South
China Sea.404 No guidance is provided on the question of the northern boundary. In this
respect, a reasonable assumption is that the Convention Area extends to the northern
limit of the Pacific Ocean‟s tuna stocks.

However, the migratory range of WCPO tuna stocks extends beyond the understood
western boundary of the Convention Area.405 The migratory range of WCPO stocks of
yellowfin and bigeye extends into the South China Sea where significant catches of
these species are taken, while the migratory range of skipjack extends into the Northern
Pacific to approximately 45N. It would appear that the migratory range of WCPO
stocks does not extend into the continental shelf waters of East Asia (i.e. Gulf of
Thailand, the East China Sea or the Yellow Sea) although some catches of bluefin are
taken in commercial quantities in the Sea of Japan.406

This is problematic for the western region as no cooperative management arrangement
for tuna exists in the South China Sea or South East Asian waters. In this regard, the
WCPFC Statistical Area is more consistent with the range of the stocks. In 1999, the
402
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Twelfth Meeting of the Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish agreed upon a
western boundary for statistical purposes. This statistical boundary effectively defined
the Australian and Asian coastlines as the western boundary and established a „WCPFC
Statistical Area.‟407 The WCPFC Science Provider (SPC Oceanic Fisheries Programme)
has continued to use this statistical area for subsequent WCPFC fisheries databases and
reports.408

The overlap of the eastern boundary of the WCPFC with the western boundary of the
IATTC (see Figure 13) is also problematic as it could potentially cause some confusion
over the application of conservation and management measures, particularly if IATTC
and WCPFC were to adopt alternative management approaches. Figure 13 provides a
map of the WCPFC Convention Area and shows the extent of the WCPFC Statistical
Area, and the overlap of the WCPFC with the IATTC.

407
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Figure 13: WCPF Convention Area409

This thesis argues that the WCPF Convention is only partly consistent with modern
principles and standards of international fisheries governance in regard to the extent of
its coverage. The Convention Area is inconsistent with the standard of international
fisheries governance, as provided in the Code of Conduct, which declares that States
should cooperate to „promote conservation and management, ensure responsible fishing
and ensure effective conservation and protection of living aquatic resources throughout
their range of distribution‟.410 The WCPF Convention does not meet this standard
because the „understanding‟ is that the Convention Area does not apply to the full range
of distribution of the stocks into the South China Sea or South East Asian waters. This
undermines the ability of the WCPFC to promote conservation and management, or
ensure responsible fishing and effective conservation and protection, throughout the
range of distribution of the WCPO tuna fisheries.

However, the WCPF Convention is consistent with the relevant UNFSA standards
relating to the range of the stocks because UNFSA allows for the consideration of the
409
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biological characteristics of the stocks concerned and the nature of the fisheries, and the
characteristics of the subregion or region, including socio-economic, geographical and
environmental factors.411 In this respect, the WCPF Convention is consistent given that
the MHLC considered the characteristics of the region and geographical factors, and
consequently did not provide an exact western or northern boundary. Furthermore, the
WCPF Convention prescribes that the Commission shall cooperate with other
organisations, particularly the IATTC.412

In balance, this section concludes that the WCPF Convention does not provide the
WCPFC with a sufficiently clear mandate to manage all tuna stocks throughout their
range due to the exclusion of waters in the South China Sea and South East Asia, and
the potential confusion caused by the overlap with IATTC. Despite the inclusion of the
western waters within the WCPFC Statistical Area, it is understood that the WCPFC
can not adopt conservation and management measures for these waters. Similarly, while
these inconsistencies are allowed under UNFSA (i.e. „characteristics of the region‟ and
„geographical factors‟), it does not meet the standard provided for by the Code of
Conduct as it does not allow States to cooperate effectively over the management of the
stocks throughout their range of distribution.

4.2.4

Compatibility of Measures

The principle of compatibility is fundamental to the management of highly migratory
tuna fisheries in the WCPO. While there are significant uncertainties regarding their
migratory behaviour and range, it is commonly accepted that these tuna are sufficiently
migratory in behaviour and regionally distributed to the extent that stocks will migrate
across, and straddle, multiple EEZs, international boundaries and pockets of high seas.
It is also apparent that there is some degree of residency (i.e. less migratory behaviour)
which may be sufficient to allow for restrictions to apply in one fishery and not in
another distant fishery without undermining conservation goals.413 Consequently, a
cooperative approach is required that enables compatible conservation and management
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measures to be implemented throughout the range of the stocks at the appropriate
regional, sub-regional and national levels.
The principle of compatible management was elaborated through the development of
UNFSA, which provides that coastal States and States fishing on the high seas have a
duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving compatible measures for straddling and
highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety.414 In practice, this may require some
balancing of measures in high seas and waters under national jurisdiction, with
potentially some amendments to existing measures if required.415

Despite general agreement during the MHLC that some form of compatible
management was required, there was strong disagreement on the degree to which the
WCPF Convention should apply to waters under national jurisdiction, and how
compatible management should be interpreted and implemented.

First, in regard to application, Indonesia and the Philippines strongly opposed the
inclusion of their archipelagic waters within the Convention Area. Other archipelagic
States subsequently argued that their archipelagic waters should also be included within
any such exemption.416 During the sixth MHLC, Indonesia (with the support of Papua
New Guinea and the Philippines) made an opening statement that explicitly stated their
understanding that the WCPF Convention:

does not and cannot be implied to require or oblige cooperation between coastal
States and other States in the conservation and management that will include
resources within archipelagic waters that fall within the sovereignty of the
archipelagic States in accordance with Article 49 of the LOSC.417
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No other delegation responded to counter this interpretation. Furthermore, the
Chairman, Satya Nandan, subsequently agreed with Indonesia that the understanding
during UNFSA negotiations was that „areas under national jurisdiction‟ referred only to
EEZs.418 The MHLC later addressed these concerns regarding the exclusion of
archipelagic waters by cross referencing the Convention Area to a „non-prejudice‟
clause in Article 4 of the Convention that reiterated the rights, jurisdiction and duties of
States under the LOSC and UNFSA. However, regardless of intent, this ultimately left
the question of application open to some degree of interpretation as it did not specify
inclusion or exclusion of archipelagic waters (or territorial seas either) within the
Convention Area. In practice, it effectively comes down to political interpretation.

Second, tensions arose over the focus and interpretation of compatibility provisions.
Pacific island States argued that any multilateral arrangement should focus on the high
seas and strengthen existing conservation and management measures in EEZs by coastal
States.419 On the other hand, DWFNs argued that the objective of the arrangement
should be to manage highly migratory fish stocks throughout their range „both within
and beyond the boundary of the respective economic zones through cooperation of all
the coastal States and the States or entities fishing for such resources in compatible and
consistent manner‟.420

The point of difference was over the interpretation of what this actually might mean in
practice. Coastal States were strongly concerned that the arrangement not prejudice or
diminish their coastal State sovereign rights in any way, and closely considered
compatibility in this context, claiming that:
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any management regime in whatever form should be compatible with existing
in-zone arrangements and should not undermine national efforts to domesticate,
nor the sovereign rights for that matter.421

DWFN such as Japan argued that compatible management should recognise coastal
State jurisdiction within their EEZs and flag State jurisdiction on the high seas,422 but
opposed interpretations that suggest high seas management should be compatible with
coastal State measures. Japan stated during the MHLC that it could not accept the
concept that in-zone management should come first.423 Other interpretations
contradicted DWFN views, one stating that:

the Pacific Island nations now have the opportunity to exercise effective control
over the high seas „donut‟ areas in the South Pacific. The requirement in Article
7(2) that regulations … be „compatible‟ gives the island nations leverage over
the distant-water fishing nations that have been harvesting in the donut areas
without restraint.424

Early drafts from coastal States mirrored compatibility language from UNFSA that
balanced recognition of the various interests, rights and obligations held by coastal and
flag States.425 Subsequent negotiations amended this text as DWFNs and coastal States
each inserted language that supported and strengthened their interpretation.426 In the
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For example, see statement by Kiribati, MHLC Secretariat. (1998) Multilateral High Level Conference on
the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific: Third
Session. Report of the Conference. Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and Management
of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific: Third Session. Tokyo, Japan. WCPFC.
422
Japan. (1997) Statement by Mr Tatsuo Saito, Japan. The Second Multilateral High Level Conference on the
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Majuro,
Marshall Islands, 10 to 13 June 1997. FFA.
423
Statement by Japan. MHLC Secretariat. (1998) Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific: Third Session. Report of
the Conference. Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific: Third Session. Tokyo, Japan. WCPFC. p19.
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Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA). Opened for signature 4
August 1995. Entered into force 2001. New York, USA. International Legal Materials, vol. 34. 1995.
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end, MHLC was unable to agree on language that supported either interpretation
conclusively, and adopted a final convention text that was open to interpretation and
ambiguous.427 This effectively deferred the question to the work of the Commission.

Within the WCPF Convention, Articles 5, 6 and 7 oblige member coastal States, in
exercising their sovereign rights, to implement the Convention‟s general principles and
measures for conservation and management that similarly apply to the high seas. These
Articles also prescribe that the members of the Commission shall give due consideration
of the capacity of developing States to meet these requirements, and their need for
assistance. While the structure of this text is different from that found in UNFSA, the
intent and effect of these principles and standards is consistent. 428 Both the WCPF
Convention and UNFSA prescribe the general principle that:

conservation and management measures established for the high seas and those
adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to
ensure conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks in their
entirety. To this end, the members of the Commission (coastal States and States
fishing on the high seas) have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving
compatible measures in respect of such stocks.429

In support of this general principle of compatibility, both the WCPF Convention and
UNFSA similarly establish a number of broad standards. When establishing
conservation and management measures, the WCPFC shall take into account seven
factors. First, the WCPFC shall consider the biological unity and other biological
characteristics of the fish stocks. Similarly, consideration must be given to the
relationships between the distribution of the stocks, the fisheries and geographical
characteristics, including the extent to which the stocks occur and are fished in EEZs.
The second standard requires consideration of existing coastal State management of the
same stocks (that are consistent with the LOSC) and the need to ensure that WCPFC
measures do not undermine such measures. The third standard requires that the same
Ocean Governance: The UN Fish Stocks Agreement and Fisheries Management Regimes. Publications on
Ocean Development. vol. 52. Boston. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p179.
427
Article 8. WCPF Convention.
428
See Articles 3, 5 and 6 in UNFSA.
429
Article 8.1 of the WCPF Convention and Article 7.2 of UNFSA.
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consideration be given to existing measures for the high seas. The fourth standard
requires consideration of previously agreed measures that have been established in
respect of the same stocks by another RFMO (i.e. IATTC), provided that they are
consistent with the LOSC and UNFSA. The fifth standard requires the WCPFC to take
into account the respective dependence of coastal States and fishing States fishing on
the stocks concerned. Sixth, the provisions require that the WCPFC ensures that such
measures do not impact harmfully on the living marine resources as a whole. Lastly, the
WCPFC shall pay special attention to ensuring compatibility between conservation and
management measures established for high seas pockets entirely surrounded by EEZs
and management arrangements established by surrounding coastal States.430

In effect, these principles and standards elaborate further conservation and management
obligations on coastal and flag States, without undermining the core LOSC principles of
coastal and flag State authority.431 This balance of new obligations with the protection
of existing rights allows for a wide degree of interpretation.

Following the adoption of the UNFSA provisions, it was noted that the application of
the compatibility principle would raise complex issues of interpretation.432 A key issue
of interpretation that will have significant ramifications for the WCPFC relates to how
different States interpret and define compatible conservation measures for multi-species
fisheries.

For example, the WCPFC is required to develop, negotiate and implement conservation
and management measures that could affect a broad range of fleets and stakeholders and
impact upon a diverse range of national interests.433 In order to reduce overfishing of
bigeye, measures may be adopted that reduce purse seine catches of bigeye, but in so
doing also limit fishing opportunities for skipjack which is not threatened by
overfishing. In circumstances such as these, some States may support conservation and
management measures that reduce fishing levels and in so doing protect their interests
430
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433
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in fisheries threatened by overfishing. Other States may oppose such measures due to
the collateral impact on their interests in fisheries that are not threatened by overfishing.
In addition, some States may accept higher levels of risk and lower rates of profitability
in order to support conservation measures that allow higher levels of fishing, while
other States may support more restrictive conservation measures.

It will be a complex challenge for the WCPFC to resolve these issues and agree on
compatible measures that consider the standards identified above and balance the
divergent interests and interpretations among its membership.434 In this respect, there is
one significant inconsistency between the WCPF Convention and relevant standards of
international fisheries governance. UNFSA prescribes standards for provisional
arrangements to be implemented while States are negotiating compatible measures. 435 In
circumstances where negotiations fail to agree on provisional arrangements, UNFSA
prescribes that any State may initiate the UNFSA dispute resolution procedures for the
purpose of establishing provisional arrangements. The WCPF Convention does not
include any such provision and lacks any explicit standard for the establishment of
provisional arrangements.

This section concludes that the general intent and scope of the WCPC Convention
provisions in Article 8 on compatibility are generally consistent with international
fisheries governance. While there are some inconsistencies relating to provisional
arrangements, and ambiguities over how to apply compatible measures across the range
of the stocks and how each standard might be interpreted and weighted, the thesis
argues that these are not significant and that similar ambiguities are found in UNFSA.
Ultimately, any development of conservation and management measures by the
WCPFC requires careful consideration of the principle of compatibility and the
standards prescribed in Article 8.
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4.2.5

Membership, Participatory Rights and the Question of Allocation

In the late 20th Century, international fisheries management began to incorporate the
view that some form of property or use right must be distributed among participants to
effectively address

overfishing and

reduce

excess

capacity. 436

Rights-based

management would give fishers and States incentives to fish in a manner that ensured
the long term sustainability and economic viability of the fishery, 437 while the lack of
determined rights in a fishery can undermine incentives for conservation.438

Support for rights-based management has grown and is now generally considered to be
a necessary component of fisheries management, in order to counter the tragedy of the
commons that is inherent in open access fisheries.439 However, the question of how to
allocate rights to a fishery is one of the most contentious and difficult issues in fisheries
management. RFMOs have found it difficult to reach agreement among members on
procedures to determine allocations. Where RFMOs have allocated rights to a fishery,
436
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these have sometimes failed to limit fishing catches or effort, as agreed limits have been
subsequently increased to accommodate new entrants.440

In transboundary fisheries, such as the WCPO tuna fisheries, rights-based management
requires (among other things) agreement on who is entitled to become a member and
participate in the fishery, and the establishment of some form of agreed process and
framework for allocating fishing rights. These matters raised significant concerns
throughout the MHLC as delegations balanced the necessity of including all States with
an interest in the fishery, with their political interests to maximise their own share of
any potential future allocation.

In regard to the question of membership and participation, tensions arose in the MHLC
in relation to the participation of Chinese Taipei, the extent of participation by
territories, and a widespread view among MHLC participants that the membership of
the MHLC be limited to those with a „real interest.‟441 There were also significant
discussions over the participation of the European Union and Canada, and to a lesser
extent Mexico, Russia, and Ecuador. The MHLC resolved most of these issues by its
final meeting in 2000.

The MHLC negotiated agreed text that enabled the participation of Chinese Taipei, with
sufficient compromises to satisfy China. Given their historical enmity, the participation
of both China and the „fishing entity‟ Chinese Taipei in the MHLC and WCPFC was a
significant achievement of the MHLC. Both participants have large fishing interests in
the WCPO fisheries (see Chapters Seven and Eight) and hold important relationships
with many of the Pacific island States.442
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The MHLC partly clarified the participation of territories in the Commission. However,
it was unable to resolve key disagreements over voting rights. Following last minute
negotiations at the seventh MHLC, the final draft allowed for the participation of
territories, but deferred deciding the extent of their participation to subsequent
deliberations on the Rules of Procedure. These discussions were an important issue for
the MHLC because there are various territories throughout the Pacific islands region
that are not sovereign States in their own right (although many are self-governing to
varying degrees). Rather than limit the engagement of these territories in the WCPFC to
the membership of their governing capitals (i.e. France, USA, New Zealand, United
Kingdom), the MHLC recognised the legitimate right of these territories to participate
in WCPFC deliberations. Article 43 of the WCPF Convention allows for the
participation of listed territories in accordance with a declaration by their capital and
their competence on relevant matters. The list of territories includes: French Polynesia,
New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna (France); American Samoa, Guam and Northern
Mariana Islands (USA); and Tokelau (NZ).

More problematically, broader negotiations over membership encountered significant
difficulties relating to „real interest‟. In 1999, FFA members argued that the criteria for
„real interest‟ needed to be clearly articulated but failed due to the preference of the
MHLC Chair to leave this question to the discretion of future Commission meetings.443
Nevertheless, in the absence of clear criteria, the Chair proposed that Canada be allowed
to join the MHLC. He argued that Canada had some historical interest in southern
albacore, was a Pacific State (although not a coastal State within most Convention Area
drafts), and was essentially a good actor in that it supported UNFSA and regional
fisheries development.444 Various MHLC members responded that Canada did not have
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a significant history, nor did it have any vessels currently fishing in the FFA region.445
Japan also expressed frustration with the lack of criteria to determine real interest,
arguing that:

without clear criteria shared by all the Conference members, this Conference can
not respond properly and in [a] trustworthy manner to any … legitimate inquiry
from those who at present are outside this Conference … Russia, Southeast
Asian countries and even some others who might have similar potential interest
to participate.446

In response, Papua New Guinea proposed a moratorium on other new participants while
Japan proposed a moratorium on new entrants to the fisheries. These proposals were
subsequently adopted by the fourth and fifth MHLCs in 1999.447 Subsequent requests
for membership in the MHLC negotiations from the European Union,448 Mexico449 and
Ecuador450 were downgraded to observer status only.
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The exclusion of the South China Sea from the Convention Area, and the ambiguity of
the northern boundary, also raised issues with membership as they prevented the full
participation of Vietnam (with significant coastal catches of tuna) and Russia (with
coastal waters within the migratory range of Northern albacore).451

As a consequence of the reluctance of MHLC members to open up participation, and the
non-decisions relating to the Convention Area and the criteria for real interest, the
MHLC did not engage all States with an interest in the WCPO tuna fisheries. While
Canada was successful in joining the MHLC, and the European Union was ultimately
invited to become a member of the WCPFC at the conclusion of the MHLC, Mexico,
Ecuador and Vietnam have only recently become cooperating non-members. The
interests of these States are discussed further in Chapters Seven and Eight. In so doing,
MHLC effectively delayed resolution of one of its most intractable challenges until a
later time when the Commission could no longer defer resolution.

Ultimately, the MHLC produced a Convention that prescribed two standards for
membership and participatory rights. Any full participant in the MHLC, including
Chinese Taipei,

452
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rights, as qualified by the LOSC, UNFSA, the WCPF Convention and its subsequent
conservation and management measures. Article 34 of the WCPF Convention lists each
of these States and declares the Convention to be open for signature (and subsequently
ratification, acceptance or approval) to these participants in the MHLC. In addition,
Article 43 also allows for the participation of seven listed „participating territories‟ with
appropriate authorisations from their governments. Following the entry into force of the
Convention, Contracting Parties may then invite, by consensus, other States and
regional economic integration organisations whose nationals and vessels wish to fish for
highly migratory fisheries in the Convention Area to accede to the Convention.453

The two standards for membership that are prescribed by the WCPF Convention raise
some significant issues within the context of international fisheries governance. A key
principle of international fisheries governance is that organisations operate in a nondiscriminatory and transparent manner and open their membership to States with a „real
interest‟ in their activities.454 The LOSC establishes the basic principles that States shall
cooperate to establish fisheries organisations and that the States concerned shall ensure
that conservation measures and their implementation do not discriminate in form or in
fact against the fishermen of any State.455 The standards for this cooperation are further
elaborated in UNFSA which prescribes that States with a real interest in the fishery
concerned:

may become members of such organisation or participants in such arrangement.
The terms of participation in such organisation or arrangement shall not preclude
such States from membership or participation; nor shall they be applied in a
manner which discriminates against any State or groups of States having a real
interest in the fisheries concerned.456

Taipei is entitled to full membership without Contracting Party status following its deposit of a written
instrument in which it agrees to be bound by the regime established by the Convention.
453
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454
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Neither the WCPF Convention, the LOSC nor UNFSA offer further guidance on the
definition of real interest. While, the definition of „real interest‟ is unclear, the general
view is that the concept of real interest should not be interpreted in an exclusive
manner.457 Adjacent coastal States and states fishing for stocks on the high seas inside
the area in question are generally regarded as having a real interest and therefore have a
right to participate in the relevant RFMOs, and a duty to cooperate. 458 In some cases, a
State may be able to demonstrate a real interest without any previous fishing history, 459
while some regional organisations do not even require a fishing interest.460

While there is little guidance on what defines real interest, both UNFSA and the WCPF
Convention are more prescriptive when it comes to the question of what participatory
rights may be available for new participants. UNFSA describes the following criteria to
be taken into account when determining the nature and extent of such rights: the status
of the stocks and existing levels of effort; the respective interests, fishing patterns and
practices of new and existing members; the respective contributions of new and existing
members to conservation and management, the collection and provision of data, and the
conduct of scientific research on the stocks; the needs of coastal fishing communities
dependent mainly on fishing for the stocks; the needs of coastal States whose economies
are overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of living marine resources; and the
interests of developing States from the sub-region or region in whose areas of national
jurisdiction the stocks also occur.461

The WCPF Convention does not describe criteria relating to the participatory rights of
new participants but does require that the WCPF Convention shall be interpreted and
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applied in the context of, and in a manner consistent with, UNFSA and the LOSC.462
Furthermore, the WCPFC states that the Commission shall agree on the means by which
the fishing interests of any new member may be accommodated.463

Deliberations over such participatory rights, for both new and old participants, are
determined within the zonal framework established by the LOSC. As discussed in
Section 4.3, the LOSC prescribes sovereignty or sovereign rights over all fisheries
within waters under national jurisdiction to the coastal State. These States have
exclusive participatory rights to fisheries within their waters. In turn, these States may
sell access to their waters but maintain their rights over these fisheries. The LOSC
obliges coastal States to allow access to their surplus fish and promote the objective of
optimum utilisation within their EEZ (without prejudice to conservation requirements).
However, coastal States are granted a wide discretion in determining this surplus and
the conditions for foreign access.464

All States have equal participatory rights for high seas fisheries, as qualified by the
LOSC, UNFSA, the WCPF Convention and its subsequent conservation and
management measures. In this context, it is important to distinguish between
participatory rights and questions of allocation. Participatory rights simply recognise the
right of a State to allow its vessels and nationals to participate in a fishery. Allocation
determines what share of the fishery that each State may hold. It is possible that a State
may have participatory rights for its vessels and nationals to fish within the WCPO
fisheries, but not have any allocation for those vessels to fish. In which case, these
vessels would need to purchase access to a coastal State with a surplus, or trade an
allocation with another fishing State.

In regard to the question of consistency with international fisheries governance, there
appears to be a significant difference between text and action. In behaviour, the MHLC
and Preparatory Conferences were exclusive and discriminatory. The European Union
argued that its exclusion was inconsistent with UNFSA requirements that participation
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should be non-discriminatory and be open to all States with a real interest.465 Mexico,
which was not party to UNFSA, argued that it had a real interest in the WCPO tuna
fisheries and subsequently had a right to participate fully in the negotiations in
accordance with „international law‟.466 In addition, the MHLC did not actively seek the
involvement of other coastal States with a real interest (such as Vietnam), as required by
UNFSA.467 Meanwhile, confusingly, the MHLC discriminated in favour of Canada, and
the Preparatory Conference in favour of the European Union, while discriminating
against Russia, Ecuador and Mexico. Subsequent analysis in Chapters Seven and Eight
demonstrates that each of these excluded States had some form of real interest in the
WCPO tuna fisheries that predated the entry into force of the WCPF Convention.468

In text, the WCPF Convention describes an inclusive organisation that invites nonmembers to cooperate and join in its management of the migratory fish stocks and, in
theory, meets principles and standards of international fisheries governance. This
assumes that the Contracting Parties themselves act in accordance with the principles
and standards established by the LOSC and UNFSA, as required by Article 4 of the
WCPF Convention.

Consequently, it appears reasonable to assert that prior to entry into force, the
Convention discriminated against a group of States with a real interest (i.e. Vietnam,
Russia, Ecuador, Mexico and the European Union) by effectively closing the
Convention to their participation. Given that conservation and management resolutions
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Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific: Sixth
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were adopted during this interim,469 this is inconsistent with standards of international
fisheries governance established by Article 8.3 of UNFSA.

However, post entry into force, it is reasonable to assert that the WCPF Convention is
consistent with international principles and standards of fisheries governance relating to
the membership and participatory rights. This is due to its repeated referral to UNFSA
and the LOSC,470 and its „without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States‟
when determining conservation and management measures.471 In theory, if Contracting
Parties act in accordance with the WCPF Convention, UNFSA and LOSC, then all new
participants should be treated consistently and be allowed to participate in the WCPFC
accordingly.

On balance, this section concludes that the WCPF Convention is only partly consistent
with principles and standards of international fisheries governance. While there may be
strong political reasons to limit the participation of non-MHLC States, this may
undermine the ability of the WCPFC to ensure the long term conservation and
sustainable use of the WCPO tuna fisheries if the WCPFC does not include all States
with an interest in the fishery. Chapters Seven and Eight will identify all States with an
interest.

4.2.6

Allocation of Fishing Rights

At a fundamental level, the LOSC prescribes a zonal approach that allocates exclusive
rights to Coastal States to fisheries within their waters, while flag States share common
rights over fisheries in the high seas. Beyond this, the LOSC provides no guidance on
allocation processes and does not restrict participatory rights for high seas fisheries,
other than through the obligations on States to cooperate and fulfil conservation
requirements.472
469
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UNFSA provides for the issue of allocation as a substantive matter for RFMOs to
consider, but does not consider it a fundamental requirement. It is qualified, „as
appropriate,‟ and allows RFMOs the flexibility to determine whether it is appropriate to
their regional circumstances to allocate rights to the fisheries within their jurisdiction.473
Similarly, the Code of Conduct does not prescribe allocation processes but provides one
sentence on standards that States should take into consideration if they do decide to
allocate fisheries resources „in order to assist decision-making on the allocation and use
of coastal resources, States should promote the assessment of their respective value
taking into account economic, social and cultural factors.‟474

While the LOSC, UNFSA and the Code of Conduct provide minimal guidance on
allocation processes for existing members of RFMOs, it is reasonable to expect that any
allocation decision by a RFMO must be consistent with the principles and standards for
conservation and management that are discussed throughout Chapters Four and Five.
Similarly they should not undermine the sovereign rights of the coastal States as
prescribed by the LOSC.475 UNFSA does prescribe standards for the allocation of
participatory rights to new entrants (see Figure 14).
Figure 14: UNFSA Standards for Participatory Rights for New Entrants476
In determining the nature and extent of participatory rights for new members, UNFSA
requires that organisations such as the WCPFC take into account, among other things:
the status of the stocks and existing levels of effort;
the interests, fishing patterns and practices of new and existing members;
the respective contributions of new and existing members to conservation and
management science and data;
the needs of coastal communities mainly dependent on fishing;
the needs of coastal States who are overwhelmingly dependent on the fisheries; and
the interests of developing States in whose waters the stocks also occur.
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Within this rather vague international context, the MHLC undertook contentious
negotiations on how the WCPF Convention might apply rights-based management and
allocation procedures to the WCPO tuna fisheries. Among various arguments in relation
to allocation, the fundamental disagreement was between coastal States and DWFNs on
whether the WCPFC should be responsible for allocating fishing rights throughout the
range of the stocks or just for the high seas. Coastal States argued vehemently that they
must not lose their rights to set national total allowable catches (TACs) or fishing effort
controls.477 These States argued that coastal States should establish their own total
allowable catches (TACs) for their own EEZs and that the WCPFC‟s role should be to
„determine the global TAC within the Convention Area and coordinate the
establishment of national TACs and those for the high seas‟.478 On the other hand,
DWFNs argued that the WCPFC should be responsible for determining global TACs
across the range of the stocks, and allocating fishing rights to this TAC among the
members of the WCPFC.479 DWFNs argued that „allocation of highly migratory species
by small areas is biologically and statistically nonsense‟.480

The MHLC was unable to resolve this conflict regarding application to EEZs, and other
questions relating to the significance or weighting of allocation criteria. Consequently,
477

See commentary in: S. Tarte. (1998) Report on the Third Multilateral High-Level Conference on the
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Suva, Fiji.
University of the South Pacific. -- S. Tarte. (1999) Report on the Fourth Multilateral High-Level Conference
on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific.
Suva, Fiji. University of the South Pacific. -- S. Tarte. (1999) Report on the Fifth Multilateral High-Level
Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central
Pacific. Suva, Fiji. University of the South Pacific. -- T. Henriksen, G. Honneland, et al. (2006) Law and
Politics in Ocean Governance: The UN Fish Stocks Agreement and Fisheries Management Regimes.
Publications on Ocean Development. vol. 52. Boston. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
478
Statement by the Solomon Islands: MHLC Secretariat. (1999) Multilateral High Level Conference on the
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific: Fourth
Session. Report of the Conference. Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and Management
of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific: Fourth Session. Honolulu, Hawaii, 10-19
February 1999. WCPFC. p23.
479
See commentary in: S. Tarte. (1998) Report on the Third Multilateral High-Level Conference on the
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Suva, Fiji.
University of the South Pacific. -- S. Tarte. (1999) Report on the Fourth Multilateral High-Level Conference
on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific.
Suva, Fiji. University of the South Pacific. -- S. Tarte. (1999) Report on the Fifth Multilateral High-Level
Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central
Pacific. Suva, Fiji. University of the South Pacific. -- T. Henriksen, G. Honneland, et al. (2006) Law and
Politics in Ocean Governance: The UN Fish Stocks Agreement and Fisheries Management Regimes.
Publications on Ocean Development. vol. 52. Boston. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
480
Statement by Japan. MHLC Secretariat. (1999) Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific: Fourth Session. Report
of the Conference. Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific: Fourth Session. Honolulu, Hawaii, 10-19 February
1999. WCPFC. p16.

Page | 135

the MHLC deferred details for determining allocation to the WCPFC, while the
Convention text provided no guidance on which allocation model the WCPFC should
develop. This lack of guidance has created uncertainty regarding whether the WCPFC
has a mandate to allocate across the range of the stocks, or just the high seas
component, and how it might prioritise or balance the various factors to be considered
in the criteria for allocation. Commentary to date suggests that this is effectively a
question of interpretation and open to negotiation at the Commission.481 Transform
Aqorau, a legal counsel for the FFA during the MHLC, notes that:

Nowhere is the ambiguity in the powers of the Commission more obvious than
in the issue of allocation. Generally, two allocation models may be developed by
the Commission, which can both be supported by legal arguments and
interpretation of the WCPF Convention.482

Furthermore, there has been some uncertainty about the decision-making role of the
WCPFC in regard to the subject of allocation with some commentary suggesting that
the WCPFC was not granted any allocation role and only a limited mandate to develop
criteria for allocation.483 This interpretation is partially incorrect and does not
acknowledge Article 10.4 of the WCPF Convention which explicitly declares that the
WCPFC may adopt decisions relating to allocation, and that such decisions shall be
taken by consensus.484 In support of this, the WCPF Convention further provides that it
is the function of the WCPFC to „develop, where necessary, criteria for the allocation of
the total allowable catch or the total allowable level of fishing effort for highly
481
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migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area‟.485 Any such process or decision must not
prejudice the sovereign rights of coastal States.486 Lastly, any such process must also
consider a set of non-exclusive standards when determining criteria for the allocation of
catch or effort (see Figure 15).
Figure 15: WCPF Convention Allocation Standards487
In developing criteria for allocation of the total allowable catch or the total level of fishing
effort the Commission shall take into account, inter alia:
(a) the status of the stocks and the existing level of fishing effort in the fishery;
(b) the respective interests, past and present fishing patterns and fishing practices of
participants in the fishery and the extent of the catch being utilised for domestic consumption;
(c) the historic catch in an area;
(d) the needs of small island developing States, and territories and possessions, in the
Convention Area whose economies, food supplies and livelihoods are overwhelmingly
dependent on the exploitation of marine living resources;
(e) the respective contributions of participants to conservation and management of the stocks,
including the provision by them of accurate data and their contribution to the conduct of
scientific research in the Convention Area;
(f) the record of compliance by the participants with conservation and management measures;
(g) the needs of coastal communities which are dependent mainly on fishing for the stocks;
(h) the special circumstances of a State which is surrounded by the exclusive economic zones
of other States and has a limited exclusive economic zone of its own;
(i) the geographical situation of a small island developing State which is made up of noncontiguous groups of islands having a distinct economic and cultural identity of their own but
which are separated by areas of high seas; and,
(j) the fishing interests and aspirations of coastal States, particularly small island developing
States, and territories and possessions, in whose areas of national jurisdiction the stocks also
occur.

Unlike UNFSA, the WCPF Convention does not prescribe specific standards for the
allocation of participatory rights to new entrants or cooperating non-members, but does
require that the WCPF Convention shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and
in a manner consistent with UNFSA and the LOSC.488 Furthermore, the WCPF
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Convention states that the WCPFC shall agree on the means by which the fishing
interests of any new member may be accommodated489 and that:

co-operating non-parties to this Convention shall enjoy benefits from
participation in the fishery commensurate with their commitment to comply
with, and their record of compliance with, conservation and management
measures in respect of the relevant stocks.490

While the factors provide a non-exclusive range of interests to be considered, they do
not provide any indication of weighting nor priority. They leave such questions to the
consideration of the Commission. Such questions will likely be highly contentious and
political due to the nature of the interests involved. For example, if the Commission
were to prioritise 10.3(d) and consider fishing history as the primary determinate of
future allocations, this would likely benefit DWFNs who have historically caught most
of the fish.491 On the other hand, it would dramatically reduce the opportunities
available to developing States to increase their benefits from the fisheries. In addition, it
may potentially be inconsistent with Article 30.2(c) as it could result in a
disproportionate burden of conservation action on to developing States (through the
requirement that they limit their fishing with the benefit going to others).

This section concludes that the provisions of the WCPF Convention relating to
allocation and rights-based management are essentially consistent with modern
principles and standards of international fisheries governance. Much of the relevant
provisions of the WCPF Convention in this regard are derived from Article 11 of
UNFSA.

It is important to note the ongoing ambiguities in the WCPF Convention due to the
contentious nature of the matter and the failure of the MHLC to resolve key
disagreements. While the WCPF Convention provides a flexible and broad enough
framework to enable the WCPFC to implement a rights-based approach to fisheries
management, and thereby address the problems inherent in an open-access fishery, the
489
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ongoing disagreements relating to the scope of any such allocation will make it highly
challenging for the WCPFC to negotiate such an agreement.

4.2.7

Decision Making and Dispute Resolution

The LOSC prescribes various factors that shall be considered within decision making
processes (i.e. best scientific evidence, maximum sustainable yield, optimum
utilisation). However, it does not prescribe any standards for how decisions shall be
made. Similarly, while the Vienna Convention on Treaties prescribes various principles
and standards relating to the behaviour and powers of treaties, it prescribes no standards
for how such treaties will decide upon matters of substance within their mandate. 492 In
this context, it is up to the discretion of treaty participants to determine the decision
making processes within their institutions.
UNFSA changed this by establishing clear standards for decision making. 493 In
describing the functions of an RFMO, UNFSA set a standard that States shall „agree on
decision making procedures which facilitate the adoption of conservation and
management measures in a timely and effective manner‟. 494 Similarly, UNFSA set a
standard for transparent decision making.495 Finally, to support cooperation and the
prevention of disputes, UNFSA set a standard requiring States to agree on „efficient and
expeditious decision making procedures‟ in RFMOs.496 The intent of this „dispute
prevention‟ principle is to strengthen decision making processes, in recognition that if
States cooperated more effectively, there would be fewer disputes for other fora to
resolve.497
492
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Where agreement fails, the LOSC prescribed principles and standards for dispute
resolution that were a significant advance (at the time of their negotiation) towards
generalised compulsory dispute resolution by judicial or arbitrary means. 498 The LOSC
prescribed compulsory resolution procedures for disputes that cannot be settled
otherwise, and established standards for how disputes should be resolved.499 This trend
towards arbitral or judicial resolution was further strengthened by UNFSA which built
on the basic principle that disputes can be resolved by judicial or arbitral means at the
instigation of one of the parties to the dispute.500

In regard to disputes over high seas fisheries, once a compulsory resolution challenge is
initiated, the LOSC transfers authority from States to international arbitrary or judicial
processes and vests them with powers to determine the appropriate conservation and
management standards.501 UNFSA further elaborated upon these requirements and
explicitly applied the dispute resolution procedures of Part XV of the LOSC to disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of fisheries agreements relating to straddling
fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks, including disputes concerning conservation
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and management.502 This imposition of compulsory dispute resolution procedures over
other RFMO conventions was a deliberate response to deficiencies in then-current
RFMOs that had been criticised for non-existent dispute resolution procedures.503
UNFSA further expanded upon the standards to be considered by dispute resolution
procedures. These specified that the court or tribunal shall apply the provisions of the
LOSC, UNFSA and the relevant RFMO convention (i.e. WCPF Convention) and
generally accepted standards for the conservation and management of living marine
resources.504 Among other things, this expansion allows for the application of principles
of international environmental law beyond the LOSC, UNFSA and the WCPF
Convention, to the extent that they are generally accepted.505

The MHLC negotiations over decision making procedures for the WCPFC were
contentious and unresolved until the last moments of the penultimate conference.
Significant differences existed between FFA members, the USA and other DWFN
States over whether decisions should require consensus, or whether majority decision
making procedures should be adopted, and how these should be enacted, and whether
opt out (objection) clauses should be included.
The Chair‟s first draft text at the third MHLC proposed a three quarter majority voting
mechanism be utilised when all attempts at consensus had failed, and did not include
any mechanism for outvoted States to opt out from measures. These proposals raised
concerns from the USA that stated throughout the MHLC that it could not tolerate any
process where it might lose a vote and not be able to opt out. Asian DWFNs expressed
concerns in response to any majority voting procedure that simply reflected numbers of
delegations (i.e. which would likely benefit the FFA voting bloc). During the following
MHLCs, Japan led various attempts to weigh voting by historical catch (thereby placing
it within the majority), while the USA proposed various drafts that differentiated
between some decisions by consensus and others by majority (with opt out clauses).
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Meanwhile, FFA members continued to support majority voting procedures and oppose
opt out clauses.506

Negotiations between the USA and the FFA at the seventh MHLC resulted in a
compromise agreement on a two chambered decision making process for circumstances
where all attempts at consensus had failed. This was despite significant opposition from
other DWFNs due to the lack of an opt out clause (among other concerns).507

Article 20 of the WCPF Convention establishes the principle that all decisions should be
made by consensus as a general rule, and sets the standard for consensus as the absence
of any formal objection at the time the decision was taken. Further, the WCPF
Convention identified five matters that required consensus: adoption and amendment of
the Rules of Procedure;508 decisions relating to the allocation of total allowable catch or
the total level of fishing effort;509 adoption of financial regulations;510 adoption of the
budget and a scheme for assessment of contributions to the budget;511 and amendments
to the Convention.512

Outside these five matters, the WCPF Convention allowed for all other matters to be
decided by majority when consensus could not be reached. The Convention prescribed a
complicated two chambered voting process that was binding on all members. One
chamber consists of all FFA members, with all other members comprising the second
chamber.513 For a measure to be adopted it must be supported by a three quarter
majority in each chamber, provided that in no circumstances shall a proposal be
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defeated by two or fewer votes in either chamber.514 Members who lose a vote have the
option of requesting a review of the decision within 30 days by an independent panel
that shall determine if the decision is consistent with the WCPF Convention, UNFSA
and the LOSC or if the decision unjustifiably discriminates against the complainant in
form or in fact.515 If the review panel finds that the decision is consistent with the
WCPF Convention, UNFSA and the LOSC and does not discriminate unjustifiably
against the complainant, then the decision is binding on the complainant without any
option for the complainant to opt out (and continue as a member of the Commission).
The principle of an independent review panel and the standards established for it were
new to international fisheries governance.516 This was a significant advance on
traditional RFMO decision making procedures that simply allowed disgruntled
members to opt out of measures.517
In addition, the WCPF Convention allowed for the participation of „fishing entities‟ (i.e.
Chinese Taipei) in almost all forms of decision making. These arrangements allow
Chinese Taipei to participate in all work of the Commission, including decision making,
except for specific matters that are limited to Contracting Parties only.518
514
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516
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of Marine and Coastal Law. 16.3. p391.
517
Concerns regarding opt out clauses had been expressed throughout the UNFSA and MHLC negotiations. In
2006, the UNFSA Review Conference responded to these concerns and recommended that States: „ensure that
post opt-out behaviour is constrained by rules to prevent opting-out parties from undermining conservation,
clear processes for dispute resolution, and a description of alternative measures that will be implemented in the
interim.‟ D. Balton. (2006) Report of the Review Conference on the Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. New York, USA.
United Nations General Assembly p37.
518
Article 35.2. WCPF Convention. For further analysis of this provision, see: M. Lodge. (2006) The Practice
of Fishing Entities in Regional Fisheries Management Organisations: The Case of the Commission for the
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.
Ocean Development and International Law. 37. p197. Chinese Taipei has since participated fully in the
workings of the Commission following its signature of the Arrangement for the Participation of Fishing
Entities. For further background on this issue, and analysis of the RFMO practice in regard to the participation
of Chinese Taipei, see: N.-T. A. Hu. (2006) Fishing Entities: Their Emergence, Evolution and Practice from
Taiwan's Perspective. Ocean Development and International Law. 37. -- M. Tsamenyi. (2006) The Legal
Substance and Status of Fishing Entities in International Law: A Note. Ocean Development and International
Law. 37. -- M. Sheng-Ti Gau. (2006) The Practice of the Concept of Fishing Entities: Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms. Ocean Development and International Law. 37. -- P. S. C. Ho. (2006) The Impact of the UN Fish
Stocks Agreement on Taiwan's Participation in International Fisheries Fora. Ocean Development and
International Law. 37.-- Arrangement for the Participation of Fishing Entities. Opened for signature 5
September 2000. Honolulu, USA. Available in Annex 10: Report of the Seventh Session of the Multilateral
High Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western
and Central Pacific. 2000.
515

Page | 143

The procedures established by the WCPF Convention for decision making are
consistent with the principles and standards established by international fisheries
governance. In effect, the key standards are all prescribed by UNFSA, within the broad
principles established by the LOSC and the Vienna Convention on Treaties. The WCPF
Convention‟s preference for consensus, with a fall-back to a majority voting procedure,
supported by a review panel in place of an opt out clause is consistent with international
fisheries governance and represents best practice among RFMOs. In 2007, an
independent panel of international fisheries experts found that the WCPF Convention
fulfilled criteria for best practice in decision making.519 The panel identified a number
of principles and functions for decision making that represented best practice and found
that only the WCPFC and two other RFMOs had incorporated these principles and
functions into their constitutive instruments (i.e. the WCPF Convention and its Rules of
Procedure).520 These principles and functions were based around the standards
articulated in Articles 10, 12 and 28 of UNFSA, and included further details relating to
procedural matters, level of support and participation (as similarly discussed in Section
4.2.5).521

If negotiations fail, and disputes arise, the WCPF Convention is explicitly consistent
with principles and standards of international fisheries governance as it simply applies
the UNFSA provisions, which in turn expanded upon the principles and standards
prescribed by the LOSC.522 The WCPF Convention applies these provisions to all
WCPFC members, regardless of whether they are also party to UNFSA.523

It is important to note that the WCPF Convention provisions relating to dispute
resolution exempt fisheries disputes in waters under national jurisdiction. This is
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consistent with the zonal framework established by the LOSC and the procedures under
UNFSA. In effect the principles and standards established by the LOSC and UNFSA for
the resolution of fisheries disputes only apply to high seas matters as coastal States are
not obliged to accept submission to dispute resolution for any dispute „relating to its
sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone or
their exercise, including its discretionary powers‟.524

Michael Lodge and Alan Boyle both argue that the UNFSA conservation and
management obligations agreed to by coastal States for fisheries within their EEZs,
require a narrower interpretation of this exemption. They argue that the coastal State
exemption prescribed in Article 297.3, and incorporated into UNFSA, should be
interpreted as covering coastal State matters „that are purely of EEZ concern only, i.e.
matters which do not affect straddling stocks, whether inside or outside the EEZ.‟525
Nevertheless, this question is, as yet, untested and the LOSC‟s traditional interpretation
appears to be dominant. In practice, the LOSC exempts from review any and all
fisheries management decisions by coastal States for waters under their national
jurisdiction.526

This section concludes that despite the controversies during the MHLC negotiations, the
WCPF Convention is consistent with principles and standards of international fisheries
governance. Furthermore, the WCPF Convention has established a benchmark for
transparent and engaging decision making processes that are not undermined by opt out
clauses or stalled by consensus-at-all-cost requirements.

524
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4.2.8

Special Requirements of Developing States

The special requirements and needs of developing States, particularly small island
developing States, were recognised at a global level throughout UNFSA negotiations,
and regionally within the MHLC negotiations. Consideration of these requirements, and
of the importance of marine resources to sustainable development, has become an
important principle of international fisheries governance. Consideration of these issues
has also been included within other globally significant agreements, such as the
Barbados Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island
Developing States527 and the World Summit for Sustainable Development‟s (WSSD)
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.528

These issues are critical to the conservation and management of the WCPO tuna
fisheries and are intrinsic to the WCPF Convention. Almost all of the key tropical
coastal States in the WCPO fisheries are developing States. As detailed in Chapters
Seven and Eight, these States control access to over 70% of the WCPO tropical tuna
fisheries and are ultimately responsible for managing the majority of the WCPO tuna
fisheries and implementing conservation and management measures.529 In addition to
their rights and responsibilities over the fisheries within their EEZs, they have
significant interests in various fishing activities and aspire to further develop their
interests and benefits.

The special requirements of developing States were a core issue on the agenda of
MHLC negotiations. In addition to their development needs, many of the developing
States within the region suffer from substantial shortcomings in national governance
and institutional capacity which impacts upon almost every aspect of fisheries
management and development. Various studies have identified significant constraints
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on fisheries management and development due to limitations in national capacity (both
human and institutional) and weaknesses in national governance.530
From the start of the MHLC, the Majuro Declaration recognised „the need for special
assistance for Pacific island developing States and territories to enable them to
participate effectively in the conservation, management and sustainable use of the
highly migratory fish stocks of the region‟.531 Despite statements from a broad range of
MHLC participants on the need for assistance for developing countries, there were
significant negotiating differences on how any such assistance might be supported and
to what degree developed States might contribute.532 Ultimately, the MHLC produced a
compromise text that mirrored much of UNFSA and resolved some disagreements,
while deferring some details to subsequent Preparatory Conferences and the WCPFC.

Article 30 of the WCPF Convention prescribes the key principles and standards relating
to the requirements of developing States. The FFA referred to this Article as the
„foundation on which the Commission will be built‟.533 The Article establishes the
principle that the WCPFC must take into account the special requirements of
developing States (and territories and colonies), particularly small island States and
prescribes the following standards that the WCPFC must take into account when giving
effect to the duty to cooperate. The Commission must consider: the vulnerability of
these States and territories that are dependent on the fisheries, including food security
530
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concerns; the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by,
subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and fishworkers, as well as indigenous
people in these States and territories; and the need to ensure that measures do not result
in transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action
onto these States and territories.534

In addition, Article 30 of the WCPF Convention prescribes the establishment of a fund
to facilitate the effective participation of developing State parties, particularly small
island developing States in the work of the WCPFC.535 However, the MHLC was
unable to agree on how to administer or fund this arrangement. In 2001, the First
Session of the Preparatory Conference identified resolution of this matter as a priority,
but also failed to resolve the mater.536 The FFA argued unsuccessfully throughout these
negotiations that the fund should be included within assessed (i.e. compulsory)
contributions, while DWFNs largely argued that it should be a matter for voluntary
contributions with some expressing concerns that the fund had the potential to „change
the nature of the Commission to a development assistance organisation‟.537 Given the
lack of resolution, there are no specific standards for the implementation of the fund.
However, some context is provided in paragraph 30.4 that prescribes general standards
for cooperation with developing States in supporting the purposes of the Article (i.e.
such cooperation may include the provision of financial assistance, human resources
development, technical assistance, transfer of technology, and advisory and consultative
services).538 The WCPF Convention directs that such assistance shall, inter alia, be
directed towards: improved conservation and management of highly migratory fish
stocks; stock assessment and scientific research; monitoring, control and surveillance;
compliance and enforcement; and access to technology and equipment.539

The WCPF Convention also recognises the special requirements of developing States in
its Preamble (vulnerability, dependence upon fisheries, need for special assistance to
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participate effectively in the conservation, management and sustainable use of the
stocks). Other relevant references in the WCPF Convention include: Article 7 (due
consideration to the respective capacities of such State to apply conservation and
management principles and their need for assistance); Article 10 (needs, conditions and
interests of small island developing States when developing criteria for allocation); and
Article 18 (discount in budget contribution calculations for catches in developing States
by vessels flagged to that State).

This section concludes that the WCPF Convention is largely consistent with key
principles and standards of international fisheries, as elaborated by UNFSA, more
generally by Article 5 of the Code of Conduct,540 and relevant paragraphs of the WSSD
Plan of Implementation.541 The WCPF Convention prescribes principles and standards
that mirror similar provisions found in UNFSA and which explicitly recognise the
special requirements and needs of developing States and territories, particularly small
island States, and to a lesser extent guide the provision of assistance to address these
requirements and needs.542

The only significant inconsistency between the WCPF Convention and international
fisheries governance is the lack of specific reference in the WCPF Convention to a
principle in the UNFSA and Code of Conduct that States shall cooperate to „to assist
developing States, in particular the least-developed among them and small island
developing States, to enable them to participate in high seas fisheries for such stocks,
including facilitating access to such fisheries subject to (conservation and management
principles)‟.543 While Article 10 of the WCPF Convention includes various standards on
540
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the needs, conditions and interests of small island developing States when developing
criteria for allocation, the WCPF Convention does not explicitly prescribe any principle
that developed States shall cooperate with developing State to support their participation
and access into high seas fisheries. However, it is reasonable to assume that the WCPF
Convention is consistent with UNFSA and implicitly includes the principle relating to
high seas participation and access. This is because of the preambular language in the
WCPF Convention that recognises the need for special assistance to participate in the
sustainable use of the fisheries, and the instruction in Article 4 that the WCPF
Convention shall be interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with UNFSA and the
LOSC, and the non-exclusive nature of the standards for cooperation in Article 30.

4.2.9

Equitable Sharing of Conservation Burden

As demonstrated in Chapter Two, the inter-meshed characteristics of the WCPO
tropical tuna fisheries make it likely that the WCPFC will need to implement a broad
mix of reductions and controls across a range of gears and locations to ensure the long
term conservation and sustainable use of bigeye and yellowfin. Consequently,
conservation and management measures may affect a broad range of stakeholders and
impact upon a diverse range of national interests.

Such conservation and management measures will distribute a burden of conservation
reductions on participants in the WCPO fisheries. Each participating State must apply
costs to its fleets through limiting fishing opportunities and regulating their activities. In
order to implement these measures, governments must fund national institutions to
implement and govern national regulations, while potentially increasing the
management costs on its fleets through more complex and costly licensing
arrangements. Hopefully, this cost is small and relatively short term and all participating
States will subsequently enjoy significant benefits in the long term due to improved
productivity and increased benefits.

However, as will be demonstrated in Chapters Seven and Eight, the diversity of interests
and the complex nature of the WCPO tuna fisheries, make it likely that the distribution
of these costs and impacts (the conservation burden) will be complicated and potentially
unevenly distributed. Depending upon its structure, the conservation and management
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measure will impact directly and indirectly on various participants: reducing benefits for
some; limiting opportunities for others; and protecting or even increasing benefits for
some participants. To further complicate matters, conservation and management
measures may impact on developing States that depend significantly on these fisheries
and have strong aspirations to further develop their benefits. Some of these States will
have few other development and resource options and will be more heavily impacted by
the conservation burden than other States with diverse resources, large institutions and
substantial revenue streams from multiple economic activities. Consequently, the
question of how the conservation burden is distributed is fundamental to conservation
and management negotiations.

This section concludes that the WCPF Convention is consistent with principles of
international governance relating to the equitable sharing of the conservation burden.
Both the WCPF Convention and UNFSA share much identical language in references to
developing States. At the global level, UNFSA articulates the principle that the global
community interest in the conservation of fisheries should not result in a
disproportionate burden of conservation action on developing States.544 The WCPF
Convention applies this at the regional level, within the context of the WCPO tuna
fisheries, and requires that the WCPFC shall take into account the need to ensure that
conservation measures do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a
disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing States parties, and
territories and possessions.545 Given the significance of developing States within the
WCPO tuna fisheries, this establishes an important framework that should support
cooperation towards the long term conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO tuna
fisheries.

4.3

Conclusion

Despite some significant failings, the MHLC and Preparatory Conferences were
ultimately successful at incorporating many of the modern principles and standards of
fisheries governance that had developed during the 1990s relating to fisheries
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cooperation. First, the WCPF Convention is consistent with international principles of
cooperation. In this regard, the WCPF Convention establishes a Commission consistent
with the standards prescribed by UNFSA for operationalising the implementation of the
duty to cooperate at the regional level.

Second, the objective and preamble of the WCPF Convention establish a strong goal
and conceptual framework. This is consistent with principles of international fisheries
governance and should be sufficient to steer the WCPFC towards ensuring the long term
conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO tuna fisheries.
Third, the WCPF Convention‟s preference for consensus, with a fall back to a majority
voting procedure, supported by a review panel in place of an opt out clause is consistent
with international fisheries governance and represents best practice among RFMOs.
This provides a strong framework to support cooperation and enable effective decision
making. In addition, the WCPF Convention is explicitly consistent with principles and
standards of international fisheries governance relating to dispute resolution as it
directly applies UNFSA provisions, which in turn expanded upon the principles and
standards prescribed by the LOSC.

Fourth, the WCPF Convention is identical and consistent with UNFSA in regard to
avoiding disproportionate transfers of conservation burdens on to developing States, and
is generally comprehensive in regard to matters relating to the special requirements of
developing States. However it is less explicitly consistent with the modern principle that
States shall cooperate to assist developing States to build their participation in high seas
fisheries. Rather, it depends upon an implicit reading of the WCPF Convention as a
whole to determine its consistency with this principle.

However, some provisions in the WCPF Convention are ambiguous and/or partly
inconsistent with principles and standards of international fisheries governance. For
example, the Convention is only partly consistent with international principles relating
to the coverage of an RFMO. The migratory range of WCPO stocks is likely to extend
beyond the eastern and western boundaries of the Convention Area. This insufficient
coverage does not allow for the conservation and management of the WCPO tuna
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fisheries throughout their range. This is particularly a weakness in the west where no
other cooperative management arrangement for tuna exists.

Similarly, the previously exclusive nature of the MHLC regarding invitations to some
States and not others, suggests that the WCPF Convention is only partly consistent with
international fisheries governance. While there may be strong political and conservation
reasons to limit the participation of non-MHLC States, this is not consistent with
principles and standards of international fisheries governance.

Lastly, the lack of explicit application to archipelagic waters, while consistent with
international fisheries governance, may impact on the ability of the WCPFC to ensure
the long term conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO tuna fisheries.

In conclusion, despite some weaknesses, the WCPF Convention is broadly consistent
with benchmarks of international fisheries governance in the areas of cooperation and
the establishment of RFMOs. Based on this analysis of the Convention, it is reasonable
to expect that the WCPF Convention should be capable of providing the necessary
governance framework and institution for States to cooperate and adopt sufficiently
strong measures. This assessment assumes that the ambiguities referred to above do not
allow significant portions of the fishery to go unmanaged. This assumption is tested
further in Chapter Nine.
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Chapter Five: The WCPF Convention – Conservation and
Management
Here lies the concept, MSY.
It advocated yields too high,
And didn‟t spell out how to slice the pie.
We bury it with the best of wishes,
Especially on behalf of fishes.
We don‟t know yet what will take its place,
But hope it‟s as good for the human race.546

5.1

Introduction

This chapter continues the analysis and assessment of the WCPF Convention within the
context of international fisheries governance. It analyses the Convention‟s principles
and standards relating to the functions of the Commission, and its adoption of
conservation and management measures.

5.2

Assessment

The following sections analyse all principles and standards as they relate to the
consideration, negotiation and adoption of conservation and management measures. The
scope of this thesis is limited to the WCPFC‟s consideration and adoption of
conservation and management measures relating to the tropical tuna fisheries. Other
matters relating to national implementation or monitoring, control and surveillance are
beyond the scope of this thesis.547

The analysis enables the chapter to determine whether the WCPF Convention provides
a sufficient framework for the WCPFC to adopt conservation and management
measures that are capable of ensuring the long term conservation and sustainable use of

546

P. Larkin. (1977) An Epitah for the Concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield. Transactions of the American
Fisheries Society. 106.1. p10.
547
See Chapter One for further discussion and justification of the scope of the thesis.

Page | 154

the WCPO tuna fisheries. A reference matrix table in Appendix One summarises the
assessment of these principles and standards against international fisheries governance.

5.2.1

Functions of the Commission

Article 10 of the WCPF Convention prescribes the functions of the WCPFC. These
provide the operational standards for the Commission‟s work. The context for these
standards is provided by the overarching framework of principles for conservation and
management that the WCPF Convention prescribes in Part II.

As discussed earlier, there were significant tensions over the role of the WCPFC in
waters under national jurisdiction, particularly in regard to concerns over allocation.
Subsequently, the MHLC inserted a qualifier into the opening paragraph of Article 10:

Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing highly migratory fish stocks
within areas under national jurisdiction548

This raises an important question regarding the jurisdiction of the WCPFC. The WCPF
Convention explicitly applies to all fisheries for species of highly migratory fish (except
for sauries) throughout the Convention Area in the high seas, and in waters under
national jurisdiction. However, in regard to the functions of the WCPFC, Article 10.1
explicitly defers to the rights and responsibilities of coastal States under the LOSC to
manage their own fisheries, in accordance with their duty to cooperate. In effect, while
the WCPF Convention applies throughout the Convention Area, it is a question of
interpretation how it applies compatible measures and whether the WCPF Convention
empowers the WCPFC to adopt measures for all waters throughout the Convention
Area. In practice, it is up to the WCPFC to determine how to interpret Article 10 and
determine the application of its measures.549 Ostensibly, the WCPFC could adopt
measures for the stocks throughout their range, or it could adopt measures that are
limited to the high seas which are compatible with measures implemented by coastal
548

Article 10.1. WCPF Convention.
T. Aqorau. (2001) Tuna Fisheries Management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean: A Critical
Analysis of the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean and its Implications for the Pacific SIDS States. The International Journal
of Marine and Coastal Law. 16.3. p394.
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States. As will be discussed further in Section 5.4.9, this has particular ramifications for
how WCPFC members may ultimately decide to allocate rights to the fisheries.

This ambiguity in the jurisdiction of the WCPFC is consistent with principles and
standards of international fisheries governance, given that general international
principles also leave the matter largely open to interpretation. As discussed in Chapter
Three, the LOSC prescribes the principle that coastal States and fishing States shall
cooperate in regard to highly migratory fisheries. UNFSA then sets the standards for
this cooperation, but does not explicitly declare how this cooperation shall be
implemented within waters under national jurisdiction.

Putting aside the question of application, Article 10 establishes clear standards for the
functions of the Commission which are largely derived from Article 10 of UNFSA.
Most of the WCPF Convention‟s standards in this regard use similar text and duplicate
standards from Article 10 of UNFSA. Consequently, they are broadly consistent with
standards of international fisheries governance as prescribed by UNFSA.

The standards established by the WCPF Convention for the functions of the WCPFC are
consistent with, and sometimes more comprehensive than, the standards of international
fisheries governance. Figure 16 compares the functions prescribed in the WCPF
Convention with the international standards provided by UNFSA550 (the most
comprehensive source of international standards for the functions of an RFMO).

550
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States when giving effect to their duty to cooperate. These are described in further detail in subsequent sections
as they arise.
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Figure 16: Comparison of WCPFC Functions Against UNFSA Standards

Paragraph

WCPF Convention
Function

10.1a

conservation and management
measures for highly migratory
stocks

10.1c

conservation and management
measures for non-target and
associated and dependent
species

10.1b

promotion of cooperation and
coordination to support
compatibility

10.1g,
10.3, 10.4

Paragraph

UNFSA
Function

10a

conservation and management
measures for straddling and
highly migratory stocks

allocation

10b

allocation

10.1h

minimum standards for
responsible fishing

10c

minimum standards for
responsible fishing

10.1f

scientific review and advice and
assessments

10d

scientific review and advice

10g

scientific assessments

10d

assess impacts of fishing on
non-target and associated and
dependent species

10.1d

data collection

10e

data collection

10.1e

data management

10f

data management

1-.1j

obtain and evaluate economic
other fisheries related data

10.1i

monitoring, control and
surveillance

10h

monitoring, control and
surveillance

10.1k

accommodating new participants 10i

accommodating new participants

10.1l

decision making procedures to
enable adoption of conservation
and management measures

10j

decision making procedures to
enable adoption of conservation
and management measures

10.1n

promotion of peaceful
settlement of disputes

10k

promotion of peaceful
settlement of disputes

10l

cooperation of national agencies
in implementing decisions

10m

publicise measures

10.1m

budgetary matters

10.1o

discuss any question or matter
and adopt any measure or
recommendations necessary to
achieve the objective of the
WCPF Convention

10.6

publicise measures
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As is evident in Figure 17, the WCPF Convention meets or exceeds all of the standards
identified above and is consistent with the basic principles of international fisheries
governance relating to the functions of an RFMO. For example, the WCPF Convention
exceeds UNFSA in respect of bycatch and ecosystem concerns in that it explicitly
prescribes that it is a function of the WCPFC to adopt conservation measures as
necessary to maintain or restore associated and dependent populations. While Article 5
of UNFSA includes such matters within its general principles, it does not explicitly
prescribe that it is a function of a RFMO to adopt such measures. The WCPF
Convention also allows for far greater flexibility in the functions of the WCPFC,
allowing that the WCPFC may adopt any measure or recommendation as necessary to
achieve the WCPF Convention‟s objective.

In addition, the WCPF Convention prescribes a number of principles and standards
relating to: conservation and management;551 compliance and enforcement;552 special
requirements of developing States;553 scientific, technical and compliance information,
advice and service;554 and obligations of members.555 These further inform the functions
of the WCPFC and nature of the member‟s responsibilities when giving effect to their
duty to cooperate. Each of these are discussed in subsequent sections.

This section concludes that the WCPF Convention prescribes functions for the WCPFC
that are consistent with principles and standards of international fisheries governance.
Given the flexibility allowed for in Article 10.1(o), and the explicit requirements to
adopt measures as prescribed in Article 10.1(a) and 10.1(c), this section concludes that
these functions are sufficient to allow the WCPFC to ensure the long term conservation
and sustainable use of the WCPO tuna fisheries.

The WCPF Convention also prescribes principles and standards for conservation and
management that direct how the WCPFC shall enact these functions and how members
shall give effect to their duty to cooperate and obligation to implement compatible
measures. These principles and standards are elaborated in Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the
551

Part II. WCPF Convention.
Parts VI and VII. WCPF Convention.
553
Part VIII. WCPF Convention.
554
Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14. WCPF Convention.
555
Parts IV and V. WCPF Convention.
552
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WCPF Convention and are in large part derived from Articles 5 and 6 of UNFSA. There
was little discussion within the MHLC of these principles and standards. The majority
of delegations, including the USA and FFA members, supported the adoption of a
comprehensive UNFSA based approach. Against this, the Asian DWFNs argued for a
more narrowly defined set of scientific standards with limited provisions relating to
biodiversity and ecosystem based approaches to management. Between these divergent
views, there was little ground for compromise. In the end, the UNFSA approach was
adopted, over the reservations of the Asian DWFNs.556 These principles are discussed in
the following sections.

5.2.2

Long Term Sustainability and Optimum Utilisation

Articles 5(a) and 7(a) of the WCPF Convention establish the overarching standards for
implementation, consistent with the zonal framework established by the LOSC. First,
they require WCPFC members to give effect to their duty to cooperate (in accordance
with the LOSC, UNFSA and the WCPF Convention) through the adoption of measures
„to ensure long term sustainability of highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention
Area and promote the objective of their optimum utilisation‟.557 Second, they require
coastal State members to apply these principles and standards within their waters under
national jurisdiction in their exercise of their sovereign rights relating to highly
migratory fisheries.
The inclusion of the ‘long term sustainability’ and ‘optimum utilisation’ standards is
consistent with modern principles and standards of international fisheries governance,
as prescribed by the LOSC, UNFSA and the Code of Conduct. This standard builds on
the LOSC provisions that require coastal States and States fishing on the high seas to
cooperate with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of
optimum utilisation, both within and beyond the EEZ.558 The basic objectives and
content of this co-operation is elaborated in Articles 61, 62, 63, 64, 69, 70, 71, 72, 117,
118 and 119 of the LOSC. These articles prescribe that conservation measures must be
based on the best scientific evidence available and designed to ensure that harvested
556

A. Sydnes. (2001) Establishing a Regional Fisheries Management Organisation for the Western and Central
Pacific Tuna Fisheries. Ocean and Coastal Management. 44. p797.
557
Article 5(a) of both the WCPF Convention and UNFSA.
558
Article 64. LOSC.
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species are maintained at, or restored to levels which can produce the ‘maximum
sustainable yield as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors’.559 Such
measures must also take into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks
and generally recommended international standards.560 In addition, there is a duty to
ensure that species associated with or dependent on harvested species are not depleted
to levels at which they would be seriously threatened and a general duty to exchange
relevant information through subregional, regional or global organisations.561 Scientific
information and catch statistics shall be exchanged and States must ensure that
conservation measures do not discriminate in form or fashion against the fishermen of
any State.562

Similarly, these standards build on the principles established by the LOSC that coastal
States shall manage and conserve fisheries within their EEZs. These require coastal
States to determine the allowable catch of the living resources in their EEZ and ensure,
through „proper‟ conservation and management measures, that living resources within
the EEZ are not over-exploited. In addition, coastal States shall share their surplus fish
and promote the objective of optimum utilisation within their EEZ (without prejudice to
conservation requirements).563
The „optimum utilisation‟ obligation reflected the 1970s concern of DWFNs that coastal
States would drastically limit utilisation of the resources newly enclosed in their
fisheries zones.564 As a result, coastal States are required to promote the objective of
optimum utilisation of living resources within their EEZ (without prejudice to the
conservation requirements).565 In recognition that many developing States did not have
the capacity to „optimally harvest‟ their EEZs, coastal States are obliged to give other

559

Articles 61 and 119. LOSC.
Articles 61 and 119. LOSC.
561
Articles 61 and 119. LOSC.
562
Article 119. LOSC.
563
Article 62. LOSC.
564
For selected readings on the development of this principle through the LOSC negotiations, see: C. Fleischer.
(1977) The Right to a 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone or a Special Fishery Zone. San Diego Law Review.
548. -- F. Vicuna. (1989) The Exclusive Economic Zone: Regime and Legal Nature under International Law.
Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. -- B.
Kwiatkowska. (1989) The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea. Publications on
Ocean Development. vol. 14. Dordrecht, Netherlands. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. -- D. Attard. (1987) The
Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law. Oxford Monographs in International Law. Oxford, United
Kingdom. Oxford University Press.
565
Articles 62, 69, 70, 71 and 72. LOSC.
560
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States access to any surplus beyond which their fleets could harvest. However, coastal
States are granted a wide discretion in determining this surplus and the conditions for
foreign access.566

Modern fisheries governance built on this framework provided by the LOSC and further
elaborated principles and standards for conservation and management. While the LOSC
has been widely criticised for its lack of guidance on the actual content of fisheries
conservation and management regimes or measures,567 it did include enough substance
to enable subsequent agreements such as UNFSA to further elaborate principles and
standards of conservation and management. Most explicitly, Articles 61 and 119 of the
LOSC both include provisions that require States, when determining total allowable
catches and other conservation measures, to take into account „any generally
recommended international minimum standards, whether subregional, regional or
global‟.568 As discussed in Chapter Two, subsequent global agreements such as
UNFSA, the Code of Conduct, and the CBD have significantly elaborated on these
minimum standards.

This section concludes that Articles 5(a) and 7(a) of the WCPF Convention are
consistent with principles and standards of international fisheries governance and
operationalise the objective of the WCPF Convention. As discussed in Chapter Four,
the concept of long term sustainability and sustainable use should be interpreted within
the broader context of the WCPF Convention‟s preamble and international principles
relating to sustainable development and sustainable use. Within this conceptual
framework, they provide criteria for assessing whether WCPFC members are acting in
manner consistent with the WCPF Convention, and broader principles and standards of
international fisheries governance. These criteria are further elaborated by the following
standards.

566

Article 62.3. LOSC.
See Chapter Two for further discussion and references.
568
Articles 61 and 119. LOSC.
567
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5.2.3

Science Based Decisions

Modern fisheries governance endorses and recognises the fundamental importance of
scientific research and data to fisheries management.569 For example, in 1996 the FAO
published a checklist for fisheries managers. The first question on the checklist asks if
conservation and management measures are based on the best scientific evidence
available.570 The LOSC, the Code of Conduct, the CBD, UNFSA and various other
global fisheries and environment agreements all incorporate the broad principle that
science shall be integral to conservation and management decisions.571

In regard to science and knowledge requirements for decisions, the LOSC, UNFSA and
the Code of Conduct collectively establish a standard that conservation and
management decisions shall be based on the best scientific evidence available,572 and
take into account traditional knowledge of the resources and their habitat573 as well as
relevant environmental and economic574 and social factors,575 including the special
requirements of developing States.576

Fisheries science has an inherently high degree of uncertainty. Butterworth describes
fisheries assessment as an inexact science „in which uncertainty is pervasive‟.577
Christensen and Pauly note that the level of uncertainty in fisheries stock assessments

569

M. Lodge and S. Nandan. (2005) Some Suggestions Towards Better Implementation of the United Nations
Agreement on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of 1995. International Journal of Marine
and Coastal Law. 20. P351. For further selected readings on the role of fisheries science, see: Y. Tanaka.
(2008) A Dual Approach to Ocean Governance. Ashgate International Law Series. Farnham, United Kingdom.
Ashgate. -- L. Motos and D. Wilson, Ed. (2006) The Knowledge Base for Fisheries Management. Amsterdam,
Netherlands. Elsevier. -- T. Pitcher, P. Hart, et al., Ed. (2001) Reinventing Fisheries Management. vol. 23.
Dordecht, Netherlands. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
570
J. F. Caddy. (1996) A Checklist for Fisheries Resource Management Issues Seen From the Perspective of
the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Rome, Italy. FAO.
571
For example, see: Article 61 and 119 of the LOSC: Paragraph 6.4 of the Code of Conduct: Article 5(b) of
UNFSA: Preamble to the CBD. For further discussion in relation to the role of science in environmental
agreements more generally, see: P. Sands. (2003) Principles of International Environmental Law. 2 ed.
Cambridge. University of Cambridge. -- S. Andresen and J. B. Skjaerseth. (2007) Science and Technology:
From Agenda Setting to Implementation. The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law. Ed. D.
Bodansky, J. Brunnee, et al. Oxford, United Kingdom. Oxford University Press. -- P. Haas. (2004) Science
Policy for Multilateral Environmental Governance. Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance. Ed. N.
Kanie and P. Haas. Tokyo, Japan. United Nations University Press.
572
Articles 61 and 119. LOSC -– Article 5. UNFSA -– Paragraph 6.4. Code of Conduct.
573
Paragraph 6.4. Code of Conduct.
574
Articles 61 and 119. LOSC -- Article 5, UNFSA -- Paragraph 6.4. Code of Conduct.
575
Paragraph 6.4. Code of Conduct.
576
Articles 61 and 119. LOSC -- Article 5, UNFSA.
577
D. Butterworth. (2000) Science and Fisheries Management: Entering the New Millenium. Current Fisheries
Issues and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. Ed. M. H. Nordquist and J. Moore,
Norton. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p39.
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can be formidable. 578 These high levels of uncertainty can be a significant obstacle to
fisheries management.579 Fisheries stock assessments must evaluate the consequences of
alternative management scenarios based on information sources with high levels of
uncertainty in core fields such predictions of fish population dynamics, productivity,
ecosystem interactions and environmental and anthropogenic impacts.580 The WCPF
Convention and standards of international fisheries governance partly account for this
inherent uncertainty by setting a low benchmark at „best available scientific evidence‟,
implying that decisions shall be based on weak or poor science if that is recognised as
the best available.581 Such uncertainties are also further addressed through the
application of a precautionary approach.
The WCPF Convention mirrors the language of UNFSA 582 and is consistent with the
principle of science based decisions, and most of the standards identified above. The
only potential inconsistency is that the WCPF Convention does not explicitly refer to
social factors, nor traditional knowledge, as prescribed in the Code of Conduct.583 But
then neither does the WCPFC Convention explicitly exclude these factors. Therefore, it
is plausible that both these factors could be considered through the requirement that
measures shall take into account international minimum standards.584

5.2.4

Precautionary Approach and Reference Points

The precautionary approach responds to the inherent uncertainty in fisheries
management. In the context of international fisheries governance, the precautionary
approach is defined as an obligation that States „shall be more cautious when
information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate‟.585 Furthermore, States must not use
578

V. Christensen and D. Pauly. (2004) Placing Fisheries in their Ecosystem Context, An Introduction.
Ecological Modelling. 172. p103.
579
I. Nomura. (2008) Fisheries Management: Status and Challenges. Fisheries for Global Welfare and
Environment, 5th World Fisheries Congress. Terrapub. p6.
580
L. Motos and D. Wilson. (2006) The Role of Science within Modern Management Processes with the
Development of Model-Based Evaluation Tools. The Knowledge Base for Fisheries Management. Ed. L.
Motos and D. Wilson. Developments in Aquaculture and Fisheries Science. Amsteram, Netherlands. Elsevier.
p428.
581
G. G. Schram and A. Tahindro. (1999) Developments in Principles for the Adoption of Fisheries
Conservation and Management Measures. Developments in International Law. Ed. E. Hey. Netherlands.
Kluwer Law International. p256.
582
See Article 5(b) in both UNFSA and the WCPF Convention.
583
Paragraph 6.4. Code of Conduct.
584
Article 5b. WCPF Convention.
585
Article 6.2. UNFSA.
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the absence of adequate scientific information as a reason for postponing or failing to
take conservation and management measures.586 This creates a direct incentive to
increase scientific research in order to reduce uncertainty given that improving the
certainty of the scientific advice may potentially allow less precautionary measures to
be implemented. Equally, the FAO notes that „not conducting such research might
require more restrictive management than would be needed with additional
information‟.587

The precautionary approach considers potential long term impacts on living marine
resources and their environment, and requires the development of reference points and
decision rules to avoid or mitigate undesired outcomes.588 Undesirable outcomes
include: „overexploitation of resources, overdevelopment of harvesting capacity, loss of
biodiversity, major physical disturbances of sensitive biotopes, or social or economic
dislocations‟.589

In order to support the implementation of the precautionary approach, it is necessary
that scientific institutions be able to advise on the status of stock(s) relative to reference
limits and targets.590 These institutions should model management alternatives for
fishing within such limits and targets, and include some characterisation of the inherent
uncertainty.591
The precautionary approach was an evolution of the precautionary principle,592 and was
endorsed by the UNCED in 1992593 and subsequently incorporated into UNFSA, the

586

Article 6.2. UNFSA -- Paragraph 7.5. Code of Conduct.
FAO. (2001) Research Implications of Adopting the Precautionary Approach to Management of Tuna
Fisheries. Rome, Italy. FAO. p3.
588
Article 6 and Annex II. UNFSA. For further elaboration, see: FAO. (1995) Precautionary Approach to
Capture Fisheries and Species Introductions. Elaborated by the Technical Consultation on the Precautionary
Approach to Capture Fisheries (Including Species Introductions). Rome. FAO. p8.
589
Ibid. p8.
590
FAO. (2001) Research Implications of Adopting the Precautionary Approach to Management of Tuna
Fisheries. Rome, Italy. FAO. pvii.
591
Ibid. pvii.
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Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration). United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. New
York, USA, 5 to 16 June 1972. United Nations. -– D. VanderZwaag. (2002) The Precautionary Principle and
Marine Environmental Protection: Slippery Shores, Rough Seas, and Rising Normative Tides. Ocean
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Code of Conduct and fisheries management more broadly.594 Nevertheless, its
incorporation into fisheries management was contentious and opposed by some States
and organisations. Following the endorsement of the precautionary approach by the
UNCED, subsequent international fisheries meetings discussed the potential application
of the precautionary approach to fisheries management. Some States, including Japan,
Korea, Russia, Norway and the European Union opposed such an application, arguing
that fishing was fundamentally different from environmentally damaging activities
(such as the dumping of toxic waste) that had led to the development of the approach,
and pronounced interpretations that the application of such an approach to fisheries
would result in bans on fishing activities that would be inconsistent with principles of
sustainable development.595

Similar arguments occurred throughout the negotiations of UNFSA where Japan, Korea
and the European Union led opposition to the inclusion of the precautionary approach
amid concerns that it would result in fishing moratoria. Indonesia, USA, Canada, FFA
members and other States argued that the precautionary approach, as elaborated by the
UNCED, was relevant to all fields of natural resource management. These States argued
that there was a general obligation to apply a precautionary approach, and that a lack of
certainty was not a sufficient reason to postpone conservation and management
measures.596
Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalising Caution. Georgetown International
Environmental Law Review. 4.
593
See Principal 15 of the Rio Declaration. United Nations. (1992) Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14
June 1992. United Nations.
594
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Approach to Capture Fisheries (Including Species Introductions). Rome. FAO.
595
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Substantive Session of the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: 12 -30
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Ultimately, UNFSA and the Code of Conduct incorporated principles and standards that
applied a „precautionary approach widely to conservation and management and
exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in order to protect
the living marine resources and preserve the marine environment‟. 597 In addition, they
also built on LOSC provisions relating to associated and dependent species 598 and
extended the application of the precautionary approach to non-target, associated and
dependent species and their marine environment.599 Freestone argues that the
incorporation of the precautionary approach into UNFSA was a significant development
in fisheries management:

the significance of the introduction of precaution, even if not in its strongest
form, should not be underrated. There is now an obligation on states parties to
be cautious and to utilise the procedures set out in Annex II (UNFSA). This
represents a major change in the traditional approach of fisheries management
which until recently has tended to be reactive to management problems only
after they have arrived at crisis levels.600

Despite its initial concerns, the FAO developed guidelines in 1995 for the
implementation of the precautionary approach (soon after the adoption of the Code of
Conduct and UNFSA).

These guidelines recognised the uncertainties in fisheries

systems and the need for „prudent foresight.‟ The guidelines proposed principles and
standards for a precautionary approach in fisheries management (see Figure 17) that
incorporated aspects of the precautionary principle, while addressing concerns that a
precautionary approach „does not imply that no fishing can take place until all potential
impacts have been assessed and found to be negligible‟.601
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Figure 17: FAO Guidelines on Precautionary Approach to Capture Fisheries602
Principles (Conceptual Framework)

Standards (Requirements)

(a) All fishing activities have environmental
impacts, and it is not appropriate to
assume that these are negligible until
proved otherwise.
(b) Although the precautionary approach to
fisheries may require cessation of
fishing activities that have potentially
serious adverse impacts, it does not
imply that no fishing can take place until
all potential impacts have been assessed
and found to be negligible.
(c) The precautionary approach to fisheries
requires that all fishing activities be
subject
to
prior
review
and
authorisation; that a management plan
be in place that clearly specifies
management objectives and how impacts
of fishing are to be assessed, monitored
and addressed; and that specified interim
management measures should apply to
all fishing activities until such time as a
management plan is in place.
(d) The standard of proof to be used in
decisions regarding authorisation of
fishing
activities
should
be
commensurate with the potential risk to
the resource, while also taking into
account the expected benefits of the
activities.

(a) Consideration of the needs of future
generations and avoidance of changes
that are not potentially reversible.
(b) Prior identification of undesirable
outcomes and of measures that will
avoid them or correct them promptly.
(c) That any necessary corrective measures
are initiated without delay, and that they
should achieve their purpose promptly,
on a timescale not exceeding two or
three decades.
(d) That where the likely impact of resource
use is uncertain, priority should be given
to conserving the productive capacity of
the resource.
(e) That harvesting and processing capacity
should be commensurate with estimated
sustainable levels of resource, and that
increases in capacity should be further
contained when resource productivity is
highly uncertain.
(f) All fishing activities must have prior
management authorisation and be
subject to periodic review.
(g) An established legal and institutional
framework for fishery management,
within which management plans that
implement the above points are
instituted for each fishery.
(h) Appropriate placement of the burden of
proof by adhering to the requirements
above.

Despite the adoption of the precautionary approach by UNFSA, the Code of Conduct,
the FAO technical guidelines, and the endorsement by the UNCED and the United
Nations General Assembly, Asian DWFNs continued to oppose the broad application of
the precautionary approach to fisheries management, and opposed its inclusion within
the draft convention.603 On the other hand, the Pacific island States firmly supported the
inclusion of a precautionary approach. The 1995 Pacific Island Form Communiqué that
launched the MHLC process, called for an RFMO to be established that utilised a
602
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precautionary approach and was consistent with UNFSA.604 This position was
supported by the majority of delegations including the USA.

Ultimately, the opponents of a precautionary approach were in the minority and the
WCPF Convention incorporated a precautionary approach that was derivative of
UNFSA and referred directly to the UNFSA guidelines for the application of
precautionary reference points.605 In accordance with modern principles of international
fisheries governance, the WCPF Convention explicitly requires that the members of the
Commission „apply the precautionary approach in accordance with this Convention and
all relevant internationally agreed standards and recommended practices and
procedures‟.606 Consistent with international principles, the absence of adequate
scientific information is no cause for deferral or failure to take conservation and
management measures.607 Figure 18 summarises the standards prescribed by the WCPF
Convention for the implementation of a precautionary approach.
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Figure 18: WCPF Convention Standards for a Precautionary Approach608
In applying the precautionary approach, WCPFC members shall:
take into account uncertainties in knowledge of the stocks;
be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate;
determine stock specific reference points and management responses (in accordance with
Annex II of UNFSA);
take measures to ensure that references points are not exceeded;
implement management responses without delay if reference points are exceeded;
take into account the impacts on non-target and associated and dependent species;
take into account existing and predicted oceanic, environmental and socio-economic
conditions;
develop data collection and research programmes to assess the impact of fishing on nontarget and associated or dependent species and their environment;
adopt plans where necessary to ensure the conservation of such species and to protect
habitats of concern;
implement enhanced monitoring for target or non-target stocks or associated or dependent
species when their status is of concern in order to review the efficacy of conservation and
management measures;
adopt cautious conservation and management measures for new and exploratory fisheries
as soon as possible. Such measures shall remain in force until there is sufficient data to
assess the impact of fisheries on the long term sustainability of the stock and devise
suitable measures;
adopt emergency measures if natural phenomena have a significant adverse impact on the
status of the fisheries.

This section concludes that the principles and standards prescribed by the WCPFC for
the implementation of a precautionary approach are consistent with modern principles
and standards of international fisheries governance. These provide a sufficient
framework to ensure the long term sustainability of the WCPO tuna fisheries.
Cordonnery notes that the WCPF Convention provisions on the precautionary approach
could have major implications for the WCPO tuna fisheries, „if effectively
implemented‟.609

A key challenge for the WCPFC will be how members reconcile varying interpretations
of the precautionary approach in light of their own interests, particularly in regard to the
implementation of compatible measures in EEZs and high seas. The multi-species and
multi-gear characteristics of the fisheries are likely to create significant challenges to the
establishment of target and limit reference points, and agreed management responses.
For example, some FFA participants in the MHLC process argue that the Convention‟s
608
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explicit reference to „as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors‟610
allows for the Commission to adopt measures that would allow continued overfishing of
bigeye in order to promote optimum utilisation of skipjack and albacore, as long as the
bigeye biomass remains above a limit reference point sufficient to ensure long term
levels of reproduction and recruitment.611 On the other hand, some commentators have
argued that such an approach might be inconsistent with the provisions in LOSC
relating to associated and dependent species and that it would be „improper to ensure the
maintenance of one or more living resources by endangering one or more other
stocks‟.612

5.2.5

Maximum Sustainable Yield and Other Factors

The WCPF Convention utilises the concept of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) as
one of its core standards around which conservation and management measures must be
designed. Article 5(b) of the WCPF Convention requires members of the Commission
to adopt conservation and management measures that, among other things:

are designed to maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing
maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and
economic factors, including the special requirements of developing States in the
Convention Area, particularly small island developing States.613

Measures must also directly support three other standards (long term sustainability of
the stocks, promotion of optimum utilisation, and compatibility)614 and take into
account various other principles and standards.615

The provisions relating to these standards are all derived from UNFSA and in many
respects include identical language.616 Similar provisions are also provided in the Code
610
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of Conduct.617 Furthermore, MSY is the only reference point that is specifically
prescribed within the LOSC.618 In this regard, the WCPF Convention is consistent with
modern principles and standards of international fisheries governance. Nevertheless,
there are significant concerns about the use of MSY due to its history of stock collapses
in fisheries management.

In practice, the use of a MSY reference point suggests that fishing effort should be
steadily increased until a decline in yield signals that the optimum fishing level has been
reached, at which stage fishing effort should then be reduced to an optimum level to
allow the stock to remain at that level.619 This is based on an understanding that the
stock will decline, under pressure from fishing, to a level where more juvenile fish will
survive and grow faster (i.e. fishing removes surplus from the stock and increases its
productivity).620 In other words, MSY is the theoretical level at which catches and
productivity are maximised.
The MSY concept first developed in the early 20th Century and flourished in the 1940s
and 1950s. However, by the late 1950s, significant flaws were emerging.621 First, the
concept relied on the assumption that fish stocks were stable in population and
behaviour. In reality, this assumption is false as few fisheries are stable due to the
impacts of environmental fluctuations. Consequently, MSY could only be maintained if
fishing rates varied widely from year to year synchronous with environmental
fluctuations.622 Second, it is difficult to accurately determine MSY in advance. Usually,
the MSY reference point is only determined retrospectively after it has been exceeded
and stock productivity is declining.623 Third, the use of MSY as a reference point
inevitably resulted in the fishery exceeding MSY, and created economic and political
616
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pressures if managers attempted to remove surplus fishing vessels in order to reduce
fishing levels down to MSY.624 Fourth, the MSY concept does not adequately account
for the inherently high levels of uncertainty in knowledge of the fishery. Fifth, MSY has
been heavily criticised as economically inefficient and reduces the profitability of the
fishery by focusing on the quantity of the catch, rather than on maximising the catch per
unit of effort, and the value of the fishery.625

Nevertheless, the LOSC incorporated MSY as its standard for conservation and
management. But due to concerns such as those described above, the LOSC inserted
qualifiers into its provisions on MSY that enabled States to consider environmental and
economic factors.626 The effect of these qualifiers is to further blur its interpretation.
Churchill and Lowe suggest that the „management objective of MSY (in the LOSC) is
so heavily qualified that a coastal State could legitimately set practically any size of
allowable catch, as long as it did not lead to over-exploitation which endangered fish
stocks‟.627

UNFSA similarly incorporated MSY (with the LOSC qualifiers) but re-focused its use
in the context of the precautionary approach. Previously, MSY had been prescribed as
an objective that fisheries management should aim towards (i.e. a management or target
reference point). UNFSA changed this and established it as a conservation or limit
reference point, within the context of the precautionary approach.628

The WCPF Convention uses the same language as UNFSA and requires the
Commission to establish MSY as a conservation reference point, above which it should
adopt management reference points that support management objectives. The WCPF
Convention and UNFSA establish standards for these reference points that require the
Commission to ensure that there is a very low risk of exceeding the conservation
reference point, and that management reference points are not exceeded on average.629
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This section concludes that the WCPF Convention is consistent with modern principles
and standards of international fisheries governance regarding the application of MSY. If
MSY is utilised as a conservation reference point, rather than a target reference point,
then these provisions should support the long term conservation and sustainable use of
the WCPO tuna fisheries.

5.2.6

Ecosystem Based Approach and Marine Biodiversity

Traditional fisheries management focused on species specific and sectoral measures and
failed to take into account the interrelated nature of marine ecosystems.630 This single
species approach did not account for the potential impacts from fishing activities on
non-target species or marine habitats. Nor did it account for the significance of marine
habitats to target and non-target species, or the effects of environmental fluctuations that
could impact directly and indirectly in various ways.631 Similarly, the LOSC‟s adoption
of a zonal approach failed to adequately account for the complex ecological
relationships between marine species that paid no heed to national boundaries.632

This lack of consideration for the ecosystems in which target fish species live has been
described as „perhaps the most egregious failure of fisheries management‟.633 In recent
decades, fisheries management has increasingly developed multi-species or ecosystem
approaches to fisheries management due to the failures of the traditional single species
approach and the increasingly dire status of fisheries globally.634
Throughout the latter part of the 20th Century and early 21st Century, international
conferences and institutions responded to these concerns and developed an ecosystem
based approach to fisheries management. In 2004, the United Nations General
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Assembly encouraged all States to apply an ecosystem approach to fisheries
management.635

There is a substantial literature on these developments, much of which goes far beyond
the scope of this thesis.636 Important sources of principles and standards for the
application of an ecosystem approach to the management of highly migratory fisheries
include: LOSC, UNFSA, the Code of Conduct (including the IPOA-Seabirds), and the
FAO issued technical guidelines and papers on ecosystem approaches to fisheries.
Despite its oft-noted weaknesses and ambiguities,637 the LOSC nevertheless was a
significant advance in international environmental law and was the first international
treaty to introduce a general obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment.638 While the LOSC did not specify an ecosystem approach, its objectives
and relevant provisions supported the development of such an approach.639 Freestone
argues that it represented a „seachange‟, reflecting broad environmental concerns, and
directly subjected the freedom of fishing to, among other things, a duty to protect the
marine environment.640 He comments that the LOSC:
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introduced a major new principle – an unqualified obligation on all States to
„protect and preserve the marine environment‟ – and active obligations to protect
and preserve rare or fragile species and ecosystems in all parts of the marine
environment, as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species
and other forms of marine life.641

The preamble of the LOSC recognised the interrelated nature of the oceans and the need
for a holistic response while Article 192 established the principle that all States held an
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.642 Articles 61 and 119
applied this principle directly to fisheries and established the framework for an
ecosystem based approach to fisheries management. This required States, when taking
measures such as determining the TAC in an EEZ or high seas, to consider:

the effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested species with
a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such associated species or
dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may become
seriously threatened.643

UNFSA built on these provisions and elaborated an ecosystem based approach to
fisheries management that recognised the interrelated nature of marine ecosystems. This
included establishing standards for the protection of

marine biodiversity and the

assessment, management, minimisation and monitoring of impacts on associated and
dependent species and the marine environment.644

The WCPF Convention largely incorporated ecosystem and biodiversity principles and
standards directly from UNFSA into the WCPF Convention, despite disagreements
within the MHLC negotiations. FFA members and the USA favoured implementing the
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full range of conservation and management principles from UNFSA, while on the other
hand, Asian DWFNs favoured a narrow interpretation.645

The WCPF Convention elaborated an ecosystem based approach to fisheries
management that recognised the need to avoid adverse impacts on the marine
environment and maintain the integrity of marine ecosystems, while minimising the risk
of long term or irreversible effects of fishing operations. 646 The WCPF Convention
prescribed a number of standards to support the implementation of this approach. These
are summarised in Figure 19.

Figure 19: WCPF Convention Standards for Protecting Marine Biodiversity and
Implementing an Ecosystem Based Approach to Fisheries Management647
WCPFC members shall:
protect marine biodiversity;
take into account the impacts on non-target and associated and dependent species;
take into account existing and predicted oceanic, environmental and socio-economic
conditions;
develop data collection and research programmes to assess the impact of fishing on nontarget and associated or dependent species and their environment;
adopt plans where necessary to ensure the conservation of such species and to protect
habitats of concern;
the development of reference points and management strategies for associated and
dependent species where necessary;
minimise pollution, waste, discards and catch by lost or abandoned gear;
minimise catch of non-target species;
minimise impacts on associated or dependent species, in particular endangered species;
promote the development and use of selective and environmentally safe and cost effective
fishing gear and techniques; and,
implement enhanced monitoring for target or non-target stocks or associated or dependent
species when their status is of concern in order to review the efficacy of conservation and
management measures, and revise as necessary.

Nevertheless, these standards are almost entirely verbatim with UNFSA with one
exception. UNFSA prescribes a standard that requires States to „adopt measures for
species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the
target stocks, with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such species above
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levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened‟.648 The WCPF
Convention does not include this specific standard, but nevertheless addresses its intent
through other standards that require the minimisation of bycatch and impacts on
associated and dependent species, and the adoption of plans to ensure the conservation
of non-target, associated and dependent species and the protection of habitats.649 The
key difference is that UNFSA prescribes a vague reference point for these measures
„with a view to maintaining or restoring populations‟ while the WCPF Convention
relies on the precautionary approach and its requirements to establish management
strategies and reference points.

In the final months of the MHLC and following the adoption of the WCPF Convention,
the FAO coordinated a number of activities that elaborated the ecosystem based
approach to fisheries management and further developed standards for reducing bycatch
of non-target species.650 These built on provisions within the Code of Conduct and
focused significantly on social and generation equity concerns. These subsequent
developments are important within the context of the WCPF Convention because they
prescribe internationally recommended standards that were developed through globally
consultative processes. As such they are relevant to Article 5 of the WCFC Convention
which requires members of the Commission to take into account generally
recommended international minimum standards and recommended practices and
procedures. In 2003, the FAO identified five core principles for an ecosystem based
approach to fisheries management (see Figure 20). The FAO has since adopted two
International Plans of Action and published various guidelines to reduce unsustainable
levels of bycatch of seabirds, sharks and turtles.651
648
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Figure 20: FAO Standards for Ecosystem Based Approach
to Fisheries Management652
1. Fisheries should be managed to limit their impact on the ecosystem to the extent possible.
2. Ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and associated species should be
maintained.
3. Management measures should be compatible across the entire distribution of the resource
(across jurisdictions and management plans).
4. The precautionary approach should be applied because the knowledge on ecosystems is
incomplete.
5. Governance should ensure both human and ecosystem well-being and equity.

These FAO standards were based on an earlier draft prepared by the 2002 FAO Expert
Workshop on Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management. The FAO workshop was
convened in order to develop technical guidelines to support the implementation of an
ecosystem based approach to fisheries management. The workshop recognised that the
operational requirements for an ecosystem approach were poorly covered by
international fisheries law.653 While international fisheries law broadly included basic
principles, the lack of detail meant that the approach was frequently not an integral
component of regional arrangements or domestic fisheries regulations.654

RFMOs continue to struggle to implement the approach and adopt necessary measures
and science programmes. For example, a 2008 performance review of the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) found that it had been
slow in moving to an ecosystem approach and had not adopted any measure of a general
nature related to the ecosystem approach.655 Similar reviews of the Commission for the
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) and the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission (IOTC) found that neither had implemented an ecosystem approach.656
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These implementation failures are in part due to the considerably greater requirements
for knowledge and data on complex marine ecosystems and ecological relationships.657
Another key challenge is the lack of perceived short term economic return from an
ecosystem based approach, and potentially conflicting socio-economic factors, which
can undermine the necessary political will to provide resources and adopt measures that
will effectively implement the approach.658 Morishta argues that a key obstacle to the
implementation of the ecosystem approach is a lack of understanding or agreement
regarding its goals. He argues that management measures that are based on the
ecosystem approach, but which are not sustainable or feasible from „the human (socioeconomic) perspective, will receive strong resistance against their introduction and, if
introduced, will not be long lasting‟.659

These socio-economic concerns raise a critical question of interpretation that arises
when considering the implementation of an ecosystem based approach to the
management of the WCPO tuna fisheries. The FAO Technical Guidelines note that
mixed-species fisheries (such as the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries) require consideration
of the different vulnerabilities and productivity of the various species that may be
caught together.660 For example, the WCPO purse seine fishery captures skipjack,
yellowfin and bigeye. As discussed in Chapter Two, each of these species have
significantly different characteristics.

In such circumstances, the Guidelines

recommended that:
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it will be necessary to implement a set of consistent catch limits across the range
of target and by-catch species to reflect these differences and address desired
ecosystem related objectives (such as maintaining food webs). Catch limits for
target species may need to be modified to control catches of more vulnerable
species.661

The implication of this is that a catch or effort limit may be established at a level that
ensures the long term conservation of the most vulnerable stock. In the case of the
WCPO purse seine fishery, this would mean that catch or effort levels would be set at a
low level that would be sustainable for the vulnerable bigeye, rather than at significantly
higher levels that would be sustainable for the highly productive skipjack.

However, the FAO Technical Guidelines and the WCPF Convention both allow for the
consideration of human „well-being and equity‟662 and „economic factors, including the
special requirements of developing States in the Convention Area, particularly small
island developing States‟.663 This could be interpreted as allowing for the adoption of
catch or effort limits that would be sustainable for skipjack, but result in significant
levels of overfishing on bigeye. Such a measure might be favoured by developing
coastal States who primarily benefit from purse seine catches of skipjack, and receive
little benefit from bigeye.664

Similar questions of interpretation were noted in regard to the implementation of a
precautionary approach. As noted earlier, there are differing views about whether the
intentional overfishing of bigeye is consistent with broader principles of international
fisheries governance.665 Ultimately, it would appear that this is a question of
interpretation that must be addressed by the WCPFC when it determines what
management responses to implement in response to overfishing of bigeye.
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This section concludes that the WCPF Convention clearly incorporates an ecosystem
based approach to fisheries management and prescribes standards for its implementation
that are consistent with modern international fisheries governance. Where international
principles and standards have since progressed (i.e. such as the FAO Technical
Guidelines), the WCPF Convention includes sufficient reference to generally
recommended international standards so as to enable these to be incorporated into
WCPFC practice.

In regard to the WCPFC, this section concludes that the WCPF Convention provides a
strong obligation on members to implement an ecosystem approach and ensure the long
term conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO tuna resources in general. Whether
this is sufficient to ensure the long term conservation and sustainable use of bigeye
specifically is an open question and depends upon interpretation. Similarly, it remains to
be seen whether the members of the WCPFC will overcome the resourcing and political
challenges that have undermined implementation in other RFMOs.

5.2.7

Artisanal and Subsistence Fishers

Modern international fisheries governance has become increasingly cognisant of the
interests and concerns of artisanal and subsistence fishers. This is evident in the
references to these communities in provisions of the LOSC, UNFSA and the Code of
Conduct. The LOSC explicitly refers to the interest of fishing communities in regard to
the establishment of conservation and management measures for EEZs.666 Schram and
Tahindro argue that recognition of coastal State rights and duties in Article 116 of the
LOSC sufficiently encompasses coastal fishing communities to allow for their
consideration in regard to high seas fisheries.667

The Code of Conduct and UNFSA further elaborate principles and standards for the
recognition of the interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers. UNFSA and the Code of
Conduct both prescribe the principle that RFMO members shall take into account the
interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers when giving effect to their duty to
666
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cooperate.668 This is further elaborated in Article 24 of UNFSA which details the
following standard when considering these interests:

the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by,
subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and fishworkers, as well as
indigenous people in developing States parties, particularly small island
developing States parties, and territories and possessions669

The Code of Conduct also prescribes similar principles and standards that require
States to take into account the interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers in their
implementation of fisheries and coastal management at the domestic level.670

Artisanal and subsistence fisheries provide significant economic benefits in the WCPO
tuna fisheries and are a critical source of protein.671 This is of significant concern to
many of the developing coastal State members of the WCPFC. The WCPF Convention
addresses this concern through prescribing principles and standards that are closely
derived from UNFSA. For example, Article 5(h) of the WCPF Convention mirrors
Article 5(i) of UNFSA, as does Article 30 of the WCPF Convention and Article 24 of
UNFSA. In this manner, the WCPF is consistent with principles and standards of
fisheries governance.

This provides a strong framework for the WCPFC to consider the interests of these
communities. It is important to note a subtle distinction in how these standards apply
within the WCPF Convention. Article 5 of the WCPF Convention applies the standard
indiscriminately to all artisanal and subsistence fishers. For example, the WCPFC shall
consider the impacts of proposed measures on subsistence fishers (and other such
communities) throughout the WCPO region, even within developed State parties or
cooperating non-members such as Indonesia and Vietnam. However, the more detailed
standards prescribed in Article 30 of the WCPF Convention only apply to such
communities in developing State parties (particularly small island developing States
668
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parties) and would not be applicable to any such communities in developed States
parties or cooperating non-members such as Indonesia or Vietnam. In effect, this could
be applied in such a manner that the WCPFC could consider the impacts on all relevant
communities throughout the WCPO region, but only consider taking action to avoid any
impact on communities in developing States that are parties to the WCPF Convention.
This could potentially exclude significant coastal communities in Indonesia and
Vietnam from any exemptions or mitigative measures.

5.2.8

Responsible Conduct of Fishing Operations

The WCPF Convention establishes a standard for the functioning of the Commission
that requires it to „adopt generally recommended international minimum standards for
the responsible conduct of fishing operations‟.672 This is consistent with similar
provisions found in UNFSA,673 and the Code of Conduct.674

This is a significant standard for the WCPF Convention as it applies international
developments in responsible fisheries practice to the WCPO tuna fisheries. For
example, if the FAO Committee of Fisheries were to endorse new minimum standards
on how fishing operations were to be conducted, then the WCPFC would be obliged to
implement these measures throughout the applicable WCPO tuna fisheries.

This section concludes that this provision ensures that the WCPF Convention is
consistent with international standards of fisheries governance in this regard. This
supports the ability of the WCPFC to ensure the long term conservation and sustainable
use of the WCPO tuna fisheries through enabling the WCPFC to incorporate
developments in global best practice.

5.2.9

Overfishing and Excess Capacity

Overfishing and excess capacity are globally significant challenges to the conservation
and management of tuna stocks. In 1995, the year that UNFSA and the Code of Conduct
were adopted, the 21st Session of the FAO Committee of Fisheries noted that
672
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overfishing (due primarily to excess capacity of fishing fleets) was threatening the
sustainability of the ocean‟s marine living resources. 675 As discussed in Chapter Two,
overfishing is threatening the sustainability of key WCPO tuna fisheries, while
overcapacity is recognised as a cause of overfishing and a barrier to economic
efficiency.676 Catch and effort limits can serve to slow overfishing, but if management
responses do not reduce the overcapacity then excess capacity continues to drive
overfishing within the fishery or it migrates into less regulated fisheries.677

The WCPF Convention establishes a standard that members of the Commission shall
take measures to prevent or eliminate over-fishing and excess fishing capacity and
ensure that levels of fishing effort do not exceed sustainable levels.678 This is identical
to relevant provisions of the UNFSA, and consistent with similar language in the Code
of Conduct.679

Following the adoption of the WCPF Convention, the FAO coordinated a number of
activities that built on the Code of Conduct and further elaborated guidelines for
addressing excess capacity. As noted above, these developments are important as they
prescribe internationally recommended standards that must be taken into consideration
by the WCPFC.680 The key outcome of these activities was the development of the
IPOA-Capacity which prescribes additional standards for States and RFMOs.681 The
IPOA-Capacity prioritised transboundary, straddling, highly migratory and high seas
fisheries which are overfished. It established standards for States to individually,
bilaterally and multilaterally (as appropriate) reduce excess capacity as a component of
management strategies. Such strategies should aim to restore overfished stocks to
675
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sustainable levels, and in so doing, consider (among other things): the economic
importance of the fleets catching overfished stocks and the need to limit these fleets to
sustainable and economically viable levels; and the condition of the fish stocks and need
to use appropriate measures to control any transfer of excess capacity into fully
exploited or overexploited fisheries.682

This section concludes that the WCPC Convention is consistent with modern principles
and standards of international fisheries governance and explicitly obliges the WCPFC
and its membership to address overfishing and reduce excess capacity.

5.2.10 Scientific Data and Information
It is a core principle of modern fisheries governance that conservation and management
decisions shall be based on the best scientific evidence available.683 The LOSC, UNFSA
and the Code of Conduct each require that conservation and management measures are
based on the best scientific evidence available.684

In order to make such decisions, managers need relevant data (evidence) and the
appropriate scientific expertise and capacity to analysis the data and provide advice as
necessary.685 UNFSA identifies the timely collection, compilation and analysis of data
as „fundamental to the effective conservation and management of straddling fish stocks
and highly migratory fish stocks‟.686 In a study of four fisheries management examples,
Policansky concludes that scientific uncertainty aggravated controversies surrounding
management decisions.687
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In support of science based decision making, the LOSC prescribes standards for data
collection and distribution that require States to contribute and exchange „[a]vailable
scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other data relevant to the
conservation of fish stocks … on a regular basis through competent international
organisations…‟688 These scientific contributions and exchanges shall involve the
participation of all States concerned, apply to all fisheries that occur within EEZs and
high seas, and may occur at a sub-regional, regional or global level.

These vague data standards were elaborated in detail by UNFSA. When viewed in the
context of the precautionary approach, UNFSA effectively prescribes the principle that
scientific certainty is not fundamental to conservation, but scientific data and
information are fundamental components of fisheries management.689 The UNFSA data
principles identify who should collect the data, the operational level down to which the
data should be collected (i.e. each set for longline and purse seine), and verification,
compilation and formatting requirements.690 UNFSA further elaborates these general
principles in Annex I with a comprehensive set of standards for the collection, exchange
and verification of fishery and vessel data that are necessary to facilitate effective stock
assessments.691
Given the comprehensive nature of UNFSA‟s data principles and standards, there was
significant concern that developing States would not have the capacity to implement
these requirements.692 In response, UNFSA provided that assistance shall be given to
developing States in order to build capacity in conservation and management.693 Despite
the binding nature of the language (i.e. shall), UNFSA does not specify who actually
shall provide this assistance. Nevertheless, UNFSA prescribes that assistance should
include training as well as financial and technical assistance, and should focus on
capacity building in: data collection and verification; observer programmes; data
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analysis; and research projects supporting stock assessments.694 In addition, UNFSA
promotes the principle that developing State scientists and managers should be involved
in conservation and management to the fullest possible degree.695

The Code of Conduct also includes principles and standards for the collection, exchange
and analysis of fisheries data and information. These principles and standards provide a
broader but less detailed approach than UNFSA to the different data requirements
necessary to support science based decisions. This reflects the subtle differences
between UNFSA and the Code of Conduct on what should be considered in decision
making. In this regard, the Code of Conduct is more expansive and prescribes that such
decisions shall also take into account traditional knowledge of the resources and their
habitat, as well as relevant environmental, economic and social factors (see Figure 21).
Figure 21: Code of Conduct Standards for Science and Data696
Paragraph 6.4
Conservation and management decisions for fisheries should be based on the best scientific
evidence available, also taking into account traditional knowledge of the resources and their
habitat, as well as relevant environmental, economic and social factors. States should assign
priority to undertake research and data collection in order to improve scientific and technical
knowledge of fisheries including their interaction with the ecosystem and encourage
appropriate bilateral and multilateral cooperation in research.
Paragraph 7.4.2
Research in support of fishery conservation and management should be promoted, including
research on the resources and on the effects of climatic, environmental and socio-economic
factors. The results of such research should be disseminated to interested parties.
Paragraph 7.4.3
Studies should be promoted which provide an understanding of the costs, benefits and effects
of alternative management options designed to rationalise fishing, in particular, options
relating to excess fishing capacity and excessive levels of fishing effort.
Paragraph 7.4.5
In order to ensure sustainable management of fisheries and to enable social and economic
objectives to be achieved, sufficient knowledge of social, economic and institutional factors
should be developed through data gathering, analysis and research.

Following the Code of Conduct, the FAO‟s Advisory Committee on Fisheries Research
and its technical Working Party on Status and Trends in Fisheries discussed
694
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shortcomings in the compilation and distribution of fisheries information. This resulted
in the negotiation and development of the FAO Strategy for Improving Information on
Status and Trends of Capture Fisheries, which was endorsed by the FAO Council and
the United Nations General Assembly in 2003.697 States were invited to support the
implementation of the Strategy at national and regional levels, and support necessary
capacity building in developing countries to enable its effective implementation.

The FAO Strategy is part of the framework of the Code of Conduct and aims to improve
the knowledge and understanding of fisheries. It proposes ten major areas for action,
with an emphasis on capacity-building needs in developing countries. The FAO
Strategy elaborates additional or extended data and information standards, in areas such
as: adequacy of funding; formulation of training programmes and strategies for
developing States; quality assurance; traditional knowledge; broad participation;
transparency; timelines; flexibility to meet changing policy requirements; provision and
exchange of information; and the role and operation of scientific working groups.698

These additional standards are significant for the WCPFC given that most of the WCPO
tuna fisheries occur within the EEZs of developing States. This is a significant concern
for Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam that have very limited capacity to meet science
and data standards.699 Similarly, while the Pacific islands region is comparatively better
resourced due to the support of its regional institutions, national governments have very
limited capacity to collect and analyse data, or contribute to scientific assessments.700
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Within this context, the WCPF Convention incorporates Annex I from UNFSA as an
integral component of the WCPF Convention and mirrors the UNFSA principles and
standards relating to the collection, compilation and distribution of scientific data and
knowledge. This is a unique feature of the WCPF Convention. No other RFMO
founding convention explicitly refers to Annex 1 in this manner. 701 In this regard, the
WCPF Convention is consistent with science and data principles and standards
prescribed by UNFSA, and therefore generally consistent with most international
principles and standards relating to data and science.

In addition, the WPCF Convention requires that the WCPFC: adopt standards for the
collection, verification and timely exchange and reporting of data; compile and
distribute statistical data while maintaining confidentiality as appropriate; establish a
regional observer programme to collect verified data and information; develop
procedures to obtain and verify data on transhipments; and obtain and evaluate relevant
economic and other fisheries-related data and information.702 Furthermore, members of
the Commission are obligated to: provide statistical, biological and other data and
information; provide information on fishing activities as required; and provide
information on implementation of such requirements.703

The WCPF Convention implements its science and data provisions through the
establishment of a scientific committee as a subsidiary body to the WCPFC, and the
engagement of independent scientific experts to provide information and advice on
conservation and management matters.704

The aim of the Scientific Committee is to ensure that the WCPFC obtains the best
scientific information available. The Scientific Committee is open to participation by all
members and is required to invite representatives of the Oceanic Fisheries Programme
of the Pacific Community and the IATTC to participate in its work. Its operation must
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701
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meet a number of functional standards relating to (among other things): scientific
assessment, review and advice; promotion of cooperation in scientific research;
assessment and advice on the priorities and objectives of the regional observer
programme (in consultation with the Technical and Compliance Committee).705

The WCPF Convention also provides for the WCPFC to engage scientific experts to
provide information and advice on the WCPO tuna fisheries and their conservation and
management.706 In order to minimise costs, the WCPF Convention requires that the
Commission shall, to the greatest extent possible, utilise the services of existing
regional organisations, and consult with any other relevant fisheries management,
technical or scientific organisation as appropriate.

This two part approach allows for independent scientists to directly advise the Scientific
Committee and the WCPFC. Simultaneously, it provides for the direct engagement of
national scientists in the development and review of advice, but ensures that the advice
is not „filtered‟ by national interests within the scientific committee.707

Although the WCPF Convention does not explicitly incorporate the broader standards
promoted by the Code of Conduct, it provides indirect links that enable the WCPFC to
meet these standards, and require its members to implement them. For example, the
functions of the Commission (among other things) include obtaining and evaluating
economic and other fisheries-related data and information relevant to the work of the
Commission.708 In support of this standard, members of the Commission shall provide
to the Commission „such data and information as the Commission may require‟. 709 In
this manner the WCPF Convention is consistent with the principles and standards
established by the Code of Conduct that are not prescribed within UNFSA (i.e.
traditional knowledge and socio-economic data and information).

The approach adopted by the WCPF Convention to the provision of stock assessments
and scientific advice is also consistent with modern principles and standards of
705
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international fisheries governance. This approach is well regarded due to the
independence of the scientific advice and the decreased likelihood for disagreements
about the nature of the advice.710

This section concludes that the WCPF Convention is consistent with international
principles and standards relating to science and data. These provisions provide the
WCPFC with a significant framework to support science based decision making and
strengthen the capacity of its developing States members.

5.3

Conclusion

Consistent with the findings of Chapter Four, this Chapter also finds that the WCPF
Convention prescribes principles and standards for the functions of the WCPFC, and the
adoption of conservation and management measures, that are almost wholly consistent
with modern principles and standards of international fisheries governance.

In theory, the WCPF Convention provides a strong governance framework that should
enable the WCPFC to consider and adopt conservation and management measures that
will ensure the long term conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO tuna fisheries.

The WCPF Convention applies all significant developments in international fisheries
management and governance, including those that have occurred since its entry into
force. These developments are incorporated either explicitly within the Convention text,
or through provisions that require the WCPFC to apply or consider generally
recommended or agreed international minimum standards.
Two important distinctions should be noted in the space between „Convention‟ and
„Implementation‟. First, the WCPF Convention provides a strong framework for the
long term conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO tuna fisheries as a whole. As
discussed in Sections 5.2.4, 5.2.5 and 5.2.6, there are varying interpretations whether
the WCPF Convention allows the WCPFC to effectively sacrifice the short term health
710
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of one target species (i.e. bigeye) in order to promote the optimum utilisation of other
species (i.e. skipjack). This is a significant question of interpretation for the members of
the WCPFC and will ultimately determine how the WCPFC responds.

Second, the implementation of the WCPF Convention depends on the membership of
the WCPFC. It is up to the members of the WCPFC to fulfil their duty to cooperate and
adopt science based, precautionary, and compatible measures throughout the
Convention Area that minimise impacts on associated and dependent species, that are
consistent with the WCPF Convention.

In conclusion, the WCPF Convention provides a global benchmark as a legal
framework for cooperation and management of migratory fish stocks. This should
provide a sufficient structure for member States to ensure the long term conservation
and sustainable use of the WCPO tuna fisheries. The following Chapter analyses the
performance of the WCPFC and assesses whether it has successfully responded to its
most urgent conservation challenge – overfishing of bigeye by purse seine and longline
fleets.
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Chapter Six: Conservation Measures – Bigeye and Yellowfin
Given the social and economic considerations of any reductions in fishing effort,
the Commission will likely need to consider a variety of measures that equitably
share, across the various WCPO tuna fisheries, the costs and benefits associated
with achieving an objective of maintaining stocks of bigeye and yellowfin at or
above BMSY.711

6.1

Introduction

As concluded in Chapter Two, the WCPFC faces a daunting conservation and
management challenge. The scientific assessments clearly indicate that urgent action is
required to reduce fishing mortality for bigeye, and halt any increases in fishing
mortality for yellowfin. In order to be effective, conservation and management
measures must necessarily address a broad range of fishing gears and locations to
ensure the long term conservation and sustainable use of bigeye and yellowfin.

The complex and inter-meshed nature of the WCPO tuna fisheries makes it almost
impossible to address a specific management challenge, such as overfishing of bigeye,
with a narrowly focused management response. For example, Chapter Two identified
purse seine bycatch of bigeye as a significant cause of overfishing. For the WCPFC to
resolve this threat, it must restrict the operation of purse seine vessels that are targeting
highly productive skipjack that are not threatened by overfishing.

Consequently, the WCPFC and its members have little choice but to develop, negotiate
and implement conservation and management measures that affect a broad range of
fleets and stakeholders and impact upon a diverse range of national interests. These
measures will directly and indirectly impact upon the national interests of all WCPFC
members and cooperating non-members: reducing benefits for some; limiting
opportunities for others; and protecting or even increasing benefits for some
participants.
711
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In response, the WCPFC adopted conservation and management measures in 2005,
2006 and 2008 to halt overfishing of bigeye and yellowfin. The 2008 conservation and
management measure (CMM 2008-01) replaced the 2005 and 2006 measures and was
intended to ensure, through compatible measures for the high seas and EEZs, that
bigeye and yellowfin were maintained at levels capable of MSY. During this time, the
tropical Pacific island States that are Party to the Nauru Agreement (PNA)712
implemented a number of measures to regulate fishing for tuna by foreign vessels
within their EEZs. These PNA measures directly influenced the development of the
WCPFC conservation and management measures and were subsequently incorporated
within the WCPFC conservation measures as recognised measures for PNA waters
under national jurisdiction.713

This Chapter assesses the adequacy of WCPFC conservation and management measures
in order to determine whether they are likely to ensure the long term conservation and
sustainable use of bigeye and yellowfin. The purpose of the analysis is to answer the
question: has the WCPFC adopted conservation and management measures that are
sufficient to address overfishing of bigeye and yellowfin?

6.2

First Attempts in Conservation and Management

In December 2004, the inaugural meeting of the WCPFC recognised the need to quickly
implement management controls on fishing effort and address looming overfishing for
bigeye and yellowfin. The meeting adopted Resolution 2004-04714 that required the next
meeting of the WCPFC in 2005 to adopt conservation and management measures to
address sustainability concerns. The Resolution also tasked the WCPFC‟s Scientific
Committee and the Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC) to provide the advice
712
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necessary to support the development of such a measure. As discussed in Chapter Two,
the Scientific Committee subsequently provided numerous reports concerning threats to
bigeye and yellowfin, and progressively recommended increasingly tougher reductions
in fishing mortality for bigeye. In response, the WCPFC adopted progressively stronger
conservation and management measures to address these overfishing concerns. These
measures are now reviewed.

6.2.1 CMM2005-01 (Bigeye and Yellowfin)
In 2005, the Scientific Committee responded to the 2004 resolution and advised that
overfishing was occurring for bigeye, and probably occurring for yellowfin. The
Committee predicted that a 20% reduction (from 2001-2003 average levels), across all
fisheries that catch bigeye and yellowfin would reduce fishing mortality to FMSY
levels.715 It advised that the long term average catch levels consistent with FMSY were
estimated to be 67% and 65% of 2001-2003 average catches of bigeye and yellowfin,
respectively.716

The Second Session of the WCPFC discussed these findings in December 2005. The
meeting accepted the assessments as the best information available, noted commitments
to the precautionary approach, and urged that the assessments be taken into account
when developing future conservation and management measures. Furthermore, the
WCPFC noted that fishing effort and capacity had expanded in the WCPO tuna
fisheries, despite the 1999 and 2003 Resolutions717 committing to exercising reasonable
restraint on capacity.718 While noting that fishing mortality for bigeye was evenly
715
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divided across high seas and waters under national jurisdiction, and across longline and
other gear types, it highlighted that reducing the use of FADs by purse seine vessels
appeared to be the most effective method for reducing bycatch of juvenile bigeye.719 In
addition, the WCPFC noted that the level of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
fishing was a significant factor in preventing the accurate estimation of catch and effort
levels and the development of appropriate conservation and management advice.
Similarly, the WCPFC noted that long term forecasts of the status of stocks was
undermined by uncertainties in species identification, particularly in respect of juvenile
bigeye tuna, and the lack of comprehensive information for fisheries in Indonesia and
the Philippines.720 However, the WCPFC failed to agree on measures that would reduce
catch and effort levels in accordance with the Scientific Committee‟s advice. Instead, it
adopted Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (CMM2005-01).721

CMM2005-01 committed WCPFC parties and cooperating non-members to restrain
purse seine effort to 2004 levels, or the average of 2001-2004 levels, and to restrain
longline catches to 2004 levels, or the average of 2001-2004 levels.722 Purse seine
measures were to be applied in waters between 20º north and 20º south, while longline
measures were to be applied throughout the Convention Area. The WCPFC also tasked
the Scientific Committee and the Technical and Compliance Committee to advise on
other actions that could be taken, and committed the WCPFC to consider measures in
2006 to further reduce catch and effort.

The purse seine measure adopted a zone based approach to limiting purse seine effort.
This meant that purse seine limits were calculated and implemented by individual EEZ
or high seas area, rather than by flag State or vessel. For example, the limit for purse
seine fishing in an EEZ was determined based upon historical catches within that EEZ.
Coastal State members were then entitled to exploit purse seine fisheries within the
specified limit, and committed to take necessary measures to ensure purse seine
fisheries did not exceed these limits (with reference to PNA measures where
719
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appropriate). The WCPFC committed to implement compatible measures for the high
seas so as to ensure that purse seine effort levels did not exceed the average of 20012004 or 2004 levels, or that there will be no increase in total fishing capacity, for high
seas fisheries.

The measure adopted a flag based approach to limiting longline catch, committing each
member and cooperating non-member to limit the catch of bigeye by their flagged
vessels to 2001-2004 average, or 2004 levels, for 2006, 2007 and 2008.723 However, the
limit did not apply to any member or cooperating non-member that caught less than
2,000 mt of bigeye in 2004 (these States were required to ensure their catches did not
exceed 2,000 mt annually in 2006, 2007 and 2008).724
CMM2005-01 was insufficient to meet the Scientific Committee‟s advice. It allowed for
fishing mortality to increase beyond 2001-2003 levels and „effectively limited nominal
fishing effort and catch (for bigeye) to the highest levels recorded‟.725 In addition, the
measure suffered from four concerns that potentially undermined its application. First,
the measure did not apply specific limits to fishing by gear types other than longlining
and purse seine. This was particularly important given the large amount of fishing effort
in Indonesia and Philippines that uses gears and methods other than purse seining or
longlining (CMM2005-01 did require the future adoption of measures which could
conceivably address other gears and methods).726

Second, there were no specific limits on purse seine effort on the high seas. However,
once again, CMM2005-01 required further work to be undertaken. In addition, the
measure required that the WCPFC implement compatible measures to ensure that purse
seine effort levels did not exceed 2004 levels on the high seas, or that total fishing
capacity will not increase in the Convention Area.727
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Third, CMM2005-01 broadly exempted small island State members and participating
territories. During early discussions of the measure, the FFA proposed a qualified
exemption for small island developing State members and participating territories. The
FFA proposal exempted the domestic purse seine fleets of small island developing
States and territories that held legitimate development plans which addressed the issue
of big-eye mortality. The proposal required that such plans be tabled at the WCPFC
before Government approval, allowing WCPFC members to be given the opportunity to
comment on the plan before it was approved through domestic processes.728 However,
during WCPFC negotiations, the „small island State exemption‟ became separated from
the „development plan‟ requirements. Article 6 of the General Rules of Application for
CMM2005-01 then exempted all small island developing State members and
participating territories from the entire measure with no qualifying requirements for a
development plan. Meanwhile, the „development plan‟ requirements were moved
towards the end of the measure and incorporated into Article 16 that applied to all
members wishing to expand skipjack purse seine fisheries (except for developing island
States exempted under Article 6). This oversight effectively removed any protection
against exploitation of the exemption and potentially allowed for unscrupulous
operators to evade limitations by transferring excess capacity to small island developing
State members and participating territories. This could also potentially be manipulated
to allow excess capacity to be transferred from mainland fleets to participating
territories to take advantage of the increased catch and effort allowances now shared
across the mainland capital and its territories (i.e. from the USA to the Northern
Marianas or from France to French Polynesia).729

Fourth, CMM2005-01 exempted members that caught less than 2,000 mt of bigeye by
longline. These States were not limited to average of the 2001-2004, or 2004 levels for
longline fishing, although they were required to ensure that their catches of bigeye by
longline did not increase beyond 2000 mt. If all such States increased their longline
bigeye catches to 2,000 mt, then this potentially allowed bigeye catches to increase
728
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across the region by 7% beyond the 2001-2004 average or 2004 levels.730 Further
increases would also be allowed under the small island developing State exemptions.

6.2.2

CMM2006-01 (Bigeye and Yellowfin)

In 2006, the WCPFC Scientific Committee and Technical Compliance Committee
responded to CMM2005-01 and advised on further conservation and management
measures for bigeye and yellowfin. The Scientific Committee advised that overfishing
was occurring for bigeye and yellowfin and recommended that fishing mortality for
bigeye and yellowfin be reduced by 25% and 10% respectively in order to maintain
these species at BMSY. The Committee advised that further reductions would be required
in future to maintain these stocks at levels greater than BMSY.731
The WCPFC endorsed these findings. In so doing, the WCPFC also noted the
Committee‟s findings that the Indonesian and Philippine domestic fisheries, and purse
seine fisheries more generally, had the greatest impact on yellowfin, while longline
fisheries, and to a lesser extent, purse seine fisheries using FADs had the greatest
impact on bigeye.732

The TCC advised that it had considered catch mitigation measures for juvenile bigeye
and yellowfin taken around FADs. However, the TCC found that more information on
the behavioural characteristics of juvenile bigeye and yellowfin was required in order to
assess bycatch mitigation measures. In addition, the TCC noted that it would be difficult
to enforce any FAD mitigation measure without high observer coverage on all purse
seine vessels. Consequently, the TCC recommended that these factors be considered in
the development of an observer programme (which was duly noted by the WCPFC).733
730
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The WCPFC Secretariat, with the assistance of the WCPFC Science Provider, also
presented a paper that responded to CMM2005-01 and was intended to support
discussion of temporary purse seine closures in a manner consistent with IATTC
closures.734 Analysis of the paper indicates that a multi-gear response is required to
equitably address overfishing. For example, the paper advised that purse seine closures
alone would be an inequitable solution to overfishing for bigeye, as it would require a
75% reduction in purse seine effort to achieve the advised conservation target. 735 This
would heavily impact on skipjack fisheries that were not experiencing overfishing.
Similarly, the paper advised that a 25% reduction in effort in the Indonesia and
Philippine fisheries would still require reductions of greater than 30% elsewhere in the
WCPO purse seine or longline fisheries. Ultimately, the paper advised that the WCPFC
would need to consider a variety of measures in order to equitably share the
conservation burden associated with maintaining stocks of bigeye and yellowfin at or
above BMSY.736
In response, the WCPFC once again failed to agree on measures that would reduce
catch and effort levels in accordance with the Scientific Committee‟s advice. In 2006, it
adopted Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (CMM2006-01).737 The measure expanded upon
CMM2005-01 through the addition of provisions relating to purse seine fisheries on the
high seas, other commercial tuna fisheries, catch retention and port controls.
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CMM2006-01 committed members and cooperating non-members to restrain the level
of purse seine effort by their vessels in areas of the high seas to 2004 levels, or the
average of 2001-2004 levels. As in CMM2005-01, this applied only to tropical purse
seine fisheries between 20º north and 20º south. In addition, the measure required
members and cooperating non-members to develop management plans for the use of
FADs on the high seas. Members and cooperating non-members were required to
include strategies to limit interaction with juvenile bigeye and yellowfin tuna, and
submit these plans to the WCPFC by January 2008.738

CMM2006-01 also committed members and cooperating non-members to limit other
commercial fisheries that were not addressed in CMM2005-01. This included purse
seine fisheries beyond 20º north and 20º degrees south, but excluded artisanal fisheries
and those fisheries taking less than 2,000 mt of bigeye and yellowfin. Members and
cooperating non-members were required to take necessary measures to limit the total
capacity of their other commercial tuna fisheries for bigeye and yellowfin tuna to the
average of 2001-2004 levels or the 2004 level. Members and cooperating non-members
with vessels operating in other commercial tuna fisheries for bigeye and yellowfin tuna
were obliged to provide the WCPFC with data relating to the catch of these vessels.739

In addition, members and cooperating non-members with purse seine vessels in their
registry that fished in the WCPO were obliged to develop catch retention plans. These
plans required their purse seine vessels to retain and land all skipjack, yellowfin and
bigeye tuna, except for fish unfit for human consumption for reasons other than size.
Members and cooperating non-members were required to submit these plans to the
Executive Director of the WCPFC Secretariat so as to enable the TCC to make a
recommendation to the WCPFC on the adoption of a catch retention measure. Port
States were also obliged to prohibit landings, transhipment and commercial transactions
in tuna products that originated from fishing activities that contravened WCPFC
measures.740
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Finally, CMM2006-01 tasked the WCPFC to adopt a measure in 2007 to reduce
juvenile bigeye and yellowfin mortalities from fishing effort on FADs. In support of
this, the measure tasked the Chairs of the TCC and Scientific Committee, and the
WCPFC Secretariat, to coordinate research to reduce fishing mortality of juvenile
bigeye and yellowfin from fishing on FADs. Members and cooperating non-members
were requested to collaborate with this research.741

The combination of CMM2005-01 and CMM2006-01 was insufficient to halt
overfishing for bigeye and yellowfin and ensure that stocks were maintained at or above
BMSY. At best, the measures simply limited fishing activities to then current levels of
overfishing. At worst, the exemptions in CMM2005-01 allowed for overfishing to
increase. By the end of the Third Session of the WCPFC, some members were
expressing concerns across the plenary table that the WCPFC had failed to adopt a
measure strong enough to address the recommendations of the Scientific Committee.742
Expert advisors within the FFA described CMM2005-01 and CMM2006-01 as a
collection of ad hoc, partial solutions, rather than the kind of strategic approach based
on reference points and management strategies anticipated in the (WCPF)
Convention.743

6.3

Negotiation Failure – WPCFC2007

In 2007, the Chair of the WCPFC, Glenn Hurry, began the Fourth Session with a strong
statement that expressed concern at the increases in fishing capacity in the WCPO tuna
fisheries and the ongoing failure of the WCPFC to adopt a sufficient response. The
Chair reminded delegates of their 2006 commitment that the Fourth Session would
develop a conservation and management measure that addresses overfishing of bigeye
and yellowfin. He noted that the FFA had tabled a draft conservation and management
measure that aspires to address overfishing and signalled his intention that the Fourth

741
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Session would successfully conclude with an agreed measure that would be consistent
with the advice of the Scientific Committee and reduce overfishing.744

The FFA proposal included, among other things, catch retention requirements for purse
seine vessels, a three month purse seine FAD closure, and a 25% reduction in longline
catches of bigeye.745 Australia, the European Union and other States argued that the
FFA proposal did not go far enough and suggested that stronger measures were
required. China, Japan, Chinese Taipei and others, responded that the impact of
CMM2005-01 had not yet been assessed and that the stock assessments were not
enough to warrant further action. These members argued that further action be deferred
until 2008 after a new stock assessment for bigeye had been completed.746

Despite the strong start and subsequent negotiations over draft measures, the Fourth
Session failed to adopt any conservation and management measure to reduce
overfishing of bigeye and yellowfin. The WCPFC accepted the advice from the
Scientific Committee that fishing mortality on bigeye and yellowfin needed to be
reduced, but could not agree on how to respond.747 Despite lengthy negotiations within
the WCPFC, and an ad hoc working group, members were unable to agree on a number
of key issues, particularly in regard to the terms of FAD closures, longline catch
reductions, and exemptions.748

In the end, the Fourth Session failed to fulfil its commitment in 2006 to adopt a measure
that would address overfishing of bigeye and yellowfin. Recognising this failure, the
Fourth Session agreed that it would adopt a supplementary or new measure for bigeye
and yellowfin at its subsequent Fifth Session in 2008 (discussed in Section 6.5). In order
to support this work, the WCPFC once again tasked the Scientific Committee and the
Technical and Compliance Committee to prepare advice and recommendations that
744
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would support the development of a conservation and management measure for bigeye
and yellowfin.749

6.4

Coastal State Measures: Vessel Day Scheme and High Seas Closures

While the WCPFC struggled to find consensus among its diverse membership of coastal
States and DWFNs, the PNA were rapidly developing their own conservation and
management arrangements for waters under their jurisdiction. Although independent of
the WCPFC, it is important to discuss the PNA developments as they played a critical
role in the subsequent negotiation and structure of the current WCPFC conservation and
management measure.

6.4.1

The PNA Vessel Day Scheme

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PNA became increasingly concerned at the
rapid expansion of the purse seine fishery and its potential impact on the long term
sustainability of the WCPO tuna fisheries. In light of these concerns, PNA initiated
discussions in 1990 to develop arrangements that might limit purse seine numbers
within the PNA sub-region. During these discussions, the PNA agreed to introduce
interim limits on how many purse seine vessels they would license to fish in their
collective EEZs while negotiating a more comprehensive arrangement to limit purse
seine fishing across all PNA EEZs. In 1993, the PNA concluded negotiations and signed
the legally binding Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Purse Seine Fishery
in the Western and Central Pacific (Palau Arrangement).750 Prior to the establishment of
the WCPFC, the Palau Arrangement was the only mechanism available to control purse
seine fishing effort in the WCPO.

The Palau Arrangement aimed to protect tuna stocks from overfishing and improve the
economic benefits to PNA from access fees and fisheries development. It attempted to
do this through limiting the licenses available to fish within the PNA EEZs (thereby
749
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limiting catches and hopefully increasing prices) and enabling further cooperation in
management of the purse seine fisheries between the PNA. Given its exclusive coastal
State membership, the scope of the Arrangement was effectively limited to EEZs.
Significantly though, the preamble to the arrangement emphasised the special interest of
coastal States in tuna in adjacent high seas areas.

Until 2007, the Palau Arrangement limited licenses through establishing a cap on purse
seine vessels. However, while the vessel cap of 205 remained stable, the vessel cap
became increasingly seen as a blunt and not particularly effective tool at promoting
conservation and development interests.751 In response, the PNA reviewed the vessel
cap and agreed to introduce a limit on the number of purse seine days. Vessel days
could be sold in such a way as to maximise economic returns and would introduce
greater fleet flexibility and better enable conservation outcomes.752

In December 2007, the PNA commenced operation of the Vessel Day Scheme. The
Scheme aims to constrain catches to sustainable levels and increase benefits from
fishing activities through access fees paid by DWFNs. The Vessel Day Scheme replaced
the broad purse seine vessel number cap with a set number of days that could be fished
in the combined EEZs of the PNA. Vessel days were then allocated to each PNA
member. A key objective of the Scheme was to create competition between DWFN
vessels to purchase fishing days at the maximum price.753

A key weakness of the previous vessel cap was that it did not account for effort creep
(where fishing vessels catch ever more fish as technology improves, engines get more
751
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powerful, nets get bigger).754 The Vessel Day Scheme enabled the PNA to account for
effort creep by differentiating fishing days based on vessel length and allowing for
vessel formulas to be modified over time to account for changes in technology and
efficiency.755 In addition, where the previous vessel cap had made it difficult for new
fleets to enter the fishery, the new Scheme enabled PNA members to sell access to the
highest bidder.

6.4.2

High Seas Closures and the Third Implementing Arrangement

In 2008, the PNA agreed to further strengthen their collaborative approach to
conservation and management by expanding their Harmonised Minimum Terms and
Conditions for Foreign Fishing Vessels. The Conditions were first established in
September 1983 through the First Implementing Arrangement to the Nauru
Agreement.756 While the Conditions were originally intended to only apply to PNA, the
broader FFA began a parallel initiative that quickly extended the application of the
Conditions to the entire FFA membership. The Minimum Terms and Conditions
harmonised licensing procedures and catch reporting and established a regional register
of fishing vessels. Each Pacific island State was responsible for the implementation of
these conditions at the national level.757

In April 1990, following a significant increase in the number of vessels fishing in PNA
waters, the PNA commissioned a legal drafting group to prepare a draft second
implementing arrangement. The Second Implementing Arrangement to the Nauru
Agreement came into effect in January 1991.758

The Second Implementing
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Arrangement expanded the Harmonised Minimum Terms and Conditions and
introduced: an annual registration for the regional vessel register, observer
requirements, prohibitions on transhipments at sea, and additional monitoring and
surveillance measures. Once again the broader membership of the FFA endorsed the
PNA‟s expanded Minimum Terms and Conditions and agreed that the Conditions
should be implemented throughout all FFA EEZs.759 The FFA subsequently expanded
the Conditions to also include a satellite based vessel monitoring system that is operated
by the FFA secretariat and forwards vessel positions to national officers to monitor.760

In May 2008, the PNA updated their conditions for foreign access through the adoption
of the Third Implementing Arrangement.761 The Third Implementing Arrangement
introduced new licensing terms and conditions that set global precedents in coastal State
management of tuna fisheries. These included: 100% observer coverage on purse seine
vessels operating in their EEZs; a three month closure on FAD fishing; and the closure
of two high seas pockets in waters adjacent to PNA EEZs. These measures only applied
to foreign vessels operating in PNA waters. They did not apply to domestic or
domestically based vessels.

For the first time, coastal States were effectively regulating the high seas adjacent to
their waters in a manner that was consistent with the LOSC. The PNA did this through
introducing licensing conditions that vessels may voluntarily accept or refuse. As such it
did not breach the LOSC or broader principles of international law, as it neither
restricted the freedom of the seas nor did it pretend to subject any areas of the high seas
to claims of sovereignty.762 Vessels could continue fishing on the high seas if they
desired, but in so doing they could not fish in PNA EEZs. If vessels wanted to gain a
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license to fish within a PNA EEZ, they were required to sign a licensing contract that
prohibited the vessel from fishing in certain zones, some of which included areas of
adjacent high seas.763

Given that the PNA EEZs contain the most productive fishing grounds, this was a
powerful tool and quickly raised the concern of DWFNs. Despite significant opposition
from these interests, the PNA signed the Third Implementing Arrangement in Palau in
May 2008.764 This was subsequently supported by the Pacific Island Forum Leaders at
their Summit Meeting in August.765 This set the agenda for subsequent conservation
and management negotiations at the Fifth Session of the WCPFC in 2008, as reflected
in the FFA opening statement:

The failure of the Commission to adopt a measure for bigeye and yellowfin in
Guam (2007) prompted the development of the Third Implementing
Arrangement by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement… . These actions reflect
our ongoing efforts to manage and conserve the tuna stocks in the region. It also
reflects the fact that the Convention was not negotiated in a vacuum. It was done
against the backdrop of a long history of intra and inter-regional cooperative
arrangements among FFA Members… . Commentary by some Commission
Members implies that coastal States should not adopt measures for their EEZs in
respect to tuna. Perhaps this reflects some discomfort with the idea that FFA
Members have been proactive. We do not believe that FFA Members should be
precluded from taking measures for their EEZs to ensure that stocks remain
sustainable and will continue to develop appropriate measures as necessary.766
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While the Third Implementing Arrangement was portrayed by PNA members primarily
as a conservation measure, it also supported PNA development aspirations. It limited
fishing options for DWFN fleets outside PNA waters and consequently increased
demand for access to the highly productive PNA waters, thereby enabling PNA
members to increase their benefit from the tuna fisheries as they migrated through their
EEZs.

6.5

WCPFC 2008

The Fifth Session of the WCPFC was held in Busan, Korea in 2008 and was strongly
driven by the Chair, Professor Hurry, towards the adoption of a conservation and
management measure for bigeye and yellowfin. In support of this goal, the Chair had
earlier called together an informal meeting of stakeholders in April 2008 with the aim of
furthering discussions on an effective conservation and management measure for bigeye
and yellowfin. The Chair synthesised the workshop discussions and identified three
principles that might guide the WCPFC‟s considerations. First, measures should address
both purse seine and longline fishing. This was necessary to meet the required
reductions in fishing mortality and to avoid imposing a disproportionate burden on a
particular fishery. Second, any such measures should aim to minimise impacts on
skipjack and albacore catches. Third, there was a need for the Fifth Session in
December 2008 to adopt such a measure.767

6.5.1

WCPFC 2008 Bigeye and Yellowfin Negotiations

In December 2008, the WCPFC Scientific Committee advised the WCPFC that
overfishing was occurring for bigeye, and that there was a possibility that the stock was
overfished. The status of bigeye had deteriorated and the Committee now recommended
a 30% in fishing mortality for bigeye.768 Furthermore, analysis of the biomass
767
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assessments indicate that a 30% reduction would be insufficient.769 While the
assessment indicated a range of 1.33 ~ 2.09 for Fcurrent/FMSY, the base case was 1.44. The
assessment suggested that a 44% reduction in fishing mortality would be required to
maintain bigeye stocks at BMSY. Although these inconsistencies were not explained
explicitly, the Committee acknowledged that the bigeye stock may still become
overfished even if a 30% reduction was implemented. Therefore it suggested that future
further reductions may be necessary.

In regard to yellowfin, the Scientific Committee advised that no new assessment had
been undertaken and therefore the 2007 assessment was still current. This assessment
had indicated that there was a possibility that the stock was being overfished and
suggested that fishing mortality would need to be reduced if the WCPFC wished to
reduce the likelihood of overfishing. The Scientific Committee did not recommend a
specific level of reduction, but provided estimates of the necessary reductions required
to meet specific biomass reference points.770 Furthermore, the Programme Manager of
the WCPFC‟s Science Provider, Dr John Hampton, explained to the WCPFC that
yellowfin catches have remained relatively consistent since the early 1990s, despite
increases in effort and fishing efficiency. He suggested that this signalled that a limit
had probably been reached.771

The Fifth Session of the WCPFC adopted the recommendations of the Scientific
Committee in regard to bigeye.772 The Fourth Session of the WCPFC had previously
accepted the Scientific Committee‟s recommendations to reduce fishing mortality on
yellowfin.773
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The WCPFC Technical and Compliance Committee met in October 2008. Among other
things, the Technical and Compliance Committee discussed an early draft of the Chair‟s
proposed conservation and management measure for bigeye and yellowfin, and
considered a number of papers on potential aspects of a conservation and management
measure.774 The Committee noted that agreement on a conservation and management
measure for bigeye and yellowfin would be a principal goal for the Fifth Session of the
WCPFC.775 However, it did not provide any recommendations to the WCPFC on the
subject.
The Fifth Session of the WCPFC considered the revised Chair‟s draft conservation and
management measure for bigeye and yellowfin. The Chair‟s revised draft included a
package of measures. First, it proposed limiting purse seine effort to the average of
2001-2004, or 2004 levels. Second, it proposed closing the high seas for three months
each year to purse seine fishing. Third, it committed members and cooperating nonmembers to reduce their high seas purse seine effort by 30% through a vessel day
scheme. Fourth, it proposed a three month FAD closure for EEZs and archipelagic
waters. Fifth, it committed members and cooperating non-members to reduce their
longline fleet capacity by 30%. Finally, it included various catch retention, reporting
and compliance measures.776
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If this second revision of the Chair‟s draft had been adopted and implemented, it would
have been insufficient to reduce catch and effort levels in accordance with the Scientific
Committee‟s advice. Nevertheless, it was far stronger than CMM2005-01 and
CMM2006-01 and effectively set a benchmark for subsequent negotiations.

Overall, the package put forward by the Chair is a substantial package of limits
and cuts. However, it is estimated to remove only slightly more than 50% of the
overfishing of bigeye, and should therefore be the minimum that any responsible
Commission member should expect and support. On the other hand, especially if
taken with the PNA pockets closure, it is likely to have, as one fishing State has
indicated, a „fatal impact‟ on some fishing operations, and so strong opposition
from some interests can be expected.777

The WCPFC Chair subsequently led further negotiations on the second draft throughout
the course of the Fifth Session. The most contentious aspects of these negotiations
related to the nature and scope of seasonal prohibitions on the use of FADs by purse
seine vessels (FAD closures), the level of reductions in longline catches, the potential
closure of two high seas pockets to purse seine and longline fishing. Negotiations
continued until the last minutes of the meeting as the Chair sought consensus on all
aspects of the measure. Ultimately, consensus was reached when Korea relented as the
remaining sole opponent to the high seas closures and accepted the compromise
measure in its entirety.778

6.5.2

CMM2008-01 Bigeye and Yellowfin

The Fifth Session of the WCPFC adopted the Conservation and Management Measure
for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (CMM200801).779 The measure replaced the now defunct CMM2005-01 and CMM2006-1 and
established a comprehensive package of measures for high seas and EEZs (see
777
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Appendix Two for a complete copy of the measure). Although delegates recognised that
the measure would be insufficient to implement the necessary reductions, there was a
celebration that the WCPFC had nevertheless made some progress towards addressing
overfishing.780

CMM2008-01 explicitly aimed to reduce mortality of bigeye by 30% from the average
of 2001-2004 or 2004 levels, and ensure that there was no increase in fishing mortality
of yellowfin from these levels. In support of this goal, CMM2008-01 prescribed a
package of measures, many of which were to be implemented by PNA members
through their Vessel Day Scheme and Third Implementing Arrangement. For non-PNA
EEZs and high seas, the provisions required members and cooperating non-members to
implement compatible measures.

The package of measures included a number of limits and closures on fishing activities.
First, WCPFC members committed to limit purse seine effort to the average of 20012004, or 2004 levels. These limits applied to fisheries in the high seas and EEZs
between 20º north and 20º south, and were to be measured in vessel days. Second, the
measure prohibited purse seine fishing on FADs for two months in 2009, and three
months in 2010 and 2011, for fisheries in EEZs and high seas between 20º north and 20º
south. Third, purse seine vessels were required to retain all catches of bigeye, yellowfin
and skipjack from EEZs and high seas between 20º north and 20º south. These catches
were to be retained until the vessel landed or transhipped its catch in port. Fourth, the
measure prescribed a phased 30% reduction of longline bigeye catch from the average
of 2001-2004, or 2004 levels by January 2012. Fifth, members and cooperating nonmembers committed to limit the bigeye catch of other commercial fisheries to the
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average of 2001-2004, or 2004 levels. Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the
measure closed two high seas pockets to purse seine fishing from 2010 onwards.781

CMM2008-01 encouraged archipelagic States to ensure that the measure was not
undermined through transfers of fishing effort into archipelagic waters and territorial
seas. As with the previous measures, CMM2008-01 exempted small island developing
States from its provisions in regard to their legitimate rights to develop their own
domestic fisheries,782 and continued to exempt all members and cooperating nonmembers that caught less than 2,000 mt of bigeye by longline (which were required to
ensure their longline catches did not exceed 2,000 mt).783

In addition, the measure now also exempted all members and cooperating non-members
that caught less than 5,000 mt of fresh bigeye by longline. The USA had argued for
protection for its Hawaiian longline fresh fish fleet which caught significantly more
than 2,000 mt (5,416 mt in 2007).784 The USA subsequently negotiated the additional
exemption and was now required to ensure its longline catches of fresh bigeye did not
exceed 5,000 mt in 2010 and 2011.785 In practice, this exemption was only relevant to
the USA.

Significantly, the measure also recognised existing bilateral and multilateral access
arrangements and provided for levels to be based on access rights for the average of
2001-2004 levels, or 2004 levels, rather than actual fishing activity.786 A number of
access arrangements were registered with the WCPFC Secretariat, including two
multilateral arrangements and various bilateral agreements.787 The measure also
781

CMM2008-01.
Paragraph 6. CMM2008-01.
783
Paragraph 32. CMM2008-01.
784
WCPFC. (2008) Summary Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Busan, Korea.
WCPFC. – Catch data sourced from: SPC. (2009) Tuna Fishery Yearbook: Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. WCPFC. p67.
785
Paragraph 32. CMM2008-01.
786
Paragraph 7. CMM2008-01.
787
See Table 6 of WCPFC Secretariat. (2008) Review of CCM's Implementation of, and Compliance with,
Conservation and Management Measures. Fourth Regular Session of the Technical and Compliance
Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia,
2 - 7 October 2008. WCPFC. Multilateral Arrangements included: Treaty on Fisheries Between the
Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States (USMLT). Opened for
signature 2 April 1987. Entered into force 15 June 1988. International Legal Materials, vol. 26. 1987. -- FSM
Arangement for Regional Fisheries Access (FSM Arrangement). Opened for signature 1995. Pohnpei,
782

Page | 214

included a number of other provisions relating to, among other things, FAD
management plans, observer coverage and data provision.

Finally, the measure required that its provisions be reviewed and adjusted as necessary
by the WCPFC. These adjustments should take into consideration future scientific
advice, issues with implementation, and future WCPFC decisions regarding
management objectives and reference points.788

6.6

Assessment of WCPFC Conservation and Management

In 2009, the Scientific Committee accepted an assessment of CMM2008-01 that in
effect concluded that the measure was sufficient for yellowfin but insufficient for
bigeye.789 The Scientific Committee agreed with the assessment‟s findings that the
measure would not achieve its objective of a 30% reduction in bigeye fishing
mortality.790

The assessment found that the efficacy of CMM2008-01 was undermined by a number
of key factors. First, the exemptions prescribed in the measure potentially allowed for a
30% increase in purse seine effort over the average of 2001-2004 levels.791 This was
mainly due to the rapid expansion of the number of vessels fishing under the USA
multilateral access treaty with the Pacific island States.792 The effect of the exemption
was minimal in regard to bilateral agreements, as there was little difference between the
access rights and the actual number of vessels fishing in 2004.793 Similarly, the effect
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was minimal in regard to vessels that fished under the other multilateral access
agreement (the FSM Arrangement)794 due to their declining numbers and inclusion
within the PNA Vessel Day Scheme limits. However, the effect was significant in
regard to the USA fleet as it allowed the fleet to potentially expand from its 2004 level
of 25 purse seine vessels, to a maximum of 40 vessels as prescribed in the USA access
agreement.795 Unlike other access agreements, the USA multilateral access agreement
was not yet included within the PNA Vessel Day Scheme.

Second, the efficacy of CMM2008-01 was further undermined by the limited
effectiveness of the FAD prohibition which only resulted in a small reduction in fishing
mortality.796 In effect, the uncertainty over the level of fishing on FADs throughout the
rest of the year undermined the effectiveness of a short term closure (i.e. did the
aggregation of fish simply get caught later). Third, the assessment found little benefit
from the high seas pocket closure as it assumed that effort was transferred into areas
where catchability of bigeye was higher.797 The assessment suggested that closures
would only reduce fishing mortality if the effort was physically removed from the
region, rather than simply transferred to another area. Fourth, the lack of application to
archipelagic waters significantly undermined the efficacy of the measure given the high
levels of fishing mortality on juvenile bigeye that occur in these waters. 798 Finally, the
reductions in longline catch were not sufficiently reducing fishing mortality of adult
bigeye due to the already significant decline in the stock and their reduced
catchability.799 The assessment noted various uncertainties in its assumptions due to the
broad nature of the exemptions and lack of data, and suggested that the estimates were
probably conservative, particularly in regard to Indonesia and the Philippines,
developing island States, and longline bigeye catches.800
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In regard to yellowfin, the result was more positive. In 2009, the Scientific Committee
agreed that CMM2008-01 could achieve its objective of limiting fishing mortality to the
average of 2001-2004 or 2004 levels.801 This was based on the assessment which
estimated that CMM2008-01 could result in levels of fishing mortality in 2018 from 8%
below to 15% above the average of 2001-2004 levels.802

Despite the comprehensive nature of CMM2008-01, the WCPFC had again failed to
adopt a conservation and management measure that sufficiently responded to the
Scientific Committee‟s advice in regard to bigeye. In its current form, CMM2008-01
effectively does nothing to reduce overfishing of bigeye. At best, full implementation of
all of its measures simply maintains fishing mortality for bigeye at current unsustainable
levels, inevitably leading to a decline in spawning biomass to levels below MSY
levels.803 Even if all the exemptions were removed from CMM2008-01, and all of its
provisions were fully implemented, the measure would only likely achieve between
32% and 55% of its goal (i.e. it would reduce overfishing by 32% and 55%).804 At the
request of the 2009 Scientific Committee, the WCPFC science provider presented an
evaluation of CMM2008-01 that indicated further reductions were required to reduce
fishing mortality to MSY levels (see Figure 22).
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Figure 22: Assessment of Bigeye Measures805
Potential Management Option

Percentage of
advised reduction

Complete high seas closure

1 - 4%

No foreign vessel FAD sets

7 - 13%

No FAD sets by large longline members

~ 7%

Full implementation of CMM2008-01 (removal of exemptions)

32 - 55%

80% Reduction in FAD purse seine effort
50% Reduction in longline catch

99 - 100%

Significant reduction of Indonesian and Philippine effort.

The evaluation implied that in order to remove all overfishing of bigeye, it was
necessary to reduce the use of FADs by purse seine vessels by 80%, reduce longline
catch by 50%, and significantly reduce fishing effort on bigeye in Indonesia and the
Philippines.806 As demonstrated in Figure 22, all other proposed measures do not
remove overfishing by a sufficient amount to maintain fishing mortality of bigeye at
MSY levels.

6.7

Negotiation Failure – WPCFC 2009

In 2009, the Sixth Session of the WCPFC, under the leadership of the new Chair, Satya
Nandan, accepted the findings of the Scientific Committee that the measure would not
achieve its objective of reducing bigeye fishing mortality by 30%. The Committee
asserted that it:

views the identification and implementation of effective management measures
to address the inadequacy of CMM-2008-01 as the most urgent issue facing the
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Commission with regard to maintaining the sustainability of target tuna
stocks.807

Within this context, the Scientific Committee further noted that overfishing of bigeye
and possibly yellowfin was occurring and noted that fishing mortality for bigeye had
significantly increased over the average of 2001-2004 levels. The Committee identified
the key threats to bigeye as high catches of bigeye by longline fleets, high mortality of
juvenile bigeye by purse seine fleets using FADs, and high mortality of juvenile bigeye
by various gears in Indonesia and Philippines.

The Scientific Committee reported to the WCPFC that the bigeye stock assessment
recommended a 34% to 50% reduction in fishing mortality for bigeye from 2004-2007
levels, and no increase in fishing mortality for yellowfin. Consequently, the Committee
recommended that a 30% reduction in fishing mortality from the average of 2001-2004
levels would be required to reach FMSY.
For the first time in its existence, the WCPFC did not explicitly accept the Scientific
Committee‟s recommendations regarding the status of bigeye and yellowfin. While all
other stock assessments were accepted, bigeye and yellowfin were deferred for
consideration until later in the meeting.808 Subsequent negotiations stalled in chaotic
and lengthy disputes over concerns regarding the perceived unfair impact of the
CMM2008-01 on various members and cooperating non-members. Similarly, some
States attributed the failure of the measure to the various exemptions that were
granted.809

In the end, the WCPFC ran out of time and could only agree that its measure would not
achieve its objective, and that once again, it would need to seek the advice of the TCC
807
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and Scientific Committee on the matter so that it could consider a new package of
measures at its Seventh Session in 2010.810 In a chaotic conclusion to the meeting, the
WPCFC was unable to formally accept the recommendations of the Scientific
Committee for bigeye and yellowfin, nor was it able to prioritise any specific measures
for future consideration.

6.8

Conclusion

The introduction to this Chapter posed the question: has the WCPFC adopted
conservation and management measures that are sufficient to address overfishing of
yellowfin and bigeye? In response, this Chapter has demonstrated that the WCPFC has
only partly responded to this challenge. While fishing mortality for yellowfin is now at
levels approximating FMSY (i.e. yellowfin is not being overfished), fishing mortality of
bigeye continues to exceed FMSY (i.e. bigeye is being overfished).
This Chapter concludes that the WCPFC has not yet adopted a conservation and
management measure that is sufficient to reduce overfishing of bigeye to levels that
ensure that bigeye stocks will remain above BMSY. In simple terms, no WCPFC
conservation and management measure has yet stopped overfishing of bigeye.

Longline fisheries that target bigeye continue to catch unsustainably high levels of adult
bigeye, and purse seine fisheries that set on FADs continue to catch unsustainably high
levels of juvenile bigeye as bycatch. While it is uncertain exactly how many bigeye are
caught in the Indonesian and Philippine fisheries, there is increasing concern that these
fisheries are also having a significant impact on the status of bigeye stocks.

Overfishing of bigeye has dominated discussions at each WCPFC since its first full
meeting in 2005, yet the WCPFC has made little progress. If anything, stock
assessments and vessel data indicate that the WCPFC has gone backwards. The status of
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bigeye stocks have declined while bigeye catches have increased.811 So too has fishing
effort in the purse seine fisheries, and the Indonesian and Philippine fisheries.812 This is
despite multiple resolutions and conservation and management measures from the
WCPFC calling upon States to restrain any further increase.

This raises a fundamental question. Given that Chapters Four and Five demonstrated
that the WCPF Convention established a benchmark legal and institutional framework
for cooperation and management of tuna fisheries, why hasn‟t the WCPFC successfully
reduced overfishing of bigeye?

811
812

See Section 2.2.3.
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Chapter Seven: Interest and Influence in Species and Gear
The decisions that we arrive at in order to achieve the long term goal of
sustained utilisation of the region‟s tuna resources will involve concessions from
all those currently involved in the fishery. This is a fact of the situation. If the
current levels of fishing are excessive and not sustainable, steps will need to be
taken to reduce the fishing effort in a way that does not unfairly disadvantage
anyone that has a demonstrated long term and dependent interest in the fishery.

His Excellency Joseph J. Urusemal
President of Federated States of Micronesia
2003 to 2007813

7.1

Introduction

Previous chapters analysed the WCPF Convention and the framework that it established
for the long term conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO tuna fisheries. These
chapters found that the framework provided by the WCPF Convention was essentially
sound. Nevertheless, while overfishing of yellowfin appears to have diminished, the
WCPFC has been unable to adopt a conservation measure that is sufficient to reduce
overfishing of bigeye.

Given the failure of the WCPF Convention to adopt a sufficient measure, the thesis now
studies the mix of interests in the WCPO tuna fisheries in order to better understand
how these interests might influence the WCPFC‟s ability to adopt measures for bigeye
and yellowfin. As noted by Balton, the benefits from a fishery are a key influence on
national negotiating positions.814 They influence each delegation‟s national interest and
drive negotiating positions to support or oppose certain measures depending upon how
they impact on that State‟s various interests.

813

J. Urusemal. (2004) Opening Statement at the Inaugural Meeting of the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheres Management Commission by the President of the Federated States of Micronesia. Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Pohnpei, 9 December 2004. WCPFC p3.
814
D. Balton and D. Zbicz. (2004) Managing Deep-Sea Fisheries: Some Threshold Questions. The
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. 19.3. p248. -- A. Langley, A. Wright, et al. (2009) Slow
Steps Towards Management of the World's Largest Tuna Fishery. Marine Policy. 33.2. p277.
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The next two chapters undertake a comprehensive analysis of the key interests that may
influence WCPFC conservation and management measures. The purpose of this
analysis is to answer two research questions: what interests do participating States have
in the conservation and management of bigeye and yellowfin; and how might these
interests influence the WCPFC‟s negotiation and adoption of conservation and
management measures for bigeye and yellowfin.

This analysis studies interests that are directly relevant to potential conservation and
management measures. As discussed in Chapters Two and Six, the key conservation
and management challenge is overfishing by longline and purse seine fishing vessels on
bigeye and, to a lesser extent, yellowfin. In order to meet this challenge, significant
reductions are required in longline and purse seine catches, and current exemptions
must be reduced to some degree.

Chapter Seven analyses the interests and influences that each participating State has in
particular species (bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack) and particular gears (purse seine,
longline). The analysis concludes with an analytical scale that grades their interests and
indicates their likely influence on negotiating positions. Chapter Eight then undertakes
further analysis into interests and influences related to: access to fishing grounds;
fishing vessels; markets; and development aspirations.

The study analyses all reported catches from within the WCPFC Statistical Area (the
perceived range of the stocks) and is based on the most recent data that was available at
the time of the study. Data is sourced from the 2010 WCPFC Yearbook excel
database,815 the FFA‟s Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries excel database, 816 and WCPFC
overview papers on the WCPO tuna fisheries.817 This covers 2008 catches that were

815

P. Williams. (2010) Tuna Fishery Yearbook: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (Raw
Excel Database). Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. SPC.
816
P. Terawasi and L. Rodwell. (2010) Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries (Excel Database). Honiara, Solomon
Islands. FFA.
817
P. Williams and P. Terawasi. (2009) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
Including Economic Conditions in 2008. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the Commission
for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific.
Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- P. Williams and P. Terawasi. (2008) Overview of Tuna
Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Including Economic Conditions in 2007. Fourth Regular
Session of the Scientific Committee of the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly
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reported in 2009 and published in 2010. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent
figures in Chapters Seven and Eight were developed by the author using these
databases.818 Specific references are only inserted where other data was used.

It is important to note the limitations of these datasets due to non-reporting and misreporting of catches by vessels and States,819 and the uncertainties due to the undefined
western and northern boundaries of the WCPFC. Not all coastal States within the
WCPFC Statistical Area currently provide tuna catch reports to the WCPFC or SPC.
China, Korea and Russia do not currently report any tuna catches, while Vietnam,
Philippines and Indonesia have only recently begun to develop the capacity to report
tuna catches.820

7.1.1

Interests and Influences

The analysis distinguishes between „positive‟ interests and „negative‟ interests. In most
cases, communities benefit from a fishery in some form and their interest is positive. In
these cases, such interests are discussed simply as „interests‟. In some cases, States may
have a „negative‟ interest. These States include communities who benefit from purse
seine activities (i.e. through the harvesting of skipjack or yellowfin), but gain little from
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, 11-22 August
2008. WCPFC.
818
Some figures include abbreviations that have not been used in the main text. RMI is Marshall Islands, FSM
is Federated States of Micronesia, PNG is Papua New Guinea. NZ is New Zealand. HS is High Seas. EU is
European Union. Some Figures includes abbreviations that refer to SPC defined areas. HS1 refers to the high
seas pocket between Papua New Guinea and the Federated States of Micronesia. HS2 refers to the high seas
pocket between FSM, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru and Tuvalu. HS3 refers to high seas
(excluding high seas pockets) east of the Philippines towards Guam, above FSM, around RMI and extending
northwards to 20ºN and westwards of 175ºE. HS4 refers to high seas east of RMI and Kiribati, extending
northwards from the equator to 20ºN and eastwards of 175ºE to 170ºW. HS5 refers to high seas around the
Line Group of islands northwards from the equator to 20ºN, eastwards from 170ºW to 150ºW and southwards
from the equator to 20ºS between 155ºW and 130ºW. HS6 refers to the remainder of high seas not covered
above in the northern hemisphere. HS7 refers to the remainder of high seas not covered above in the southern
hemisphere. HS8 refers to high seas between Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. HS9 refers to high seas
between Cook Islands and French Polynesia. HS10 refers to high seas between Tuvalu, Phoenix Islands and
Tokelau, southwards from the equator to 10ºS and eastwards of 175ºE to 170ºW. HS11 refers to high seas
between the Phoenix Islands and the Line Islands, southwards from the equator to 10ºS and eastwards of 175ºE
to 155ºW (excluding the HS9 area). These areas were defined in: P. Terawasi and L. Rodwell. (2010) Value of
WCPO Tuna Fisheries (Excel Database). Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA.
819
For further discussion of the problems with non-reporting and mis-reporting of catches by both vessels and
States, see: D. Soutar, Q. Hanich, et al. (2009) Safeguarding the Stocks: A Report on Analytical Projects to
Support the Development of a Regional MCS Strategy for Pacific Oceanic Fisheries. Honiara, Solomon
Islands. FFA. -- P. Williams. (2010) Scientific Data Available to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Sixth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Nuku'alofa, Tonga, 10-19 August 2009. WCPFC.
820
UNDP and WCPFC. (2009) West Pacific East Asia Oceanic Fisheries Management. Pohnpei, Federated
States of Micronesia. United Nations Development Programme and the WCPFC.
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the bycatch of bigeye. Consequently, these States have a „negative‟ interest in bigeye
because it represents a management burden for which they will receive little benefit,
either in the short term or the long term. Given the significant impact of bigeye bycatch,
the WCPFC must engage these States in the conservation of bigeye (they have an
interest). But these States will receive no direct benefit from their engagement (it is a
negative interest).

The interests identified in the following analysis do not necessarily reflect the overall
„national interest‟ of a State. Many of the identified States will have multiple
communities with diverse interests. While one of the sections below might suggest that
a State will oppose any conservation measure that negatively impacts its interests,
another section might suggest otherwise. Such States will need to balance their interests
when considering potential management responses. It is not possible for this thesis to
determine what an individual „national interest‟ might be for each of the 87 identified
States. This is far beyond the scope of the thesis and would require a far broader
analysis of the various political, ideological, institutional, demographic and strategic
national considerations that influence how a government of the day may perceive its
„national interest‟.821 The focus for this thesis is on identifying the interests of each
State that may impact on, and complicate the negotiation, adoption and implementation
of conservation and management measures.

7.1.2

Allocation Considerations

The importance of the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries vary from community to
community. In some cases, their importance to each community is obvious. For
example, if the WCPO tuna fisheries were to substantially decline or collapse, urbanised
wealthy communities in distant markets might only notice an increase in price for their
favourite luxury sashimi as scarcity caused price rises, perhaps encouraging them to
choose from a wide range of other readily available foods. Meanwhile, communities in
821

For further discussion of „national interest‟, see: J. A. Camilleri and J. Falk. (1992) The End of Sovereignty?
The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World. Aldershot. Edward Elgar. H. Bull. (1977) The Anarchical
Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London, United Kingdom. MacMillan. R. Barnes. (2009) Property
Rights and Natural Resources. Studies in International Law. vol. 22. Oxford, United Kingdom. Hart
Publishing. P. Allott. (1992) Mare Nostrum: A New International Law of the Sea. The American Journal of
International Law. 86.4. S. Barrett. (2003) Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty
Making. New York, USA. Oxford University Press.
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developing coastal States throughout South East Asia and the Pacific islands region
could face devastating losses in government revenue, employment and food security. 822

While in some cases it might appear reasonably simple to rank the importance of these
benefits (i.e. food security over luxury items), in many cases it is difficult and highly
subjective to attach rankings of importance for each benefit and each community. This
is particularly problematic when each community is represented by a different national
delegation that immediately prioritises the interests of its own communities above all
others. David Balton notes that governments seek to maximise the rights of their own
nationals and vessels to exploit resources (i.e. their interests), while minimising their
obligations to regulate or supervise such exploitation.823

Ranking the importance of one benefit over another raises fundamental questions for
RFMO negotiations on the allocation of rights, because it values one activity over
another, or suggests that one national context may be more deserving than another. The
determination of who deserves what benefits, or „how the pie is sliced‟, raises complex
and contentious questions and is a key challenge to the implementation of rights-based
fisheries management. Balton suggests that overfishing, habitat degradation, pollution
and declining fisheries are all consequences of the inherent behaviour of States to
protect their interests, while minimising their obligations.824

This thesis does not judge how the fisheries should be distributed and consequently does
not need to assess how the WCPFC should value one factor over another, or one
national context over another. However, these issues do raise an important conundrum
that is central to the study of this thesis. As discussed in Chapter Four, the lack of
determined rights in a fishery can undermine incentives for conservation. But
determining these rights through an explicit allocation process is highly fraught and
could easily consume years of effort as allocation decisions within the WCPFC require

822

J. Bell, M. Kronen, et al. (2009) Planning the Use of Fish for Food Security in the Pacific. Marine Policy.
33. R. Gillett and I. Cartwright. (2010) The Future of Pacific Island Fisheries. Noumea, New Caledonia. SPC.
UNDP and WCPFC. (2009) West Pacific East Asia Oceanic Fisheries Management. Pohnpei, Federated States
of Micronesia. United Nations Development Programme and the WCPFC.
823
D. Balton and D. Zbicz. (2004) Managing Deep-Sea Fisheries: Some Threshold Questions. The
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. 19.3. p248.
824
Ibid. p248.
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consensus.825 Reaching consensus would be difficult given the wide range of factors to
be considered, and the various criteria to be considered.826 While energies are focused
on allocation negotiations, overfishing may continue and could potentially be
exacerbated as the consideration of historical catch in allocation negotiations
encourages a race-to-fish mentality to build up a catch history.827

These issues are particularly problematic for the WCPFC given that much of the catch
is taken inside waters under national jurisdiction and the FFA has stated that any
mandate for WCPFC allocation negotiations is limited to the high seas only. 828 In 2010,
the Japanese government stated at an international tuna workshop that allocation was a
very difficult issue, particularly in the context of the WCPO tuna fisheries where much
of the catch is taken from within EEZs.829

After discussions in 2005 and 2006, the WCPFC has taken allocation off the agenda by
noting that it is not a priority.830 In 2008, after minimal discussion, the WCPFC agreed

825

WCPF Convention. Article 10.4.
A. Willock and I. Cartwright. (2006) Conservation Implications of Allocation under the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. WWF Australia and TRAFFIC Oceania. p19. -- I. Cartwright and A.
Willock. (1999) Oceana's Birthright: the Role of Rights-Based Management in Tuna Fisheries of the Western
and Central Pacific. FishRights 1999. Perth, Australia. FAO. p13.
827
A „race to fish‟ can occur where fleets attempt to rapidly build up a catch history to support imminent
negotiations for an allocation, that will be partly or wholly based on their historical catch. In 2007, concerns
were expressed that a race to fish was already underway in the WCPO tuna fisheries as WCPFC members
sought to maximise their catches and access rights in advance of allocation decisions within the WCPFC. See:
Transform Aqorau (2007). Fisheries: Pacific Tuna - Turning the Tide. Islanders No Longer Bystanders. Islands
Business. Suva, Fiji, Islands Business International. For general discussion of the problems posed by the last
minute race to fish, M. Lodge and S. Nandan. (2005) Some Suggestions Towards Better Implementation of the
United Nations Agreement on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of 1995. International
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. 20. p374. -- D. Agnew, D. Aldous, et al. (2006) Discussion Paper:
Allocation Issues for WCPFC Tuna Resources. Third Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Apia, Samoa, October 2006. WCPFC. p5.
828
WCPFC. (2006) Summary Report of the Third Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Third Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Apia, Samoa,
11-15 December 2006. WCPFC. p17.
829
Personal notes. Comments by Masanori Miyahara, Chief Counsellor. Fisheries Agency of Japan.
Commissioner and Head Delegate to the WCPFC. Comments made on 30 June 2010 at Kobe II International
Workshop on RFMO Management of Tuna Fisheries. Brisbane, Australia. 29 June to 1 July 2010.
830
In 2005, the WCPFC commissioned a discussion paper on allocation. This was presented to the WCPFC in
2006. Following brief discussions, New Zealand offer to host a workshop on allocation in 2008. In 2007, New
Zealand announced to the WCPFC that it would not host the workshop in 2008 as it now thought it premature
to workshop the question of allocation. Following further discussions within the WCPFC, the members agreed
that the issue was not a priority. For references, see: D. Agnew, D. Aldous, et al. (2006) Discussion Paper:
Allocation Issues for WCPFC Tuna Resources. Third Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Apia, Samoa, October 2006. WCPFC. -- WCPFC. (2006) Summary Report of the Third
Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Third Regular Session of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Apia, Samoa, 11-15 December 2006. WCPFC. p17. -WCPFC. (2007) Summary Report of the Fourth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
826
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that consideration of allocation issues would be merged with consideration of
management objectives and reference points and future discussions will be guided by
the outcomes of ongoing deliberations on these other matters.831 There was little
discussion of allocation at the Sixth Session of the WCPFC in 2009.832

Nevertheless, although not discussed explicitly, the WCPFC has implicitly made several
allocations through various conservation and management measures that limit and
attribute catches or fishing effort.833 For example, according to CMM2008-01, some
States are required to limit their longline vessels to a combined fleet catch of no more
than 2,000 mt, while other States enjoy significantly higher catch limits or
exemptions.834 These limits restrict the fishing opportunities for WCPFC members and
thereby allocate the maximum level of participation for each WCPFC member.

These implicit allocations last only as long as the conservation and management
measures are in force. Nevertheless, without an explicit allocation, WCPFC members
have no choice but to negotiate their interests within the context of conservation and
management measures.
7.2

Species

The next three sections (7.2.1, 7.2.2 and 7.2.3) analyse the direct interest that each
participating State and territory has in skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin. Some
communities within each State may benefit more from one species than another. A State
with communities that benefit significantly from a specific species will have an interest
in ensuring that its communities can maximise their benefit from that species to the
degree that it is not overfished, with perhaps little conservation interest in other species
that may be impacted. The following sections analyse catches of skipjack, yellowfin and
Commission. Fourth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Tumon, Guam.
WCPFC. p45.
831
WCPFC. (2008) Summary Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Busan, Korea.
WCPFC. p11.
832
Author‟s personal notes. Australian delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission. 7-11 December 2009. Tahiti, French Polynesia. WCPFC. (2009) Summary
Report of the Sixth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Sixth Regular
Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Tahiti, French Polynesia, 7-11 December
2009. WCPFC.
833
S. Soh. (2010) WCPFC Allocation and Management of Fishing Capacity. Kobe II International Workshop
on RFMO Management of Tuna Fisheries. Brisbane, Australia, 29 June to 1 July 2010. FFA. Slide 2.
834
Paragraphs 31 to 38. WCPFC CMM2008-01.
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bigeye and identify States that have a particular interest in each species. Skipjack is
included in the analysis because of the link between the purse seine fishery that targets
skipjack, and the significant bycatch of yellowfin and bigeye that is taken in this
fishery. The analysis concludes with an analytical scale in Section 7.2.4 that grades the
interests of participating States from skipjack to bigeye, and discusses their likely
influence on negotiating positions.

7.2.1

Skipjack

The skipjack fishery provides benefits to communities in a diverse collection of flag and
coastal States. Vessels from 12 flag States caught 97% of skipjack in the WCPO in
2008, valued at approximately US$2.765 billion. Nine coastal States received licensing
and access benefits for 77% of all WCPO skipjack catches, valued at approximately
US$2.195 billion. Figure 23 lists these States in order of the value of their catch
(whichever is the highest of the flag State or coastal State value) and demonstrates the
significance of their interest as a pie-chart percentage of the total catch of the WCPO
skipjack fishery. 835

835

All of these States are WCPFC members, except Indonesia which was a MHLC participant and is a cooperating non-member.
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Figure 23: Value of Largest Skipjack Catches in 2008 by State836
State
Papua New Guinea
Japan
Philippines
Indonesia
Korea
Chinese Taipei
USA (except A. Samoa)
Kiribati
Solomon Islands
Fed. States of Micronesia
Nauru
China
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Marshall Islands
New Zealand
European Union (Spain)

US$ Value Flag State Catch
249,571,978
539,165,859
441,330,200
390,371,000
319,011,042
283,125,179
282,595,531
20,690,807
12,858,800
27,140,272
No vessels
73,800,794
No vessels
51,870,400
46,201,155
42,871,894
42,418,439

US$ Value Coastal State Catch
654,288,451
84,873,538
391,096,900
391,526,444
No report
2,284,800
3,449,428
228,578,952
148,224,848
123,627,205
78,028,238
No report
57,073,564
29,381
23,376,569
14,896,986
Non-Coastal State

Flag State Percentage of Total Skipjack Catch

Coastal State Percentage

Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Philippines and Japan have the most significant interests
in skipjack. Vessels flagged to these four States caught more than 53% of all WCPO
skipjack in 2008, while their treasuries benefited from additional coastal State licensing
and access revenue for 55% of all skipjack catches. Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and
the Philippines have all experienced significant growth in skipjack catches since 2000
by their flagged vessels, and for catches within their waters.
836

The values for flag States include catches taken by all registered vessels in all waters. The values for coastal
States include catches taken by all domestic and foreign vessels within that State‟s waters. Whereas some
States have significant interests as both a coastal State and a flag State (i.e. Indonesia), some States only have a
significant interest as either a coastal State (i.e. Kiribati) or a flag State (i.e. Korea). In the case of States that
have only a significant interest in one or the other field, the non-significant value is presented in small grey
italic font.
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For most States, the primary gear used to catch skipjack was purse seine (see Figure
24). However, pole and line also took significant catches for Japan and Indonesia, while
other gears (includes artisanal) were significant for the Philippines and Kiribati.

Figure 24: Skipjack Catches by Gear
2008 Flag State
Longline SKJ
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300,000

250,000
200,000

150,000

100,000

50,000

S

ol
.

ad
or
Is
ld
s
E
cu
A
ll
ot a d
he or
rF
la
gs

E

P

lS

al
v

M

ba
ti

FS

iri
K

S

pa
in

I

N
Z

R
M

hi
li

Ja
pa
n
pp
in
es
In
do
ne
si
a
K
or
ea
Ta
iw
an
U
S
A
P
N
G
C
hi
na
V
an
ua
tu

-

2008 Coastal State
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Given that skipjack is not overfished, and overfishing is not occurring, the States in
Figure 23 all have a significant interest in maximising their continued catch of skipjack.
For most States, this will translate into significant interest in the purse seine fishery.
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While the WCPFC has adopted measures that impact on fisheries targeting skipjack,
these do not directly limit skipjack catches.837

7.2.2 Bigeye
The bigeye fishery is targeted by longliners and some other small scale gears, but is also
a significant bycatch within the purse seine fishery. However, as discussed earlier, this
bycatch provides far less benefit than that enjoyed by longline and other gears.
Therefore, the analysis distinguishes between the interests of those States with
communities that benefit from targeted fishing for bigeye and have a positive interest in
the species, and those States with communities that benefit from purse seine activities
but gain little from bycatch of bigeye and have a negative interest.

Vessels from 11 flag States caught 98% of targeted WCPO bigeye in 2008 (i.e. not
including bycatch by purse seine vessels), worth approximately US$768 million. Eight
coastal States received licensing and access benefits for 50% of all targeted WCPO
bigeye catches (equal to 96% of all catches from within waters under national
jurisdiction), worth approximately US$293 million. Figure 25 lists these States in order
of the value of their catch and charts the significance of their interest.838

Figure 25: Value of Largest Bigeye Catches in 2008 by State
State
Japan
Korea
Chinese Taipei
Indonesia
China
USA (except A. Samoa)
Philippines
Marshall Islands
Palau
Australia
Vanuatu
Fed. States of Micronesia
Fiji

US$ Value Flag State Catch
226,701,700
140,644,504
134,738,238
111,953,564
72,525,337
38,894,398
13,411,267
3,101,225
8,484,951
8,435,332
8,013,813
5,543,576

US$ Value Coastal State Catch
95,923,060
No report
2,987,146
113,273,756
No report
17,188,144
14,642,205
16,588,594
18,698,911
8,315,103
1,427,369
9,402,614
4,141,071

837

WCPFC CMM2008-01.
All of these States are WCPFC members, except Indonesia which was a MHLC participant and is a cooperating non-member.
838
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Flag State Percentage of Total Bigeye Catch

Coastal State Percentage

Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Chinese Taipei and China have the most significant interests in
bigeye. Vessels flagged to these States accounted for more than 85% of all targeted
WCPO bigeye in 2008, while Japan and Indonesia benefited from additional coastal
State licensing and access revenue for 34% of all bigeye targeted catches.

Indonesian reported catches for targeted bigeye (longline and other gears) increased
dramatically in 2004 and have been fairly consistent at approximately 27,000 mt per
year. However, it should be noted that there are significant uncertainties in regard to
catch data from Indonesia and the Philippines and that it is likely that a significant
portion of these increases can be attributed to improved reporting by fishing vessels.839
Japanese and Chinese Taipei targeted catches have been fairly consistent at
approximately 30-35,000 mt and 10-20,000 mt per year respectively. Meanwhile,
Chinese Taipei targeted catches have declined slightly to approximately 12-20,000 mt
per year (from a height of 31,098 mt in 2003).

The WCPFC conservation measure for bigeye and yellowfin, CMM2008-01, impacts on
fisheries that catch bigeye as it includes an explicit limit on bigeye catch that reduces

839

For further discussion on data uncertainties in Indonesia and the Philippines, see: UNDP and WCPFC.
(2009) West Pacific East Asia Oceanic Fisheries Management. Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia.
United Nations Development Programme and the WCPFC. -- Philippines. (2009) Annual Report to the
Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009.
WCPFC. -- D. Itano and P. Williams. (2009) Review of Bigeye and Yellowfin Catches Landing in Palawan,
Philippines. Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. WCPFC.
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further over time, and prescribes various controls on purse seine and longline fisheries.
For most States, the primary gear used to target bigeye was longline. Japan, Indonesia
and the Philippines all reported significant catches of bigeye by other artisanal gears,
and some catch by pole and line and troll. A number of States have also taken
significant amounts of bigeye as bycatch by purse seiners (see Figure 26).
Figure 26: Bigeye Catch by Gear
2008 Flag State
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Consequently, some States have a solely positive interest in bigeye, some States have a
solely negative interest, and some States have a mixture of positive and negative
interests. Figure 27 identifies flag and coastal States with significant „negative‟ interests
in bigeye.
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Figure 27: States with Negative Interest in Bigeye
Flag State Percentage of Total Bigeye Purse Seine Bycatch

Coastal State Percentage

The „pie‟ in Figure 27 is the total level of purse seine bycatch of bigeye. Those States
with the biggest slices of the pie have the most significant problem with bycatch of
bigeye by purse seine fleets. European Union (Spain), Papua New Guinea, Ecuador, El
Salvador, New Zealand, Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu and the Solomon Islands all have a
negative interest in bigeye, and gain little or no positive benefit. Consequently, these
States receive little benefit from conservation measures that improve the status of
bigeye stocks, while bearing a conservation burden if such measures include limitations
on purse seine fleet activities. In the context of WCPFC negotiations, these States have
an immediate interest in minimising application to purse seine fleets and maximising
the conservation burden on other gears that catch bigeye.

USA, Japan, Philippines, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei, Korea, China, Marshall Islands,
Vanuatu and Federated States of Micronesia simultaneously have a positive and
negative interest in bigeye to varying degrees. Given these potentially conflicting
interests, these States may experience internal tensions as they negotiate and determine
their national interest. Regardless of their ultimate interpretation of their national
interest, these States will have some form of interest in bigeye conservation and
management and are likely to engage substantially in WCPFC negotiations in order to
negotiate an outcome that best meets their mixed interests.
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Finally, Fiji, Australia and Palau have solely positive interests in bigeye. These States
have an interest in supporting conservation measures that ensure the sustainability of
bigeye stocks while maximising the conservation burden on to the purse seine fleets.

7.2.3

Yellowfin

The yellowfin fishery is dominated by communities from the Philippines, and to a much
lesser extent, 12 other States. Vessels from these States caught 98% of yellowfin in the
WCPO in 2008, valued at approximately US$1.392 billion. Eight coastal States
received licensing and access benefits for 84% of all WCPO yellowfin catches (equal to
96% of all catches from within waters under national jurisdiction), worth approximately
US$1.193 billion. Figure 28 lists these States in order of the value of their catch and
charts the significance of their interest.840

Figure 28: Value of Largest Yellowfin Catches in 2008 by State
State
Philippines
Papua New Guinea
Indonesia
Chinese Taipei
Japan
Korea
Kiribati
USA (except A. Samoa)
China
Fed. States of Micronesia
Solomon Islands
Vanuatu
Marshall Islands
European Union (Spain)
Nauru

US$ Value Flag State Catch
340,530,336
112,834,423
192,429,035
187,630,737
181,192,191
159,258,606
11,148,171
67,995,358
54,936,363
6,012,122
16,044,930
17,572,115
8,495,407
9,026,181
No vessels

US$ Value Coastal State Catch
314,764,886
228,073,153
193,853,160
29,667,801
57,822,823
No reports
137,991,986
6,559,487
No reports
39,618,627
38,176,262
5,295,851
11,505,128
Non-coastal State
19,950,942

840

All of these States are WCPFC members, except Indonesia which was a MHLC participant and is a cooperating non-member.
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Flag State Percentage of Total Yellowfin Catch

Coastal State Percentage

Yellowfin is targeted by longline and purse seine. This can have significant
ramifications for the value of the catch due to the substantially lower prices for purse
seine (for canning) compared with longline (for fresh and frozen products). For
example, while China catches almost half the tonnage of the USA, it has a far higher
proportion of longline catch and therefore the value of its entire yellowfin catch is only
slightly less than that enjoyed by the USA (which is predominantly a purse seine catch).
Figure 29 demonstrates that all of the States with a significant interest in yellowfin
report some catch (generally the majority) by purse seine, while the most significant
States (Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei, Japan, Korea,
China) also have some proportion of catch by longline. Philippines, Indonesia and Japan
also have significant catches by other artisanal gears and pole and line vessels.
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Figure 29: Yellowfin Catch by Gear
2008 Flag State
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The WCPFC conservation measure for bigeye and yellowfin, CMM2008-01, impacts on
purse seine and longline fisheries that catch yellowfin. Given that yellowfin is targeted
by multiple gears and fully fished, it presents many of the associated flag and coastal
States with a conundrum. The States involved all have a significant interest in
maximising their continued catch of yellowfin, while limiting their share of the
necessary conservation burden given the fully fished status of the stock and the likely
need to reduce fishing mortality sometime in the near future. The situation is further
complicated because purse seine catches of yellowfin are not as closely associated with
FADs (such as with bigeye) and therefore cannot be easily addressed through FAD
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prohibitions. This directly connects any conservation approach to the skipjack purse
seine fishery. Given that this raises potentially conflicting interests between longline
and purse seine fleets, these States are likely to experience internal tensions as they
negotiate and determine their national interest. Regardless of their ultimate
interpretation of their national interest, these States will have some form of interest in
yellowfin conservation and management measures and are likely to engage substantially
in WCPFC negotiations in order to negotiate an outcome that best meets their mixed
interests.
The Philippines has the most significant interest in yellowfin. Vessels flagged to the
Philippines caught approximately 30% of all WCPO yellowfin in 2008, while the
Philippines treasury benefited from additional coastal State licensing and access revenue
for 28% of all yellowfin catches. Philippine reported catches for yellowfin have
increased dramatically since the WCPF Convention was signed in 2000 (from
approximately 100,000 mt per year to a record in 2008 of 340,000 mt, or 314,000 mt
within its waters under national jurisdiction). However, it is likely that a significant
portion of these increases can be attributed to improved reporting by fishing vessels.
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, European Union (Spain) and Indonesia
have also recorded increasing trends in catches since 2000, although less dramatic.

7.2.4

Interest and Influence – From Skipjack to Bigeye

Analysis of the preceding three sections identifies a core of 14 States that collectively
control almost all fishing activities for the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries (i.e. bigeye,
skipjack and yellowfin). These core 14 States are: China, Chinese Taipei, Federated
States of Micronesia, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Korea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Papua
New Guinea, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and USA. Vessels registered to
eight of these States caught 91% of the total value of the 2008 WCPO tropical tuna
fisheries, while 68% of the value of the fishery was caught within the waters of 10 of
these States (equal to 96% from waters within national jurisdiction).841

841

Estimates vary slightly for percentage of catch (as opposed to value) as the value of high seas catch is higher
due to the higher price paid for bigeye and yellowfin caught by longline over purse seine.
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The pie charts in Figure 30 illustrate the significance and influence of these States. The
charts show the percentage that each State controls of the total value of the tropical tuna
fisheries. This serves as an indicator of the influence that each of these States has over
the management of the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries. For example, the Philippines
controls fishing vessels that caught 15.6% of the total value of these fisheries. The
Philippines also controls access to fishing grounds that produced 14.2% of the total
value of these fisheries.

Figure 30: Core States in the WCPO Tropical Tuna Fisheries
Flag State Percentage of Total Value

Coastal State Percentage

The analysis in the above sections identified the varied interests of each of these core 14
States. This information is vital to understanding the key conservation and management
challenges facing the WCPFC because these States effectively control the fishery and
are ultimately responsible for implementing conservation and management measures.
Each of these core 14 States have a different interest in the fishery: some concerned
with bigeye, some primarily with skipjack, and many to a lesser degree with yellowfin.
A few States have a relatively simple interest, dominated by one species, but most must
balance diverse interests in two or three species. A further complication for some States
occurs where their species interests differ between their coastal State fisheries (domestic
and foreign vessels) and their registered vessels (local and distant water).

For the purposes of this analysis, a State is considered to have a dominant interest when
80% or more of the benefits accruing to its communities derive from a single species or
gear. A strong interest is considered to be between 50% and 80%, and a moderate
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interest is considered to be between 10% and 50%. Anything less than 10% is
considered to be a minimal interest.
Seven of the core States can be loosely referred to as „skipjack States‟. Each of these are
primarily coastal States with less significant vessel registry interests (i.e. fishing in their
coastal waters returns more benefit than fishing by their flagged vessels). The exception
within this group is the Marshall Islands with a significant fleet that returns more
benefit than the fisheries within its EEZ. Tuvalu has a straightforward interest that is
dominated by skipjack, with a minimal interest in yellowfin and a negative interest in
bigeye. Nauru, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Marshall Islands and the Solomon Islands
have a strong interest in skipjack but also have a moderate interest in yellowfin, and a
negative interest in bigeye. Federated States of Micronesia has a strong interest in
skipjack, but also has moderate interests in yellowfin and bigeye.

The remaining seven States all have mixed interests to varying degrees in each of the
three species. Each of these States is a core flag State, while five of these also have
significant coastal State catches. China is evenly split as a flag State with moderate
interests in bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin. Korea and Indonesia have strong skipjack
interests balanced with moderate bigeye and yellowfin interests. The Philippines has a
strong skipjack interest balanced with a moderate yellowfin interest. Chinese Taipei,
Japan and the USA all experience significant differences between their coastal interests
and their flag State interests. The USA has a strong bigeye interest within its coastal
waters, but its flag State interests are strongly skipjack. Chinese Taipei is dominated by
yellowfin interests within its coastal waters, while its flag State interests are more
evenly balanced between skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye. Japanese interests are fairly
evenly spread between the three species, favouring skipjack as a flag State and bigeye
as a coastal State.

Figure 31 illustrates these species interests for each of the 32 States and Territories that
reported catches for 2008. The percentage of interest in each species is charted
horizontally and is based on the value of the catch taken by the State‟s registered vessels
(Flag) or taken within its waters under national jurisdiction (EEZ).
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Figure 31: Scale of Interests from Skipjack to Bigeye
Belize Flag
Tonga Flag
Tonga EEZ
New Cal. Flag
New Cal. EEZ
Australia Flag
Australia EEZ
Wallis/Futuna EEZ
Samoa Flag
Samoa EEZ
Niue Flag
Niue EEZ
Fiji Flag
Fiji EEZ
Cook Islands Flag
Cook Islands EEZ
Palau EEZ
French Poly. Flag
French Poly. EEZ
China Flag
Taiwan Flag
Taiwan EEZ
Korea Flag
Philippines Flag
Philippines EEZ
Indonesia Flag
Indonesia EEZ
Flag State Avge
Japan Flag
Japan EEZ
Amer. Samoa EEZ
Coastal State Avge.
Kiribati Flag
Kiribati EEZ
Vanuatu Flag
Vanuatu EEZ
Ecuador Flag
Spain Flag
El Salvador Flag
USA Terr. Flag
USA Terr. EEZ
FSM Flag
FSM EEZ
PNG Flag
PNG EEZ
RMI Flag
RMI EEZ
Nauru EEZ
Sol. Islands Flag
Sol. Islands EEZ
Tuvalu EEZ
Tokelau EEZ
New Zealand Flag
New Zealand EEZ
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Figure 31 demonstrates the influence of skipjack: the most valuable fishery. While
skipjack may be the least valuable in price per tonne, the sheer size of its stock and the
strong market demand for canning has made this species the most influential interest.
Figure 31 reveals that on average, flag States have a strong interest in skipjack and only
a moderate interest in yellowfin and bigeye. Coastal States, on average, have a strong
interest in skipjack, a moderate interest in yellowfin and a minimal interest in bigeye.
Significantly, skipjack is the dominant or strongest interest for most of the core 14
States. With the exception of Palau, the States at the top of the chart, who are dominated
by bigeye or yellowfin interests, are not core States and are located outside the most
productive 10º to 10º degree equatorial zone.

Consequently, it is reasonable to surmise that skipjack is the most influential interest. It
is the most widely held interest within the core 14 States who control the WCPO
tropical tuna fisheries, and a significant interest among the WCPFC membership.

Interests in bigeye are less influential as they are complicated and diluted by three
factors. First, bigeye is worth less in overall value and provides less benefit, therefore
less States have an immediate interest in its overall conservation. Second, almost all
States with a significant interest in bigeye, have a more significant competing interest in
skipjack. Third, longline fishers have historically reported much of their bigeye catch as
originating from the high seas (see forthcoming discussion in Section 7.3.3 and Figure
38). Given that there appears to be no biological or oceanographic reason for why
longline fishing in high seas would be more productive than inside EEZs, it is
reasonable to assume that these activities were reported as occurring on the high seas to
reduce the costs of paying license fees to coastal States.842 Regardless of whether these
reports accurately reflect the location of the fishing activity, the effect of this high seas
focus is that there is very little incentive for coastal States to bear a significant
conservation burden for bigeye. As demonstrated in Figure 25, coastal States on average
have a minimal interest in bigeye.

842

In 2009, the FFA commissioned a series of studies relating to monitoring, control and surveillance. These
studies prioritised misreporting of catch by fishing vessels as one of the most significant challenges risks to the
management of the WCPO tuna fisheries. D. Soutar, Q. Hanich, et al. (2009) Safeguarding the Stocks: A
Report on Analytical Projects to Support the Development of a Regional MCS Strategy for Pacific Oceanic
Fisheries. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. p11.
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7.3

Gear

The next four sections (7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.3.3 and 7.3.4) analyse the direct interests that
each participating State and territory has in purse seine (with or without FADs),
longline and multiple gears. Some communities within each State may benefit more
from one gear than another. A State with communities that benefit significantly from a
specific gear will have an interest in ensuring that its communities can maximise their
benefit from that activity with minimal limitation or cost, with perhaps little concern for
impacts on other gears. The following sections analyse catches by gear and identify
States that have a particular interest in purse seine or longline and those States that have
a mixed interest across multiple gears. The analysis concludes with an analytical scale
in Section 7.2.4 that grades the interests of participating States from purse seine to
longline, and discusses their likely influence on negotiating positions.

7.3.1

Purse Seine

In 2008, the purse seine fishery was dominated by vessels flagged to seven of the core
14 States. Vessels flagged to these States caught 89% of all purse seine catches, valued
at approximately $US2.935 billion. Most of this fishing activity (approximately 81%)
occurred within the equatorial waters of 10 of the core 14 States returning catches
valued at approximately $US2.52 billion. Figure 32 lists these States and charts the
significance of their interest.

Page | 244

Figure 32: Value of Largest Purse Seine Catches in 2008 by State
State
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Indonesia
Kiribati
Japan
Korea
USA
Chinese Taipei
Solomon Islands
Fed. States of Micronesia
Nauru
China
Tuvalu
Marshall Islands

US$ Value Flag State Catch
353,676,837
472,835,979
353,607,196
10,062,677
417,345,453
434,287,649
353,742,494
353,155,753
26,741,121
31,208,019
No reported activity
96,436,919
No reported activity
56,690,991

Flag State Percentage of Total Purse Seine Catch

US$ Value Coastal State Catch
881,014,673
384,435,648
354,838,967
362,689,438
35,815,720
No reports
2,099,019
No reported activity
178,134,532
165,345,063
100,211,347
No reports
62,717,245
30,717,543
Coastal State Percentage

Purse seine catches and vessel numbers have fluctuated significantly by fleet since the
signature of the WCPF Convention in 2000. Historically, most WCPO purse seine catch
has been taken by vessels flagged to Japan, Korea, Chinese Taipei and the USA.843 This
collective distant water fleet declined to 111 vessels in 2006 and then increased to 130
vessels in 2008. This fluctuation was largely within the USA fleet. In 2000, the USA
fleet was part-way through a steady decline to a low of 13 purse seiners in 2007, and
then dramatically increased back to 32 purse seiners in 2008.844 Meanwhile the Chinese
843

P. Williams and P. Terawasi. (2009) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
Including Economic Conditions in 2008. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the Commission
for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific.
Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p3.
844
The USA fleet reached its height of 49 purse seine vessels in 1994 and was down to 33 vessels in 2000. It
has since increased to 38 in 2009. P. Williams and P. Terawasi. (2010) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Including Economic Conditions in 2009. Sixth Regular Session of the
Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Nuku'alofa Tonga, 10 - 19
August. WCPFC. p3. -- P. Williams and P. Terawasi. (2009) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and
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Taipei fleet declined from a height of 42 purse seiners in 2000 to a 2008 fleet of 34
purse seine vessels. The Korean and Japanese fleets numbered 28 and 36 purse seine
vessels respectively in 2008. Figure 33 illustrates these fluctuations.
Figure 33: Historical Trends in Purse Seine Fisheries: 2000 - 2008
Key Flag States
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Philippines

111,634
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194,898

220,580

Indonesia

132,143
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139,198

168,223

181,833

204,781

208,384

207,381
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133,223

260,546
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80,562

101,379

207,488

167,581

168,887

206,067

4,751

32,533

9,027

52,615
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81,715

220,463

145,544
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93,857

Nauru
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62,145

128,981

21,285

68,886

51,592

58,547

67,047

57,780

Tuvalu

41,608

23,105

29,784

3,757

20,581

15,351

15,204

44,351
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RMI

34,321

62,563
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20,340

23,058
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Sols. Islds

Central Pacific Ocean, Including Economic Conditions in 2008. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee of the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the
Western and Central Pacific. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p3.
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Significant increases in purse seine catches have also occurred in fleets registered in
Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and the Philippines, with increases in purse seine catches
of 200%, 63% and 84% respectively. The most dramatic increase occurred in Papua
New Guinea where the number of purse seine vessels rose from 20 vessels in 2000 to a
fleet of 41 purse seiners in 2008.845 Similarly, it appears that there have been significant
increasing trends in purse seine catches within the waters of Papua New Guinea,
Indonesia and Philippines since 2000. However, as noted above in regard to Philippines
and Indonesian catches, it is likely that a significant portion of these increases can be
attributed to improved reporting by fishing vessels. There are significant fluctuations in
the location of purse seine catches that heavily influence the interests of coastal States.
These fluctuations are largely driven by movements in the western equatorial warm pool
as it migrates east and west in phase with El Nino and La Nina events.846 These
fluctuations particularly affect purse seine fisheries in the central Pacific Ocean which
benefit strongly from El Nino events. For example, in 2002/2003 the region experienced
a strong El Nino period which drove purse seining into the central Pacific, dramatically
increasing the benefits for Kiribati from access and licensing fees for 351,067 mt (see
Figure 35). In reverse, the WCPO was dominated by a La Nina state in 2008 which
influenced purse seine fleets to focus activities in the western Pacific, benefitting the
coastal States of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and the Federated States of
Micronesia.

The question of where purse seine fleets actually fish is also influenced by the distant
water nature of the purse seine fishery and its dependence upon access agreements for
fishing in waters under national jurisdiction where the bulk of the fishery is located. The
two most flexible access agreements in this regard are the USA multilateral access
agreement847 and the FSM Arrangement.848 Specified vessels that are flagged to the

845

P. Williams and P. Terawasi. (2009) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
Including Economic Conditions in 2008. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the Commission
for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific.
Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p3. -- SPC. (2009) Tuna Fishery Yearbook: Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. WCPFC. p137.
846
See Section 5.2.2 for further discussion.
847
Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the
United States (USMLT). Opened for signature 2 April 1987. Entered into force 15 June 1988. International
Legal Materials, vol. 26. 1987.
848
FSM Arangement for Regional Fisheries Access (FSM Arrangement). Opened for signature 1995. Pohnpei,
Federated States of Micronesia. Available at http://www.ffa.int/node/30#attachments. 1995.
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USA or States that are party to the FSM Arrangement can fish across multiple EEZs
across the region under one umbrella agreement.

While 14 flag and coastal States dominate the purse seine fishery, their interests are not
necessarily dominated by purse seine fleets. The sheer size of their tuna interests mean
that purse seine is but one part. Among these core States, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati,
USA, Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands, Nauru and Tuvalu, have
dominant purse seine interests where greater than 80% of the value of the fishery
derives from purse seine vessels. Five other „non-core‟ States and territories also have
dominant purse seine interests: New Zealand, European Union (Spain), El Salvador,
Ecuador and Tokelau. Figures 34 demonstrates the dominance of purse seine interest
within these 12 States in regard to catches of skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye.

Figure 34: States with Purse Seine Interests
Flag States (Value of Catch in 2008)
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The challenge for these 12 „purse seine States‟ is that their fisheries give them little
incentive to support any measure that places a conservation burden on purse seine fleets,
from which other fleets will benefit. As identified in Section 7.2.3, only two of these
States have any positive interest in bigeye (USA and the Federated States of
Micronesia). For the remainder, bigeye presents a management challenge that provides
no immediate benefit through fishing revenue. The nature of this challenge is largely
dependent upon the fishing behaviour of their fleets, or the fleets that fish their waters,
and the degree to which they set on associated schools and use FADs.

The Marshall Islands has a dominant interest in purse seine as a flag State, but this is
balanced with broader interests within its coastal fisheries. These interests are discussed
further in Section 7.3.3. The remainder of the core States also have a strong or moderate
interest in purse seine fishing, but this is complicated by simultaneous interests in other
gears. These multiple interests are analysed further in Section 7.3.3.

Consequently, these States are likely to receive little benefit from conservation
measures that improve the stock status of bigeye and therefore increase the profitability
of longline fleets. However, they do have an interest in ensuring the long term
sustainability of yellowfin given that this provides significant value to the purse seine
fleets. While there may be other interests to consider, from the point of view of fishing
fleet interests, they have an immediate interest in minimising the application of bigeye
and yellowfin conservation measures to purse seine fleets and maximising the
application to other gears – or to seek exemptions or allowances for their own purse
seine activities as has been achieved by New Zealand, USA and developing States more
broadly.849 Furthermore, these 12 purse seine States would likely receive little benefit
from measures to boost the economic yield of the overall WCPO tuna fisheries through
blanket reductions in capacity and effort. As discussed in Chapter Two, bioeconomic
modelling has suggested that reductions in fishing effort would maximise the benefits
available from the WCPO tuna fisheries. However, these 12 States would largely miss

849

See footnote two of paragraph 10 of CMM2008-01 regarding the allowance for New Zealand to limit its
effort to its best year (rather than the average of 2001-2004 or 2004 levels). Paragraph 7 prescribes the
allowance for the USA purse seine fleet to be limited to the maximum allowed vessel numbers under the USA
access treaty, (rather than its maximum actual effort for 2001-2004 or 2004 levels). Paragraph 6 exempts small
island developing States.
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out on these benefits as they would primarily go to longline fleets with only small
increases to States with primary interests in purse seine fleets.

7.3.3

Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs)

Chapters Two and Six discussed the increasing use of FADs and logs within the purse
seine fishery and their impacts on the WCPO fisheries, particularly juvenile bigeye. Not
all States with purse seine interests share the same interest in defending purse seine sets
on FADs or floating logs. As demonstrated in Figure 35, some States have significantly
less interest in purse seine sets on FADs or floating logs.
Figure 35: Use of FADs by Flag and Coastal States850
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Figure 36 was created by the author based on data provided in Excel form by the SPC Oceanic Fisheries
Programme. Data was emailed to the author on 20 November 2010 by Peter Williams.
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For example, Korea has a notably lower interest in FAD or log sets as its registered
vessels primarily set on unassociated schools of tuna. Korean registered vessels only set
on FADs or floating logs 23% of the time between 2002 and 2008. Consequently, a
conservation measure that proposes a FAD prohibition to address overfishing of
juvenile bigeye will have less impact on Korean interests than a generalised limit on
purse seine effort. Alternatively, fleets from European Union (Spain), Latin America,
Solomon Islands, New Zealand and the Marshall Islands primarily set on FADs and
floating logs. The flag States for these vessels may consider a generalised limit on purse
seine effort to impact on their interests less significantly than a prohibition on the use of
FADs.

Similar questions arise for coastal States, although there is less differentiation between
each State‟s interests. FAD and log sets account for 40 to 70% of all purse seine sets
within the EEZs of Pacific island tropical coastal States. These States will have an
interest in FAD sets and will need to carefully consider which will have a greater impact
on their interests: FAD prohibitions or purse seine effort limits.

In conclusion, some States with an interest in purse seine fisheries, but minimal interest
in FADs, may support FAD prohibitions over generalised purse seine effort limits.

7.3.3

Longline

The longline fishery includes a large and diverse collection of fleets with distinct subcategories. This section focuses on those vessels that catch significant amounts of
bigeye and yellowfin and operate throughout the tropical region. Other longline fleets
target albacore and swordfish, sometimes with small bycatches of bigeye and yellowfin.
Some of these fleets comprise distant water vessels from Chinese Taipei, China,
European Union (Spain) and Vanuatu while others operate from Pacific island home
ports in American Samoa, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.851

851

SPC. (2009) Tuna Fishery Yearbook: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Pohnpei,
Federated States of Micronesia. WCPFCP. Williams and P. Terawasi. (2010) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Including Economic Conditions in 2009. Sixth Regular Session of the
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Longline fleets that target bigeye and yellowfin include tropical locally based (offshore)
longliners and distant water longliners. Both of these fleets target bigeye and yellowfin
for fresh or frozen sashimi. The „offshore‟ fleet comprises: Chinese Taipei vessels based
in Chinese Taipei, Federated States of Micronesia, Guam and the Philippines; Chinese
vessels based in Federated States of Micronesia; and domestic fleets based in Palau,
Indonesia, Philippines, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vietnam. Domestic longliners also operate out of
Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Hawaii and target different species, including bigeye
and yellowfin at times, depending on markets and seasons. Smaller vessels operating
out of Indonesia, Philippines and Papua New Guinea often fish around anchored FADs
and target yellowfin. The tropical distant water longline fleet primarily operates in the
Central Pacific and Eastern Pacific Ocean and comprises vessels from Chinese Taipei,
China, Japan, Korea and Vanuatu.

The longline fisheries for bigeye and yellowfin are dominated by a small number of flag
States, while the location of fishing effort is more evenly distributed. In 2008, 91% of
all longline catches of bigeye and yellowfin were taken by vessels registered in only
seven States. Much of this was by large-scale distant water longliners.852 Figure 36 lists
these States and charts the significance of their interest.853

Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Nuku'alofa Tonga, 10 - 19
August. WCPFC.
852
P. Williams and P. Terawasi. (2009) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
Including Economic Conditions in 2008. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the Commission
for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific.
Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p22.
853
All of these States are WCPFC members, except Indonesia which was a MHLC participant and is a cooperating non-member.
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Figure 36: Value of Largest Longline Catches in 2008 by State
State
Japan
Chinese Taipei
Korea
Indonesia
China
Philippines
USA
Fiji
Australia
Papua New Guinea
Palau
Marshall Islands

US$ Value Flag State Catch
320,189,782
255,196,613
188,839,103
183,021,670
106,523,876
48,617,116
47,650,163

US$ Value Coastal State Catch
129,825,052

26,307,054
20,788,426
18,490,658
No reported activity
3,779,196

Flag State Percentage of Longline Catch of Tropical Tuna

32,370,192
No reports
185,690,932
No reports
61,613,835
22,235,080
18,831,623
20,529,375
19,913,203
23,927,216
20,647,626

Coastal State Percentage

Figure 36 also demonstrates the significance of the high seas focus for longline
fisheries. Only 48% of longline fishing for bigeye and yellowfin occurred within waters
under national jurisdiction. This was largely distributed throughout the following 10
coastal States: Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Chinese Taipei, Palau, USA territories,
Papua New Guinea, Australia, Fiji and the Marshall Islands.

Despite overfishing concerns regarding bigeye and yellowfin, Figure 37 demonstrates
that longline catches of these species have remained generally consistent since 2000.
The most dramatic change since then has been the substantial increase in Indonesian
longline catches of bigeye and yellowfin. Another significant change is the doubling of
bigeye catch since 2000 by vessels flagged to Chinese Taipei. This appears to have been
partly due to a shift in focus by Chinese Taipei distant water longliners from albacore to
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bigeye; although it seems that reductions in vessel numbers have reduced the
significance of this component.854

Figure 37: Historical Trends in Longline Fisheries: 2000 - 2008
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7,854
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711
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While the longline fishery for bigeye and yellowfin is dominated by seven of the core
14 States, it does not follow that the fishing interests of these States are necessarily
dominated by longline fleets. Their significant engagement in purse seine fisheries, and
the sheer size of their tuna interests, mean that the longline fleets are but one interest
among many. None of these States could be described as a „longline State‟ as none of
them have dominant longline interests where greater than 80% of the value of the
fishery derives from longline fleets. While each of these seven States have a strong or
moderate interest in longline fishing, this is complicated by simultaneous interests in
other gears. These multiple interests are analysed further in Section 7.3.4.

854

P. Williams and P. Terawasi. (2009) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
Including Economic Conditions in 2008. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the Commission
for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific.
Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p21.
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Three of the smaller States identified above (Fiji, Australia and Palau) do have
significant interests in longline to the extent that these States could be referred to as
longline States. Figure 38 demonstrates that greater than 80% of the value of catches by
Australian and Fijian registered vessels derive from longliners, as do catches from their
coastal waters.

Figure 38: States with Longline Interests
Flag States (Value of Catch in 2008)
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Eight other Pacific island States and territories with strong albacore interests could be
identified as „longline‟ States. These States and territories are: French Polynesia,
Samoa, Cook Islands, New Caledonia, Tonga, Niue, Wallis and Futuna and American
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Samoa (see Figure 38). In additional, Belize (an open registry for distant water fishing
vessels) is solely a longline State with vessels that target bigeye and yellowfin.

The USA territories, Chinese Taipei and Vanuatu all have dominant longline interests
for their coastal waters but the value of these interests are far overwhelmed by their flag
States‟ interests in other gears. For example, the value of catch by the dominant gear
within the USA registry (purse seine vessels) was $US414 million in 2008, while the
value of the dominant gear (longline) for the coastal waters of its territories was only
$US36 million.

The challenge for the 11 longline States is that their dominant fishing interest is in fleets
that are overfishing the target species from which many of them benefit. From the point
of view of a fishing interest alone, longline States stand to lose significantly if no action
is taken, unlike the purse seine States who will lose little if bigeye were to decline
further (but will lose something more if yellowfin were to also decline significantly).

Palau is overwhelmingly dependent upon longline catches of bigeye and yellowfin. In
2008, over 60% of the value of Palau fisheries was derived from longline bigeye
catches. Despite this, Palau only accounted for 2% of all bigeye longline catches.
Consequently, Palau has a dominant interest in rebuilding the bigeye stock and
preventing further overfishing of yellowfin, while minimising the impact on its longline
fisheries. This is particularly problematic for Palau as most of this fishing activity is
undertaken by foreign vessels and therefore the fleets that fish within Palau waters do
not enjoy developing State exemptions. Australia, Fiji and the other eight longline states
have varying interests in bigeye and yellowfin, but also have significant interests in
albacore and swordfish that mitigate their dependence upon bigeye and yellowfin.

While the fishing interests of these States are dominated by longline, they do not
dominate the longline fishery and have little impact on the fishery overall.
Consequently, a key concern for these longline States is that the long term value of their
longline interest depends upon the actions of 14 other States. Ultimately, the future of
the longline fishery for bigeye, and to a lesser extent yellowfin, depends upon the
adoption and implementation of conservation measures by those States with the largest
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longline catches (Japan, Chinese Taipei, Korea, Indonesia and China) and those States
with the largest purse seine bycatch of bigeye (USA, European Union (Spain), Japan,
Philippines, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Ecuador, El Salvador, New Zealand,
Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, Korea, China, Marshall
Islands, Vanuatu and Federated States of Micronesia).

In conclusion, the 11 longline States have a clear interest in supporting conservation
measures that eliminate overfishing of bigeye and yellowfin and rebuild bigeye stocks
to more profitable levels. In doing so, these States would favour measures that eliminate
purse seine impacts and focus longline reductions on those States with the largest
longline catches. Finally, while these longline States do not dominate the longline
fishery, they would stand to gain from measures to boost the economic yield of the
fishery through blanket reductions in capacity and effort.855

7.3.4

Multiple Gears

The preceding sections identified 14 core States that collectively dominate the purse
seine and/or longline fisheries and 23 States with fishing interests that are dominated by
purse seine or longline interests (i.e. greater than 80% of the value of the benefits to
these States derive from one or the other gear). An important insight from the above
analysis is that of the core 14 States that collectively control the WCPO tuna fisheries,
seven are dominated by purse seine interests, yet none are dominated by longline
interests. The remaining seven States are not dominated by one or the other gear, as they
are for almost all the remaining States with smaller catches. These seven States have
fishing interests across multiple gears, mostly longline and purse seine but also some
pole and line and other artisanal gears. They are: Japan, Philippines, Indonesia, Chinese
Taipei, Korea, China and Marshall Islands. Figure 39 illustrates their mixed interests,
demonstrating significant interests in purse seine, longline, pole and line and other
gears.

855

See Chapter Two for further discussion.

Page | 257

Figure 39: States with Mixed Interests Across Multiple Gears
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Purse Seine

Longline

Pole and Line

Troll

Other Gears

1,200,000,000

1,000,000,000

800,000,000

600,000,000

400,000,000

200,000,000

Japan

Philippines

Indonesia

Taiwan

Korea

China

Vanuatu

Kiribati

Coastal States (Value of Catch in 2008)
Purse Seine

Longline

Pole and Line

Troll

Other Gears

$800,000,000.00
$700,000,000.00
$600,000,000.00
$500,000,000.00
$400,000,000.00
$300,000,000.00
$200,000,000.00
$100,000,000.00
$0.00
Philippines

Indonesia

Japan

Marshall Islands

Fr. Polynesia

Amer. Samoa

Japan has interests across multiple gears, both within its coastal waters and its registered
fleet. Similarly, so too do Indonesia and the Philippines. Chinese Taipei, Korea and
China have interests across multiple gears throughout their registered fleet. Of these
three, only Chinese Taipei reports coastal catches and these are overwhelmingly
dominated by longline but are less than 10% of the catch by its registered fleet.
Marshall Island‟s interests within coastal waters are balanced between purse seine and
longline interests, while its equally large interests in its registered fleet are dominated
by purse seine vessels. As discussed previously, the fishing interests of Kiribati are
dominated by the large catches taken by purse seine within its waters. However, its
registered fleet is far more diverse and includes a large proportion of catch by other
artisanal gears. Although, this non-purse seine catch is less than 10% of the catch
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reported from its coastal waters, hence its dominant purse seine interest. While the value
of the catch taken by its fleet is significantly less than the value of the catch harvested
from its waters, it may raise some important domestic national interest questions for
consideration.

All of these seven States have strong interests in longline and purse seine fisheries.
Consequently, they must balance the costs and benefits of different conservation
measures across their own domestic interests when considering how best to address
conservation challenges. These tensions are further complicated by broader interests
held by Indonesia, Philippines and Japan in other gears. Each of these States effectively
present a microcosm of the regional tensions between longline and purse seine interests
when considering how best to address overfishing of bigeye and yellowfin.

In addition, other States and territories with less significant catches have fishing
interests across multiple gears. These include: French Polynesia, American Samoa,
Vanuatu and Marshall Islands. French Polynesia and American Samoa have mixed
interests in their coastal fisheries. Vanuatu has mixed interests in its registered fleet,
whereas its coastal fisheries are dominated by longline interests. These multiple and
mixed interests give the Marshall Islands and Vanuatu some challenging domestic
issues to consider when determining their overall national interest.

In summary, 10 States have mixed interests in multiple gears. This includes seven of the
largest and most influential States in the WCPO tuna fisheries that between them
controlled vessels that caught 77% of the value of the WCPO tropical tuna and 34% for
coastal waters in 2008 (see Figure 30).

7.3.5

Interest and Influence – From Longline to Purse Seine

This section synthesises the analysis in previous sections and scales the interests of the
various flag and coastal States from longline to purse seine by proportion of their
benefit. This is presented in Figure 40. The scale places these interests in order of their
influence (not to scale). States with minimal fishing interests have limited influence
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over access to productive waters or control over fishing vessels.856 The scale visualises
where the fishing interests of each State lie, and differentiates between their coastal
State interests („State EEZ‟) and flag State interests („State Flag‟).

For example, Papua New Guinea was identified in Section 7.2.4 as holding the most
valuable coastal waters and the seventh most valuable vessel registry (in terms of
catches of skipjack, bigeye and yellowfin). In 2008, 98% of the value of Papua New
Guinean coastal tuna fisheries was caught by purse seine, while purse seiners accounted
for 95% of the value of catches by its registered vessels. Consequently, both Papua New
Guinea‟s EEZ and Papua New Guinea‟s Flag are circled within the „High Value Purse
Seine States.‟

In some cases, a coastal State will be identified as influential (i.e. Kiribati) in regard to
its EEZ where significant catches occur, but will be identified as of limited influence in
regard to its flag due to the minimal catch of its registered vessels.

856

These values include albacore catches for the purpose of accurately assessing the overall interest in longline
fleets.
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Figure 40: Scale of Interests from Longline to Purse Seine
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100%

7.4

Conclusion

The analysis presented above demonstrates yet again the complex and inter-meshed
nature of the WCPO tuna fisheries. While the fishery is dominated by 14 core States,
each of these core 14 States have a different interest in the fishery: many primarily with
skipjack, some moderately with bigeye, and some with yellowfin.

Figures 31 and 40 synthesised the analysis and charted the interests in relation to
species and gear. They revealed that most States must balance diverse interests.
However, in the context of bigeye conservation, they demonstrate the dominance of
skipjack. Seven of the core States can be loosely referred to as „skipjack States‟. The
remaining seven States all have mixed interests to varying degrees in each of the three
species, but none have more than moderate interests in bigeye.

Similarly, the analysis demonstrated the strength of purse seine interests and the relative
weakness of longline interests. Few of the core 14 States have a strong interest in the
longline fleets. Those States that do have an overwhelming interest in longline are
largely side-players in the tropical tuna fisheries and are primarily involved in the
temperate albacore fisheries.

In conclusion, Chapter Seven shows that ultimately, there are a handful of States that
control access to the WCPO tuna fisheries and have the power to manage the interests
involved. These core 14 States control the most productive waters and the vessels that
fish in these waters. Putting aside the question of their international obligations, all of
these States have a vested interest to some degree in the long term sustainability of
some part of the fishery. However, the analysis demonstrates that a key challenge for
the WCPFC is that there is no straightforward interest among these 14 States to resolve
the current overfishing of bigeye. Each of these States has a dominant or strong interest
in purse seine fisheries for skipjack that complicates any interest in conserving bigeye.
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Chapter Eight: Interest and Influence in Access, Vessels and
Markets

Sovereign nations jealously guard their sovereignty. The first instinct of most
governments in the international arena is to protect and promote their own
national interests.

Ambassador David Balton
US Department of State857

8.1

Introduction

This chapter continues the analysis of tuna interests that may influence WCPFC
conservation and management measures.858 As with Chapter Seven, the purpose of this
analysis is to answer two research questions: what interests do WCPFC members have
in the conservation and management of bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack; and how do
these interests influence the WCPFC‟s consideration, negotiation and adoption of
conservation and management measures for bigeye and yellowfin.

The analysis studies three areas of interest and influence. Section 8.2 studies the
interests of the coastal States who control access to the tropical tuna fisheries within
their EEZs and archipelagic waters. Section 8.3 studies the interests of flag States that
register fishing vessels which operate within the WCPO tuna fisheries. Section 8.4
discusses the balance of the interests of coastal and flag States and how they may
influence conservation and management negotiations. Section 8.5 studies the interests
857

D. Balton and D. Zbicz. (2004) Managing Deep-Sea Fisheries: Some Threshold Questions. The
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. 19.3. p248.
858
As with Chapter Seven, unless otherwise indicated, all figures, charts, maps and tables provided in this
Chapter were developed by the author. These figures were generated using excel databases created by the SPC
and FFA. Specific references are only inserted where additional data was used. Some figures include
abbreviations that have not been used in the main text. RMI is Marshall Islands, FSM is Federated States of
Micronesia, PNG is Papua New Guinea. NZ is New Zealand. HS is High Seas. EU is European Union.
References are: P. Williams. (2010) Tuna Fishery Yearbook: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission (Raw Excel Database). Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. SPC. -- P. Terawasi and L.
Rodwell. (2010) Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries (Excel Database). Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA.
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of market States that import significant amounts of tuna from the WCPO and discusses
how these interests may influence conservation and management negotiations.

The analysis identifies 91 States and territories that have some form of existing or
historical interest in the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries (see Appendix Three for a
summary of the interests for each of these 91 States and territories). 859 These 91 States
include: 67 States and territories that have reported some form of vessel activity in the
WCPO tuna fisheries since 1960; 34 States and territories that are located within the
migratory range of the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries;860 and 43 States with markets or
industries that consume or process tropical tuna products from the WCPO tuna fisheries.
Some of these States have multiple interests.

8.2
Coastal States
One of the key factors that differentiate the WCPO tuna fisheries from other tuna
fisheries is that most of the catch is taken from within waters under national jurisdiction.
In 2008, 79% of all reported tropical tuna catches from the WCPO were caught in
waters under national jurisdiction.861 Yellowfin catches from waters under national
jurisdiction totalled 88%, while skipjack was 79% and bigeye was 58%. Much of the
catch is highly concentrated in the equatorial waters of Indonesia, Philippines and the
tropical Pacific island States. Only bigeye is extensively fished beyond these waters.862
Figure 41 demonstrates the dominance of the coastal States over access to the tropical
tuna fisheries and illustrates the most productive fishing grounds (coloured dark blue).

859

For a comprehensive list of references, see Appendix Two.
Coastal States are defined as States with territories inside the WCPFC Statistical Area. This indicates a
coastal State interest as these States may receive licensing revenue from vessels that fish for skipjack, yellowfin
or bigeye tuna. This does not suggest that these States are coastal States for the purposes of WCPFC
membership or application of conservation measures.
861
These percentages vary slightly according to whether the calculation is based upon tonnage or value. As the
majority of longline activity occurs on the high seas, the proportion of fishery taken from the high seas is
higher if calculated by value (27%) than if calculated by tonnage (21%). This is due to the higher price paid for
longline catches of bigeye and yellowfin over purse seine catches.
862
Figure sourced from: SPC. (2009) Status of Tuna Stocks (Powerpoint Presentation). Sixth Regular Session
of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Papeete, French Polynesia, 7-11 December 2010.
WCPFC.
860
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Figure 41: Map of Coastal States’ Interests in Skipjack, Bigeye and Yellowfin863

Fishing fleets depend upon access to these waters for their financial viability. No
surface fishing fleet, distant water or locally based, can profitably operate pole and line
or purse seine vessels without some access to waters under national jurisdiction.864 This
gives coastal States significant influence due to their sovereign rights over the fisheries
within their EEZ, and their sovereignty over fisheries within their territorial seas and
archipelagic waters.

Unlike the migratory distant water fishing fleets that follow the tuna, the coastal States
are permanently fixed in location and cannot transfer their EEZ or archipelagic waters
elsewhere if these fisheries decline. The immobility of their sovereign rights gives them
a special interest in the long term sustainability of these fisheries, particularly for those
who have few other natural resources or development options. As demonstrated in
Chapter Two, the migratory nature of the tuna fisheries ultimately requires these States
to cooperate to ensure the long term sustainability of these stocks. Unrestrained
863

The map was created by the author based on information summarised in Appendix Three. See Appendix
Three for a full list of references. Thanks to Andi Arsana for design assistance.
864
G. Van Santen and P. Muller. (2000) Working Apart or Together: The Case for a Common Approach to
Management of Tuna Resources in Exclusive Economic Zones of Pacific Island Countries. Washington. The
World Bank.
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exploitation in a particular EEZ or on the high seas clearly has the potential to impact
on catches elsewhere, and thus the revenues to be derived from the resource, and the
sustainability of the fishery as a whole.

For the purposes of this analysis, a coastal State or territory is defined as a State or
territory that has waters under its jurisdiction within the migratory range of the tropical
tuna fisheries. This definition is used as it includes all States that have an interest in the
stocks of yellowfin, bigeye and skipjack as they migrate through their waters. However,
due to the ambiguities regarding the western and northern boundaries of the WCPF
Convention Area, not all of these States may be considered coastal States for the
purposes of the WCPFC and the application of conservation and management
measures.865 Similarly, not all of these States report catches of tropical tuna to the
WCPFC. Nevertheless, all of these States have some level of interest in skipjack,
yellowfin and bigeye fisheries within their waters.

This section identifies the interests of coastal States in terms of the 2008 value of the
catch reported from their waters, and the type of gear that was used to catch it. The
analysis uses the value of the tuna as an indicator of the coastal State‟s interest. It is
beyond the scope of this thesis to differentiate between the various access regimes and
domestic involvement in tuna fisheries and assess in detail all the myriad benefits
enjoyed by each coastal States.866 Appendix Three provides a summary of each coastal
State‟s interest.
865

As discussed in Chapter Four, the migratory range of WCPO tropical tuna extend beyond the „understood‟
western boundary of the WCPF Convention into the South China Sea, while the migratory range of skipjack
extends into the Northern Pacific to approximately 45N. This includes some States and territories within the
disputed South China Sea (China, Vietnam, Chinese Taipei) and two States that do not currently report tuna
catches within their coastal waters (Korea and Russia).
866
For example, while access fees from distant water fishing vessels are the principal benefit for many Pacific
island States (estimated at A$78.5 million for all Pacific island EEZs or 4-11% of the value of the catch), some
coastal States also enjoy other benefits from their own domestic fishing vessels, such as crew and onshore
employment, and income revenue. R. Gillett. (2009) Fisheries in the Economies of the Pacific Island Countries
and Territories. Mandaluyong City, Philippines. Asian Development Bank. p329. For further insights into
additional benefits and costs, see: K. Barclay. (2010) Impacts of Tuna Industries on Coastal Communities in
Pacific Island Countries. Marine Policy. 34.3. -- C. A. Vera and Z. Hipolito. (2006) The Philippines Tuna
Industry: A Profile. International Collective in Support of Fishworkers. -- E. Petersen. (2006) Institutional
Economics and Fisheries Management: The Case of Pacific Tuna. Cheltenham. Edward Elgar. -- J. Tamate.
(2003) Access Agreements: South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency. Workshop and Exchange of Views on
Fiscal Reforms for Fisheries to Promote Growth, Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Management. . Rome,
Italy. FAO. -- L. Clarke. (2006) Perspectives on Fisheries Access Agreements: Developing Country Views.
Fishing for Coherence: Proceedings of the Workshop on Policy Coherence for Development. Paris, France,
April 2006. OECD. -- S. Herrick, B. Rader, et al. (1997) Access Fees and Economic Benefits in the Western
Pacific United States Purse Seine Tuna Fishery. Marine Policy. 21.1. -- T. Lewis. (2004) A Review of Current
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8.2.1

Coastal States’ Interest in EEZs

There are 34 coastal States and territories that have an interest in stocks of skipjack,
yellowfin and bigeye as they migrate through their EEZs. 26 of these States and
territories reported catches of tropical tuna from their waters in 2008. These States and
territories are listed in Figure 42. Coastal States and territories that are outside the
„understood‟ WCPF Convention Area are italicised.
Figure 42: Coastal States’ Interests in Skipjack, Bigeye and Yellowfin
List of all Coastal States and Territories within Migratory Range

American Samoa (USA Terr.)
Australia
China
Chinese Taipei
Cook Islands
Federated States of Micronesia
Fiji
French Polynesia (Fr. Terr)
Guam (USA Terr.)
Indonesia
Japan

Kiribati
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Marshall Islands
Mathew and Hunter (Fr. Terr)
Nauru
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Niue
Northern Marianas (USA Terr.)
Palau
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Samoa
Solomon Islands
Russia
Tokelau (NZ Terr.)
Tonga
Tuvalu
USA (Hawaii)
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Wallis and Futuna
(Fr. Terr)
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10 of these States and territories dominate access to the WCPO tuna fisheries. These
States license and control access to 78% of the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries (or 98% of
Access Agreements in Pacific Developing Member Countries (PDMCs). Manila, Philippines. Asian
Development Bank.
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all catches from waters under national jurisdiction). They are: Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Nauru, Federated States of
Micronesia, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands. Figure 43 shows that the interests of these
10 key coastal States are principally in purse seine fisheries for skipjack and yellowfin,
with some interests in longline and other gears. In 2008, these 10 States held exclusive
rights over US$3.55 billion of tropical tuna fisheries in 2008.

In 2008, the purse seine fishery was the dominant interest for the coastal fisheries of
Nauru (100%), Tuvalu (100%), Papua New Guinea (98%), Tokelau (99%), Federated
States of Micronesia (93%), Kiribati (92%) and the Solomon Islands (91%). The
Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati and the Solomon Islands
all have proportionally small longline fisheries within their waters that catch small
amounts of yellowfin and bigeye. Only Federated States of Micronesia has a higher
bigeye catch by longline (i.e. positive interest) than by purse seine (i.e. negative
interest). All of these six States have an immediate interest in minimising the
application of bigeye and yellowfin conservation measures on purse seine fleets or on
waters on national jurisdiction, and are likely to support conservation measures that
focus reductions on high seas and longline fisheries.867

The Marshall Islands, Indonesia, Japan and the Philippines have more challenging
interests as their coastal waters hold mixed interests. In 2008, the purse seine fishing in
the Marshall Island‟s EEZ accounted for 58% of the value of its fishery, while longline
accounted for 39% and pole and line the remaining 2.8%. These mixed interests are
further complicated by its dominant flag State interest in purse seine (94%). The most
significant fisheries in the Japanese EEZ were longline (56%), followed by pole and
line (29%), purse seine (11%), troll (3%) and other gears (1%). Indonesia and the
Philippines favoured purse seine (50% and 53% respectively), and then other gears (8%
and 38%), longline (26% and 8%) and pole and line (15% and 0%). As discussed in
Section 7.3.4, all of these mixed States have a more challenging interest to address.
Regardless of their ultimate interpretation of their national interest, these States will
867

A 2010 Study by the FFA found that the high seas closures should result in a significant increase of the
value of the tropical tuna fishery within the waters of PNA members (i.e. Nauru, Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea,
Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Palau and Marshall Islands). FFA. (2010) Economic
Outlook and Prospects for the Tuna Fisheries FFC74/WP16 Seventy Fourth Meeting of the Forum Fisheries
Committee. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. p12.
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have some form of interest in bigeye and yellowfin conservation and management
measures and are likely to engage substantially in WCPFC negotiations in order to
negotiate a balanced outcome that best meets their mixed interest.

A number of less significant coastal States and territories are dominated by longline
interests. These States are: Australia, Fiji, Palau, French Polynesia, Samoa, Cook
Islands, New Caledonia, Tonga, Niue, Wallis and Futuna and American Samoa.
Furthermore, the USA territories, Vanuatu and Chinese Taipei are all dominated by
longline interests within their coastal waters, although their other flag State interests are
far larger (discussed further in Section 8.4). None of the States above are dominated by
bigeye interests, with only Palau and the USA territories recording strong interests.

While the waters of the longline States are largely peripheral to the tropical tuna
fisheries, these States do have a legitimate interest in the fishery and would benefit from
conservation measures that eliminate purse seine impacts. Furthermore, all of these
States take relatively small longline catches and would benefit from conservation
measures that focus longline reductions on States with the largest longline catches (such
as Japan, China, Chinese Taipei, Korea and the USA).868 Similarly, these longline States
would stand to gain from measures to boost the economic yield of the fishery through
blanket reductions in capacity and effort.869

In summary, 26 out of 34 coastal States and territories reported catches of tropical tuna
from their waters in 2008 (see Figure 42). The efficacy of the WCPFC depends in large
part upon these States implementing conservation measures within their jurisdiction. All
are members or cooperating non-members of the WCPFC and can influence the
negotiation and adoption of conservation measures. Within this group, purse seine
interests dominate, or are the strongest interest for the most productive equatorial
coastal States, while longline interests dominate many of the sub-tropical less
productive coastal States.

868

CMM2008-01 exempts these small longline States from any reductions in bigeye catches, so long as their
total catches of bigeye do not exceed 2,000 mt.
869
See Chapter Two for further discussion.
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8.2.2

Coastal States’ Interests in Archipelagic Waters

Some of the coastal States identified above also control significant areas of archipelagic
waters. Indonesia, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Fiji have all submitted
claims870 for archipelagic Status that are in accordance with the LOSC and broadly
recognised.871 The Solomon Islands is also considered to be an archipelagic State under
the LOSC.872 In accordance with the LOSC, these States are all entitled to claim
sovereignty over substantial archipelagic waters. Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Marshall
Islands have also made declarations873 claiming archipelagic status, but these are
inconsistent with the LOSC and are not shown on regional maps.874

The archipelagic waters of Indonesia, Philippines, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon
Islands include fisheries that catch significant amounts of bigeye and yellowfin. These
archipelagic fisheries have been identified as a conservation and management

870

Indonesia. (2009) Submission in Compliance with the Deposit Obligations Pursuant to the United Nations
Convention
on
the
Law
of
the
Sea
(UNCLOS).
United
Nations.
Available
at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/IDN.htm. Accessed on 6 August
2010. -- Philippines. (2009) Submission in Compliance with the Deposit Obligations Pursuant to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). United Nations. Available at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/PHL.htm. Accessed on 6 August
2010. -- Papua New Guinea. (2002) Submission in Compliance with the Deposit Obligations Pursuant to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). United Nations. Available at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/PNG.htm. Accessed on 6 August
2010. -- Vanuatu. (2010) Submission in Compliance with the Deposit Obligations Pursuant to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). United Nations. Available at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/VUT.htm. Accessed on 6
August 2010. -- Fiji. (2007) Submission in Compliance with the Deposit Obligations Pursuant to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). United Nations. Available at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/FJI.htm. Accessed on 6 August
2010.
871
R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe. (1999) The Law of the Sea. Melland Schill Studies in International Law.
3rd ed. Manchester. Manchester University Press. P122. See also G. Boyles and P. Woodward. South Pacific
Region Maritime Limits Map. (1995). Suva, Fiji. South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission and the FFA.
-- WCPFC Secretariat. Convention Map for the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. (2005). Pohnpei, Federated States of
Micronesia. WCPFC.
872
R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe. (1999) The Law of the Sea. Melland Schill Studies in International Law.
3rd ed. Manchester. Manchester University Press. p122.
873
United Nations Office of Legal Affairs. (2010) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:
Declarations and Reservations. UN Publications. -- R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe. (1999) The Law of the
Sea. Melland Schill Studies in International Law. 3rd ed. Manchester. Manchester University Press. p122.
874
R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe. (1999) The Law of the Sea. Melland Schill Studies in International Law.
3rd ed. Manchester. Manchester University Press. p122 -- WCPFC Secretariat. Convention Map for the
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean. (2005). Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. WCPFC. -- G. Boyles and P. Woodward.
South Pacific Region Maritime Limits Map. (1995). Suva, Fiji. South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission
and the FFA.
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weakness.875 However, as discussed in Chapter Four, archipelagic waters are considered
part of a State‟s territory with different rights and responsibilities than EEZs. While it is
widely acknowledged that tuna fisheries within these waters must be managed to ensure
long term conservation, there are conflicting views over whether the WCPF Convention
applies to archipelagic waters.876

It does not appear that there is enough support within the WCPFC to force the issue
through the WCPFC‟s two chamber voting procedures for contentious decisions (as
discussed in Chapter Five).877 Ultimately, the archipelagic States have an interest in
ensuring that the tuna fisheries are managed sustainably and maximise their benefit.
How these States choose to cooperate with the WCPFC in managing their archipelagic
waters is effectively open to their interpretation. It is conceivable that these States may
875

J. Hampton and S. Harley. (2009) Assessment of the Potential Implications of Application of CMM-2008-01
for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu. WCPFC.
876
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the Philiipines continue to lead arguments within the WCPFC that the
terms of the LOSC, UNFSA and the WCPF Convention limit the jurisdiction of the WCPFC to high seas areas
and EEZs. They argue that internal and archipelagic waters are to be managed at the discretion of the coastal
State. By contrast, the USA argues that the WCPFC applies to archipelagic waters, as well as EEZs and high
seas. Due to some controversy over the issue, in 2008 the Chair of the WCPFC, requested an opinion from the
legal counsel on, among other things, the application or otherwise of the WCPFC to archipelagic waters. The
legal counsel referred to the WCPF Convention, LOSC and UNFSA and suggested that the WCPF Convention
only has application to the high seas and EEZs, and not the internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial
seas, due to qualifications in UNFSA and the WCPF Convention between „sovereign rights‟ and „sovereignty‟.
Nevertheless, the legal counsel noted that in addition to the WCPF Convention, the LOSC and UNFSA, other
principles of international law need to be considered, particularly the principle of „good neighbourliness‟ which
requires that States must act in good faith and ensure that activities in their territories do not cause harm or
affect the interests of other States. Despite this, the USA continued to oppose such an interpretation and argued
that the WCPFC applies to archipelagic waters, as well as EEZs and high seas. Confusingly, the USA
distinguished between territorial seas and archipelagic waters in this regard and contended that territorial seas
remained excluded from the application of the WCPF Convention – therefore supporting a Convention Area
that would include a number of 12 nautical mile wide rings of non-management between „managed‟
archipelagic waters and EEZs. The summary of the legal counsel‟s presentation was recorded in the Draft
Summary Record of the Fifth Session of the WCPFC. However, due to complaints from the USA, the draft
record was subsequently amended to remove this description. In 2009, Papua New Guinea complained about
this amendment, and the process through which it was amended. The author has a copy of the original draft (as
do all WCPFC members). In addition, the Papua New Guinea statement is recorded in the 2009 Summary
Record. For references see: WCPFC. (2008) Summary Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Busan, Korea. WCPFC. -- WCPFC. (2009) Summary Report of the Sixth Regular Session of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Sixth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Tahiti, French Polynesia, 7-11 December 2009. WCPFC. -- Papua New Guinea. (2009)
Independent State of Papua New Guinea Statement of Position on 'Areas Under National Jurisdiction' in the
WCPFC. Sixth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Papeete, French
Polynesia. WCPFC. -- Papua New Guinea. (2009) Papua New Guinea - Statement. Sixth Regular Session of
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Papeete, French Polynesia, 7 - 11 Decembre 2009.
WCPFC.
877
A successful decision would require the support of a majority of the FFA. In 2008, the FFA produced an
internal strategy paper that noted that the WCPF Convention Area does not include internal waters,
archipelagic waters or territorial seas. FFA. (2008) National Jurisdiction. Management Options Consultation.
Apia, Samoa, 20-23 October 2008. FFA.
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argue that the tuna fisheries within their archipelagic waters are more valuable given the
absolute nature of their sovereignty, compared to the lesser „sovereign rights‟ over
fisheries within EEZs, or the shared rights that all States have over fisheries within the
high seas. If these States were to propose such an argument, they may have an interest
in negotiating smaller conservation reductions within their archipelagic waters than
would otherwise apply in EEZs and the high seas.

8.2.3

Coastal States’ Interest in Ports and Transhipments

All catches must inevitably be landed if they are to be sold and consumed. This presents
an opportunity for port States to benefit from landings or in-port transhipments through
government charges and port employment. Additionally, ports serve as a critical
opportunity to inspect vessels and monitor compliance with license conditions and
conservation and management measures.878

In April 1990, the equatorial Pacific islands States collectively agreed to prohibit all atsea transhipments within their EEZs by licensed distant water fishing vessels. This was
subsequently adopted by the FFA to be implemented throughout all FFA member
EEZs.879 The prohibition was adopted, in part to address misreporting of catches
through verification of catch logbooks, and also to generate onshore services and
revenue for Pacific island port States by forcing foreign fishing vessels in to port.880
This prohibition was subsequently incorporated into the WCPF Convention for purse
seine vessels (excepting small group seine vessels).881
878

There has been an increasing recognition of the importance of strong port controls to combat IUU fishing. In
November 2009, the Thirty Sixth Session of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation Conference
approved The Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing. The aim of the Agreement is to prevent illegally caught fish from entering international
markets through ports. The following WCPFC members have signed the Agreement: Australia, European
Union, New Zealand, Indonesia, Samoa and the USA. Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter
and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Port State Agreement). 22 November 2009.
Rome, Italy. 2009.
879
The transhipment prohibition was a component of the Second Arrangement Implementing the Nauru
Agreement Setting Forth Additional Terms and Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties. The
Nauru Agreement and its ramifications for the WCPFC are discussed in detail in Chapter Five. A copy of the
Second Implementing Arrangement is available in Appendix 2 of: M. Lodge. (1992) Minimum Terms and
Conditions of Access: Responsible Fisheries Management Measures in the South Pacific Region. Marine
Policy.
880
S. Tarte. (1999) Report on the Fourth Multilateral High-Level Conference on the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Suva, Fiji. University of the
South Pacific. p13.
881
Article 29. WCPF Convention. See Chapter Five for further discussion and analysis of the WCPF
Convention‟s prohibition on purse seine transhipment at sea.
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The at-sea transhipment prohibition has since caused a dramatic increase in port activity
with some in-port transhipment occurring throughout most FFA member States.882 The
benefits of these port activities can be substantial. Transhipment activities by visiting
distant water fishing vessels can provide US$3,000 to US$6,000 in direct government
revenue per activity (in 2007)883 and US$5,000 to US$10,000 in income to the local
economy (in 1995).884 However, the costs can also be high with significant social
impacts (i.e. prostitution, substance abuse, disease transmission).885 Due to data
limitations, there is currently no simple indicator that can value the significance of a
port to the WCPO tuna fisheries. In this absence, the analysis relies on national reports
and literature to identify ports with a significant interest but does not further assess the
level of their interest.

Most States throughout the region will have some level of tuna landings or
transhipments within their ports, and therefore some level of interest in WCPFC
deliberations on port controls. However, a few States have a significant interest as they
are host to the key ports which appear to handle most landings or transhipments of
unprocessed WCPO tuna. The busiest ports within the Pacific islands region for purse
seine in-port transhipments during the period 2004-2006 were: Pohnpei, Federated
States of Micronesia (889 transhipments); Majuro, Marshall Islands (524); Rabaul,
Papua New Guinea (381); Honiara, Solomon Islands (279); and Tarawa, Kiribati
(187).886

Throughout the broader Asia-Pacific region, the key States that tranship significant
amounts of tuna within their ports are: Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Solomon
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Japan, Fiji,

882

R. Gillett, M. McCoy, et al. (2001) Tuna: A Key Economic Resource in the Pacific Islands. Manila. Asian
Development Bank and Forum Fisheries Agency. p28.
883
R. Gillett. (2009) Fisheries in the Economies of the Pacific Island Countries and Territories. Mandaluyong
City, Philippines. Asian Development Bank.
884
R. Gillett, M. McCoy, et al. (2001) Tuna: A Key Economic Resource in the Pacific Islands. Manila. Asian
Development Bank and Forum Fisheries Agency.
885
K. Barclay. (2010) Impacts of Tuna Industries on Coastal Communities in Pacific Island Countries. Marine
Policy. 34.3.
886
R. Gillett. (2009) Fisheries in the Economies of the Pacific Island Countries and Territories. Mandaluyong
City, Philippines. Asian Development Bank. p332.
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Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, and the USA (American Samoa and Hawaii). 887 This
group of States includes nine of the 14 core States identified in Chapter Seven. These
States have an interest in any conservation and management measures that may require
port States to implement additional regulations and encourage/restrict at-sea
transhipments by WCPO tuna fishing vessels.

8.2.4

Coastal States’ Interests in Food Security and Artisanal Fisheries

Many of the WCPO coastal States are home to coastal communities that depend heavily
upon living marine resources for food security and employment in artisanal fisheries.888
Among the Pacific islands, the tuna fisheries represent an important source of protein.
887

For references and further details on port interests, see: Ibid. p332. -- R. Gillett and C. Lightfoot. (2002)
The Contribution of Fisheries to the Economies of Pacific Island Countries. Manila. Asian Development Bank,
FFA and the World Bank. p28. -- K. Barclay and I. Cartwright. (2007) Capturing Wealth from Tuna: Case
Studies from the Pacific. Canberra, Australia. Asia Pacific Press. (multiple references through Barclay report). - T. Lawson, B. Iskandar, et al. (2007) Report of the Eastern Indonesia Tuna Fishery Data Collection
Workshop. Eastern Indonesia Tuna Fishery Data Collection Workshop. Jakarta, Indonesia, 30-31 January 2007.
WCPFC. (multiple references throughout Lawson report). -- China. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission
Part 1: Information on Fisheries, research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p7. -French Polynesia. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and
Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p5. -- Federated States of Micronesia. (2009)
Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, research and Statistics. Fifth Regular
Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila,
Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. pp14-16. -- Kiribati. (2008) Annual Report to the Commission - Part 1:
Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics Fourth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. WCPFC. pp12. -Republic of the Marshall Islands. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries,
Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. pp14-15. -- Philippines. (2009)
Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular
Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila,
Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. pp11. -- United States of America. (2009) Annual Report to the
Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 20-21 August 2009.
WCPFC. pp21. -- T. Lewis. (2005) The Tuna Fisheries of Vietnam - An Overview of Available Information.
First Meeting of the Scientific Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Noumea,
New Caledonia, 8-19 August 2005. WCPFC. (multiple references through Lewis report). -- C. A. Vera and Z.
Hipolito. (2006) The Philippines Tuna Industry: A Profile. International Collective in Support of Fishworkers.
--P36-38. K. Barclay, H. Parris, et al. (2009) Tuna Trade Flows from The Coral Triangle. Sydney, Australia.
TRAFFIC. pp24-27.
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The definition of artisanal fisheries can vary from region to region and fora to fora. For the purposes of this
thesis, artisanal fisheries are defined as subsistence and small scale commercial fisheries as described in: R.
Gillett. (2004) Global Study of Non-Industrial Tuna Fisheries. Management of Tuna Fishing Capacity:
Conservation and Socio-Economics. Madrid, Spain. FAO. p175. For further details, see: R. Gillett and I.
Cartwright. (2010) The Future of Pacific Island Fisheries. Noumea, New Caledonia. SPC. p1. -- D. Zeller, S.
Booth, et al. (2007) Fisheries Contributions to the Gross Domestic Product: Underestimating Small-Scale
Fisheries in the Pacific. Marine Resource Economics. 21. p369. -- P. Labrosse, J. Ferraris, et al. (2006)
Assessing the Sustainability of Subsistence Fisheries in the Pacific: The Use of Data on Fish Consumption.
Ocean and Coastal Management. 49. p204. -- M. Kronen, A. Vunisea, et al. (2010) Socio-Economic Drivers
and Indicators for Artisanal Coastal Fisheries in Pacific Island Countries and Territories and Their Use for
Fisheries Management Strategies. Marine Policy. 34. p1135.
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Scientists have recommended that Pacific island governments should increase local
access to these tuna fisheries in order to partly meet increasing Pacific island food
security requirements. Recent studies have estimated that 75% of Pacific island coastal
fisheries will not meet forecast food security needs due to a forecast 50% growth in
population by 2030, limited productivity of coastal fisheries (exacerbated by
overfishing) and inadequate national distribution networks.889

Similarly, coastal communities within Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines also
depend heavily on living marine resources for food security.890 Unfortunately, coastal
fisheries resources throughout South East Asia are in severe decline due to overfishing.
This is increasing poverty throughout artisanal fishing communities and reducing the
contribution of fisheries to food security among other things.891

The following coastal States are home to coastal communities that depend upon WCPO
tuna fisheries for food security and artisanal employment to some degree: 892 Indonesia,
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Japan, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, USA
Territories, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Palau, Nauru, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Samoa, Fiji,
American Samoa, Vanuatu, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue and Tonga. Many of
the subsistence and artisanal fisheries that operate in these States and territories catch
significant proportions of tuna (approximately 30% for subsistence and up to 100% of
artisanal fisheries).893 It is significant to note that 11 of the 14 core tuna States have
interests in food security for their coastal communities.
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J. Bell, M. Kronen, et al. (2009) Planning the Use of Fish for Food Security in the Pacific. Marine Policy.

33.
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N. Salayo, L. Garces, et al. (2008) Managing Excess Capacity in Small-Scale Fisheries: Perspectives from
Stakeholders in Three Southeast Asian Countries. Marine Policy. 32. P696. -- R. Pomeroy, J. Parks, et al.
(2007) Fish Wars: Conflict and Collaboration in Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia. Marine Policy. 31.
p645.
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G. Silvestre, L. Garces, et al. (2003) South and South-East Asian Coastal Fisheries: Their Status and
Directions for Improved Management. Conference Synopsis and Recomendations. Assessment, Management
and Future Directions for Coastal Fisheries in Asian Countries. Worldfish Center Conference Proceedings.
Penang, Malaysia. Worldfish Center. p37.
892
Summaries for each State and references are listed in Appendix Two.
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R. Gillett, M. McCoy, et al. (2001) Tuna: A Key Economic Resource in the Pacific Islands. Manila. Asian
Development Bank and Forum Fisheries Agency. p35.
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The value of artisanal catches in some Pacific island States may exceed the value of
commercial catches.894 For example, in 2008 Kiribati received AU$32 million in
government revenue from distant water fishing access fees. However, the artisanal
fishing industry caught approximately 12,800 mt in 2008, valued at around A$33.2
million. While much of this value was consumed locally and provided little revenue, the
locally based artisanal fleets operated approximately 4,800 vessels (under 7m) and
directly or indirectly employed 20,000 people – roughly 20% of the entire Kiribati
population.895

Many of the States with food security interests must balance tensions between artisanal
and commercial fishing interests. Many Pacific island States have implemented
regulations to protect near-shore artisanal fisheries and prohibit distant water fleets from
fishing within coastal exclusion zones. Nevertheless, artisanal communities throughout
the WCPO region continue to express concerns at the perceived impacts of distant water
fishing fleets on artisanal fisheries.896 These tensions are likely to increase if coastal
fisheries continue their decline and increasingly transfer effort to near-shore skipjack
tuna and anchored FADs.

Given their food security interests, these coastal States will suffer from conservation
measures that limit artisanal catches or inequitably transfer any conservation burden
onto artisanal communities. Furthermore, these States will have an explicit interest in
ensuring that key fish stocks are sustained at a level to support continued food security
for coastal communities.897
894

K. Barclay and I. Cartwright. (2007) Capturing Wealth from Tuna: Case Studies from the Pacific. Canberra,
Australia. Asia Pacific Press. p31.
895
Q. Hanich and M. Tsamenyi. (2010) Review of Kiribati Access and Licensing Arrangements for Offshore
Fisheries in Kiribati's EEZ. Canberra, Australia. AusAID.
896
R. Gillett. (2010) Replacing Purse Seining with Pole and Line Fishing in the Western Pacific: Some Aspects
of the Baitfish Requirements. Washington DC, USA. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation. p9. -- G.
Silvestre, L. Garces, et al. (2003) South and South-East Asian Coastal Fisheries: Their Status and Directions
for Improved Management. Conference Synopsis and Recomendations. Assessment, Management and Future
Directions for Coastal Fisheries in Asian Countries. Worldfish Center Conference Proceedings. Penang,
Malaysia. Worldfish Center. p24. -- D. Pauly, R. Watson, et al. (2005) Global Trends in World Fisheries:
Impacts on Marine Ecosystems and Food Security. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. 360. p370.
-- K. Barclay and I. Cartwright. (2007) Capturing Wealth from Tuna: Case Studies from the Pacific. Canberra,
Australia. Asia Pacific Press. -- P. Manoa, L. Apps, et al. (2004) Development without Destruction: Towards
Sustainable Pacific Fisheries. Suva, Fiji. Greenpeace Australia Pacific.
897
While there has been no discussion within the WCPFC of limiting artisanal catches, it is noteworthy that the
European Union delegate to the Kobe II International Workshop on RFMO Management of Tuna Fisheries
suggested that the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission may need to consider limiting artisanal catches of tuna
given their significant impact on Indian Ocean tuna stocks. Personal notes. Comments by Mr Antonio
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8.2.5 Coastal States’ Interest in Development
Across the WCPO, the tropical tuna fisheries represent the primary economic
opportunity for many of the region‟s developing coastal States. The equatorial Pacific
islands States, Indonesia and the Philippines all depend heavily upon skipjack,
yellowfin and bigeye for employment and economic development.898

Many of the developing coastal States throughout the WCPO region have long standing
development aspirations for the WCPO tuna fisheries. These aspirations are particularly
important for the Pacific islands region given their dependence upon fisheries resources
and their lack of other development options. Regional institutions and donors have
supported numerous development studies and projects to support these development
aspirations, with mixed results.899 A recent study prepared for the FFA identified six
common development aspirations among the Pacific island States: expansion of
longline fleet and catches; expansion of purse seine fleet and catches; value-adding
through non-cannery activities; tuna processing ventures; expanding or starting shore
based fleets; and small-scale development.900 However, these development aspirations

Fernandez. European Commission Delegate. Comments made on 30 June 2010 at Kobe II International
Workshop on RFMO Management of Tuna Fisheries. Brisbane, Australia. 29 June to 1 July 2010.
898
SPC. (2009) Estimates of Annual Catches in the WCPFC Statistical Area. Fifth Regular Session of the
Scientific Committee of the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Port Vila, Vanuatu. WCPFC. -- Philippines. (2009) Proposed
Amendments to Paragraphs 22 of Conservation and Management Measure 2008-01. Sixth Regular Session of
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Papeete, French Polynesia, 7-11 December 2009.
WCPFC. -- Indonesia. (2009) Indonesia Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries,
Research and Statistics - Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port
Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- B. Prisantoso. (2008) Annual Report to the Commission Part
1: Information on Fisheries, research and Statistics - Indonesia. Fourth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.
WCPFC.
899
For project examples, see: P. Philipson, D. Evans, et al. (2007) Longline Framework (LLF). Honiara,
Solomon Islands. FFA. -- T. Gloerfelt-Tarp. (2003) Technical Assistance for Alternative Negotiating
Arrangements to Increase Fisheries Revenues in the Pacific. Asian Development Bank. -- D. Evans, P.
Philipson, et al. (2008) Purse Seine Strategy. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. -- AusAID. (2007) Valuing
Pacific Fish: A Framework for Fisheries Related Development Assistance in the Pacific. Canberra, Australia.
AusAID. -- L. Clarke. (2006) Pacific 2020 Background Paper: Fisheries. Canberra, Australia. AusAID. -FFA. (2006) Options for Domestic Fishing Industry Developments, Including Access Agreements. 25th
Meeting of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement. Nadi, Fiji -- T. Lewis. (2004) A Review of Current Access
Arranagements in Pacific Developing Member Countries (PDMCs). Manila, Philippines. Asian Development
Bank. -- R. Gillett. (2003) Domestic Tuna Industry Development in the Pacific Islands: The Current Situation
and Considerations for Future Development Assistance. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. -- P. Philipson, R.
Stone, et al. (2008) Lessons Learned - A Review of Successes and Failures in Tuna Fisheries Development in
the Pacific Islands. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA, Pacific islands Forum Secretariat and the SPC.
900
R. Gillett. (2008) A Study of Tuna Industry Development Aspirations of FFA Member Countries. Honiara,
Solomon Islands. FFA. p5.
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suffer significant constraints and challenges due to a number of industry and governance
obstacles.901

Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines are also developing coastal States with active
interests in the WCPO tuna fisheries. These include significant commercial and
artisanal catches and various onshore operations.902

Since the establishment of the WCPFC, these developing coastal States have been
particularly concerned that their development aspirations are not unreasonably limited
by WCPFC conservation and management measures. To date, these States have
successfully sought exemptions for their developing fisheries from most conservation
and management measures. While this satisfies short term concerns, there is increasing
recognition that these exemptions are significantly undermining the effectiveness of
conservation and management measures.903 In the long term, Pacific island States
appear to accept that these broad exemptions are not consistent with sustainable use
objectives and will need to be replaced with measures that accommodate coastal State

901

Pacific island States are disadvantaged by the highly globalised and integrated nature of the tuna industry,
their remote location, lack of suitable skills, and weak domestic governance and institutions. The Pacific island
States are effectively excluded from the more profitable „downstream‟ end of the tuna business, as these
activities, especially the distribution and retail components of the commodity chain, are dominated by
multinational corporations. This has resulted in the failure of various attempts to establish domestic tuna
operations. A number of reports and various literature have been written on these development constraints and
challenges, and past failures. Further reading includes: R. Gillett and G. Van Santen. (2008) Optimising
Benefits in the Pacific Islands: Major Issues and Constraints. Washington DC USA. World Bank. -- R.
Schurman. (1998) Tuna Dreams: Resource Nationalism and the Pacific Island's Tuna Industry. Development
and Change. 29. -- K. Barclay and I. Cartwright. (2007) Capturing Wealth from Tuna: Case Studies from the
Pacific. Canberra, Australia. Asia Pacific Press. -- Q. Hanich, F. Teo, et al. (2008) Closing the Gaps: Building
Capacity in Pacific Fisheries Governance and Institutions. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. -- E. Petersen.
(2002) Economic Policy, Institutions and Fisheries Development in the Pacific. Marine Policy. 26. -- V. Ram
Bidesi and M. Tsamenyi. (2004) Implications of the Tuna Management Regime for Domestic Industry
Development in the Pacific Island States. Marine Policy. 28. -- H. Parris and R. Q. Grafton. (2006) Can Tuna
Promote Sustainable Development in the Pacific. The Journal of Environment and Development. 15. -- E.
Havice. (2010) The Structure of Tuna Access Agreements in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean: Lessons
for Vessel Day Scheme Planning. Marine Policy. 34.5. -- K. Barclay. (2010) Impacts of Tuna Industries on
Coastal Communities in Pacific Island Countries. Marine Policy. 34.3. -- M. Pretes and E. Petersen. (2004)
Rethinking Fisheries Policy in the Pacific. Marine Policy. 28. For discussion of the globalised nature of the
fishing industry, see also: OECD. (2010) Globalisation in Fisheries and Aquaculture: Opportunities and
Challenges. Paris, France. OECD.
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K. Barclay, H. Parris, et al. (2009) Tuna Trade Flows from The Coral Triangle. Sydney, Australia.
TRAFFIC. -- UNDP and WCPFC. (2009) West Pacific East Asia Oceanic Fisheries Management. Pohnpei,
Federated States of Micronesia. United Nations Development Programme and the WCPFC.
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In 2009, John Hampton presented a SPC study that found that all exemptions were having a significant
impact on the effectiveness of the 2008 Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin.
See: J. Hampton and S. Harley. (2009) Assessment of the Potential Implications of Application of CMM-200801 for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu. WCPFC.
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sovereignty, sovereign right and participatory right interests through which their
development aspirations can be pursued.904

In the meantime, these developing coastal States will continue to bring their
development aspirations to WCPFC negotiations and pursue these interests through
conservation and management discussions. While there are vague principles in the
WCPF Convention and fisheries governance that recognise the special requirements of
developing States,905 the criteria for inclusion in this context are the specific provisions
of existing exemptions from current conservation and management measures. These
exemptions specify:

nothing in this measure shall prejudice the legitimate rights and obligations of
those small island developing State members and participating territories in the
Convention Area to develop their own fisheries.906

While there is still some uncertainty regarding exactly what constitutes legitimate
development under the auspices of this exemption, there is no contention that all Pacific
island States and territories are included within the exemption. This includes seven of
the core 14 States and territories identified in Chapter Seven: Papua New Guinea,
Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru, Solomon Islands and Marshall Islands and Federated States of
Micronesia. Furthermore, Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Solomon Islands are also categorised
by the United Nations as Least Developed Countries.907

8.3

Flag States

The WCPO tuna fisheries are fished by a variety of distant water fishing vessels and
domestic fishing vessels from all over the globe. Distant water fishing vessels provide
the majority of the fleet and are highly migratory like the fish they chase. Figure 43
904

R. Gillett. (2008) A Study of Tuna Industry Development Aspirations of FFA Member Countries. Honiara,
Solomon Islands. FFA.
905
See Chapter Four for further discussion and analysis of these principles.
906
Paragraph 6. CMM2008-01.
907
Least Developed Countries are the poorest and weakest States in the international community. There are
currently 49 Least Developed Countries (33 in Africa, 15 in Asia and the Pacific and 1 in Latin America).
These States suffer from extreme poverty and structural weaknesses within their economies, and lack the
necessary capacities required for growth. UN-Sec-Gen. (2010) Implementation of the Programme of Action for
the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010: Report of the Secretary General. New York, USA.
United Nations General Assembly Economic and Social Council.
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demonstrates the diversity of the States that register these distant water fleets, and
illustrates the States that have the largest vessel registries (coloured dark green).
Figure 43: Map of Flag States’ Interests in Skipjack, Bigeye and Yellowfin908

The fishing vessels are either based in the port of a coastal State (due to licensing
requirements or operational factors) or operate from a distant home port. They take the
majority of the catch and operate through access agreements, or are directly licensed by
coastal states. The remainder is caught by domestic fishing vessels that are either
nationally owned and operated, or foreign owned and operated through domestic
charters and/or joint ventures with local interests. These are generally smaller vessels
that mostly fish for tuna within their own flag State‟s EEZ. The majority of such vessels
are longliners, although in the past decade an increasing number of purse seiners have
registered in Pacific island States and are now considered to be domestically based
vessels. By 2008, the Pacific islands region was home to 56 locally based purse seiners,
while locally based longliners and pole and line vessels had declined to 269 and two
respectively.909
908

The map was created by the author based on information summarised in Appendix Three. See Appendix
Three for a full list of references. Thanks to Andi Arsana for design assistance.
909
R. Gillett and I. Cartwright. (2010) The Future of Pacific Island Fisheries. Noumea, New Caledonia. SPC.
P3. For selected readings on these historical activities, see: D. Doulman. (1989) Japanese Distant-Water
Fishing in the South Pacific. Pacific Economic Bulletin. 4.2. -- D. Doulman. (1987) Development and
Expansion of the Tuna Purse Seine Fishery. Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region. Ed. D.
Doulman. Honolulu, USA. East West Centre. -- A. Bergin and M. Haward. (1994) The Last Jewel in a
Disintegrating Crown - The Case of Japanese Distant Water Tuna Fisheries. Ocean Development and
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States that are solely or primarily flag States for such fleets are likely to be more
supportive of measures that minimise costs on their fleets and maximise freedoms to
fish. Meanwhile, coastal States with strong domestic fleets will likely have an interest
in minimising any measures that impact on their EEZs or archipelagic waters.
The following sections review catch data and vessel registries and identify „flag‟ States
with significant interests in fishing vessels that participate in the WCPO tuna fisheries.
For the purposes of this analysis, a flag State is defined as a State that has registered
vessels that currently participate, or have historically participated, within the WCPO
tuna fisheries. This definition is used as it includes all States that have an existing or
historical interest in the fisheries for yellowfin, bigeye and skipjack. The analysis used
the WCPFC definition of „fishing vessels‟ and included all support vessels (i.e. carriers
and bunkers) on the basis that the effectiveness of the WCPFC will, in part, depend
upon its ability to control and monitor such vessels. It is noted that this analysis includes
States that operate open registries that may have little genuine link with the vessel.

This analysis only includes States that have registered vessels that have been reported
either to the WCPFC, the SPC or the FFA. It is possible that there are additional flag
States with vessels fishing in the WCPO which have not reported to these databases. For
example, the only evidence that Venezuela has participated in the WCPO tuna fisheries
is the listing of two of it‟s vessels on the WCPFC IUU Vessel List.910

This section analyses the interests of these flag States in terms of the 2008 value of the
catch reported by registered vessels, and the type of gear used. It is beyond the scope of
this thesis to assess these benefits in further detail (i.e. vessel registration fees, crew
salaries, taxation, company tax, etc). In addition, some flag States (such as Belize) are

International Law. 25. -- O. S. Stokke. (1991) Transnational Fishing: Japan's Changing Strategy. Marine
Policy. -- K. Barclay and S.-H. Koh. (2005) Neo-Libealism in Japan's Tuna Fisheries? Government
Intervention and Reform in the Distant Water Longline Industry. Canberra, Australia. Asia Pacific School of
Economics and Government. -- R. Teiwaki. (1987) Access Agreements in the South Pacific. Marine Policy. -P. Williams and P. Terawasi. (2010) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
Including Economic Conditions in 2009. Sixth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Nuku'alofa Tonga, 10 - 19 August. WCPFC.
910
WCPFC. (2007) Summary Report of the Fourth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Fourth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
Tumon, Guam. WCPFC. p27.
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open registries and benefit less than other flag States with broader links to their
registered vessels. Assessing what link exists between vessels and their flag State goes
beyond the scope of this thesis.911 In addition, much of the fishing activity may occur
within domestic or foreign EEZs, further complicating the assessment of what benefits
may flow to the flag State. Consequently, the analysis uses the value of the catch
reported by the flag State as a rough indicator of the interest that a flag State may have
in the fishery. These values are not indicators to long term participatory rights, but
simply indicate the level of interest that a State currently holds due to the breadth of the
fishing activity of its registered vessels.

Analysis of vessel registries and catch data identifies 67 States and territories from all
parts of the world that have reported some form of vessel activity in the WCPO tuna
fisheries since 1960.912 Figure 44 list all of these flag States. Of these 67 States and
territories, 26 reported catches of WCPO tropical tuna by their registered vessels in
2008. These are presented in bold. States that are not members or cooperating nonmembers of the WCPFC are italicised.

911

For selected readings on open registries and genuine link, see: E. Desombre. (2005) Fishing Under Flags of
Convenience: Using Market Power to Increase Participation in International Regulation. Global Environmental
Politics. 5.4. -- E. Molenaar. (2000) The Concept of Real Interest and Other Aspects of Cooperation Through
Regional Fisheries Management Mechanisms. International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. 15. -- E.
Desombre. (2010) Flags of Convenience and Property Rights on the High Seas. Conservation and Management
of Transnational Tuna Fisheries. Ed. R. Allen, J. Joseph, et al. Ames, USA. Wiley-Blackwell. -- M. Gianni and
W. Simpson. (2005) The Changing Nature of High Seas Fishing: How Flags of Convenience Provide Cover for
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry,
International Transport Workers Federation, and WWF International. -- J. Swan. (2002) Fishing Vessels
Operating Under Open Registers and the Exercise of Flag State Responsibilities. Information and Options.
Rome, Italy. FAOF. J. M. Llacer. (2003) Open Registers: Past, Present and Future. Marine Policy. 27.
912
The analysis was based on the following data: FFA. (2008) Forum Fisheries Agency Vessel Registry of
Good Standing. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. -- WCPFC. (2011) Record of Fishing Vessels. Pohnpei,
Federated States of Micronesia. WCPFC. -- WCPFC. (2011) Interim Register of Non-Member Fish Carrier and
Bunker Vessels. Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. WCPFC. -- Mexico. (2007) Declaration of Mexico
as an Observer to the 4th Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Fourth
Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Tumon, Guam. WCPFC. -WCPFC. (2007) Summary Report of the Fourth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Fourth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Tumon, Guam.
WCPFC. -- WCPFC. (2008) Summary Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Busan,
Korea. WCPFC. An earlier version of this analysis was published in Q. Hanich. (2009) Control, Cooperation
and 'Participatory Rights' in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Tuna Fisheries. Navigating Pacific
Fisheries: Legal and Policy Trends in the Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments in the Western
and Central Pacific Region. Ed. Q. Hanich and M. Tsamenyi. Oceans Publications. Wollongong. Australian
National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS).
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Figure 44: Flag States with Interests in the WCPO Tuna Fisheries
Fishing Vessels (including Transhipment Vessels)
Australia
Belize
Bolivia
Cambodia
Canada
China
Chinese Taipei
Cook Islands
Ecuador
El Salvador
Estonia (EU)
Federated States of Micronesia
Fiji
France (EU)
French Polynesia (Fr. Terr.)
Georgia
Guatemala
Guinea
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Japan
Kiribati
Korea

Transhipment Vessels Only

Marshall Islands
Mexico
Nauru
New Caledonia (Fr. Terr.)
New Zealand
Niue (Charter Vessels)
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Portugal (EU)
Russia
Samoa
Senegal
Seychelles
Solomon Islands
Spain (EU)
Sri Lanka
St Vincent
Tokelau (NZ Terr.)
Tonga
Tuvalu
USA (excluding A. Samoa)
Vanuatu
Venezuela

Bahamas
Hong Kong (Special
Administrative Region China)

Cuba
Cyprus
Isle of Man (EU)
Latvia (EU)
Liberia
Lithuania (EU)
Maldives
Malta (EU)
Netherlands (EU)
Netherlands Antilles
Poland (EU)
Sierra Leone
Singapore
St Kitts and Nevis
Thailand
Ukraine

These vessel activities were the sole fishing interest for 40 of these States and territories
that have no coastal waters within the WCPO tuna fisheries. Appendix Three provides a
complete summary of these interests.

8.3.1

Flag States’ Interest in Vessels that Fish for WCPO Tuna

In 2008, eight flag States dominated the control of vessels which fish in the WCPO tuna
fisheries. Vessels registered in Japan, Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, Chinese Taipei,
USA, Papua New Guinea and China caught 91% of all tropical tuna, valued at
approximately US$4.674 billion (see Figure 45).
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Figure 45: Value of Flag States’ Interest in Skipjack, Bigeye and Yellowfin
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Six of these flag States hold mixed interests across multiple gears and species. While
purse seine interests are clearly the strongest within this group, they do not dominate to
the degree they do among the core coastal States. Consequently, these States will have a
complicated interest and must balance their own domestic interests when considering
how to address conservation challenges.

Within the group of flag States, only the USA and Papua New Guinea are dominated by
purse seine interests. In terms of their flag State interests, neither are likely to benefit
significantly from conservation measures that improve the stock status of bigeye and
therefore increase the profitability of longline fleets (although the USA territories do
have coastal interests in bigeye and longline activities, these are far less valuable than
the flag State interests in purse seine activities). Both Papua New Guinea and the USA
have a flag State interest in ensuring the long term sustainability of yellowfin given that
this provides significant value to the purse seine fleets. While there may be other
interests to consider (for example, markets), from the point of view of fishing fleet
interests, they have an immediate interest in minimising the application of bigeye and
yellowfin conservation measures to purse seine fleets and maximising the application to
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other gears – or to seek exemptions for their own purse seine activities as both States
have so far achieved to varying degrees.913

Once again, it is important to note that longline and bigeye interests do not dominate
any of the core flag States. The interests that support addressing purse seine bigeye
catches, are tempered by the mixed interests of each of the influential States who all
hold strong purse seine interests.

Outside this group, 18 other States reported catches by their registered vessels in 2008.
These catches accounted for 9% of all tropical tuna and were collectively worth US$464
million. Three of these States hold mixed interests within their registered fleets
(Vanuatu, Federated States of Micronesia and Kiribati), although each of their coastal
State interests are dominated by single gears (purse seine for Kiribati and Federated
States of Micronesia, longline for Vanuatu). Six of these States are dominated by purse
seine interests within their registered fleets, while the remaining nine States are
dominated by longline interests. Once again, it is important to note that the States
dominated by longline interests generally have the smallest fleets.

There are 16 flag States and territories that have historically registered vessels that
operated within the WCPO tuna fisheries but no longer do so.914 It is probable that all of
these flag States and territories (with the exception of Canada) have effectively
withdrawn from the fishery due to the establishment of the WCPFC Vessel Record and
its exclusive limitation to WCPFC members and cooperating non-members.915
913

Papua New Guinea is entitled to developing State exemptions under Paragraph Six of CMM2008-01. The
USA purse seine fleet is exempt from Paragraph 10 that limits purse seine effort be limited to 2001-2004 levels
due to the provision in Paragraph 7 that allows for the USA to limit its purse seine effort to the maximum
allowed under its multi-lateral access treaty with the Pacific island States. In effect, this exemption allows for
the USA to substantially increase purse seine effort within its fleet.
914
Many of these States have previously been listed on the FFA Vessel Database, but do not appear in the
WCPFC yearbook. SPC has previously received logsheet data from: Bolivia, Cambodia, Estonia, Georgia,
Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, India, Maldives, Portugal, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and St Vincent. Data from
these States has historically been recorded against the substantive nationality of ownership, often Chinese
Taipei. SPC is currently investigating these small historical catches in order to more accurately report them
against the relevant flag or potentially coastal charter State. For the time being, it should be noted that these are
small catches by longline vessels, with minimal catch history to each flag State. Personal communication to
author by Peter Williams via email, Oceanic Fisheries Programme Management. Secretariat of the Pacific
Community. 30 June 2010.
915
WCPFC. (2009) WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels and Authorisation to Fish (CMM2009-01). Sixth
Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Pohnpei, Federated States of
Micronesia, 7 - 11 December 2009. WCPFC. Many of these States have open registries and are not WCPFC
members. It is likely that the vessels have re-flagged. For discussion of these open registries, see: M. Gianni
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The history of participation can significantly influence a State‟s approach to
conservation and management, particularly for States that have extensive interests in
high seas fisheries or have little or no EEZ rights within the WCPO fisheries. The
fishing interests of these non-coastal States are limited to the benefits that they accrue
from their registered fishing vessels that operate in the high seas, or under license in
EEZs (other non-fishing benefits such as markets and processing are discussed later).

Traditionally, most of the fishing activity in the WCPO tuna fisheries has been
undertaken by distant water fishing vessels that travel far beyond the coastal waters of
their flag State and fish in foreign EEZs and high seas. These vessels are largely
operated by communities from Japan, Korea, USA, Chinese Taipei, China, and, more
recently, the European Union, New Zealand and the Philippines. Some of these fleets
have enjoyed a long history of fishing in WCPO tuna fisheries, while other fleets have
only more recently entered the fisheries. Appendix Three summarises the history of all
States that have reported an interest in the WCPO tuna fisheries. States with
communities that have historically benefitted from fishing will have an interest in
ensuring that their communities can continue this benefit with minimal reduction. States
with communities that have only recently begun to benefit, or hope to benefit in the
future, will have an interest in ensuring that measures do not close the door on their
participation in the fishery.

Flag States and territories with catch histories for high seas fisheries will benefit from
conservation measures that favour their historical activities at their height or their length
of fishing activity. For example, New Zealand successfully argued for special treatment
in CMM2008-01 that established its baseline for purse seine fishing effort as the highest
level between 2001 and 2004, rather than the average of 2001 to 2004.916 China,
Indonesia and the USA had similarly argued in previous years for special treatment and
their baselines were established at 2004 levels.917 Such factors will also influence
delegations when they consider whether to support capacity limits that refer to historical
and W. Simpson. (2005) The Changing Nature of High Seas Fishing: How Flags of Convenience Provide
Cover for Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Forestry, International Transport Workers Federation, and WWF International.
916
Footnote Two. CMM2008-01.
917
Article 10. CMM2008-01.
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catches or vessel numbers. Those States with small historical catches or numbers of
vessels will suffer in such circumstances and it will be in their interests to either oppose
such measures or mitigate them with other considerations or exemptions. For example,
the FFA States have repeatedly opposed any capacity limitations that would impact on
their aspirations to develop their own fleets.918

In summary, there are a large number of historically active flag States in the WCPO
tuna fisheries. However, in effect only eight flag States dominate the fleets of vessels
that fish within the WCPO tuna fisheries. All of these States are members or
cooperating non-members of the WCPFC and hold significant influence over the
negotiation and adoption of conservation measures. Within this group, purse seine
interests are once again strongest, but less dominant than within the coastal States
described in the previous section.

8.3.2

Flag States’ Interest in Transhipment Vessels

There are 22 flag States and territories with transhipment vessels that have historically
operated within the WCPO tuna fisheries (see Appendix Three). Fourteen of these flag
States and territories reported transhipment vessels that have been active since 2008.
They are: Bahamas, Cambodia, Cyprus, Isle of Man, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands
Antilles, Panama, Russia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, St Kitts and Nevis, Thailand and
Tuvalu. None of these 14 States reported any other form of vessel activity during this
time.919 Only five of these States are WCPFC members or cooperating non-members
(Tuvalu and European Union members, Cyprus, Lithuania, Isle of Man and Malta). The
remaining eight States are not WCPFC members or cooperating non-members
(Bahamas, Cambodia, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Russia, Sierra Leone, Singapore
and Thailand) although Panama and Thailand have both attended WCPFC meetings as

918

For example, see: WCPFC. (2009) Summary Report of the Sixth Regular Session of the Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission. Sixth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Tahiti, French Polynesia, 7-11 December 2009. WCPFC. p32. See repeated comments in:
WCPFC. (2010) Summary Report of the Seventh Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Honolulu, USA, 6 - 10 December 2010.
WCPFC.
919
See Appendix Two for a summary of transhipment interests and a complete list of references.
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observers.920 Many of these States have long histories in the region as active registers
for transhipment vessels.

Of the 11 States that no longer register transhipment vessels in the WCPO tuna
fisheries, one continues to register fishing vessels (Belize) while the other 10 States and
territories appear to have no current flag State interest in the WCPO tuna fisheries prior
to 2008. These States and territories are Hong Kong (a Special Administration Region
of China), Cuba, Honduras, Latvia, Liberia, Maldives, Netherlands, Poland, St Vincent
and Ukraine.

Few of these transhipment States are members or cooperating non-members of the
WCPFC and are therefore not engaged in negotiations, nor able to readily influence
negotiations. However, the vessels they flag are nevertheless expected to implement
conservation and management measures relating to transhipment operations.

8.4

Interest and Influence – From Coastal to Flag States

The coastal and flag State interests impact on how States and territories negotiate
conservation measures, particularly in regard to whether they favour or oppose high
seas closures, support or oppose direct application of region wide measures to waters
under national jurisdiction, and whether limits are implemented by flag or by zone.
States that are dominated by flag State concerns are likely to suffer negatively from
conservation measures that limit fishing opportunities or impose a higher conservation
burden on high seas fisheries. Additionally, these States may favour measures that
empower their authority and long term allocation aspirations through the
implementation of limits by flag, rather than by zone. 921 On the other hand, States
dominated by coastal State concerns will benefit from measures that advantage their
EEZs or archipelagic waters over high seas (i.e. high seas closures) and will favour
measures that empower coastal States and their long term allocation aspirations through
the implementation of limits by zone, rather than by flag State.

920

See Appendix Two for further information and references.
The WCPFC currently implements purse seine measures through area limits (i.e. by coastal State for EEZs
and by flag State for high seas) and longline measures by flag State. See CMM2008-01. For further discussion
of flag based versus zone based limits, see: V. Ram Bidesi and M. Tsamenyi. (2004) Implications of the Tuna
Management Regime for Domestic Industry Development in the Pacific Island States. Marine Policy. 28.
921
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The following three sections synthesise the above analysis and identify the coastal and
flag State interests of the currently active States and territories. Figure 47 presents a
calculation of the balance of interests between the value of the catch from a State‟s
coastal waters and the value of the catch from that State‟s distant water fishing fleet
(flag State interest). In cases where a State does not have any coastal waters within the
WCPO, the State is assessed to have a 100% flag State interest. In cases where a State
does not report any catches from registered distant water fishing vessels, the State is
assessed to have a 100% coastal State interest. These calculations are based on 2008
data.922 Figure 46 provides an approximate scale of these interests from flag State to
coastal State. 923

922

These values include albacore to represent the various longline interests held by each State within this
context. Calculations are based on data sourced from: P. Williams. (2010) Tuna Fishery Yearbook: Western
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (Raw Excel Database). Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia.
SPC. -- P. Terawasi and L. Rodwell. (2010) Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries (Excel Database). Honiara,
Solomon Islands. FFA.
923
Some flag State reports include charter vessels that were registered to other States but reported under the
charter State for the duration of the charter. For example, Niue did not have a registry in 2008 and depended
upon a charter fleet of vessels from New Zealand and the Cook Islands. Niue. (2009) Annual Report to the
Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009.
WCPFC.
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Figure 46: Scale of Interests from Flag State to Coastal State
Flag States
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8.4.1

Coastal States (May Include Interests in Domestic Fishing Vessels)

As demonstrated in Figure 47, 15 States and territories are dominated by coastal State
interests. This is due to the large value of the catch taken from within their coastal
waters compared to the smaller value of the catch (if any) taken by their registered
fishing vessels. Some of these States have reported substantial catches by their
registered vessels, but mostly within their own domestic waters. Consequently, these
States have little interest in distant water fishing activities and remain primarily focused
on the interests of the fisheries within their coastal waters, reinforcing their coastal State
interests. States and territories with dominant coastal State interests are: American
Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, French Polynesia,
Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga,
Tuvalu and Wallis and Futuna.

Seven of these coastal States (Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu) are dominated by purse seine
interests and control some of the most productive fishing grounds in the WCPO (six of
these States are part of the core 14 States identified in Chapter Seven). All of these
seven States have an immediate interest in minimising the application of bigeye and
yellowfin conservation measures on purse seine fleets or on waters under national
jurisdiction, and are likely to continue to support conservation measures that focus
reductions on high seas and longline fisheries.924

The remaining eight coastal States and territories are dominated by longline interests.
These States are: American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Palau,
Samoa, Tonga and Wallis and Futuna. However, none of these longline coastal States
are dominated by bigeye interests, with only Palau recording strong interest in bigeye.
Nor are any of these longline coastal States part of the core 14 States identified in
Chapter Seven. While they do not control waters as productive as the purse seine coastal
States, they do have a legitimate interest in the fishery and would benefit from

924

A 2010 Study by the FFA found that the high seas closures should result in a significant increase of the
value of the tropical tuna fishery within the waters of PNA members (i.e. Nauru, Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea,
Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Palau and Marshall Islands). FFA. (2010) Economic
Outlook and Prospects for the Tuna Fisheries FFC74/WP16 Seventy Fourth Meeting of the Forum Fisheries
Committee. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. p12.
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conservation measures that address purse seine impacts while minimising impacts on
longline fleets and waters under national jurisdiction.

In summary, there are 15 States and territories that have a dominant interest in
maximising their coastal State benefits and focusing conservation measures on high seas
fisheries. All of these States and territories are members of the WCPFC and are relied
upon to effectively implement measures within their jurisdiction. Within this group,
purse seine interests dominate the most productive equatorial coastal States, while
longline interests dominate Palau and the sub-tropical less productive coastal States.

8.4.2

Flag States (Dominated by Distant Water Fishing Interests)

Nine States are dominated by their flag State registered fleets. These are: Belize, China,
Chinese Taipei, Ecuador, El Salvador, European Union (Spain), Korea, USA and
Vanuatu. These States have reported far more valuable catches from their distant water
fishing fleets than from their own waters within the WCPO (Ecuador, El Salvador,
Spain and Belize do not have any waters within the WCPO). Four of these States
(China, Chinese Taipei, Korea and the USA) are part of the core 14 States and control
significant fleets of purse seine and longline vessels).

Four of these States (Ecuador, El Salvador, Spain and the USA) are dominated by purse
seine interests. While the USA has a strong interest in bigeye as a coastal State, this is
significantly outweighed by its flag State interest in the purse seine fisheries. Ecuador,
El Salvador and Spain have little or no interest in longline fisheries, or bigeye
specifically, compared to the size of their purse seine interests.

Only Belize has a dominant interest in longline fisheries, and even then its interest in
bigeye is moderate at best. The remaining flag States have mixed interests across
multiple gears and multiple species, with none having more than a moderate interest in
bigeye. The inactive flag States identified in Figure 44 (with the exception of Canada)
have effectively no influence over management negotiations and have no current
interest in negotiations, nor implementation obligations.925
925

However, these States may at some time in the future wish to re-enter the fishery and therefore may refer to
their historical participation in support of any request for participatory rights.
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8.4.3

States with Mixed Coastal and Flag State Interests

The remaining eight States and territories have mixed interests. Japan, Fiji, Marshall
Islands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Indonesia and the Philippines all hold
significant coastal State and flag State interests.

Four of these States (Japan, Marshall Islands, Indonesia and the Philippines) control
productive fishing grounds and significant fishing fleets, and are part of the core 14
States identified in Chapter Seven. Each of these four States has mixed interests across
multiple gears and species, but none have more than a moderate interest in bigeye.

This mixture of coastal and flag State interests can be particularly challenging for
Indonesia and the Philippines which have extensive vessel interests that extend into the
high seas. This significantly undermines any interest that these States may have in
supporting high seas closures or conservation measures that prioritise conservation
reductions on the high seas over waters under national jurisdictions. The Philippines has
expressed its strong opposition to high seas closures in 2008 and 2009 due to the
significant interests of its fishing fleets that fish both within its EEZ and in
neighbouring high seas pockets.926

Fiji, New Caledonia and Niue are all dominated by longline interests, although none
have more than a moderate interest in bigeye. New Zealand has divergent coastal and
flag State interests due to the different benefits derived from fisheries within their
coastal waters (domestic and foreign vessels) and the benefits they receive from their
registered vessels. As a flag State, New Zealand is dominated by purse seine interests
(82% of the value its reported catch in 2008). As a coastal State, New Zealand is more
balanced between purse seine, longline and trolling fleets (see Figure 40 for a
representation of the gear interests for all active States in terms of their flag State‟s
interests and their coastal State‟s interests).

926

Philippines. (2009) Proposed Amendments to Paragraphs 22 of Conservation and Management Measure
2008-01. Sixth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Papeete, French
Polynesia, 7-11 December 2009. WCPFC.
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Such divergent interests also occur in other States that are more dominated by either
coastal or flag State interests. While these divergent interests are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, they can come into conflict during conservation and management
negotiations when States negotiate specific measures for longline and purse seine fleets.
Such States include: USA, Kiribati, Vanuatu, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall
Islands, New Zealand, Chinese Taipei. The USA has perhaps the most complicated
interest because its flag State interests are dominated by purse seine vessels (85%) yet
the coastal State interests of its territories are clearly dominated by longline vessels
(86%). In total, the combined value of these two interests is still dominated by purse
seine, however this may not accurately reflect the development aspirations of its
territories given that their primary licensing benefit derives from longline fleets. This is
an important insight given the ramifications that this may have on the USA approach to
conservation and management measures and how it negotiates and implements such
measures.

8.5
Market States
A number of States around the world have a market interest in the WCPO tuna fisheries
through their consumption of tuna products. Figure 48 demonstrates the global nature of
the market for WCPO tuna and illustrates the largest market States (coloured dark red).
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Figure 47: Map of Market States with Interest in WCPO Tuna Fisheries927

Tropical tuna are processed into a variety of products, ranging from minimally
processed fresh and frozen whole tuna (i.e. bigeye and yellowfin), through various
loining stages to fully processed canned retail products (i.e. skipjack and yellowfin).928
Canned tuna is one of the most significant products that originate from the WCPO purse
seine fisheries. Processing of canned tuna occurs in two stages. Loining is where the
fish is headed, gutted, de-boned, pre-cooked and prepared for canning. Subsequently,
the loins are then canned and cooked a second time in an automated process.929

The commodity chains that provide the raw tuna, through the processing stages, and
into the final retail product are complex and globalised.930 Much of the product
(particularly canned tuna) is traded through a small number of companies.931

927

The map was created by the author based on information summarised in Appendix Three. See Appendix
Three for a full list of references. Thanks to Andi Arsana for design assistance.
928
For further details on the various forms of tuna processing and products, see: C. Catarsi. (2004) World Tuna
Markets. Rome, Italy. FAO
929
Ibid. p5.
930
For detailed discussion of commodity chains and markets for WCPO origin tuna, see: L. Campling, E.
Havice, et al. (2009) Pacific Island Countries, The Global Tuna Industry and the International Trade Regime A Guidebook. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. K. Barclay, H. Parris, et al. (2009) Tuna Trade Flows from The
Coral Triangle. Sydney, Australia. TRAFFIC. C. Catarsi. (2004) The World Tuna Industry - an Analysis of
Imports and Prices, and of their Combined Impact on Catches and Tuna Fishing Capacity. Management of
Tuna Fishing Capacity: Conservation and Socio-Economics. Madrid, Spain. FAO.
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Given the complexity of the global tuna commodity chain, and the highly globalised
market, it is not currently possible to consistently determine exactly what proportion of
each tuna product in each market originated from the WCPO tuna fisheries. Global
market reports and industry studies do not break down import and export of retail or
processed product by coastal State origin and only provide export data for processing
States or „producer‟ States.932 This can be misleading if interpreted incorrectly as
producer States may not include catches taken through access agreements by foreign
vessels. For example, three of the core 14 States (Kiribati, Tuvalu and Nauru) report
little or no tuna exports despite the significance of their coastal catches.933

This analysis works around this limitation by cross-referencing various industry reports
and secondary literature, so as to determine where most WCPO catch goes for
processing, and consequently which States have a significant interest in processing that
is, in part, dependent upon tropical tuna sourced from the WCPO fisheries. However, it
is not possible to consistently determine the exact proportion of the exported processed
product that originated from the WCPO tuna fisheries. Within this limited context, the
analysis identifies the world‟s key processing States that land or import tuna from the
WCPO, and then assesses their interest in processing by the significance of their total
processed tuna exports. Given that these States import or land tuna from the WCPO,
and the global significance of the WCPO tuna fishery, the analysis makes an
assumption that the State therefore has an interest in continuing supply from the WCPO
tuna fisheries for its processing operations.

The analysis also assesses import and export data for canned tuna and identifies those
markets with the most significant interests. The assessment is based on imports of
canned tuna for retail consumption. The connections to the WCPO tuna fisheries are
confirmed through the commodity chain, industry reports or secondary literature. For
931

Trimarine, FCF and Itochu are globally integrated companies that control most of the trade in canned tuna
from the WCPO. For further details, see: L. Campling, E. Havice, et al. (2009) Pacific Island Countries, The
Global Tuna Industry and the International Trade Regime - A Guidebook. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA.
932
For example, the United Nations FAO Globefish Tuna Commodity Update provides summaries of tuna
production by ocean (i.e. WCPO, Eastern Pacific, Indian, Atlantic Ocean) but does not subsequently ocean of
origin in export and import data, nor does it provides any further detail on coastal State origin or sub-region. P.
Sabatini and H. Josupeit. (2010) Tuna Commodity Update. Rome, Italy. FAO Globefish.
933
R. Gillett. (2009) Fisheries in the Economies of the Pacific Island Countries and Territories. Mandaluyong
City, Philippines. Asian Development Bank. p320.
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example, Thailand is identified as the world‟s largest processor of canned tuna.
Thailand is also the recipient of almost half of the WCPO‟s purse seine catch.934
Therefore, there is a reasonable assumption that markets which are supplied by Thailand
canneries consume some amount of tuna from the WCPO.

The WCPO tuna fisheries are a critical source of raw product for tuna processing. A
large number of intermediary ports and processing States, from Europe through Asia to
the Americas, are increasingly impacted by landings and processing of tuna caught in
the WCPO.935 Thailand is the most significant canning and loining processor of tuna
caught in the WCPO. Other States with canning and loining industries that land or
import tuna (raw or loins) from the WCPO include: Japan, Philippines, Korea, China,
Vietnam, Indonesia, American Samoa, Papua New Guinea, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Mexico, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands, Tonga, Italy and Spain.936

Some WCPO States and territories also export various fresh, smoked and frozen
products to global markets. Much of this requires minimal processing infrastructure
compared to canning and loining, although some operations such as Katsuoboshi937
require significant processing infrastructure. States with such processing and export
interests include:938 Chinese Taipei, Korea, Japan, Vanuatu, Indonesia, Papua New
934

Trimarine. (2010) Tuna Markets and Seiner Capacity. RFMO Tuna Management Workshop. Brisbane,
Australia. FFA. Slide 6.
935
Personal notes from attendance at the Fifth Session of the WCPFC during a presentation by Michael
McGowan from Bumble Bee Foods. 8 December 2008. See also: M. McGowan. (2008) Market and Cannery
Overview: Presentation to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Fifth Regular Session of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Busan, Korea, 8-12 December 2008. WCPFC.
936
Trimarine. (2010) Tuna Markets and Seiner Capacity. RFMO Tuna Management Workshop. Brisbane,
Australia. FFA. Slide 6. See also, K. Barclay, H. Parris, et al. (2009) Tuna Trade Flows from The Coral
Triangle. Sydney, Australia. TRAFFIC. P25. European and USA operations commonly process tuna up to
loining stages as close as possible to the landing port, and then export the semi-processed product into their
domestic canneries. Italy and Spain import tuna loins from Thailand and Latin America, that originate from the
WCPO tuna fisheries, to supplement their domestic tuna canneries. P. Sabatini and H. Josupeit. (2010) Tuna
Commodity Update. Rome, Italy. FAO Globefish. p32. -- C. Catarsi. (2004) World Tuna Markets. Rome, Italy.
FAO P5. -- K. Barclay, H. Parris, et al. (2009) Tuna Trade Flows from The Coral Triangle. Sydney, Australia.
TRAFFIC. p30. Analysis of industry reports and import tables indicate that while Maldives, Seychelles,
France, Portugal and other States are home to significant processing operations, there is no reliable link that
these States land or import raw/loined tuna from the WCPO.
937
Katsuoboshi are hot-smoked, then mould-cured skipjack. Other related products (Fushi Mono) utilise similar
treatments on yellowfin and mackerel species. K. Barclay, H. Parris, et al. (2009) Tuna Trade Flows from The
Coral Triangle. Sydney, Australia. TRAFFIC. p49.
938
All listed States are identified (unless separately noted) as exporters of fresh and frozen tuna in: P. Sabatini
and H. Josupeit. (2010) Tuna Commodity Update. Rome, Italy. FAO Globefish. p56. -- Japan is identified in
Sabatini and Josupeit as a significant exporter of fresh and frozen tuna. It is also home to 90% of all
Katsuoboshi processing which utilises purse seine and pole and line caught skipjack from the WCPO. K.
Barclay, H. Parris, et al. (2009) Tuna Trade Flows from The Coral Triangle. Sydney, Australia. TRAFFIC.
p49. -- For further detail on Indonesia beyond that provided in Sabatini and Josupeit, see also T. Lawson, B.
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Guinea, Thailand, Philippines, China, Fiji, Marshall Islands, USA, New Zealand, Niue,
Palau, Vietnam, Australia, Solomon Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Samoa,
Cook Islands and Tonga.

While it is not possible to assess the level of interest that these States have in processing
WCPO tuna, it is fairly clear that Thailand, USA, Japan, China, Philippines, Korea,
American Samoa, and increasingly Papua New Guinea and Indonesia all have
significant interests in domestic processing operations that are highly dependent upon
consistent supplies of skipjack and yellowfin. Consequently each of these States has a
strong interest in the continued operation of the skipjack and yellowfin fisheries and
their provision of cheap raw material for their factories. The interests within these States
may suffer if conservation measures were to restrict supply seasonally (as could happen
if the WCPFC were to adopt proposals to close the entire WCPO purse seine fishery for
3 months a year),939 or increase the costs of raw materials, as may have occurred

Iskandar, et al. (2007) Report of the Eastern Indonesia Tuna Fishery Data Collection Workshop. Eastern
Indonesia Tuna Fishery Data Collection Workshop. Jakarta, Indonesia, 30-31 January 2007. WCPFC. -- PNG
is identified in Sabatini and Josupeit with further details in: R. Gillett. (2003) Domestic Tuna Industry
Development in the Pacific Islands: The Current Situation and Considerations for Future Development
Assistance. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. p68. -- For further detail on Philippines beyond that provided in
Sabatini and Josupeit, see also: C. A. Vera and Z. Hipolito. (2006) The Philippines Tuna Industry: A Profile.
International Collective in Support of Fishworkers. -- Fiji is identified in Sabatini and Josupeit with further
details in: R. Gillett. (2003) Domestic Tuna Industry Development in the Pacific Islands: The Current Situation
and Considerations for Future Development Assistance. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. p80. -- Niue
processes and exports small amounts of fresh yellowfin and bigeye sashimi and loins. R. Gillett. (2009)
Fisheries in the Economies of the Pacific Island Countries and Territories. Mandaluyong City, Philippines.
Asian Development Bank. p110. -- Palau processes and exports small amounts of fresh yellowfin and bigeye
sashimi and loins. R. Gillett. (2009) Fisheries in the Economies of the Pacific Island Countries and
Territories. Mandaluyong City, Philippines. Asian Development Bank. p123. -- Solomon Islands exports
Sashimi and Arabushi to Japan through Brisbane, Australia. R. Gillett. (2003) Domestic Tuna Industry
Development in the Pacific Islands: The Current Situation and Considerations for Future Development
Assistance. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. p59. -– Federated States of Micronesia exports fresh and frozen
tuna to Europe and the USA. R. Gillett. (2003) Domestic Tuna Industry Development in the Pacific Islands:
The Current Situation and Considerations for Future Development Assistance. Honiara, Solomon Islands.
FFA. p98. -- Samoa exports chilled tuna to USA. R. Gillett. (2003) Domestic Tuna Industry Development in the
Pacific Islands: The Current Situation and Considerations for Future Development Assistance. Honiara,
Solomon Islands. FFA. p111. -- Cook Islands exports fresh and chilled tuna. R. Gillett. (2009) Fisheries in the
Economies of the Pacific Island Countries and Territories. Mandaluyong City, Philippines. Asian Development
Bank. p20. -- Tonga exports fresh and frozen to USA, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Tonga. (2009)
Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular
Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, 2009.
WCPFC. p10.
939
For example, in February 2011 an industry association that represents some tuna industry interests called for
a 3 month closure of the WCPO purse seine fishery. ISSF. (2011) Tuna Coalition Backs Seasonal Pacific
Fishery Closure. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation. Available at: http://issfoundation.org/2011/02/22/tuna-coalition-backs-seasonal-pacific-fishery-closure/. Accessed on 23 February
2011.
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following the adoption of CMM2008-01.940 Similarly, these States would suffer if the
WCPFC failed to address sustainability concerns for yellowfin. For those States with
other coastal State interests, this may present internal tensions as these States balance
their interests in a cheap supply for processing factories with an interest to increase
access and licensing revenue through tightening supply and access.

The largest tuna markets in the world for fresh, frozen, smoked and canned tuna are the
USA, Japan and Europe.941 All of these markets, to some degree, depend upon the
WCPO tuna fisheries for their supply. In addition, markets in developing States are
looking towards domestically produced and imported canned tuna to counter food
insecurity and as a cheap form of protein.942 Within this context, conservation and
management decisions within the WCPFC, particularly in regard to skipjack and purse
seine fisheries, can quickly affect global markets and have significant repercussions on
prices.943

Within the European Union, the key markets for canned tuna that have some proportion
originating from the WCPO tuna fisheries are the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy,
European Union (Spain), Belgium, France944 and the Netherlands.945 Other identifiable
markets for WCPO sourced canned tuna include:946 Australia, Egypt, Libya, Canada,
940

P. Williams and P. Terawasi. (2010) Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
Including Economic Conditions in 2009. Sixth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Nuku'alofa Tonga, 10 - 19 August. WCPFC. p15.
941
C. Catarsi. (2004) World Tuna Markets. Rome, Italy. FAO p6.
942
Ibid. p59. M. Chou. (2010) Managing and Migrating Harvesting Capacity to Retain Profitability.
International Workshop on RFMO Management of Tuna Fisheries. Brisbane, Australia, 29 June to 1 July 2010.
FFA. Slide 6.
943
Y. Jeon, C. Reid, et al. (2008) Is There a Global Market for Tuna? Policy Implications for Tropical Tuna
Fisheries. Ocean Development and International Law. 39.
944
France imports some canned tuna from Thailand but most of its tuna appears to be imported from Indian and
Atlantic Ocean sources. L. Campling, E. Havice, et al. (2009) Pacific Island Countries, The Global Tuna
Industry and the International Trade Regime - A Guidebook. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. p325. -- H.
Josupeit. (2009) Tuna Market Report - Europe June 2009. Rome, Italy. FAO Globefish. p1
945
Each of these States imports significant levels of canned or loined tuna from identified processors of WCPO
tuna (Thailand, Philippines, Papua New Guinea). P. Sabatini and H. Josupeit. (2010) Tuna Commodity Update.
Rome, Italy. FAO Globefish. (various tables). -- H. Josupeit. (2009) Tuna Market Report - August 2009,
Thailand. Rome, Italy. FAO Globefish. p1. -- H. Josupeit. (2008) Trade Trends, Issues and new Barriers Faced
by the Tuna Industry. INFOFISH TUNA CONFERENCE. Bangkok, Thailand p11.
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There may be other tuna markets where tuna from the WCPO are sold. However, these markets are were
either not recorded in FAO reports (enabling cross referencing to demonstrate a link to tuna from the WCPO,
or there is no documentation linking these markets to the WCPO. Markets where there is a discernible link
include the following. Australia, Egypt, Libya, Canada, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Korea, Mexico import
significant levels of canned or loined tuna from identified processors of WCPO tuna (Thailand, Philippines,
Papua New Guinea or domestic operations). References are various tables in P. Sabatini and H. Josupeit.
(2010) Tuna Commodity Update. Rome, Italy. FAO Globefish. -- Poland, Syria, Israel, Argentina and the
United Arab Emirates imported canned tuna from Bangkok. See: P. Sabatini and H. Josupeit. (2008) Tuna
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Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Tunisia, Turkey, Iran, Syria, Israel,
Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates.

These States each have a strong interest in the continued provision of cheap skipjack
and yellowfin, and the long term sustainability of these fisheries. The market interests
within these States may suffer if the WCPFC were to fail to address sustainability
concerns for yellowfin, or were to adopt conservation measures that increased the costs
of skipjack and yellowfin enough to impact on retail prices.

The largest markets for non-canned tropical tuna, primarily bigeye and yellowfin, but
also some skipjack in smoked forms are Japan, USA, Europe and other Northeast Asia
States (Korea, China, Chinese Taipei). In Europe, tuna is consumed mainly as steaks,
while the USA consumes tuna as steaks and sashimi. Japan primarily consumes tuna as
sashimi.947 As above, it is not currently possible to consistently determine exactly what
proportion of this trade originates from the WCPO tuna fisheries. However, given
general references to exports of WCPO fresh, smoked and frozen products to these
markets, it is reasonable to state that these are important markets for fresh, smoked and
frozen tuna from the WCPO.948 Furthermore, there are a number of smaller domestic
markets throughout the region for local landings of fresh and frozen tuna, and small but
significant export markets to Australia, Canada and New Zealand.949
Commodity Update. Rome, Italy. FAO Globefish. p10. – Tunisia, Turkey and Iran imported WCPO skipjack
from New Zealand. New Zealand. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries,
Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p11.
947
C. Catarsi. (2004) World Tuna Markets. Rome, Italy. FAO P91. Japan is by far the largest market for high
value sashimi tuna (approximately 300,000 to 400,000 mt per year), distantly followed by the USA (30,000 to
50,000 mt), Korea (15,000 to 20,000 mt), China (6,000 to 10,000 mt), Chinese Taipei (5,000 to 8,000 mt) and
Europe (4,000 to 8,000 mt). 947 OPRT. (2010) The Present and Future of the International Tuna Longline
Fishing Industry. RFMO Tuna Management Workshop. Brisbane, Australia, 29 June to 1 July 2010. FFA.
Slide 9.
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Fishworkers. p46. -- T. Lewis. (2005) The Tuna Fisheries of Vietnam - An Overview of Available Information.
First Meeting of the Scientific Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Noumea,
New Caledonia, 8-19 August 2005. WCPFC. p18. -- L. Campling, E. Havice, et al. (2009) Pacific Island
Countries, The Global Tuna Industry and the International Trade Regime - A Guidebook. Honiara, Solomon
Islands. FFA. pp258, 263, 300, 332. -- China. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on
Fisheries, research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p7.
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T. Lewis. (2005) The Tuna Fisheries of Vietnam - An Overview of Available Information. First Meeting of
the Scientific Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Noumea, New Caledonia,
8-19 August 2005. WCPFC. p18. -- Fiji. (2009) Fiji Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on
Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p7. -- Republic of the
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All the market States identified above have some level of interest in the continued
sustainability of bigeye and yellowfin, but none more so than Japan. Japan‟s
overwhelming share of the sashimi market, and that market‟s dependence upon bigeye
and high grade yellowfin (in addition to non-WCPO fisheries for bluefin), gives Japan a
strong market driven interest in the sustainability of bigeye and yellowfin. Japanese
market interests would suffer if longline catch per unit of effort for bigeye and yellowfin
were to decline, forcing prices to rise.

Much like the fishing interests discussed earlier, the market interests of the States
identified above may conflict domestically in States that consume significant amounts
of canned tuna, and significant amounts of fresh and frozen tunas, particularly in the
case of Japan and the USA with their large markets for high grade sashimi. The USA
and Japan, and to a lesser extent Korea, China, Chinese Taipei and Europe, must
balance the costs and benefits of different conservation measures across their own
domestic market interests in canned tuna and sashimi when considering how best to
address conservation challenges.

8.6

Conclusion

Chapter Eight analysed the coastal, flag and market State interests that will be impacted
by conservation and management deliberations within the WCPFC. While none of these
interests alone will represent the overall „national interest‟ of a State, they are important
considerations and may influence how a State negotiates conservation and management
responses to overfishing challenges.
Marshall Islands. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and
Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p14. -- New Zealand. (2009) Annual Report to
the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the
Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21
August 2009. WCPFC. p11. -- Niue. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on
Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p8. -- Papua New
Guinea. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics.
Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p21. -- Tonga. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part
1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, 2009. WCPFC. p10. -- United States of America.
(2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth
Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port
Vila, Vanuatu, 20-21 August 2009. WCPFC. p21.
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The study identified 91 States and territories that have some form of existing or
historical interest in the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries (see Appendix Three for a
summary of their interests). However, of these 91 States and territories, analysis
revealed that only 14 States plus the European Union ultimately control access to the
most productive fishing grounds, the vessels that fish in them, and access to the most
profitable markets. Within this group, 10 States dominate the control of the most
productive fishing grounds, eight States dominate the control of the fishing vessels, and
the USA, Japan and Europe dominate the markets.

Chapter Eight further confirmed the findings of Chapter Seven that the key challenge
for the WCPFC is the weak position of bigeye in relation to the interests for skipjack,
yellowfin, and the purse seine fisheries. All the core 14 States and the European Union
have dominant or strong interests in the WCPO purse seine fleet feeding cheap and
prolific skipjack and yellowfin into canneries in South East Asia and Papua New
Guinea for global consumption almost everywhere. Furthermore, seven of the core
States can be loosely referred to as „skipjack States‟. Each of these are primarily coastal
States with less significant vessel registry interests (i.e. fishing in their coastal waters
returns more benefit than fishing by their flagged vessels).

Some of the core 14 States do have moderate bigeye interests that motivate them to
negotiate conservation measures for bigeye, but all of these States also have conflicting
coastal State or flag State interests in purse seine activities. There is no dominating
interest within these 14 States and the European Union to overcome the inherent
concerns of the skipjack purse seine interests that will be impacted by any effective
conservation and management measure. This is particularly a challenge for the
equatorial Pacific island States with communities that receive little benefit from bigeye.
Consequently these States have minimal interests driving them to support bigeye
conservation measures that require them to make short term sacrifices for the sake of
long term gain, particularly as any gains are likely to flow elsewhere.

An additional challenge for longline and bigeye interests is the historical behaviour of
the longline fleets. As noted above, longline fleets have historically reported the
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majority of their catch as taken on the high seas. While this has minimised the access
fees that they have paid, and reduced the costs of operating their vessels, it has also
significantly undermined their influence as it has lessened access fee revenue to the
WCPO coastal States and impacted upon the fishing history of the key fishing States.
Consequently, they have effectively further reduced bigeye conservation interests in the
core 14 States, particularly among the developing island coastal States within this
group.

The negotiation and adoption of an effective conservation and management measure is
further complicated by the development aspirations and legitimate claims for
consideration that are held by many of the core 14 States. These interests are not based
on any historical or existing benefit, but reflect principles of fisheries governance that
support the aspirations of developing States to increase their participation in the WCPO
tuna fisheries. These States currently enjoy exemptions in response to their legitimate
aspirations to develop their benefit from the fishery, and will have an interest in
ensuring that their development aspirations are not adversely impacted.

In conclusion, Chapter Eight has demonstrated that despite the large number of States
and territories with an interest in the WCPO tuna fisheries, ultimately there are only a
handful that control the WCPO tuna fisheries. Putting aside the question of their
international obligations, all of these States have a vested interest to some degree in the
long term sustainability of some part of the fishery. However, the key challenge for the
WCPFC is that there is no straightforward interest among these States to resolve the
current overfishing of bigeye.
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion
We live in a system of sovereign States jealous of their powers.
This is quite basic, even though the system itself is obsolescent.
Arvid Pardo, 1993.950

9.1

Introduction

In Chapter One, this thesis proposed that the WPCFC has failed to adopt conservation
and management measures that are sufficient to stop overfishing of bigeye. Chapter
Two demonstrated that overfishing of bigeye has increased since the establishment of
the WCPFC, while overfishing of yellowfin appears to have declined. The analysis in
Chapter Six makes it clear that the WCPFC has accepted that it must act to reduce
overfishing of bigeye. Every session of the WCPFC since 2005 has accepted advice that
overfishing for bigeye is occurring.951 In 2005, 2006 and 2008, the WCPFC adopted
measures that were intended to reduce overfishing.952 In 2007, 2009 and 2010 the
WCPFC discussed further extending these measures but failed to agree on what specific
measures should be adopted.953 Despite these multiple attempts, the WCPFC has failed
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to adopt a conservation and management measure that is sufficient to stop overfishing
of bigeye. As demonstrated in Chapter Six, none of the three WCPFC conservation and
management measures for bigeye and yellowfin have significantly reduced overfishing
of bigeye.

Given that the WCPFC accepts that it must act to reduce overfishing, why does it
repeatedly fail to adopt a sufficiently strong conservation and management measure that
would achieve its objective and reduce fishing to sustainable levels? The aim of this
thesis is to develop the understanding of this failure and its causes. This Chapter
synthesises the findings of the thesis and discusses the causes of the WCPFC‟s failure.

9.2

Research Overview

In order to understand the cause of the WCPFC‟s failure to adopt a sufficient measure,
it is helpful to provide an overview of the research relating to the problem, the rules and
the participants. That is: the characteristics of the WCPO tuna fisheries and the
complexity of the management challenge (the problem); the WCPF Convention and the
framework that it provides for conservation and management (the rules); and the
interests of the participants in the WCPO tuna fisheries and their influence over the
development and adoption of conservation and management measures (the participants).
These three factors frame the development and adoption of conservation and
management measures by the WCPFC.

9.2.1

The Problem – The WCPO Tuna Fisheries

Chapter Two demonstrated that the inter-meshed characteristics of the WCPO tropical
tuna fisheries present an inherently complex and difficult management challenge. The
scientific assessments clearly indicate that urgent action is required to reduce fishing
mortality for bigeye and halt any increases in fishing mortality for yellowfin. However,
catches have continued to increase across all gears and all three tuna species, despite
numerous recommendations from the WCPFC Scientific Committee that conservation
action is required.
Fisheries Commission. Tahiti, French Polynesia, 7-11 December 2009. WCPFC. -- WCPFC. (2010) Summary
Report of the Seventh Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Honolulu, USA, 6 - 10 December 2010. WCPFC.
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The inter-meshed nature of the tropical tuna fisheries makes it difficult for the WCPFC
to sufficiently reduce fishing mortality of bigeye, and restrain fishing mortality for
yellowfin, without significantly impacting on fishing activities for skipjack. The
complexity of this management challenge is exacerbated by the substantially different
biological characteristics of bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack. While the longer-lived and
less productive bigeye is suffering significantly from overfishing, the highly resilient
and productive skipjack is not suffering from overfishing.

This is an inherently difficult and challenging problem to solve, and particularly
problematic in regard to the negative interest that many core States have in bigeye.
While purse seiners are primarily used to target skipjack, their bycatch of bigeye
impacts significantly on the sustainability of the entire bigeye stock. In addition, the use
of FADs raises serious conservation concerns due to the high levels of bycatch of
juvenile tuna and other species from FAD sets, and the possibility that the use of FADs
may be creating an „ecological trap‟.

Chapter Two demonstrated that the WCPFC must implement a broad mix of reductions
and controls across a range of gears and locations to reduce fishing mortality for bigeye,
and restrain fishing effort for yellowfin, to sustainable levels. These measures must
apply to both the purse seine and longline fisheries and must apply throughout the
WCPO, particularly in the Philippine and Indonesian fisheries that have largely been
unmanaged. Furthermore, it appears increasingly likely that some form of total, or
almost total, FAD prohibition will ultimately be required to address the increasingly
significant concerns regarding juvenile bycatch and the potentially significant
ecological trap concerns.

9.2.2

The Rules – The WCPF Convention

Chapters Three, Four and Five analysed the WCPF Convention and assessed its
principles and standards against benchmarks in international fisheries governance. This
analysis found that the WCPF Convention provides a global benchmark as a legal
framework for cooperation and the management of migratory fish stocks and is
generally consistent with international principles and standards of fisheries governance.
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However, the analysis did identify some potential ambiguities that may impact on the
ability of the WCPFC to achieve its objective of long term conservation and sustainable
use.

First, the Convention Area does not include the entire migratory range of the WCPO
tuna stocks. This insufficient coverage may undermine the conservation and
management of the WCPO tuna fisheries throughout their range. In addition, the
exclusive nature of the MHLC has resulted in a membership that does not include all
coastal States within the migratory range of the WCPO tuna stocks. Neither Vietnam or
Russia were members of the MHLC, and China and Chinese Taipei are not considered
to be coastal States.

Although the Convention Area does not include the entire migratory range of the tuna
stocks, it does include the EEZs of the key States. Chapters Seven and Eight identified
14 core States that dominate and control the WCPO tuna fisheries. All of these States
are included within the membership of the WCPFC. While Vietnam catches significant
amounts of tuna within its EEZ, these catches have not been identified as impacting
significantly on bigeye and yellowfin. In addition, Vietnam has recently become a
cooperating non-member of the WCPFC.954 The political tensions over the South China
Sea make it unlikely that the WCPFC will be able to adopt measures for these waters in
the foreseeable future. However, this does not currently appear to be a significant
problem as no conservation concerns have been expressed regarding the impact of
fisheries in the South China Sea on WCPO stocks of tuna. In addition, both China and
Chinese Taipei are members of the WCPFC through their DWFN status, even if their
coastal State status is in dispute. While Russia is not a member of the WCPFC and does
not report catches to the SPC or WCPFC, there is no record of any concern that fishing
in the Russian EEZ will impact significantly on WCPO tuna stocks.
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In 2009, Vietnam became a cooperating non-member. In 2010, the WCPFC renewed the cooperating nonmember status for Vietnam. See Agenda Item 2 in the WCPFC Summary Reports: WCPFC. (2009) Summary
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2009. WCPFC. --WCPFC. (2010) Summary Report of the Seventh Regular Session of the Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission. Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Honolulu, USA, 6 - 10
December 2010. WCPFC.
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Second, the lack of explicit application to archipelagic waters may impact on the ability
of the WCPFC to ensure the long term conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO
tuna fisheries. This has become an increasingly significant concern as recent stock
assessments have suggested that catches in the archipelagic waters of Indonesia, Papua
New Guinea, Philippines and the Solomon Islands are impacting on bigeye and
yellowfin stocks.955 Paragraph 5 of CMM2008-01 encourages members to ensure that
the effectiveness of the measure is not undermined by any transfer of fishing effort into
archipelagic waters. Consistent with the LOSC, this is a voluntary request and is not
binding on members. This non-binding nature is highlighted in the subsequent transfer
of effort into Philippine archipelagic waters that may have occurred in 2009 and
2010.956

Lastly, there are varying interpretations as to whether the WCPF Convention allows the
WCPFC to sacrifice the short term health of one target species (i.e. bigeye) in order to
promote the optimum utilisation of other species (i.e. skipjack). This is potentially a
significant issue given the inter-meshed nature of the WCPO tuna fisheries and the
divergent interests of the WCPFC members.

In effect, the WCPF Convention potentially allows for the WCPFC to establish catch or
effort limits for the purse seine fisheries that would be sustainable for skipjack, but
unsustainable for bigeye. Such an approach could be more attractive to the interests of
developing coastal States who primarily benefit from purse seine catches of skipjack,
and receive little benefit from bigeye.957 This would favour seven of the core 14 States
that were identified in Chapter Seven as having a dominant purse seine interest. This
includes almost the entire PNA membership (Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Tuvalu,
Nauru, Federated States of Micronesia and the Solomon Islands) and the USA.

955

J. Hampton and S. Harley. (2009) Assessment of the Potential Implications of Application of CMM-2008-01
for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu. WCPFC. p1.
956
In 2010, the Philippines expressed concern that there had been a significant transfer of effort into its
archipelagic waters and argued that this was a result of the high seas closure. Philippines. (2010) Philippines
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Although it is feasible that the WCPFC could adopt such a management strategy, there
is no indication that WCPFC members are intentionally and decisively sacrificing
bigeye for the sake of skipjack. In fact, those States with the most to gain from pursuing
such a strategy (i.e. the PNA States) have shown the most leadership on conservation
and management measures that apply to purse seine vessels. It was the PNA that first
implemented FAD closures, catch retention and high seas closures for purse seine fleets
through their own licensing arrangements, and then proposed that the WCPFC emulate
these measures.958 While it is clear that the PNA have maximised their own interests
through focusing much of the conservation burden on high seas fisheries, they did apply
FAD closures and catch retention requirements to purse seine fisheries within their own
waters.

Despite these ambiguities, this thesis argues that, dependent upon one condition, the
WCPF Convention does provide a sufficient governance framework to enable WCPFC
members to cooperate to the degree necessary to ensure the long term conservation and
sustainable use of the WCPO tuna fisheries. While there may be some inconsistencies
with international principles, this does not appear to directly undermine the ability of
the WCPFC to adopt sufficient measures because all the key States and all the key
fisheries are included within the Convention Area and the membership of the WCPFC.
Similarly, although there are significant concerns regarding the need to better
understand and manage fisheries within the Philippine and Indonesian archipelagos, and
to a lesser extent the South China Sea, most of the WCPO fishery is clearly included
within the WCPF Convention Area.
The „one condition‟ relates to the willingness of the membership to fulfil their duty to
cooperate, particularly the core 14 States who control access to the fisheries and
regulate the vessels that catch the tuna. Ultimately, it is up to the member to adopt
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science based, precautionary, and compatible measures throughout the range of the
stocks.

9.2.3

The Participants – The Members of the WCPFC

Chapters Seven and Eight analysed the interests of the participants in the WCPO tuna
fisheries and concluded that the interests of the participants, and the nature of their
influence, weigh heavily against the conservation of bigeye.

These two chapters identified 91 States and territories that have some form of current or
historical interest in the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries (see Appendix Three for a
summary of their interests). However only 14 of these States (no territories) plus the
European Union ultimately control access to the most productive fishing grounds, the
vessels that fish in them, and access to the most profitable markets. Within this group,
10 States dominate the control of the most productive fishing grounds, eight States
dominate the control of the fishing vessels, and the USA, Japan and the European Union
dominate the markets.

These 14 States and the European Union must balance diverse interests in: species, gear,
access to fishing grounds, control over fishing and transhipment vessels, development
aspirations, food security, and markets. None of these interests alone represent the
overall „national interest‟ of these States, but they are important considerations and
influence how these States negotiate conservation and management responses to
overfishing challenges.
Seven of the core 14 States can be loosely referred to as „purse seine/skipjack States‟,
six of which are part of the group of coastal States that dominate the control of the most
productive fishing grounds (Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru, Federated
States of Micronesia and the Solomon Islands). Greater than 80% of the benefits that
these six States enjoy from the WCPO tuna fisheries come from skipjack (compared
with bigeye and yellowfin), purse seine fisheries (compared with longline and other
gears) and licensing revenue for access to their EEZ (compared to their vessel registry
interests). These six States also have strong interests in the welfare of their artisanal
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coastal communities and aspirations to develop and expand their participation in the
WCPO tuna fisheries.

These interests have influenced these six States to support measures that distribute the
conservation burden in a manner that minimises its impact on their interests. For
example, these six States (and all other FFA members) actively supported the insertion
of an exemption in every WCPFC conservation and management measure to protect the
development aspirations of small island developing States and territories in accordance
with Article 30 of the WCPF Convention. Paragraph Six of CMM2008-01 exempts the
domestic fisheries of these States from any of the conservation limits that are prescribed
in the conservation measure.

The dominant coastal State interests of these six States also ensured that they opposed
any suggestion that CMM2008-01 should prescribe measures that did not distinguish
between high seas and EEZs, or that it should apply new measures over their EEZs.
Consequently these States opposed any seasonal closure to purse seine fishing across
the entire WCPO and successfully argued that CCM2008-01 should incorporate their
existing coastal State management arrangements for tuna (i.e. the PNA Vessel Day
Scheme and Third Implementing Arrangement) and apply compatible measures to the
high seas.959

The seventh of the purse seine/skipjack States is the USA. The USA is dominated by its
vessel registry interests which provide greater than 80% of the benefits that the USA
enjoys from the WCPO tuna fisheries (compared to the catch from within its EEZ).
Although far less significant in the context of its overall interest, the USA catches
substantial amounts of bigeye through its Hawaiian longline fisheries. As an established
DWFN, the USA has a strong interest in protecting its historical level of activity.

These interests have influenced the USA to support measures that distribute the
conservation burden in such a manner as to minimise the impact on its interests. For
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The author attended the Fifth Session of the WCPFC on the Australian delegation. Author‟s personal notes
from observations of delegation statements at the Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Busan, Korea. 8 – 12 December 2008. See also: Palau. (2008) Opening Statement by
the Chair of the Forum Fisheries Committee. Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Busan, Korea, 8 - 12 December 2008. WCPFC.
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example, in 2008 the USA argued for special treatment for its purse seine fleet. It
argued that it should not be bound by the agreed reference points that limited purse
seine effort to the reported maximum in 2004, or the average effort between 2001 2004. Instead, the USA argued that its reference point should be set at the hypothetical
limit of how many vessels it could have had fishing in the WCPO tuna fisheries during
that time in accordance with the multilateral access treaty between the USA and the
Pacific island States.960 Despite the fact that the multilateral access treaty did not apply
to any other members of the WCPFC, and did not entitle the USA to any further rights
over the high seas fisheries within the WCPO, the USA won this exemption and was
subsequently able to substantially increase the size of its purse seine fishing fleet to a
level far above its reported level of purse seine effort between 2001 and 2004.961 This
exemption was subsequently identified in 2009 as a key reason for the ineffectiveness of
CMM2008-01.962

Consistent with its dominant DWFN interest, the USA argues for measures that
distribute the burden of conservation across all waters of the WCPO, and are applied
consistently by the WCPFC without regard to waters under national jurisdiction.963 The
USA also argues that conservation measures should apply to archipelagic waters, but
has suggested that the thin band of territorial waters that surround archipelagic waters
are excluded from the WCPFC‟s mandate.964
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Paragraph 7. CMM2008-01. See also: Japan, China, et al. (2009) Statement by Japan on Behalf of Five
Asian Nations Regarding CMM 2008-01. Sixth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Papeete, French Polynesia, 7 - 11 December 2009. WCPFC. The author attended the Fifth
Session of the WCPFC on the Australian delegation. Author‟s personal notes from observations of delegation
statements at the Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Busan,
Korea. 8 – 12 December 2008.
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Pacific Fisheries Commission. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August. WCPFC. p31.
963
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Yellowfin Tuna. Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Busan, Korea,
8 - 12 December 2008. WCPFC. p4.
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Statements supporting this interpretation, and arguments with Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, were made
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statements at the Fifth Regular Session (Busan, Korea, 8 – 12 December 2008) and the Sixth Regular Session
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Seven of the core 14 States are dominated by purse seine interests, but none of these
States are dominated by longline interests. The remaining seven States have fishing
interests across multiple gears, mostly longline and purse seine but also some pole and
line and other artisanal gears. They are: Japan, Philippines, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei,
Korea, China and Marshall Islands. These States must balance the costs and benefits of
different conservation measures across their own domestic interests when considering
how best to address conservation challenges. These tensions are further complicated by
broader interests held by Indonesia, Philippines and Japan in pole and line and other
gears.

The positions of the coastal States with mixed interests in multiple gears and species are
further complicated by their significant flag State interests. This is particularly a
challenge for Indonesia and the Philippines which have extensive vessel interests that
extend into the high seas. This significantly undermines any motivation that these States
may have in supporting high seas closures or conservation measures that prioritise
conservation reductions on the high seas over waters under national jurisdictions. For
example, the Philippines has expressed its strong opposition to high seas closures in
2008 and 2009 due to the significant interests of its fishing fleets that fish both within
its EEZ and in neighbouring high seas pockets.965

9.3

Research Synthesis

Chapters Two and Six demonstrated that there is a problem (overfishing of bigeye) and
that the WCPFC has failed to resolve it. Chapters Three, Four and Five demonstrated
that the rules (the WCPF Convention) are essentially sufficient. Chapters Seven and
Eight demonstrated that the interests of the participants do not favour bigeye.
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Philippines statements on this issue were made to the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Sessions of the WCPFC in
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This thesis argues that the WCPFC has failed to adopt a sufficiently strong conservation
measure because the interest in bigeye is moderate at best, and WCPFC members are
unwilling to compromise their interests. The practical reality of the overfishing problem
is that some or all States will ultimately have to carry a burden of conservation for
bigeye, and to a lesser extent for yellowfin. The combination of the multi-gear, multispecies and multi-national characteristics of the fishery, with the diversity of the
participants‟ interests, makes this a complicated and inherently political challenge. This
is because resolving the problem of overfishing in the WCPO tuna fisheries requires a
diverse collection of States to determine who should carry a burden of conservation, and
to what degree they should compromise their interests. To date, the WCPFC has failed
to successfully resolve the political aspects of this problem, and consequently, the
members have proven unwilling to compromise their interests.

It would be incorrect to say that there has been no discussion of compromise by the
WCPFC members. Delegations have stated that compromises are required and an
equitable approach should be adopted that recognises the special requirements of
developing States. For example, in 2008 at the start of WCPFC negotiations for
CMM2008-01, the USA delegation stated that:

any proposed measure should ensure that the conservation burden is distributed
equitably among Members of the Commission and among industry sectors. We
emphasise that the criterion here is equitably, rather than equally. Of course,
special circumstances of developing States must be taken into consideration, but
all Members should accept a fair and equitable share of the responsibility for
reductions. A proposal under which some countries are expected to shoulder the
entire burden, while others have no obligation along these lines, does not meet
this criterion.966

But when negotiations begin in earnest, it appears that this spirit of compromise and
equitable distribution is not applied. In practice, WCPFC members have generally
demonstrated a desire to distribute the burden of conservation elsewhere. Most States
966

USA. (2008) Views of the United States on Conservation and Management Measures for Bigeye Tuna and
Yellowfin Tuna. Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Busan, Korea,
8 - 12 December 2008. WCPFC.
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have proposed measures that explicitly focus the burden on others. For example, the
USA has demonstrated this behaviour with its arguments for exemptions for its purse
seine fleet (refer to Section 9.2.3). Delegations from Japan, China, Chinese Taipei,
Korea and the Philippines complained in 2009 that the exemptions for the USA were
unfair and that they were not prepared to accept any further burden of conservation on
their longline interests unless the unfair nature of these exemptions was addressed.967
Japan has also demonstrated this behaviour on previous proposals where it has proposed
capacity limits that would entrench Japan‟s historically high levels of fishing effort and
place the majority of the conservation burden on developing States and new entrants
through limiting their capacity at historically low levels.968

Small island developing coastal States have demonstrated similar behaviour with their
demands for exemptions from the application of all conservation measures and their
drive to close high seas pockets and limit the application of measures to their EEZs and
archipelagic waters.969 Not all within the FFA immediately supported these proposals.
Consistent with its DWFN flag State interests, New Zealand expressed concerns to its
FFA colleagues against proposals to close the high seas pockets (New Zealand flagged
distant water fishing vessels fished in these high seas pockets). New Zealand relented in
late 2008 when the rest of the FFA indicated their support for the proposal.970 Korea,
967

Japan. (2006) Draft Conservation and Management Measures for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean. Third Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
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development should be sustainable and should not undermine the conservation efforts of the WCPFC. The
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French Polynesia, 7 - 11 December 2009. WCPFC.
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Fourth Regular Session (Tumon, Guam, 3 – 7 December 2007) and the Fifth Regular Session of the Western
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (Busan, Korea, 8 – 12 December 2008). See also: E. Fiske. (2008)
WCPFC Yet to Reach Consensus on New Rules. Fish Information and Services (FIS). Available at:
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consistent with its dominant DWFN flag State interest, also opposed these high seas
closures and was the last WCPFC member to reluctantly accept this measure in 2008.971

Korea has also favoured measures that prohibit or heavily restrict the use of FADs over
seasonal closures that would simply shut down the entire purse seine fishery for a
period of time.972 This is consistent with the analysis in Section 7.3.3 that demonstrated
that Korean purse seine vessels have a low interest in FADs. On the other side of FAD
negotiations, the European Union has favoured seasonal closures over FAD
prohibitions. This is consistent with their high level of interest in FADs as demonstrated
in Section 7.3.3. In addition, the proposal by the European Union to remove high seas
closures and apply a purse seine closure across the entire Convention Area is consistent
with their dominant interests as a DWFN flag State (the European Union is not
responsible for any coastal waters within the WCPO).973

The reluctance shown by WCPFC members to compromise their purse seine interests
has also been demonstrated by Asian DWFNs and the USA in regard to their longline
fleets. Although longline interests are not as influential as purse seine interests, they are
nevertheless moderate to strong within the Asian DWFNs, and significant within the
USA EEZ surrounding Hawaii. For example, the USA successfully negotiated an
exemption in 2008 that protected its longline bigeye interests. Under this exemption, the
USA longline fleet is entitled to land up to 5,000 mt of fresh bigeye. 974 All other
WCPFC members (except small island developing States and territories) are required to
reduce their catches of bigeye by 30% by 2011 if their bigeye longline catch was over
2,000 mt in the reference years of 2001 – 2004. States with catches of less than 2,000
mt of bigeye in during the reference years are limited to 2,000 mt. In combination with
971
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the 2,000 mt entitlements for each of the USA territories, this has effectively
quarantined USA longline interests from any conservation burden. Controversially, it
was reported in December 2009 that USA longline interests were lobbying for an
expansion of longline fishing through an amalgamation of bigeye entitlements across all
the USA Pacific territories.975 This was subsequently reputed by the USA but not before
it caused some frustration among WCPFC members. The leader of the Papua New
Guinean delegation, Sylvester Pokajam argued that this behaviour:

goes to show how big and wealthy countries like the US can cooperate
when dealing with stock sustainability and then use loopholes in the treaty to
look after themselves. In other words, their national interests come above all
others.976

After blocking longline reductions in 2007, Asian DWFNs reluctantly accepted that
longline catch should be reduced by 30% in CMM2008-01.977 Since then, they have
opposed any further reductions in longline catch and argue that they have compromised
enough in this regard and will not compromise further until the burden of conservation
is more evenly distributed.978

There have been some examples of behaviour where States have accepted the need for
compromise and tabled proposals that directly impinge on their own interests. For
example, the PNA initiatives mentioned above included FAD and catch retention
measures that directly impacted on PNA purse seine interests. Similarly, the USA
proposed a gradual shift to FAD restrictions that would eventually impact on its purse
seine fleet‟s high level of interest in FADs.979 Japan appears to have softened its
position on vessel capacity limits. Japan‟s latest proposal for a capacity limit required
975
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DWFNs to reduce their capacity while explicitly allowing for developing island States
to build their capacity.980 While it continued to favour Japan‟s historical interests over
new entrant DWFNs such as the European Union and Chinese Taipei, it would
ultimately require some reduction in Japanese capacity, even if this was only an
opportunistic limit given declines in the Japanese fleet.

The FFA continues to be deeply sceptical of any capacity limitations due to the apparent
misuse of earlier overcapacity resolutions by DWFNs to block the expansion of purse
seine capacity in small island developing States such as Tuvalu and Marshall Islands.981
Since 2006, small island developing States have responded to proposals by DWFNs to
limit capacity, with demands that DWFNs „reduce or restructure their fleets to
accommodate the aspirations of SIDS‟.982

The interests of the small island developing States within the FFA is crucial,
particularly given their dominant control over access to the most productive fishing
grounds. The WCPF Convention and principles of international fisheries governance
explicitly recognises that these States shall not carry a disproportionate burden of
conservation. Furthermore these States are entitled to special consideration. In 2010, the
Kobe II International Workshop on RFMO Management of Tuna Fisheries, with
participants from all tuna RFMOs, recommended that freezes on fishing capacity
„should not constrain the access to, development of, and benefit from sustainable tuna
fisheries by developing coastal States.‟983 The developing island States require certainty
that conservation measures will not limit their development aspirations unreasonably.
As noted in Chapters Seven and Eight, this is particularly problematic in regard to the
980
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mitigation of purse seine impacts on bigeye as any limit on purse seine fisheries will
impose a significant share of the conservation burden (i.e. the cost of conserving
bigeye) on developing coastal States who will gain little or no benefit.

This thesis concludes that the weak position of bigeye, and the unwillingness of
members to compromise their interests, is the cause of the WCPFC‟s failure to adopt a
sufficiently strong conservation and management measure. The current approach to
conservation and management negotiations requires that some States agree to
significant compromises without any transparent processes to ensure that the burden of
conservation is distributed equitably. Consequently, the necessary compromise has not
been forthcoming.

To be fair, this is not an easy task. The complex characteristics of the fishery, combined
with the diverse interests and the weak political position of bigeye, create a labyrinthine
mix of factors to be considered.

9.4

Distributing the Burden of Conservation

In 2007, Barclay and Cartwright warned that unless allocation and effective
management measures were implemented quickly enough to halt overfishing of bigeye
and yellowfin:

the WCPO tuna fishery seems likely to trend towards becoming a high volume,
skipjack-oriented purse-seine fishery, dominated by the low-cost Chinese and
Taiwanese fleets, with minimal input from Pacific islanders.984

In essence, the WCPFC must determine how to distribute the burden of conservation,
and the benefits that go with it, or else the WCPO tuna fisheries will effectively
continue to decline as a result of overcapacity and overfishing. This lack of management
or limit will first affect the vulnerable bigeye, then the more productive yellowfin, and
lastly, the skipjack fisheries. Even the highly productive and resilient skipjack has
sustainability limits.
984
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As noted in Chapter Four, some commentators argue that a rights-based approach to
fisheries management is necessary to counter the tragedy of the commons that is
inherent in open access fisheries.985 However, allocating these rights in a highly
migratory fishery is contentious and particularly problematic for the WCPFC given the
varying views of the coastal States and DWFNs over the mandate of the WCPFC. Given
these tensions, the WCPFC appears to have effectively taken allocation off the
agenda.986

While the WCPFC has deferred any explicit allocation of the benefits of the fishery, it
has implicitly begun to allocate the burden of conservation. As noted in Chapter Seven,
the WCPFC has effectively made several allocations through various conservation and
management measures that limit or attribute catches or fishing effort. The distribution of
the burden of conservation is an allocation negotiation in all but name. And here lies the
problem.

The negotiation over whether to apply a FAD prohibition or a seasonal closure of the
entire purse seine fishery is a negotiation over how the burden of conservation is
distributed. The eventual decision will allocate the costs (conservation) and the benefits
(fishing opportunities). Negotiations will have to balance all the diverse interests
identified in Chapters Seven and Eight and come to an agreement over how these
interests are compromised. But, despite all the statements supporting an equitable
distribution of the burden of conservation, the WCPFC does not actually study the
interests of its members nor discuss what an equitable distribution might be. Rather, it
hides a deeply political and economic argument behind a veneer of conservation
science. Policansky notes that „marine fishery-resource controversies are couched in
scientific terms, although often they are not scientific disputes‟.987

The WCPFC does not transparently and openly negotiate the distribution of the costs
and opportunities. Consequently, it fails to adopt a conservation measure that meets the
985
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scientific advice. The current approach does not enable the negotiation of a politically
acceptable distribution of the conservation burden.

Given current levels of overfishing, a sustainable solution will require that some or all
Sates compromise their interests and carry some of the conservation burden. In order to
facilitate this, the WCPFC must transparently determine how it distributes the burden of
conservation across its membership. In so doing, it must balance the interests identified
in Chapters Seven and Eight in a politically acceptable manner that is in accordance
with the international principles and standards identified in Chapters Three, Four and
Five. This requires that the WCPFC establish parameters for how it distributes the
burden of conservation and balances and prioritises different interests.

For example, should a historically high level of catch and fishing activity be prioritised,
or should this be given a lower weighting if it is considered that it is now somebody
else‟s turn? How should the development aspirations of developing States be
prioritised? How should the WCPFC consider the long term benefit that the longline
fishery would receive from the conservation of bigeye and the increased profitability of
this fishery as catch per unit of effort improved. Similarly, how should the WCPFC
consider the lack of benefit that the purse seine fishery might receive from bigeye
conservation?

When considering matters of food security, how should the WCPFC consider the
diversity and choices of food enjoyed by distant markets compared to the limited
options available to artisanal communities in coastal developing States? Should a
consumer of luxury sashimi in New York or Tokyo be given equal weighting compared
to an artisanal community in the Philippines?

When considering access rights, the WCPFC might consider the shared nature of
common rights to high seas fisheries compared to the exclusive nature of sovereign
rights over fisheries within EEZs. How might these common rights be weighted against
the absolute sovereignty that coastal States hold over fisheries within their archipelagic
waters? Does the immobility of a coastal State‟s rights over its EEZ grant it greater
consideration compared to the flexibility of a DWFN‟s common rights to high seas
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fisheries (i.e. a DWFN can always purchase access rights and move its vessels to
another fishery)?

If the WCPFC determined that it gave special recognition to the development
aspirations of its developing island State members, then it would need to minimise the
burden of conservation on development opportunities for developing States. This could
be achieved through the continuation of exemptions or through other arrangements that
transferred benefits to these developing States or protected their domestic fleets. The
WCPFC might determine that the longline fishery would ultimately benefit the most
from bigeye conservation, and therefore should carry a disproportionately higher burden
of conservation (i.e. high reductions of catch by longline fishing vessels).

For the WCPFC to overcome its current stalemate, it must acknowledge the interests of
its members and define the parameters for how it distributes the burden of conservation.
If it is necessary to distribute the burden of conservation on to interest fields that will
benefit little from bigeye (for example, prohibitions on FADs), then a transparent
approach will ensure that all members can trust that the conservation measure is
equitable and no member is getting special treatment beyond what was transparently
agreed.

A transparent approach would still raise many concerns of self-interest and likely
machinations as States strategised to inflate the prioritisation of their interests.
However, without a transparent approach, overfishing of bigeye will continue until there
is a significant change in the interests, the nature of the fishery, and/or the approach to
the problem.
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Appendix One: Summary of WCPF Convention Analysis
Matrix of Principles and Standards – Cooperation and the Establishment of the Commission
WCPF Convention Principles and Standards
Objective &
Preamble

Convention
Area &
Stocks

Principle of long term conservation and sustainable use. Includes:
precautionary approach and best scientific information available;
avoid adverse impacts on the environment;
minimise risk of long term or irreversible effects of fishing;
preserve biodiversity;
maintain the integrity of marine ecosystems;
recognition of the special circumstances and needs of small island
developing States and territories;
needs of human food consumption;
recognises needs of both present and future generations;
optimum utilisation; and,
compatible, cooperative and binding measures.
The WCPF Convention Area suffers from three significant issues. The
WCPF Convention prescribes an area of application but the „understood‟
Convention Area is not consistent with the range of the stocks, nor is it
consistent with its own WCPFC Statistical Area. Furthermore, its eastern
boundary overlaps in part with the existing arrangements of the IATTC. The
WCPF Convention prescribes that the Commission shall cooperate with
other organisations, particularly the IATTC. WCPFC Convention determines
that it applies to all stocks of highly migratory fish within this Convention
Area, except sauries.

Assessment Against International Fisheries Governance
Consistent The objective and preamble are consistent with principles of
international fisheries governance and sustainable development. They
incorporate all principles and standards from the LOSC and UNFSA, and
broader principles of sustainable development (Stockholm Declaration,
Brundtland Report and Rio Declaration Principles of Sustainable
Development).

Partly Consistent Convention is inconsistent with principle (Code of
Conduct) throughout their range of distribution due to Chair‟s Statement
limiting the application of the WCPFC Convention so that it does not apply
to the full range of the stocks into the South China Sea. However,
Convention is largely consistent with relevant standards (UNFSA) which
prescribe conditional requirements (qualified by various factors, including
geographical) to agree on mandated stocks, the area of application, and
relationships with any relevant existing fisheries management organisations
or arrangement.
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Cooperation
& the
Commission

WCPF Convention prescribes the WCPFC as the institutional mechanism for
„giving effect to their duty to cooperate‟ in accordance with LOSC and
UNFSA. While there are questions regarding archipelagic waters, the
Convention applies to EEZs and high seas in a manner consistent with the
LOSC and UNFSA. It prescribes standards consistent with UNFSA relating
to the operationalisation of this cooperation, in relation to: the establishment
of a Commission; subsidiary bodies; secretariat; administrative, financial and
legal arrangements; transparency; cooperation with other organisations; and
entry into force.

Consistent WCPF Convention is derivative of UNFSA on matters of

Membership
Participatory
Rights

WCPF Convention prescribes two standards for membership: MHLC
participants entitled to join Commission at their discretion; non-MHLC
participants must seek invitation from Contracting Parties and membership is
by consensus of all Contracting Parties. Chinese Taipei is member, but not
Contracting Party. Real interest and participatory rights are undefined and
defer to interpretation of LOSC and UNFSA.
WCPF Convention prescribes a preference for consensus, with a fall back to
a majority voting procedure, supported by a review panel in place of an opt
out clause. The WCPF Convention explicitly applies comprehensive dispute
resolution procedures as established by UNFSA.

Partly Consistent WCPF Convention is partly consistent with

WCPF Convention mostly prescribes principles and standards that mirror
similar provisions found in UNFSA and which explicitly recognise the
special requirements and needs of developing States and territories,
particularly small island States, and to a lesser extent guide the provision of
assistance to address these requirements and needs. While the WCPF
Convention does not explicitly prescribe principles that developed States
shall cooperate with developing States to support their participation and
access into high seas fisheries, it implicitly includes such a principle through
inference and references to UNFSA.
WCPF Convention prescribes principles that conservation and management
measures do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a
disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing States
parties, and territories and possessions.

Consistent WCPF Convention is consistent with key principles and

Decision
Making

Special
Requirements
of
Developing
States

Conservation
Burden

cooperation and is broadly consistent with the principle of cooperation as
prescribed by the LOSC, and the various standards prescribed by UNFSA
that operationalise this principle. Despite uncertainty over whether the
Convention applies to archipelagic waters, it would still be consistent with
international fisheries governance regardless, as UNFSA does not appear to
apply to territorial and archipelagic either (therefore, there is no minimum
standard for territorial or archipelagic waters).

international fisheries governance. Discriminatory limits on the participation
of non-MHLC States are inconsistent with principles and standards of
international fisheries governance.

Consistent Decision making procedures are consistent with international
fisheries governance (primarily elaborated by Articles 10, 12 and 28 of
UNFSA) and represent best practice among RFMOs. The Convention
explicitly applies UNFSA dispute resolution principles and standards
standards of international fisheries, as elaborated by UNFSA and more
generally by Article 5 of the Code of Conduct and relevant paragraphs of the
WSSD Plan of Implementation.

Consistent WCPF Convention is identical to Article 24 of UNFSA.
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Matrix of Principles and Standards – Commission Functions and Conservation and Management
WCPF Convention Principles and Standards
Functions of
Commission

Compatible
Management

Long Term
Sustainability
& Optimum
Utilisation

WCPF Convention prescribes a comprehensive range of functions for the
Commission, including: conservation and management measures for target
stocks (10.1a); promotion of cooperation and coordination to support
compatibility (10.1b); conservation and management measures for non-target
and associated and dependent species (10.1c); allocation (10.1g, 10.3 and
10.4); minimum standards for responsible fishing (10h); scientific review,
assessments and advice (10f); data collection (10d); data management (10e);
obtaining and evaluating economic and other fisheries related data (10j);
monitoring, control and surveillance (10i); accommodating new participants
(10k); decision making procedures to enable adoption of conservation and
management measures (10l); promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes
(10n); budgetary matters (10m); discussion of any question or matter and
adoption of any measure or recommendations necessary to achieve the
objective of the Convention (10o); and, publication of measures (10.6). In
addition, the Convention also prescribes other principles and standards that
further inform the implementation of functions and responsibilities of States.
Development of CMMs by the Commission requires careful consideration of
the principle of compatibility and the standards prescribed in Article 8.
Measures established for the high seas and for areas under national
jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and
management of fish stocks in their entirety. In support of this principle, the
Convention establishes a number of broad standards. However, the WCPF
Convention lacks UNFSA standards relating to the implementation of
provisional arrangements while compatible measures are negotiated.
WCPFC members shall give effect to their duty to cooperate (in accordance
with the LOSC, UNFSA and the WCPF Convention) through the adoption of
measures „… to ensure long term sustainability of highly migratory fish
stocks in the Convention Area and promote the objective of their optimum
utilisation‟ (Article 5a of WCPFC and UNFSA). Coastal State members
shall apply these principles and standards within their waters in their
exercise of their sovereign rights relating to highly migratory fisheries.

Assessment Against International Fisheries Governance
Consistent Despite some differences in language and approach, the
standards established by the WCPF Convention are consistent with, and
sometimes more comprehensive than, the standards of international fisheries
governance. By comparison, Article 10 of UNFSA prescribes the most
comprehensive standards in international fisheries governance for the
functions of an RFMO

Mostly Consistent WCPF Convention is generally consistent with
international fisheries governance, although it lacks standards relating to
provisional arrangements.

Consistent „Long term sustainability‟ and „optimum utilisation‟ principles
are consistent with modern principles and standards of international fisheries
governance. In effect, Articles 5(a) and 7(a) operationalise the objective of
the WCPF Convention.
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WCPF Convention mirrors the UNFSA provisions and establishes a standard
that conservation and management decisions shall be based on the best
scientific evidence available and take into account relevant environmental
and economic factors, including the special requirements of developing
States. Neither UNFSA nor the WCPF Convention explicitly refer to social
factors or traditional knowledge (as found in Code of Conduct). But then
neither do they explicitly exclude these factors. Therefore, it is plausible that
both these factors could be considered through the requirement that measures
shall take into account international minimum standards.
WCPF Convention explicitly requires the members of the Commission to
„apply the precautionary approach in accordance with this Convention and
all relevant internationally agreed standards and recommended practices and
procedures‟. Consistent with international principles, the absence of
adequate scientific information is no cause for deferral or failure to take
conservation and management measures. In support of this principle, the
WCPF Convention establishes a number of standards for implementation.
WCPF Convention requires the Commission to establish MSY as a
conservation reference point, above which it should adopt management
reference points that support management objectives. The WCPF
Convention and UNFSA establish standards for these references points that
require the Commission to ensure that there is a very low risk of exceeding
the conservation reference point, and that management reference points are
not exceeded on average.
WCPF Convention prescribes an ecosystem based approach to fisheries
management that recognises the „… need to avoid adverse impacts on the
marine environment, preserve biodiversity, maintain the integrity of marine
ecosystems and minimise the risk of long term or irreversible effects of
fishing operations‟. The Convention prescribes various standards for
consideration and implementation relating to: non-target species; marine
biodiversity; associated and dependent species; pollution; waste; discards;
lost or abandoned gear; and selective and environmentally safe and cost
effective fishing gear and techniques.

Consistent LOSC, UNFSA and the Code of Conduct collectively establish
a standard that conservation and management decisions shall be based on the
best scientific evidence available, and take into account traditional
knowledge of the resources and their habitat as well as relevant
environmental and economic and social factors, including the special
requirements of developing States. The WCPF Convention mirrors the
language of UNFSA.

Consistent WCPF Convention incorporated a precautionary approach
that is highly derivative of UNFSA and refers directly to the UNFSA
guidelines for the application of precautionary reference points. The
principles and standards are consistent with modern international fisheries
governance and established a benchmark for RFMO Conventions.

Consistent WCPF Convention provisions relating to MSY and other
factors are all derived from UNFSA and in instances use identical
language.988 Similar provisions are also provided in the Code of Conduct. 989
Furthermore, MSY is the only reference point that is specifically prescribed
within the LOSC. In this regard, the WCPF Convention is consistent with
modern principles and standards of international fisheries governance.

Consistent WCPF Convention incorporates an ecosystem based approach
to fisheries management and prescribes standards for its implement that are
consistent with modern international fisheries governance. Where
international principles and standards have since progressed (i.e. such as the
FAO Technical Guidelines), the WCPF Convention includes sufficient
reference to generally recommended international standards so as to enable
these to be incorporated into WCPFC practice.

Article 5(b). UNFSA.
Paragraph 7.2.1. Code of Conduct.
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WCPF Convention establishes standards for consideration of the interests of
artisanal and subsistence fishers. Prescribes principle that members of the
Commission shall take into account the interests of artisanal and subsistence
fishers when giving effect to their duty to cooperate. Establishes standard:
„the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by,
subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and fishworkers, as well as
indigenous people in developing States parties, particularly small island
developing States parties, and territories and possession‟.
The WCPF Convention establishes a standard for the functioning of the
Commission that requires it to „adopt generally recommended international
minimum standards for the responsible conduct of fishing operations‟.

Consistent The WCPF Convention directly and indirectly is consistent

The WCPF Convention establishes a standard that members of the
Commission shall take measures to prevent or eliminate over-fishing and
excess fishing capacity and ensure that levels of fishing effort do not exceed
sustainable levels.

Consistent WCPF Convention is identical to UNFSA, and consistent with

The WCPF Convention does not establish a standard requiring the allocation
of participatory rights, but it does establish standards for how any allocation
process might proceed if the Commission were to allocate rights. The
WCPF Convention requires that allocation decisions must be by consensus
and that consideration must be given to specified non-exclusive factors.
The WCPF Convention incorporates Annex I from UNFSA as an integral
component and mirrors the UNFSA principles and standards relating to the
collection, compilation and distribution of scientific data and knowledge. In
addition, the WPCF Convention requires that the Commission: adopt
standards for the collection, verification and timely exchange and reporting
of data; compile and distribute statistical data while maintaining
confidentiality as appropriate; establish a regional observer programme to
collect verified data and information; develop procedures to obtain and
verify data on transhipments; and obtain and evaluate relevant economic and
other fisheries-related data and information. Furthermore, members of the
Commission are obligated to: provide statistical, biological and other data
and information; provide information on fishing activities as required; and
provide information on implementation of such requirements.

Consistent WCPF Convention provisions relating to allocation and

with relevant provisions of UNFSA, LOSC and Code of Conduct.

Consistent The WCPF Convention is consistent with UNFSA. Standard is
further extended in the Code of Conduct which also prescribes standards for
education and training of industry in responsible practices etc.

similar language in the Code of Conduct. Consequently, the WCPC
Convention is consistent with modern principles and standards of
international fisheries governance.
rights-based management are consistent with modern principles of
international fisheries governance, and are substantially derived from Article
11 of UNFSA.

Consistent The WCPF Convention is consistent with modern principles
and standards of international fisheries governance. Although it does not
explicitly incorporate the broader standards promoted by the Code of
Conduct, it provides indirect links that enable the Commission to meet these
standards, and require its members to implement them.
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The WCPF Convention prescribes a two part approach that allows for
independent scientists to directly advise the Scientific Committee and the
WCPFC. Simultaneously, it provides for the direct engagement of national
scientists in the development and review of advice, but ensures that the
advice is not „filtered‟ by national interests within the Scientific Committee.
Key provisions include: national fishing vessel records and prohibition on
vessels fishing in the Convention Area unless authorised to do so in
accordance with specified requirements; regional record of fishing vessels;
centralised VMS; boarding and inspection scheme based upon UNFSA;
endorsed port State measures to promote the effectiveness of conservation
and management measures; regional observer programme; discourage at-sea
transhipments and specifically prohibit transhipments at sea by purse seine
vessels (with minor exemptions); and members to co-operate on
investigations into illegal fishing.
WCPF Convention obliges members to (among other things): implement
conservation measures and provide data and information; inform the
Commission of measures they adopt to implement conservation measures;
enforce the provisions and measures of the WCPF Convention; annually
report on compliance actions; take action against foreign fishing vessels that
are undermining measures; recognise special requirements of developing
States and give due consideration to their respective capacities.

Consistent The approach adopted by the WCPF Convention is consistent
with modern principles and standards of international fisheries governance
and is well regarded due to the independence of the scientific advice and the
reduced likelihood for disagreements about the nature of the advice.

Consistent WCPF Convention broadly incorporated all developments in
MCS and was widely acknowledged to have established a benchmark for
RFMOs in regard to Monitoring, Control and Surveillance.

Consistent The provisions relating to implementation are consistent with
modern international fisheries governance and further strengthened by
provisions within UNFSA that effectively extend the mandate of the
WCPFC to all UNFSA parties.
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Appendix Two: CMM2008-01

FIFTH REGULAR SESSION
Busan, Republic of Korea
8-12 December 2008
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT MEASURE FOR BIGEYE AND
YELLOWFIN TUNA IN THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PACIFIC OCEAN
Conservation and Management Measure 2008-01990
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC):
Recalling that since 1999, in the Multilateral High Level Conferences, the Preparatory
Conferences, and in the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean ( the Commission, a number of
resolutions and Conservation and Management Measures (CMMs) were developed to mitigate
the overfishing of bigeye and yellowfin tuna and to limit the growth of fishing capacity in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean and that these measures have been unsuccessful in either
restricting the apparent growth of fishing capacity or in reducing the fishing mortality of bigeye
or juvenile yellowfin tuna;
Recalling that the objective of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (the Convention) is to ensure
through effective management, the long-term conservation and sustainable use of the highly
migratory fish stocks of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean in accordance with the 1982
Convention and the Agreement;
Further recalling the final statement of the Chairman of the Multilateral High Level
Conferences in 2000 that: “It is important to clarify, however, that the Convention applies

to the waters of the Pacific Ocean. In particular, the western side of the Convention
Area is not intended to include waters of South-East Asia which are not part of the
Pacific Ocean, nor is it intended to include waters of the South China Sea as this would
involve States which are not participants in the Conference" (Report of the Seventh and
Final Session, 30th August- 5 September 2000, p.29);
Recognising that the Scientific Committee has determined that there is a high probability that
the bigeye stock is subject to overfishing, and that and yellowfin stocks are currently being

990

This is an abridged copy of the measure. Further appendices to the measure have not been included. A
complete version of the measure is available at: WCPFC. (2008) CMM 2008-01 Conservation and
Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Fifth Regular
Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Guam, USA, 8 - 12 December 2008.
WCPFC.
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fished at capacity, reductions in fishing mortality are required in order to reduce the risks that
these stocks will become overfished;
Conscious that the Commission , at its regular sessions in December 2005 and 2006 adopted
CMMs for bigeye and yellowfin tuna and agreed to review annually those measures;
Aware that the Commission committed itself, in 2006 and 2007, to adopt a measure at its next
session to reduce juvenile bigeye and yellowfin tuna mortalities from fishing effort on Fish
Aggregating Devices (FADs)991;
Noting that Article 30(1) of the Convention requires the Commission to give full recognition to
the special requirements of developing States that are Parties to the Convention, in particular
small island developing States and territories and possessions, in relation to the conservation
and management of highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area and development of
fisheries on such stocks;
Noting further that Article 30(2)(c) of the Convention requires the Commission to ensure that
conservation and management measures adopted by it do not result in transferring, directly or
indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing States Parties, and
territories and possessions;
Taking note of Article 8(1) of the Convention requiring compatibility of conservation and
management measures established for the high seas and those adopted for areas under national
jurisdiction;
Recalling Article 8 (4) of the Convention which requires the Commission to pay special
attention to the high seas in the Convention Area that are surrounded by exclusive economic
zones (EEZs);
Noting the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) have agreed to implement the Third
Arrangement of the Nauru Agreement of May 2008 (Attachment A);
Also noting that the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) Members will be adopting a
system of zone-based longline limits to replace the current system of flag-based bigeye catch
limits within their EEZs.
Noting further paragraph 19 of CMM 2005-01 which states that: “Any future reduction in catch
levels shall take into account increases in the levels of such catches by each CCM in recent
years.”
Adopts, in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention, the following Measure to be
implemented over a three-year period with respect to bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna, in
particular.
OBJECTIVES
1. The objectives of this Measure are to:


Ensure through the implementation of compatible measures for the high seas and EEZs
that bigeye and yellowfin tuna stocks are maintained at levels capable of producing
their maximum sustainable yield; as qualified by relevant environmental and economic

991

For the purposes of these measures, the term Fish Aggregation Device (FAD) means any man-made device,
or natural floating object, whether anchored or not, that is capable of aggregating fish.
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factors including the special requirements of developing States in the Convention area
as expressed by Article 5 of the Convention.


Achieve, through the implementation of a package of measures, over a three-year period
commencing in 2009, a minimum of 30% reduction in bigeye tuna fishing mortality
from the annual average during the period 2001-2004 or 2004;



Ensure that there is no increase in fishing mortality for yellowfin tuna beyond the
annual average during the period 2001-2004 average or 2004; and



Adopt a package of measures that shall be reviewed annually and adjusted as necessary
by the Commission taking account of the scientific advice available at the time as well
as the implementation of the measures. In addition, this review shall include any
adjustments required by Commission decisions regarding management objectives and
reference points.

GENERAL RULES OF APPLICATION
2. For the purposes of these measures, vessels operated under charter, lease or other similar
mechanisms by developing islands States and participating territories, as an integral part of their
domestic fleet, shall be considered to be vessels of the host island State or territory. Such
charter, lease or other similar mechanism shall be conducted in a manner so as not to charter
known illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) vessels. The Commission shall consider the
implementation of a Charter Arrangements Scheme at its 6th Session in 2009.
3. In giving effect to CMM 2004-02, the Commission shall advise non-Parties to the
Convention wishing to acquire Co-operating Non member (CNM) status that there is a high
probability that overfishing is currently taking place in respect of bigeye and yellowfin and tuna
in the Convention Area. Therefore, where necessary, the limits that apply to CNMs,
particularly on the high seas, will be determined by the Commission in accordance with CMM
2004-02 or its revision.
4. The Commission will not delay the adoption of precautionary measures while research to
reduce the fishing mortality on juvenile bigeye and yellowfin tuna is being undertaken by
CCMs.
5. The Commission encourages CCMs to ensure that the effectiveness of these measures is not
undermined by a transfer of effort into archipelagic waters and territorial seas.
6. Unless otherwise stated, nothing in this measure shall prejudice the legitimate rights and
obligations of those small island developing State Members and participating territories in the
Convention Area seeking to develop their own domestic fisheries.
7. In the determination of levels of effort for the purpose of implementing this Measure current
levels of fishing effort shall include, as applicable, fishing rights organised under existing
regional of bilateral fisheries partnership arrangements or agreements previously registered with
the Commission by December 2006 in accordance with CMM2005-01, provided that the
number of licences authorised under such arrangements does not increase and noting that the
registration of bilateral agreements or arrangements does not provide a basis for establishing
effort levels on the high seas.
PURSE SEINE FISHERY
8. The purse seine fishery provisions of this Measure herein apply to the Convention Area
bounded by 20ºN and 20ºS with the objective of achieving over a 3-year period commencing
from the date this measure comes into effect in 2009, a 30% reduction in fishing mortality on
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bigeye tuna in the purse seine fishery in that area and a reduction in the risk of overfishing
yellowfin tuna.
9. CCMs shall ensure that the effectiveness of these measures for the purse seine fishery are not
undermined by a transfer of effort in days fished into areas within the Convention Area south of
20ºS. In order to not undermine the effectiveness of these measures, CCMs shall not transfer
fishing effort in days fished in the purse seine fishery to areas within the Convention Area north
of 20ºN.
10. CCMs shall take necessary measures to ensure that the level of purse seine fishing effort in
days fished992 by their vessels in areas of the high seas does not exceed 2004 levels or the
average of 2001-2004. In accordance with paragraph 6 this Measure, this paragraph shall not
apply to small developing state members and participating territories.
Measures for 2009
EEZ and High Seas
11. For the members of the FFA who belong to the PNA, this measure will be implemented
through their domestic processes and legislation, including the Vessel Day (VDS) Scheme
which limits total days fished in the EEZs of PNA members to no greater than 2004 levels
(Attachment C). The purse seine fishery in EEZs in the area bounded by 20ºN and 20ºS shall be
closed to fishing on FADs between 0000 hours on 1 August and 2400 hours on 30 September.
During this period all purse seine vessels required to carry an observer from the Regional
Observer Program on board, and without such an observer on board, will cease fishing and
return directly to port. During this period, a vessel may only engage in fishing operations if the
vessel carries on board an observer from the Regional Observer Program to monitor that at no
time does the vessel deploy or service any FAD or associated electronic devices or fish on
schools in association with FADs.
12. Other non-PNA CCMs shall implement compatible measures to reduce purse seine fishing
mortality on bigeye tuna in their EEZs.
13. The purse seine fishery on the high seas in the area bounded by 20ºN and 20ºS shall be
closed to fishing on FADs between 0000 hours on 1 August and 2400 hours on 30 September.
During this period all purse seine vessels without an observer from the Regional Observer
Program on board will cease fishing and return directly to port. During this period, a vessel may
only engage in fishing operations if the vessel carries on board an observer from the Regional
Observer Program to monitor that at no time does the vessel deploy or service any FAD or
associated electronic devices or fish on schools in association with FADs.
14. Vessels seeking an observer from the Regional Observer Program for the period of the
closures identified in paragraphs 11 to 13 above shall notify the Regional Observer Program
Coordinator 21 days in advance. If the lack of an available observer from the Regional Observer
Program would prevent a vessel from being able to fish during the period in question, the flag
State may place an observer from its national program on the vessel to monitor compliance with
these measures with approval from the Regional Observer Program Coordinator and, in respect
to fishing in EEZs, the approval of the relevant national authority.
High Seas Alternative to Paragraph 13 (Catch Limits)

992

In the case of small developing fleets, of four vessels or less, that legitimately entered the fishery after 2000
but before 2004, the baseline level of effort shall be a year in the period 2001-2004 in which its full vessel
complement was active in the fishery.
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15. As an alternative to the high seas FAD closure established pursuant to paragraph 13,
Members may adopt measures to reduce their catch by weight of bigeye tuna in the purse seine
fishery in the area between 20 N and 20 S by a minimum of 10 percent relative to 2001-2004
average levels through a Member-specific catch limit to achieve this goal. This alternative shall
only be available to Members identified by the Commission in advance as having demonstrated
a functioning capacity to implement such measures in an effective and transparent manner,
including through: an established and functioning port monitoring program that allows
monitoring of bigeye landings for each trip by each vessel; a commitment to carry on board
observers from the Regional Observer Program, including upon return to port so that the
observer can view the port monitoring program for each trip; a commitment to provide data for
each trip by each vessel to the Commission within 30 days from the completion of the trip;
having provided operational catch and effort data at least for the period 2001 to 2004 to
substantiate the base level catch and effort; other such conditions as the Commission may
determine. Any such program will be open to audit by the Commission to review the
effectiveness of the program.
16. Once identified by the Commission as having met the requirements outlined above, the
Members in question shall submit the full details of their intended measures and their port
monitoring program to the Commission by 31 January 2009. The Commission will review
these submissions and take them into account when assessing the effectiveness of the measures.
Measures for 2010-2011
EEZs
Waters under the jurisdiction of PNA members
17. For the members of the FFA who are members of the PNA, this measure will be
implemented through their domestic processes and legislation, including:
a. the VDS which limits total days fished in the EEZs of PNA members to no
greater than 2004 levels (Attachment C); and
b. the Third Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement of May 2008 which
comprises a 3 month FAD closure period in the EEZs of the PNA member
countries from 0000 hours on 1 July each year until 2400 hours on 30 September
each year; full catch retention and other conditions for the purse seine fleet in
national waters.
Waters under the jurisdiction of non-PNA members
18. Other non-PNA CCMs shall implement compatible measures to reduce purse seine fishing
mortality on bigeye tuna in their EEZs.
High Seas
19. The purse seine fishery on the high seas in the area bounded by 20ºN and 20ºS shall be
closed to fishing on FADs between 0000 hours on 1 July and 2400 hours on 30 September.
During this period all purse seine vessels without an observer from the Regional Observer
Program on board will cease fishing and return directly to port. During this period, a vessel may
only engage in fishing operations if the vessel carries on board an observer from the Regional
Observer Program to monitor that at no time does the vessel deploy or service any FAD or
associated electronic devices or fish on schools in association with FADs.
20. Alternative measures may be set to reduce bigeye catch by a further 20% as a result of the
review by the Commission of the 2009 alternative measure.
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21. The Commission shall consider the development of a high seas vessel day scheme (HS
VDS) to be compatible with the PNA VDS to provide a common currency for managing purse
seine effort. Based on the advice and recommendations of the SC and TCC, the Commission
shall consider such a scheme at its annual session in 2009 with a view to adoption at its annual
session in 2010 with a view to ensuring that reductions in fishing effort on the high seas and in
adjacent EEZs are compatible.
22. The high seas pockets indicated in Attachment D [will be closed effective from 1 January
2010 unless the Commission decides otherwise at its 6th annual meeting in December 2009. At
this meeting the Commission will also consider the closure of all high seas pockets in the
Convention Area between 20 north and 20 south.
FAD Management Plans
23. By 1 July 2009, CCMs fishing on the high seas shall submit to the Commission
Management Plans for the use of FADs by their vessels on the high seas. These Plans shall
include strategies to limit the capture of small bigeye and yellowfin tuna associated with fishing
on FADs, including implementation of the FAD closure pursuant to paragraphs. 13 and 18
above. The Plans shall at a minimum meet the Suggested Guidelines for Preparation for FAD
Management Plans for each CCM (Attachment E).
24. The Commission Secretariat will prepare a report on additional FAD management options
for consideration by the Scientific Committee, the Technical & Compliance Committee and the
Commission in 2009 including:
a. Marking and identification of FADs;
b. Electronic monitoring of FADs
c. Registration and reporting of position information from FAD-associated buoys; and
d. Limits to the number of FADs deployed or number of FAD sets made.
Juvenile Tuna Catch Mitigation Research
25. The Commission will work with CCMs, regional tuna commissions and industry to develop
and implement a 3 year program to explore methods to reduce catches of juvenile bigeye and
yellowfin tuna caught in association with FADs.
26. CCMs, working independently or collaboratively with industry, and reporting through the
Scientific Committee and the Technical and Compliance Committee at each regular session,
shall explore and evaluate mitigation measures for juvenile bigeye and yellowfin taken around
FADs and present the results annually to the Commission.
Catch Retention
27. In order to create a disincentive to the capture of small fish and to encourage the
development of technologies and fishing strategies designed to avoid the capture of small
bigeye and yellowfin tuna, CCMs shall require their purse seine vessels fishing in EEZs and on
the high seas within the area bounded by 20ºN and 20ºS from 1 January 2010, subject to the
Commission implementing the program in Paragraph 28 for 100 percent coverage on purse
seine vessels by the observers from the Regional Observer Program, to retain on board and then
land or transship at port all bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin tuna. The provisions of this
paragraph, shall not prevent the PNA from implementing the catch retention requirement in
their EEZs in accordance with the Third Implementing Agreement. The only exceptions shall
be:
a) when, in the final set of a trip, there is insufficient well space to accommodate all fish
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caught in that set noting that excess fish taken in the last set may be transferred to and
retained on board another purse seine vessel provided this is not prohibited under
applicable national law; or
b) when the fish are unfit for human consumption for reasons other than size; or
c) when serious malfunction of equipment occurs.
Monitoring
28. Purse seine vessels fishing within the area bounded by 200N and 200S exclusively on the
high seas, on the high seas and in waters under the jurisdiction of one or more coastal States, or
vessels fishing in waters under the jurisdiction of two or more coastal States, shall carry
effective 1 January 2010, an observer from the Commission‟s Regional Observer Programme.
29. In 2009 vessels fishing in the area described above will carry observers compliant with
licensing arrangements and on the high seas will have a minimum of 20% observer coverage
drawn from the Regional Observer Program. The level of coverage achieved will be monitored
and reported through TCC. The Secretariat, in conjunction with the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission (IATTC), will develop a cross-endorsement arrangement in order to allow
vessels operating within IATTC and Commission areas on the same fishing trip to use the same
observer.
Other Considerations for Purse Seine Measures
30. Developing skipjack purse seine fisheries, between 20ºN and 20ºS that can provide
verifiable evidence of minimal yellowfin and bigeye by-catch (cumulative <2%), with 100%
observer coverage, and with a legitimate development plan, will be exempted. Any such plan
shall restrict the use of FADs and implement other such management measures necessary to
minimise impacts on bigeye and yellowfin tunas. These measures must be supported by
adequate monitoring, control and surveillance to ensure their effective implementation.
Existing plans shall be tabled at the Commission for information. The Commission is to be
given the opportunity to comment on the plan before its approval. This measure does not apply
to the domestic purse seine fisheries of small island developing states.
LONGLINE FISHERY
31. The total catch of bigeye tuna by longline fishing gear will be subject to a phased reduction
such that by 1 January 2012 the longline catch of bigeye tuna is 70% of the average annual
catch in 2001-2004 or 2004 (Attachment F).993 The catch of yellowfin tuna is not to be increased
in the longline fishery from the 2001-2004 levels.
32. Paragraph 30 does not apply to members and participating territories that caught less than
2,000 tonnes in 2004. Each member that caught less than 2,000 tonnes of bigeye in 2004 shall
ensure that their catch does not exceed 2,000 tonnes in each of the next 3 years (2009, 2010 and
2011). Consistent with paragraph 3 opportunities for non members will be decided by the
Commission on a case by case basis.
33. Each member or cooperating non-Member that caught an average of more than 2,000 tonnes
of bigeye shall be subject to the following catch limits for bigeye tuna for the years 2009 to
2011 inclusive:
2009: 10% reduction of the catch specified in Attachment F;
2010: 20% reduction of the catch specified in Attachment F;
2011: 30% reduction of the catch specified in Attachment F.
993

The year 2004 shall apply only to China, the United States and Indonesia.
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34. In accordance with paragraph 6, the limits for bigeye tuna established in paragraphs 31 to
33 above, shall not apply to small island developing State members and participating territories
in the Convention Area undertaking responsible development of their domestic fisheries.
35. Further to paragraph 34, the reductions specified in paragraph 33 for 2010 and 2011 shall
not apply to fleets of members with a total longline bigeye tuna catch limit as stipulated in
Attachment F of less than 5,000 tonnes and landing exclusively fresh fish, provided that the
details of such fleets and their operational characteristics are registered with the Commission by
31 December 2008 and that the number of licenses authorised in such fisheries does not
increase from current levels. In such cases, catch limits specified in Attachment F shall continue
to be applied.
36. The catch limit for China for 2009 and 2010 will remain at 2004 levels pending agreement
being reached to develop an arrangement for the attribution of Chinese catch taken as part of
domestic fisheries in the EEZs of Pacific Island Countries.
38. If such reductions would result in a catch limit less than 2,000 tonnes for a Member, then a
catch limit of 2,000 tonnes shall apply to that Member or cooperating non member.
OTHER COMMERCIAL TUNA FISHING EFFORT RESTRICTIONS
39. Beginning in 2009, CCMs shall take necessary measures to ensure that the total capacity of
their respective other commercial tuna fisheries for bigeye and yellowfin tuna, including purse
seining that occurs north of 20ºN or south of 20ºS, but excluding artisanal fisheries and those
fisheries taking less than 2,000 tonnes of bigeye and yellowfin, shall not exceed the average
level for the period 2001-2004 or 2004. CCMs shall provide the SC with estimates of fishing
effort for these other fisheries or proposals for the provision of effort data for these fisheries for
2009 and future years.
DATA PROVISION
40. CCMs shall provide within the agreed timeframes each year, catch and effort data and size
composition data for all fleets in the format required by the rules and requirements adopted by
WCPFC as “Scientific Data to be Provided to the Commission”.
41. The Commission shall take into account the level of compliance by CCMs to the data
reporting requirements in paragraph. 351 in implementing any additional reductions in fishing
mortality that may be required to give effect to the precautionary approach.
PORT CONTROLS
42. Each CCM shall prohibit landings, transhipment and commercial transactions in tuna and
tuna products that are positively identified as originating from fishing activities that contravene
any element of the Commission‟s CMMs.
43. Monitoring shall be conducted at landing and transshipping ports to assess the amount of
catch by species. The outcomes shall be reported annually to the Commission.
CAPACITY
44. Drawing on work that has been completed by CCMs, the Commission Secretariat shall
present a report on measuring and monitoring fishing capacity in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean for consideration at the fifth regular session of the Technical and Compliance
Committee.
REPORTING
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45. All CCMs will report to each regular session of the Technical and Compliance Committee,
through their Annual Report Part 2, on the implementation of this Measure for their fishing
vessels operating on the high seas and/or in waters under national jurisdiction. The Technical
and Compliance Committee will prepare a template for reporting this requirement for the
consideration of the Commission.
REVIEW OF MEASURES
46. The measures described above for the purse seine and longline fisheries shall be reviewed
annually in conjunction with the scientific advice to measure the impact and compliance with
the measure. The measure shall remain in place unless the Commission adopts alternative
measures. This review shall consider, inter alia, whether the measures are having the intended
effect and the extent to which all CCMs and fishing sectors are contributing to achieving the
Commission‟s conservation goals.
FINAL CLAUSE
47. This Measure replaces CMM 2005-01 and CMM 2006-01.
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Appendix Three: Summary of WCPO Interests
Appendix Three summarises the interests of all currently and historically active
participants in the WCPO fisheries. The table was created by the author based on data
sourced from a wide variety of references. Explanatory notes and references for each
column are provided below. States with an active interest in the study year (2008), or
subsequently in 2011, are in colour.
EEZ Column.994 The estimated size of each EEZ is approximate. Some EEZs are
disputed and could change significantly in size if resolution were reached. China, Hong
Kong (SAR), Chinese Taipei and Vietnam are all coastal States to the South China Sea
through which WCPO tuna stocks migrate. However, South China Sea is specifically
excluded from the WCPFC, therefore these States are not coastal States for the purposes
of the WCPFC. For further discussion, see Chapter Four. States with an EEZ in the
WCPO are coloured blue.
Total Value of Coastal State Catch Column.995 States with an interest are blue.

994

Data compiled from: Sea Around Us Project. (2010) Data and Visualisation: Exclusive Economic Zones.
University of British Columbia. Available at: http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/. Accessed on at 14 May 2010. - R. Gillett. (2002) Pacific Island Fisheries: Regional and Country Information. Bangkok. Asia Pacific Fishery
Commission, FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. -- Geoscience Australia. (2010) Australian
Exclusive Economic Zone. Geoscience Australia - Australian Government. Available at:
http://www.ga.gov.au/education/geoscience-basics/dimensions/oceans-seas.jsp. Accessed on at 14 May 2010. - United Nations Office of Legal Affairs. (2010) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:
Declarations and Reservations. UN Publications. -- Vanuatu. (2010) Submission in Compliance with the
Deposit Obligations Pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). United
Nations. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/VUT.htm.
Accessed on 6 August 2010. -- Fiji. (2007) Submission in Compliance with the Deposit Obligations Pursuant
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). United Nations. Available at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/FJI.htm. Accessed on 6 August
2010. -- Philippines. (2009) Submission in Compliance with the Deposit Obligations Pursuant to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). United Nations. Available at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/PHL.htm. Accessed on 6 August
2010. -- Papua New Guinea. (2002) Submission in Compliance with the Deposit Obligations Pursuant to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). United Nations. Available at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/PNG.htm.
Accessed on 6
August 2010.-- R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe. (1999) The Law of the Sea. Melland Schill Studies in
International Law. 3rd ed. Manchester. Manchester University Press.-- A. H. Oegroseno. (2009) Indonesia's
Maritime Boundaries. Indonesia Beyond the Water's Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State. Ed. R. Cribb and
M. Ford. Singapore. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
995
Data sourced from: P. Terawasi and L. Rodwell. (2010) Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries (Excel Database).
Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. -- Oceanic Fisheries Programme of the Secretariat to the Pacific Community.
(2010) (Raw Excel Database for) Tuna Fishery Yearbook: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
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Food Security Column.996 No comprehensive dataset exists on the significance of tuna
in terms of artisanal fisheries and food security to WCPO coastal States. Data is
compiled from multiple sources. States with an interest are blue.
996

R. Gillett, M. McCoy, et al. (2001) Tuna: A Key Economic Resource in the Pacific Islands. Manila. Asian
Development Bank and Forum Fisheries Agency. -- R. Gillett. (2009) Fisheries in the Economies of the
Pacific Island Countries and Territories. Mandaluyong City, Philippines. Asian Development Bank.-- Kiribati.
(2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth
Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port
Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- French Polynesia. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission
Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -Fiji. (2009) Fiji Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics.
Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- Nauru. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1:
Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -Philippines. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and
Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- Samoa. (2009) Annual Report to the
Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009.
WCPFC. -- P. Martosubroto. (1987) The status of management of the marine fishery resources in Indonesia.
Proceedings of the Symposium on the Exploitation and Management of Marine Fishery Resources in Southeast
Asia. Bangkok, Thailand. FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. -- J. Veitayaki. (2005) Staking Their
Claims: The Management of Marine Resources in the Exclusive Economic Zones of the Pacific Islands. A Sea
Change: The Exclusive Economic Zone and Governance Institutions for Living Marine Resources. Ed. S. A.
Ebbin, A. H. Hoel, et al. Dordrecht, Netherlands. Springer. -- Solomon Islands. (2009) Annual Report to the
Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009.
WCPFC. -- Tokelau. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and
Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- Tonga. (2009) Annual Report to the
Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, 2009. WCPFC. -- Tuvalu.
(2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth
Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port
Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- United States of America. (2009) Annual Report to the
Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 20-21 August 2009.
WCPFC. -- Australia. (2009) Australia Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries,
Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 20-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- New Caledonia. (2009) Annual
Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of
the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21
August 2009. WCPFC. -- Japan. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries,
Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- Niue. (2009) Annual Report to the
Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009.
WCPFC. -- J. Bell, M. Kronen, et al. (2009) Planning the Use of Fish for Food Security in the Pacific. Marine
Policy. 33. --- T. Lewis. (2004) Federated States of Micronesia. Honiara, Solomon Islands. Pacific Islands
Forum Fisheries Agency. -- L. Clarke and C. Brown. (2004) Cook Islands. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. -T. Lewis. (2004) Palau. Honiara, Solomon Islands. Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency. -- I. Cartwright
and S. Tuqiri. (2004) Papua New Guinea. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. -- T. Lewis. (2004) Republic of the
Marshall Islands. Honiara, Solomon Islands. Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency. -- Republic of Vanuatu.
(2000) Tuna Management Plan: A National Policy for the Management of Tuna Fisheries. Port Vila, Vanuatu.
Ministry of Agriculture, Quarantine, Forestry and Fisheries. -- Wallis and Futuna. (2007) Annual Report to the
Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Third Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Honolulu, United States of America, 13-
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Flag State Total value of catch.997 Active States are coloured yellow.
Flag State Activity.998 No complete dataset exists on all current and past flag States.
The analysis summarised in this table was based on an earlier study by the author
utilising data from a number of sources. Currently active States are yellow.
Market States.999 No comprehensive dataset exists on processing and market States for
tuna sourced from WCPO tuna. Data is compiled from multiple sources. Small markets
24 August 2007. WCPFC. -- Indonesia. (2008) Indonesia Annual Report to the Commission Part 1:
Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fourth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, 11-22 August 2008.
WCPFC.
997
Oceanic Fisheries Programme of the Secretariat to the Pacific Community. (2010) (Raw Excel Database for)
Tuna Fishery Yearbook: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Pohnpei, Federated States of
Micronesia. Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. -- P. Terawasi and L. Rodwell. (2010) Value
of WCPO Tuna Fisheries (Excel Database). Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. -- WCPFC Secretariat. (2008)
Review of CCM's Implementation of, and Compliance with, Conservation and Management Measures. Fifth
Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Busan, Korea. WCPFC. -- T. Lewis.
(2005) The Tuna Fisheries of Vietnam - An Overview of Available Information. First Meeting of the Scientific
Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Noumea, New Caledonia, 8-19 August
2005. WCPFC.
998
Oceanic Fisheries Programme of the Secretariat to the Pacific Community. (2010) (Raw Excel Database for)
Tuna Fishery Yearbook: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Pohnpei, Federated States of
Micronesia. Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. -- FFA. (2008) Forum Fisheries Agency
Vessel Registry of Good Standing. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. -- Q. Hanich. (2009) Control, Cooperation
and 'Participatory Rights' in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Tuna Fisheries. Navigating Pacific
Fisheries: Legal and Policy Trends in the Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments in the Western
and Central Pacific Region. Ed. Q. Hanich and M. Tsamenyi. Oceans Publications. Wollongong. Australian
National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS). -– WCPFC. (2011) Record of Fishing Vessels.
Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. WCPFC. -- WCPFC. (2011) Interim Register of Non-Member Fish
Carrier and Bunker Vessels. Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. WCPFC. -- WCPFC. (2008) Summary
Report of the Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Fifth Regular
Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Busan, Korea. WCPFC. -- WCPFC. (2007)
Summary Report of the Fourth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
Fourth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Tumon, Guam. WCPFC. -WCPFC Secretariat. (2008) Review of CCM's Implementation of, and Compliance with, Conservation and
Management Measures. Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
Busan, Korea. WCPFC. -- Mexico. (2007) Declaration of Mexico as an Observer to the 4th Regular Session of
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Fourth Regular Session of the Western and Central
Pacific Fisheries Commission. Tumon, Guam. WCPFC. -- S. Tarte. (2001) Report on the First Session of the
Preparatory Conference for the Establishment of the Commission on the Conservation and Management of
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific. Suva, Fiji. University of the South Pacific. -Kiribati. (2008) Annual Report to the Commission - Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics
Fourth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. WCPFC. -- T. Lawson, B. Iskandar, et al. (2007) Report of the Eastern
Indonesia Tuna Fishery Data Collection Workshop. Eastern Indonesia Tuna Fishery Data Collection
Workshop. Jakarta, Indonesia, 30-31 January 2007. WCPFC.
999
K. Barclay, H. Parris, et al. (2009) Tuna Trade Flows from The Coral Triangle. Sydney, Australia.
TRAFFIC. -- H. Josupeit. (2010) World Tuna Trade Challenges and Opportunities Seychelle Tuna Conference.
Mahe, Seychelles. Globefish. -- H. Josupeit. (2008) Trade Trends, Issues and new Barriers Faced by the Tuna
Industry. INFOFISH TUNA CONFERENCE. Bangkok, Thailand -- D. James and H. Josupeit. (2007) Review
of
Global
Tuna
Trade
and
Major
Markets.
FAO.
Available
at:
http://www.globefish.org/filedownload.php?fileId=549. Accessed on 10 May 2010. -- T. Lewis. (2005) The
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imported less than 20,000 mt of canned tuna. Medium markets imported between
20,000 and 40,000 mt of canned tuna. Large markets imported more than 40,000 mt of
canned tuna. Active States are coloured purple.

Tuna Fisheries of Vietnam - An Overview of Available Information. First Meeting of the Scientific Committee
of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Noumea, New Caledonia, 8-19 August 2005.
WCPFC. -- L. Campling, E. Havice, et al. (2009) Pacific Island Countries, The Global Tuna Industry and the
International Trade Regime - A Guidebook. Honiara, Solomon Islands. FFA. -- P. Sabatini and H. Josupeit.
(2010) Tuna Commodity Update. Rome, Italy. FAO Globefish. -- Tonga. (2009) Annual Report to the
Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific
Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, 2009. WCPFC. -- Fiji. (2009)
Fiji Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular
Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila,
Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- Australia. (2009) Australia Annual Report to the Commission Part 1:
Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 20-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -Republic of the Marshall Islands. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries,
Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- New Zealand. (2009) Annual
Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of
the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21
August 2009. WCPFC. -- Papua New Guinea. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on
Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- Philippines. (2009)
Annual Report to the Commission Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular
Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila,
Vanuatu, 10-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- United States of America. (2009) Annual Report to the Commission
Part 1: Information on Fisheries, Research and Statistics. Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Port Vila, Vanuatu, 20-21 August 2009. WCPFC. -- C.
A. Vera and Z. Hipolito. (2006) The Philippines Tuna Industry: A Profile. International Collective in Support
of Fishworkers. T. Lawson, B. Iskandar, et al. (2007) Report of the Eastern Indonesia Tuna Fishery Data
Collection Workshop. Eastern Indonesia Tuna Fishery Data Collection Workshop. Jakarta, Indonesia, 30-31
January 2007. WCPFC.
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Coastal State

Flag State

Market State

State
EEZ

Value 2008
catch BYE,
YFN, SKJ

Food Security

(ALB in italics)

1.
Australia

8,148,250km²

$20,529,375
$3,270,854

Value 2008
catch BYE,
YFN, SKJ

Earliest report to
FFA, SPC, or WCPFC Vessel Records

(product contains some/all WCPO tuna)

(ALB in italics)

Some local consumption of
locally caught tuna. Not
integral to food security.

$20,788,426
$3,172,200

1976 Earliest data in Yearbook. 202 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (97 in
2011).

2.
Austria
3.
Bahamas

4.
Belize

$1,697,103
$17,416

Small market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.

6.
Bolivia

No data

7.
Cambodia

No data

9.
Chile

Moderate market for canned
tuna, some of which originates
from WCPO.
Small market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.

1996 Bahamas registered transhipment vessels
on FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing
1996-2000. 4 transhipment vessels on WCPFC
Record in 2008 (none in 2011).
1998 Belize registered transhipment and fishing
vessels on FFA Vessel Registry Good Standing
since 1998. 1 fishing vessel, 2 transhipment
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (8 in 2011).

5.
Belgium

8.
Canada

Significant importer or
consumer of tuna

No catch in
2008

2002 Bolivian registered longliner on FFA
Vessel Registry of Good Standing 2002. No
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 or 2011.
2001 Cambodian registered longline fishing
vessel and transhipment vessels on FFA Vessel
Registry of Good Standing 2001-2002. 3
transhipment vessels on WCPFC Record in
2008 (4 in 2011).
2001 Canada registered fishing vessels on FFA
Vessel Registry of Good Standing since 1998.
2,884 vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (1 in
2011).

Large market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.
Small market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.
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EEZ

10.
China

South China
Sea

Catch
Value

Food Security

No data

No data

Catch
Value
$202,960,794
$37,586,445

(Special
Administrative
Region China)

14.
Cook
Islands

South China
Sea

$34,939,747
$620,756

1,830,000km²

$3,128,023
$4,497,580

No data

Some artisanal catch and/or
local consumption of locally
caught tuna. Not integral to
food security.

$610,921,921
$16,232,244

$3,786,532

16.
Cyprus

1964 Earliest data in Yearbook. 1,940 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2010.

Medium market for sashimi tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.
Small market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.

1994 Earliest data in Yearbook. 25 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2010.

$15,747,496
$0

1996 Cuban registered transhipment vessels on
FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing 199697. No vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008/2011
1996 Cypriot registered transhipment vessels on
FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing since
1996. 2 transhipment vessels on WCPFC
Record in 2008 (1 in 2011).
1999 Ecuador registered fishing vessels on FFA
Vessel Registry of Good Standing 1999-03 and
since 2007. 6 fishing vessels on WCPFC
Record in 2008 (10 in 2011).

18.
Egypt
19.
El Salvador

Processor of canned tuna, some
of which originates from WCPO.
Market (size unknown) for
canned tuna, some of which
originates from WCPO.

$4,730,161

15.
Cuba

17.
Ecuador

1988 Earliest data in Yearbook. 229 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (360 in
2011).

Markets & Processing

2000 Hong Kong registered transhipment
vessels on FFA Vessel Registry of Good
Standing 2000-02. No vessels on WCPFC
Record in 2008 or 2011.

11.
Hong Kong

12.
Chinese
Taipei
13.
Columbia

Flag State History

$18,743,819
$0

2001 El Salvador registered fishing vessels on
FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing 200103. 2 fishing vessels reported in 2008 and 2011.

Processor of canned tuna, some
of which originates from WCPO.

Medium market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.
Processor of canned tuna, some
of which originates from WCPO.
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EEZ

Catch
Value

Food Security

20.
Estonia

Catch
Value

No data

European
Union
(not counted
so as to avoid
double
counting with
independent
States)

21.
Federated
States of
Micronesia
22.
Fiji

23.
France

24.
French
Polynesia
(Fr.
Territory)
25.
Georgia

2,980,000km²

$177,380,118
$74,595

1,290,000km²
(Archipelagic
State)

$20,391,034
$12,465,696

Some artisanal catch and/or
local consumption of locally
caught tuna. Not integral to
food security.
Some artisanal catch and/or
local consumption of locally
caught tuna. Not integral to
food security.

$9,436,133
$7,331,479

Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.

1999 Estonian registered fishing vessels on FFA
Vessel Registry of Good Standing 1999-04. No
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 or 2011.
2005 Earliest submission to WCPFC Record.
Now submits for: Cyprus; Portugal; Malta;
Lithuania; Spain; and France.

Markets & Processing

EU collectively is a large
processor of canned tuna and a
large market for canned tuna.
Some of this originates from
WCPO. EU is also a market for
sashimi tuna, some of which
originates from WCPO.

$41,665,507
$0

1991 Earliest data in Yearbook. 27 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (37 in
2011).

$27,291,439

1976 Earliest data in Yearbook. 38 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (79 in
2011).

Processor of tuna, all of which
originates from WCPO.

FFA, SPC and WCPFC have no catch reports
from non-territory French vessels. Refer to
French Territories for their vessels‟ catch data,
or to French Territories or EU submissions for
WCPFC Record.18 fishing vessels on WCPFC
Record in 2010.

Processor of canned tuna, little of
which originates from WCPO.
Large market for canned tuna,
although most sourced from nonWCPO fisheries. Part of EU
market for sashimi, some of
which originates from WCPO.

$19,014,167

Non-coastal
State in
WCPO (refer
to French
Territories)
4,767,242km²

Flag State History

$10,010,719
$7,690,239

No data

1980 Earliest data in Yearbook. Uncertain
number of vessels in 2008 due to confusion
over whether France or French Polynesia
reports (95 in 2011).
2002 Georgian registered fishing vessels on
FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing 200204. No vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 or
2011.
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EEZ

Catch
Value

Food Security

Catch
Value

Flag State History

Large market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO fisheries. Part of EU
market for sashimi, some of
which originates from WCPO.
Small market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.

26.
Germany

27.
Greece
28.
Guatemala

No data

29.
Guinea

No data

30.
Honduras

No data

31.
India

No data

32.
Indonesia

2,700,000km²
(Archipelagic
State)

$705,075,532
$0

Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.

$701,174,499
$0

1999 Guatemalan registered fishing vessels on
FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing 199901. No vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 or
2011.
1999 Guinean registered fishing vessels on FFA
Vessel Registry of Good Standing 1999-04. No
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 or 2011.
1999 Honduran registered fishing vessels and
transhipment vessels on FFA Vessel Registry of
Good Standing 1999-04. No vessels on WCPFC
Record in 2008 or 2011.
2006 Indian registered fishing vessels on FFA
Vessel Registry of Good Standing 2006-2007.
No vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 or 2011.
1985 Earliest data in Yearbook. No vessels
reported in 2008. 403 fishing vessels on
WCPFC Record in 2011.

Medium processor of canned
tuna, most of which originates
from WCPO.

Small market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.
Large processor of canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO. Part of EU market for
sashimi, some from WCPO.

33.
Israel
34.
Italy

35.
Isle of Man

Markets & Processing

2008 Isle of Man registered transhipment vessel
on WCPFC Temporary Registry of Carrier
Vessels in 2008. 1 transhipment vessel on
WCPFC Record in 2008 (none in 2011).
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36.
Japan

37.
Kiribati

38.
Korea

EEZ

Catch
Value

4,479,388km²

$238,915,778
$73,791,172

3,550,000km²
Disputed
archipelagic
status

$393,669,561
$387,765

40.
Liberia

41.
Libya
42.
Lithuania

43.
Maldives
44.
Malta

Catch
Value

Flag State History

Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.

$956,239,286

Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.

$32,626,155
$0

1979 Earliest data in Yearbook. 17 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (36 in
2011).

$623,126,752

1960 Earliest data in Yearbook. 276 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (275 in
2011).

475,469km²
No data

39.
Latvia

Food Security

No data

$117,617,722

$3,681,043

1960 Earliest data in Yearbook. 1,545 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (1,330 in
2011).

Markets & Processing
Large processor and market for
canned tuna, some of which
originates from WCPO. World‟s
biggest market for sashimi and
katsuoboshi tuna, some of which
originates from WCPO.

Large processor and market for
canned tuna, some of which
originates from WCPO. Large
market for sashimi tuna, some of
which originates from WCPO.

1998 Latvian registered transhipment vessels on
FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing 19982000. No vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 or
2011.
1996 Liberian registered transhipment vessels
on FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing
1996-2002. No vessels on WCPFC Record in
2008 or 2011.
Medium market for canned tuna,
some from WCPO.
2001 Lithuanian registered transhipment vessels
on FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing
2001-2002 and on WCPFC Temporary Registry
of Carrier Vessels in 2008. 1 transhipment
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (9 in 2011).
1996 Maldivian registered transhipment vessels
on FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing
1996-1998. No vessels reported 2008 or 2011.
1996 Maltese registered transhipment vessels on
FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing 19962004. No transhipment vessels on WCPFC
Record in 2008 (1 in 2011).

Small processor of canned tuna,
little of which originates from
WCPO.
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EEZ
45.
Marshall
Islands

2,131,000km²

46.
Matthew &
Hunter Isds

Extent of EEZ
uncertain.
France
Vanuatu
dispute.

Catch
Value
$52,848,893
$95,360

No data

Food Security
Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.

$60,470,187
$37,320

No catch in
2008

431,000km²

$100,211,347
$0

Flag State History
1992 Earliest data in Yearbook. 11 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (28 in
2011).

Small processor of canned tuna,
all of which originates from
WCPO.

1983 Earliest data in Yearbook. No vessels
reported in 2008 or 2011.

Large processor of canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO. Small market for canned
tuna, some of which originates
from WCPO.

Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.

No catch in
2008

2000 Earliest data in Yearbook. No vessels
reported in 2008 or 2011.

49.
Netherlands

1996 Dutch registered transhipment vessels on
FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing 19961997. No vessels reported in 2008 or 2011.

50.
Netherlands
Antilles

1999 Netherlands Antilles registered
transhipment vessels on the FFA Vessel
Registry of Good Standing 1999-2007. 3
transhipment vessels on the WCPFC Temporary
Registry of Carrier Vessels in 2008.
1981 Earliest data in Yearbook. Uncertain
number of vessels in 2008 due to confusion
over whether France or French Polynesia
reports (27 in 2011).

51.
New
Caledonia
(Fr.
Territory)
52.
New
Zealand

1,422,543km²

$3,662,647
$3,686,614

4,053,000km²

$16,078,707
$9,308,330

Markets & Processing

No data

47.
Mexico

48.
Nauru

Catch
Value

Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.
Some local consumption of
locally caught tuna. Not
integral to food security.

$3,679,902
$3,743,181

$50,501,140
$9,302,632

Large market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO. Part of EU market for
sashimi, some of which
originates from WCPO.

1983 Earliest data in Yearbook. 11 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (7 in 2011).
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EEZ
53.
Niue

54.
Palau

390,000km²

Catch
Value
$52,440
$2,747

629,000km²

Food Security
Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.
Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.

Catch
Value
$69,572
$14,928

3,120,000km²
(Archipelagic
State)

$900,927,875
$1,240,761

Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.

$372,167,495
$1,154,432

57.
Peru

58.
Philippines

2,200,000km²
(Archipelagic
State)

$727,446,791
$353,296

Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.

$802,850,403
$353,296

59.
Poland

60.
Portugal

Markets & Processing

2005 Niue does not have a vessel registry.
Yearbook records 13 longliners to Niue
(charter) in 2005.

1964 Earliest data in Yearbook.

55.
Panama

56.
Papua New
Guinea

Flag State History

No catch in
2008

1996 1 Panamanian purse seine vessel is
reported as licensed in Kiribati 2008 Part A
Report. 80 transhipment vessels reported in
2008 (65 in 2011).
1970 Earliest data in Yearbook. 33 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (32 in
2011).

Large processor of canned tuna,
all of which originates from
WCPO.

2001 Formally requested participation in
WCPFC Preparatory Conferences but was
refused. No vessel or catch reports to WCPFC,
SPC or FFA.
1980 Earliest data in Yearbook. 577 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (613 in
2011).

Large processor of canned tuna,
most of which originates from
WCPO.

1997 Polish registered transhipment vessels
were on the FFA Vessel Registry of Good
Standing 1997-1998. No vessels on WCPFC
Record in 2008 or 2011.
2010 Portugese registered longline fishing
vessels on WCPFC Registry of Fishing Vessels
in 2011. None in 2008.

Small processor of canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO. Small market for canned
tuna, some of which originates
from WCPO.
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EEZ
61.
Russia

62.
Saudi
Arabia
63.
Samoa

64.
American
Samoa
(USA Terr.)
65.
Senegal
66.
Seychelles

3,419,202km²
(Pacific
coastlines
only)

Catch
Value
No data

Food Security

Catch
Value

No data
No catch in
2008

70.
South
Africa

Markets & Processing

1985 Earliest data in Yearbook. Russian
registered transhipment vessels on FFA Vessel
Registry of Good Standing 1996-2006. 12
transhipment vessels on WCPFC Temporary
Registry of Carrier Vessels in 2008.
Small market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.

120,000km²

$2,931,886
$5,459,802

404,391km²

$523,884
$156,239

Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.
Some artisanal catch and/or
local consumption of locally
caught tuna. Not integral to
food security.

$3,291,912
$5,821,069

1993 Earliest data in Yearbook. No vessels
reported in 2008 or 2011.

Inc. within
USA

1982 Earliest data in Yearbook. No vessels
reported in 2008 or 2011 (could be included in
USA reports).

No catch in
2008
No data

67.
Sierra
Leone
68.
Singapore

69.
Solomon
Islands

Flag State History

1,340,000km²
(Archipelagic
State)

$189,990,742
$5,489,735

Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.

$29,053,330
$0

2006 Earliest data in Yearbook. No vessels on
WCPFC Record in 2008 or 2011.
2001 Seychelles registered fishing vessels on
FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing 200104. No vessels reported in 2008 or 2011.
2008 Sierra Leone registered 1 transhipment
vessel on WCPFC Temporary Registry of
Carrier Vessels in 2008 (5 in 2011).
1996 Singapore registered transhipment vessels
on FFA Vessel Registry Good Standing 199607. 12 transhipment vessels on WCPFC
Temporary Registry of Carrier Vessels in 2008
(9 in 2011).
1973 Earliest data in Yearbook. 2 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2011 (none in
2008).

Large processor of canned tuna,
most of which originates from
WCPO.

Medium processor of canned
tuna, little of which originates
from WCPO.

Medium processor of canned
tuna, all from WCPO.

Small market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.
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EEZ

Catch
Value

Food Security

71.
Spain

Catch
Value
$61,851,305
$164,208

72.
Sri Lanka

Markets & Processing

1999 Earliest data in Yearbook. Reports
included in EU report in 2008 but not broken
down. 77 fishing vessels on WCPFC Record in
2011.

Large processor of canned tuna
and large market for canned tuna.
Some of this originates from
WCPO. Also part of EU market
for sashimi tuna, some of which
originates from WCPO.

1996 Sri Lankan registered fishing vessels on
FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing 19961999. No vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 or
2011.
2011. 1 transhipment vessel on WCPFC Record
in 2011.
1996 St Vincent registered fishing vessels and
transhipment vessels on FFA Vessel Registry of
Good Standing 1999-2004. No vessels on
WCPFC Record in 2008 or 2011.

No data

73. St Kitts
and Nevis
74.
St Vincent

Flag State History

No data

No data

75.
Switzerland
2008 Thailand registered 2 transhipment vessels
on WCPFC Temporary Registry of Carrier
Vessels in 2008 (5 in 2011).
1982 Earliest data in Yearbook.

76.
Thailand
77.
Tokelau
(NZ
Territory)

319,031km²

78.
Tonga

700,000km²

79.
Tuvalu

900,000km²

$4,547,231
$18,959

$2,879,082
$546,813

$63,690,395
$61,414

Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.
Some artisanal catch and/or
local consumption of locally
caught tuna. Not integral to
food security.
Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.

Small market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.
World‟s largest processor of
canned tuna, some of which
originates from WCPO.

No catch in
2008

$2,837,881

1982 Earliest data in Yearbook. 6 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (6 in 2011).

$547,360
$0
$0

Small processor of loined tuna
and sashimi, all of which
originates from WCPO.

1982 Earliest data in Yearbook. No fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (5 in 2011).
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EEZ

Catch
Value

Food Security

Catch
Value

Flag State History

Small market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.
Small market for canned tuna,
some from WCPO.

80.
Tunisia
81.
Turkey
82.
Ukraine

1998 Ukraine registered transhipment vessels
on FFA Vessel Registry of Good Standing
1998-1999. No vessels on WCPFC Record in
2008 or 2011.
Small market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.

83.
United Arab
Emirates
84.
United
Kingdom

85.
United
States of
America
(ex Am.
Samoa)

Some artisanal catch and/or
local consumption of locally
caught tuna. Not integral to
food security.

836,108km²
(Pitcairn
Island)

$0
$0

5,399,418km²
(WCPO
coastlines
only)1000

$27,257,654
$9,285,253

Significant artisanal catch
and/or consumption of
locally caught tuna.
Significant to food security
for some/all communities.

$404,353,903
$10,116,208

680,000km²
(Archipelagic
State)

$6,752,600
$14,314,989

Some artisanal catch and/or
local consumption of locally
caught tuna. Not integral to
food security.

$78,539,146
$14,101,143

1960 Earliest data in Yearbook. Vessel and
catch data does not include American Samoa.
453 fishing vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008
(494 in 2011).

86.
Guam
87.
Northern
Marianas
88.
Vanuatu

1000

Markets & Processing

Large market for canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO. Part of EU market for
sashimi tuna, some of which
originates from WCPO.
Large processor of canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO. World‟s biggest market
for canned tuna, some of which
originates from WCPO.
Important market for sashimi
tuna, some of which originates
from WCPO.

1994 Earliest data in Yearbook. 89 fishing
vessels on WCPFC Record in 2008 (112 in
2011).

Includes all EEZs for: Guam, Northern Marianas, Hawaii, Howland & Baker Islands, Johnston Island, Wake Island, Kingman Reef, Palmyra Island & Jarvis Island.
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EEZ

Catch
Value

Food Security

89.
Venezuela

90.
Vietnam

South China
Sea

91.
Wallis and
Futuna
(Fr.
Territory)

258,269km²

No data
(Studies
indicate
Vietnam
catches ~
40,000 mt
tuna)
$175,553
$209,768

Some artisanal catch and/or
local consumption of locally
caught tuna. Not integral to
food security.

Little artisanal catch and/or
local consumption of locally
caught tuna.

Catch
Value

Flag State History

No data

2007 In 2007, 2 Venezualan flagged vessels
were sighted fishing illegally in the WCPO and
recorded on the IUU list. No vessels on WCPFC
Record in 2008 or 2011.

Small processor of canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.

No reports.

Large processor of canned tuna,
some of which originates from
WCPO.

No data
(Studies
indicate
Vietnam
catches ~
40,000 mt
tuna)

Markets & Processing

No reports (through France).
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Appendix Four: Summary of Participation in Regional
Meetings
The following is a list of meetings attended by the author that discussed the WCPO tuna
fisheries. These meetings were a crucial source of background information.
Meeting
5th Preparatory Conference to the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

Date
2003

Location
Rarotonga
Cook Islands

6th Preparatory Conference to the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

2004

Bali
Indonesia

7th Preparatory Conference to the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

2004

Pohnpei
Federated States
of Micronesia

1st Session of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

2004

Pohnpei
Federated States
of Micronesia

2nd Session of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

2005

Pohnpei
Federated States
of Micronesia

3rd Session of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

2006

Apia
Samoa

4th Session of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

2007

Tumon
Guam

2008

Busan
South Korea

6th Session of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

2009

Tahiti
French Polynesia

7th Session of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

2010

Hawaii
USA

1st Session of the
Technical and Compliance Committee to the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

2005

Pohnpei
Federated States
of Micronesia

2005

Honiara
Solomon Islands
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5th Session of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency
Management Options Workshop

Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency
Management Options Workshop

2007

Rarotonga
Cook Islands

Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency
Management Options Workshop

2008

Apia
Samoa

58th Session of the
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Committee

2004

Pohnpei
Federated States
of Micronesia

2005

Pohnpei
Federated States
of Micronesia

60th Session of the
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Committee
63rd Session of the
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Committee

2006

Apia
Samoa

65th Session of the
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Committee

2007

Rarotonga
Cook Islands

66th Session of the
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Committee

2007

Tumon
Guam

67th Session of the
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Committee

2008

Koror
Palau

68th Session of the
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Committee

2008

Apia
Samoa

69th Session of the
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Committee

2008

Busan
South Korea

73rd Session of the
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Committee

2009

Tahiti
French Polynesia

21st Session of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement

2008

Honiara
Solomon Islands

2007

Port Vila
Vanuatu

2006

New York
USA

2010

Brisbane
Australia

Annual Consultation Between the Parties to
The Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of
Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of
the United States of America
UNFSA Review Conference

Kobe II Management Workshop
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